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Perceval with irnbeciliQ-His pruofs thereof-Atiiity and m1 of lord 
tVellin&n antl hlr. Stnart &om-Alisurd plana of the corint o€ 
Funclinl-Mr. Villiers nnd Mr. Vnnsittarb'he English miniatan pro- 
pose tn sell the Portuycm crnm and church lands-The folly .rnd 
injudim of these, and otlier schemw, s q v w d  by lord Wellington 
-He @es to Carliz-Es mwption tlier+Yrv orgñnisation of ttie 
Spiiish armie~Wellirigton goes tu Lixbon wliere he is entliusiltstically 
r~ocived-Hia depnsturc h m  Cndiz the a ipa l  for renewerl diascnaions 
-L'arlotta's intrifiuesilecree tu aboli~h tlie lnquisition oppowd by 
the clerg-The rugency aid the clero-Are diaplaced bg tho Cnrtcs 
-New repncy ~pliointwl-The Amerimn party in tlia Cort~s adopt 
Carlotta's caus+3'd froni fear of the peopl+&ny Inshopri niid 
churcli dignikries are amatd,  and othen fiy into Porhigal-llia 
pope's nunciu Gnviria oppuws the Corkea-Hia Iisrre6cee ~lequestered 
-He fries to Portupl-Biaintngins th-crct ovcrtms m d a  to 
Joseph by some oC trie S i  a . . . . . . . . . p. 1 
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Political d a t e  of  Portupl-Wellington's I Jrnproper condad 
of some EngFiah ahips of war-Piratical* ScotcL merchant- 
man-llisordera in the m i l i k y  sy&m-lrnratron of the p e o p b  
Miswnduct of &e rnagistratea-'Srellin&n and Stuart p p p l e  witl  
the dhordera of the dminiatration-The ltttter caiis for the inkr- 
fcrence of the Uritieh go~arnmentWellington mites s rernarhbie 
lettcr t o  the prince rogcnt and raqnests Iiim t o  return to Portugnl- 
Partia1 m~endnienCThe efticiency of the army restored, Iiut tlie 
muntry remains in an unseitled shto-The prince unsble t o  quit the 
J ~ m z i ~ ~ ~ a f t n t t a p r e p ~ ~ ~ , ~  to come done-l~stoipped Iq tlie inteiference 
u l  Ilie Brititili goverrimeudAu auxiliary Ruiixiiu h r c e  ia oflured to 
lori llrellington by admira1 GIeig-The Rwiari ambnssdoi. in London 
dis~,vowu tlie ohr-1%e euiperor ~ i l ex~nt ler  propusea tu mediate 
betmccn Cnglmd md Amcricn-Tho empcror of Awtria orcm to 
niediate for a general peace-Doth o f f m  are r e b e d  . . . 22 
i l R i s  woni 
l i e c o m ~  secs 
rmis-Tho 
ands are mi 
NapoIeon's embarmmd pomtiot lerful nt$ivib-Bis deeigs 
explained-'llie mr in Spain ondary-Many thousand old 
soldicm wi$hdr&wn from tho a partid.. bccomc moro disei- 
pliiierl and dangerori+New b sed in Discay mnd Guipusws 
and the ihmrrcction of tho nortnern provinccs c r q a  on-n'npolcon 
ortlew &he king k~ fix his quarter~ at 7v'all~~olid, to inenace Portugal, 
annd to reinforllo the nrmy of the north-dosaph complains of hia 
generala, and wpecially of SouR-Napolew's magnanimitp-Joseph's 
cornphimts not altogether wíthontfoundiltion . . . . . . p. 36 
Operationa soutb of the 'hgue-r;mles ancl C;dnngton seek to  enimp 
the gnvernor of Taragon+They fail-Sarsfield and Vi lh  Campa 
uaite, but disperse at tlie a p p m h  o f  Pannetier a ~ i d  SevemlilSuchet's 
p6tion-Gmat force of the alliea in hia fmnt-The younger h i i l t  
enpges the Spnish mvairy in la, Mancha-Ueneral Dartrimu rnarcliee 
witli a culumn t O w d 8  Vdench-Rmires a hrge convoy and returns 
to La lfancha-Abwd rumoum about the Englirih army rife in the 
French m m p 8 o m e  of lord Wellin$on'a gpie~ detected4oult  is 
recalled-Gaxan assumea the commanrl of tEie m y  of the muth- 
Acliet t  positiim d e w t i b d 4 r  John hiurrav takes the command of 
the Aqlo-Sicilin troops at bl icantAttacks the Frencb post at 
Alsoy-His mant of vigoii-Ee pmjects ri. maritribim~ th  e 
city of Valencia, but rlrups the des ip  bbecuse lord T ,inck 
recaIa some of his t r o n p R e m o r k s  npon his proc chel 
mrprises a Spaaish divisiun a? Ywls, and then advan \Iur+ 
my-Takes a, thoiinmnd Spanish primer3 in Titleri+nlni*ray ~ K P S  a 
pwition ~t Cmtall:+-Hiw advancd guad driveii from Rin-Gmond 
hnttle o f C ~ ~ t 9 1 1 ~ n @ r n ~ ~ k 9  . . . . . . . . . 46 
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Operñtions n&li of &e Tws-Puaition of the Fronch a r m i ~ P a l o m -  
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c o r n h b  take p h e  ~vitl l  the parkirhs-Foy fails to aurprke the Britisli 
p w h t  fijar-Gafkwlli demhnrls r ~ i n f o r c e m e n t ~ c e e p h  rniwonceives 
tlie umperor's plaris -WclIingtonon'~ plans vinclicahd z g a k t  Fivricli 
writm7Soult atlvise~ ,Towph to hold Madrid and +he mnuntrtins of 
hvila-Inde~isiori of tlle king-He p~ to T a l i a d o i i d ~ o n c e n t ~ a ~  
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3 alabid- Josoph wishes to ababrndon that capital- Worthein in- 
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s t w n @ M m l  marches into E'~m+Defeats Mina in the d l e y  
af Roncid iind pumueR him into Arqon-Foy ncte oo the coastT;lkca 
Cwtm-Iteturns tu Bilbao-DeEeats the Giscxyan volunteem uuder 
Mugartepui at V i H h ,  and thosc of Guipuswa under Artola at Ido- 
quitin-Tlie invurrectiond junta. tiies-Uermeo and Isaw sra takeii- 
Opomtions of tho pnrtidaa on ths great lino o€ commanication . p, 63 
OITAPTER VI, 
Wcllinghn restores the discipline of tha nllied nmy-Rohtive stmgth 
d tlie h1lip;erent forces-Wellington"6i plana ~lewibed-lord \ir. 
Bmtinck ngnin proposes to invnde Italy-~\rellington oppoms i d T h e  
olaning ofthe cumpaign delnyed by tlie wcnthe+State of the French 
nruiy-lts movements previous to the opening of the campaign . 85 
Di~tyemus dimonta -tngnom arm y-hyed  by Wllinghn- 
Noble conduct of L U ~  W~UCI -Tb 1& wiug of tlie dliea under geuerd 
Omham mnrches through the Tras os Montes to the Esl+The riplit 
wing nader Wellinyton iulvanms apinst Hshinsnw-Combat tliere- 
I h o  alIica p n ~ s  tlio Tormeu-1Ycllind;on goes in pmon to the Esla- 
FRRR~,? d thnt Tiver-Cavalty comliat aat >Iomles-Tlie trw mings of 
tbe nllied army unite at T m  on ths 1)uer~Ibrnarks on tliat event- 
llrellin$nn mkdiea in xrlvíince-Fre~ivioua momrnents o€ tlie French 
JescriLed-lliq pasa tlia Carrion and Pisuerp iii retreadTlie alüea 
pns? thc Carrion jn pumnit-Joaeph tnkes post in front of Burgoa- 
\Vcllinfiton turne tlia Rsuerga ivith bis IeR wing and atttlacks the 
cnmy witli hia rir~ht wing-Chmbat on tho Homaz+Tho French 
retreat belrind I'ancorbo and blomup tbe &le o f  IJurjios-Wellington 
oms~os  t h  uppcr Ebro aiid turns tlio Fmch line of defonco-K~ntm- 
rler ic  doptcrl as a &pdt station and the military eshbSishmenL3 in 
Portuya1 tlm bbnoken up-Joseph changes him di~positions of dsfen- 
Tlie allies n,rIvrince-Combat 3f Osmn-CornhíLt nf Ft. 3Fillw-Comhnt 
of  Suliijnna Moriih-T1ie French armies ~vncentrate in tlie h s i u  of 
Fitoris iieliind the Xadom . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 
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Contüsetl he Fmch in the W n  -M  convoy^ am 
gent 'LO -The king trikes up a ni battl-he Gal- 
licianq ,,,,,,,,  s e i 7 ~  nidufia hut a~ i,u.......-Graham mt~mliea 
a m a s  tlio hillv to Murguia-Relative strengtli and pusition uf the 
Iia+ilc ~rmice-'IJ~ttlo f Vitoria-Joscph rctreab b~ Salvnticrrrs- 
Wellington pursues Km up the Uoruudia aiid Armquil m l l e p  
&nda L o n p  snd Giron intn Quipnscadmph hdts 3t Yrurmn- 
Uetachex the arrny of  Portugnl tta t1ie Bidaiwon-Retreats with the 
ariny o€ tho mntre xnd the army of tho south tc Fampelun+Welling- 
ton rlet?chr~ Graham thmiigli t,he moiintxins h the paw of St. Aílrinn 
into GU~~WCOB md marches himself tv ~.imp~~-~rnlia.t with the 
vi, CONTENTE. 
Ftwich rear-prd-Jowph retreak np tbe valley of Roncem!le+ 
&nomi Foy ralliea the Fmch  troopa in Guipmma and firhta the 
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Grahnrn entera Guipnsc-Cornht on the Orio rivm-Foy sotires to 
Tolosa-Cornbat there-The F m c h  posts on the s e a - c o ~ t  a b d o n s d  
wth exception of Smtorw. and Bt. Scbtian-Foy retires behind tho 
Ilidmo&bu6el dvxnces tomairls Vitori-Retires to Jfipúa,- 
Wollington endwvo1m tu m u n d  liim-Ile makon n f m d  iiioscb to 
Tude!+Ia in p t  dan[pr-&capes tu Zaragoz-Lislb there-ía 
drrccived hy Xina ami finaUy marches t o  Jncn-Gazan rc-entera Spnin 
m d  occupies t he  vdey  of Bastan-Q'Donnel reduoea the forls of 
Pancorbu-HiU drives Gnznn fuom the mlley of  Baetnn-Obs- 
t i 0 ~ . . . m . w . . . m . . , m i m . m . p . 1 1 5  
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tions on tlie e ~ t e r n  oo& of Spain - Generd Elio's misconduct - SIC 
John hfurray sajla to attack T q o n a - C o l o n e l  Prevot Eakes St. 
Felippo de kllayer-Second Gege of Tarryoníi-Sachet and Manrice 
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~ e z ~ p e  de D~loguer -Lord Il'iilifmi Bentinck arrirrea - S i  J o h  
Mnrrafs trial-Ohservations . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 
Dangw of Sicil y-Bvded by Murat's secret defeGtion 6vm the emperor 
-Lord Riiiiam Benbnck +e-emha~ks- Hiu derigm of attacking the 
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Sauroren- Various movsmenta-D'Erlvn joins Soult, who a t a t i  
gcnml Hill-Smnd Iiattle of hurorcn-Foy ia  cnt o$ from thc main 
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8anlt'a vim md poeitiona during tbe ~iege ddbed-He endeavarim ui 
mmur the place-Attacks lord TPellington4omh.ts of Km adarcial 
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is stormed-Smlt redves  to wlopt a d e b i v e  systeia4liseivk 
ti mi^.......... . . . . . . . . . p , % S T  
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volume, aro tlro oficial corrcspoiirlcncc oF lord MTilliam Ben- 
tinck; Bomo notes by IortZ IGll; tlie journal and correqiond- 
ence of sir Xtufane Donlíin; a jonrnal of colonel OgImder, 
tmenty4ixth regirnent; a niemoir Zig sir George Gipps, roya1 
ciigineeiys; and n, varicty o f  communicstions Iq other oflcera. 
Lastly, auuthenticated copies of the official jouriials and corres- 
pondelice of most of tlic rnarslinls and genemls who com- 
mnnrled nrmiw in Epain; which were a t  niy request snpplied 
by tlie Fmnch War-OEce wikh a promgt 1ilieraIity indicative oE 
tliat niilitary franlcness and just pricle whcL ouglit and does 
chmcterise flie officers of Nnpoleoii'a nrmy. I llave also 
been ennbled $0 corrcct my formcr nccounts of the assaults oT 
Port Gayehno at Salamrincn, and tliose of h r p a ,  from the 
profcssioud papere siiice pulilished by tlie engincera 
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HISTOTcY 
OP THE 
P E N I N S U L A  W A R ,  
B00K THE TWEXTIETH. 
CHAPTER T. 
WHLLE the armies were strivlng the politiml afiirs continued 
mmplicated and unsteaciy. She evila of bw1 government ' 
in England, Spin and Portugul, the incongnroue allince 
of bigoteti a r i s t o c q  witk awiikened deniocray, and tlie 
ine&ablc growtli of nntiond jealousies aa externa1 danger 
seemed to recede, were becoming so powerful, that if relief 
had not been obtained from extmneous events even the 
vipirr of Wellington must have sunk nnder the prmsure. 
The secret causes of disturbance sl~all now he laid hre ,  and it 
lrill then be seen that tlie catnstrophe of Napoleon'a Russiau 
cnmpaip mas ~b;bsoIutely neccssary to the final succesa of the 
Eritish arrns in tlie PeninsuIa 1 speak not of the physiml 
power mhich, if Lis hoat had not witherecl on tlie snowy 
 vast tea of M i i s o o ~ ,  the emperor coiild liave pourerl into 
Spin, liut of those innumerable moral disemes wliich wr- 
mpted tlie vey life-hlood of the contest in the Peninsulrr. If 
Rtissiu oived her safety in some rlegree .t;a thtrt contest, the 
fate of tlie Pen in~u la  wm jn inturn deckied on the plnina of 
Russin; for Iind thc French vcterrans who therc perished, 
returned ~{ctorioua, thc mnr wuld htive bccn rnaintained for 
ycnra in Spain with nll its waste of trmums and of blood, to 
tlie absolute ruin o€ England even though her army hnd bceii 
VOL. V. B 
9 PEBINSULA WAR [ISIZ. 
victmioua in wery battle. Yct who shdl sny with certainty 
wlmt termination any ~ f i r  will evtr ham P Who shll prophesy 
of an aat dwriys vnrging, and of auch intricacy that its aeerets 
srem hcyond tho readi uf human intellect? Whnt vsst pw 
prntiong what aatoniahing combinfltions were involved in the 
planwi, m h ~ t  vigour and abiIity display4 in tlie execution of 
Napoleon's march to Moscow ! Yet wben the winter a m e ,  
only four d q s  sooner tlian he expected, the giant'a schamc 
becnmc n theme for children's Iaught er ! 
Nevertheless the political grandeur of thnt expedition wil1 
not be herenfter judD& from the wild triumph of hia enemies, 
nor its r n i l i t a ~  merits from the declamation hitherto piisaed 
off as the histery of that wondraus though unfortunate enter- 
prise. I t  will not be the puerilities of hbnnme, of Segur, 
and their Mitstors, nor even tha* splendid military and poli- 
tical essay of Jomini, calle8 the 'A3 of ~Vapolmn: wliich 
pterity wili macpt aa tbe measure of a general who carried 
four hundred thousand soldiers acrosa the Niemen, snd a 
Kundred and sixty thousand to Xosoow. And with such a 
11iiIitary proGdence, with such a %lance, so disposing his 
resen-es, so guarding his Aanks, so gt~iding his masses, that 
white constantlj* victorious in front no post mas lost in his 
rear, no convoy failed, no courier was stopped, not evea a 
letter was missinp: the conimunication with Lis capital ma.s 
as rcplar and certrain as if tl~.liat immense m m h  liad been but 
s, summer excursion of plea-ure l Eomever it failed, and ih 
failure ivns the safetp of tlie Peninsula 
Iu Englnntl the rekreat from Bnrgos mas viewed with the 
nnnry fear wliicli n lwqs  nccumpanies the disappointment of 
Iiig-11 raisetl pulilic exprcta-tion; the people, bught to believe 
tlie Friwrh wcalr and Jixpirited, paw them so strong and 
ilxri~ig tlint even victory lid not enabled the allias to make r 
perniniicmt stand beyond tlie frontiers of Portugal. 1-Ience a 
grwving distrust as to  the ultimate result, whicli would not 
Lave failed to ovedurn tlie m r  faction, if the retreat of the 
French fmm Xosco~v, the defection of Prnssia, and ths 
strango rinlook~l-for spectncle of Kapoleon vanquished, hd 
not come in hnppy time as a counterpoise. Bnd when tlie 
parliament m ~ t  lurd Ti'elledey diil wry diatiiictly shom, h i t  

Wellington is nndeniable. Even in Beptember there were 
still betwem fifty md gixty thousand soldiers present under 
arms at home, and additional forces codd d a i n l y  have been 
fed in Portugal, because the reserve magwines 
WPttinm contained providona for one hundred thausand 
arss. 
men for nine montbs. The only question ww 
the procuring specie to purchase mpplies wl~ich could nof be 
had on credit. WelEington had made the c a m p i p  dmost 
witbout gp&e, and a s m d  additional force wonld not have 
ovenvhelmed his resources; but what efforts, wl~at ability, 
what oder,  what amgements were made by the governmerit 
t o  overcome the difficultiea of the time! Was there le= 
extravapnce in piblic oEces, public works, public salmies, 
public coatractsP Tlie and-boxes nnd services of plate given 
to diplomatistg, the gorgeous fmiture o£ palaces, the pudy 
trappinp wasted on Whittingham'~, Roche's, and Downie'a 
divisions, wouId almost have furnished the ivants of the 
additiond fxoops: JVhere were the lnillions lavished in sub- 
sidies te thc Bpaniards? where the millions vhich 8outli 
Americti, hd transmitted t o  Cadizt where the aums speut by 
tlie soluiers: during the warP Real money had nearlp dis- 
appeafed fmm EngiancI and a base papa had usurped its 
place; but gold had not disilppeared from tha worIil anti an 
able rniniahy would have found it. Those men only knew 
how t o  squander. 
Tlie subsidy gnmted to Portupl was paid by the mmmcr- 
cial spemilation~ of lord Wellington and Mr. Sturart, specula- 
tiona which also fd the army, ~ a v d  the whole 
"'" stm% popdation of Portugd from fámine, and pre- nrss. 
venteti the wai from atopping in 1811 ; and so 
little could tlie ministers comprehend, much l e a  make snch 
arrangements, that they now rebuked theii geneml for having 
adopted them, rrnd after thcir awn imbecile manner insiskd 
npon a new mode of provlding snpplies. On every siide t h y  
gave pmof of incapacity. Lord TElliam Bentinek was 
allo~~ed to plan an invasion of Itdy when additionaI troops 
were mnted in Portugal ; and suffered to bid in tEie money- 
market against Wellington a d  sweep away four miilions of 
doIlars at an exorbitant prmium for a &mera, when the wm 
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iii the Peninauln mm nnearly stopped in default of tht very 
money \yhich Wellingbn wuid have otherwiaise protured- 
nay, liad actaaliHy been promised at ti re~aontable cost. Nor 
was tl~is the fuU measnre o£ their folly. 
h r i I  Welleslcy affirmed, m d  they were unable to deny the 
fact, that dotlam might h a ~ e  been obtained from South 
America t o  any amount, if the gavernrnent wodd have con- 
sentetl to pay t l ~ e  market-pLice Sor them ; they would not do 
it, and y& aftcrwarrds sought to purcliaso the same dollam at 
a Iiiglier rate in the European markets I He tuld them arad 
they could not deny ib, that t,hey had empowered h e  afferent 
q e n h  to purcLuse dollars for five diñerent aervices witbout 
auy controlling liead; that they were bidding against ea& 
otlier in mery money-market, irnd the restrictions ag t o  the 
price were exwtly in tLe inverse proportion to the impor- 
tniico of tho service: tlie v n t  for the troopa in Nalh WM 
permittd tn ofer tlis higliact prim, lord Wellin@on ms 
revtricted to the lowest ! Anri l i e s i d ~  this hi iy  Iie aliowed 
tliat tliey lin J undsr tlieir licensing system, permithd French 
Y ~ S R C ~ ~  tu bring French goods, silla and gloves, to England, 
nnd to carry bullion away in return. Napoleon thiia paid 
his nrmy in S p i n  mith the verg coin whicli should hnvc sub 
~istct~(1 the English troop. 
Eut ineapabIe as tho rninistcrs were of making the 8irnpT~t 
arrnnprnents nnd neglecting the moat obvioiis menns of 
supplying the nrmy; incapnblo even of scnding out a few 
hIcs af clotliing rind nrms for the Sponirards without p d u ~  
ing the utmost confusion, they nerc hccdlcsa of thcir grmc- 
rnl's coiinsela, prompt tn listcn to every intriguing dviser, 
rind t o  plilunge intn nlmrd oornplicated measnres to rdieve 
thnt di'itrcm FPTlich their QWn imbecility had prodiiccd. 
Wl~cn tlie war witlt the United Stiites brolre out, a wnr pro- 
vnl~cd by themaelvm, thcy mffered tho kdmiralty, contrarg 
to the wishes of Mr. Stuarlt, t o  reduce the naval 
3rr+ ShIa ~ r t g  
forcc rit Iiislion 11nd negiect Weliington's expresa Corrwrmd- 
recommendntioníi for the protection of the mer- "lCee' 
cliantmen liringinp Aour and ntorcs to Portiigil. Then the 
American priveteers being unmoIeded nrn doran Ghe coa& 
of Africa, intercepted the proviaion trade from the Brmils, 
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ona of tho prindpd resomes of tlie m y ,  rtnd mlioldened 
by impunity infestcd the m& oE Portugal, captured fonrteeii 
shilis Pondcd with 0our off thn Douro, and a large; vesscl in 
tlie vcry mouth of the Tws, Thwe t h i a ~  hqpened wlien 
tbe ministcrs wcrc ecnsurhg and intcrfcring witli tEie g o n c d s  
coinmercial transactionq nnd seelring to tlirow the feeding of 
Iiis 8ollicrs into the hnnria af Eritish speculators; as if tlie 
aiipply of an army wns 1 ikc thnt of a common markct ? nevcr 
considering that it wauld bo thc morchnnt's intcmt to s t a m  
tlie troops for the increrise of profit; never considerinfi thnt 
tlie commcrce thoy rrouId atop lid paid the Portupcsc 
~~ilnidy for them, and had furnished tlie militnry cliest with 
eipecje whcn ttlicir administrative cnpncity wae unecpd to the 
bl$k. 
Kcvcr wm e govcmment better ucrvcd thun tho Erikish 
government w ~ s  by loiul Wellington nnd Mr. Stunrt. f ibh 
oliilitim vigillance nrid indusitry sclrlorn cquallcd, tlicy liad 
innde tlicmselves mosters o£ the Portngxcae policy? forcign, 
domestic, militas; c i d ,  and jridicial; tlicy Irnew nll tlnc 
causm of mischief and ffiitlifully reprmentcd them to  tli8 
Portupcso and Britiah governmonts, md hnd doviscd cRca 
tw l  remedies. By the former they wero met ~ i t h  vexntious 
opposition; the lntter, neglectiag their ad~ice, lent themselves 
ta those fooliih finmcinl schemes beforo touchd upon m 
emmating from Villierri, Yansittnrt and the count of Fuaclialj 
tha first deficient as an ~mliuesudor md stategrn~n, the ~ccond 
univeraally derided as a hancier, the third from his long 
sesidcnce in London lrnowing little of Portugal, dcriving tlitbt 
little from his brother the reetlew principal, ancI in nll iiie 
scflemes liaving reference to liis o wn intriguw in tho I3mib. 
Their plaus wcre necessarily tllis~ra. Funclid revived tIie 
old project of an Englisli loan, and in concerh with his codju- 
tors desired to estaliGsh a bmk a h r  tlie Eugliuli nitbuuer; 
advancing several minor details and propositiona, most of 
them supgwted before by principal Sonze but rejeeted by 
Wellington, and al1 desigrted t o  evade not to rernedy tlie evils. 
Finally tbey devised, and the English cabinet actuillly enter- 
hined tlie plan, of selling the crown and church propertg of 
Partugal; and t k  ~polistion of the eatliolic church was to b 
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effected by commissionem, ono of tliern to be 
Mr. Sydenliem, m Engli~hinnn and e potes- 
fant l Thinking hnwever t l i~t  he pope would no& i ; ~ p L  
redily y-ielrl coment, they resolved te apply to Fiia 
nuncio, wbo being in tlreir power they expected ho find more 
pliable. 
Ehving thus provided in their way for financia1 diñictilties, 
tlie miniatea concocted for the supply of the army, mbet tliey 
cal1ed a modified systtm of requisitions &er the manner of 
tbe Frenchl Their speechea, their manifestoes, tlieir wliole 
sclime of policp, which in the working had nearly cnished 
the liberties of England and Rad plunged the mliole world 
into war; that policp whose aim and iicope was, t b g  saicl, ta 
snpport established religion the r i g h  of monarehs a ~ d  the 
independence of natiom mss tlms cast asids. Tea! thase 
rnen, to remove difficulties mwed by their own incapmity and 
negligente, were ready to  adopt dl theg had before condamned 
and reded in tiae French; they were eager t o  meddle in tlie 
most oil'enaivve manner with tlie caitholic reiigion, by getting 
from the nuncio whe wari in their power wliat they eould 
not geE from the pope voIuntady; they were redy ta rntcr- 
fcro with the rlghts of the Portiiguese crom by aelling its 
property, nnd desired ta adoph thc v e q  sptem of rcqnisitions 
~vhiCh tliey bad EO often denounced as rendering the name of 
Frnnce ~bhorrent o thc world ! 
Al1 these sch~mes were dnly tmnamitted to WeIIington and 
kfr. Stuart, nnd the former hnd in thc field t o  unraye1 thc 
intricacies, detect the fallsicies, and combat the wild spocula- 
tiom uf rnen who were giving rt loose to their jmfi$natione 
an weh complicated qmestions of &ate. It waa wliile pre- 
paring t o  fight Mannont he had to expme the futility of n 
toan,-jt was on the heights of &n Clmistoval, on thc field 
of battle itself, that he demomtratd the a b d i t y  of attempb 
ing to  form a Portapese hnh-it ms in the trenclies of 
Burgos he dissected hnehal's ond Villiers's schemes of finance, 
and exposed the folIg of attempting the sale of church property, 
-it waa at the termination of the retrmt t b f  ivihh 8 mixture of 
rebuke and rwoning he quelled the proposal to live by forced 
iequisitiom-and on each occmion he sliowed b e l f  ag wel1 
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mquaintcd with these subjects he m with the rncchaiiism 
of amics. Reform abuseg, raise your actual taxes dtIi -vigolir 
and impartinlity, pcy your present dcbh before you contrnct n 
new one, wwrts his c o n s h t  reply to  the propositions for lonns. 
And wlien the English ministen pressed the otlier planu, 
whicb, besides tbe banlr, includcd a rn-coinago of dollars into 
cnimdos, in other words tlie dcpreciation of tbe eilver standard, 
he mith an anqaring hand laid their foiiy hare. Tlio mjlitxy 
and political sb te  of Portugal he 6s,icI mas such that no man 
in his seases, native or foreigner, would place Iiis ca~iitral 
where he could not witlidraw it rtt a moment's notice. When 
hlaasena invaded tlilrt country unreasonable dmponrfency had 
prevxiled amonpt tba rninistem, now tlieq. seerned to Iiare a 
confidente ae wild ns their former fetir; but he who h e m  tlie 
real atate of aff'iiirs; he vlio knew the persons tlitat wers 
expected to advarice money; he who knew the relatire forces 
of t t e  eentending armiea, the ndmntap and r l i s i ~ r l v u n ~ e s  
attenrling eacli; he who knew the absolute weakness ol t l i e  
I'ortuguese bionticr as a line of defcnce, could only laugh at 
the notion that the mpitahts \vould take gold out of their 
own ctests to ludge it iu the diests of the banlt and eveutually 
in those of tlie Portuguwe treasury, a treasury desewdly mith- 
outcredit, Tlie French &ea opposd to liim intfie field (he \vas 
then on San Ciiristoval) w r e  just doulile liiy uwn strea$11, mil 
a~erious accidelit t o  BalIesteros, a rash generd with aa bnd 
-7, would eompel the Ando-Fortuguese force t o  retire Luto 
Portugal and the prospects of the earnptign would vanish; 
aiid rthis argument left out of tlie queation any accident wliicli 
rniglit hppen to liimself ar general IIilI. Portugal would 
be hoped be saved, bnt its securjty masl not such as these 
visionnries wonld repiesent it. 
Tliey had proposed also oi Bntisli security in j e d s  for tlie 
ccpitnl of tlieir riank, and tbeir reasonings on this h e d  meie 
equnlly fallacious. Shis security was t o  be strengthened by 
collecting tbe duties on wines exported from Portugal to Eng- 
land, and they bad not even aseerhined mhether thoae dutiea 
were conformable to the treaty with Englund. Then cnme 
the fomer qtiestion. Wou2d Greitt Britain gnarmtee the 
capital of tlie subscrihrs whether Portugal mas lost ox savedt 

wl~ere the cnraado mas current, sume s i n  miglit perhnps be 
made; but it \vas not certain, snd foreigners, Englislimen 
nnd Ameiicnna from whom tlie peat mpplies nere purcl~ascd, 
ivould immedlately add to their priws as the coia deteriorated. 
Tbe operatlons md expenditure of tlie armymere not confjned 
t o  Lisbon, nor even to Portugal, md tlie cruzado woirld ~ o t  
pass for its nominal vPilue in Spain; thus the greatest incon- 
venience wouId xesult frorn a, scheme at tlie best unmorthy of 
tlie Bcitislt govmment. In fine the reform of abuses, tbe 
diwontinuance of uselw expenaes, cconomy and ener,y 0 wem 
thc only rcrnctlim. 
Suclz wea h i ~  rensoning, get it h d  liktle cffcct on his p m -  
cutom; for wlicn hia best men were fdling by hundrdq Iiis 
brighteet visions o€ gloq fncling on the smoky walIs of 
Rnr~o~i, he wm ~ g a i n  forced to examfne and refute ianm 
valuminoua plms of Portupese frnance, cencoctcd by Funchal 
nnd Villiera wibli notes Iiy Tnnsittart, And thesc pmjecb 
werc riccompsnicd with complaints thnt frauds bad bcen prns 
tiscd on thc miñtnm-house antl vinlence usecl towards thc inbzbi- 
tnnts by the British comrnissmics, whose misconduct WM thc 
red cause of %he financid rllstresscs of Portiignl, The patient 
industq of gcnius wns ncver more severely tuxed! 
Wcllinson rcpclled the ehargc of cxactiona und f d a  as 
npplied to the amy; lic ahowed thot at rcfmm the cnstom- 
Iiouse so m to prevcnt frauds had been his unceasing recnrn- 
rnendntion t o  tlw Portugucse governmcnt; tlint hc had in detni1 
taughe tliat governmeiit how to rcmcdy tho c ~ i l s  tlicy com- 
p ln ind  of, how to increaqe tlieir custam, how to  levg their 
tmes, und a m g e  tlreir whole financia1 systcm in a manaer 
t o  mndw tlieir revenues c q u l  to their axpenpes, without thnt 
01)prcssian and injustice wliich tliey wcre in the liabit of 
jn-actising: for the extortlons and violence complained of, 
TVere lierpetmted by the Portoguese commi~saht, and yet the 
t roop  nf tliat natioa were starviiig. &ing exposed Pun- 
chal's ignorante of financia1 £ncts in detail, aud challen,d Iiim 
t o  prove his cliarges @st tlie British arrny, he discasaed 
the p e a k  qucstion of eelling tlie nown and church lands, 
proposed ns a subditute for that economy and reform of 
abuses which be so long, so ofkn, and so vain1y iid pressed 
upon tho rgency. The proposal neas not q6te new. ' I 
Iinm alrcady,' he ohervd,  'hd hfore me a proposition for 
tlic snlc or rathcr trensf~r of crown landa to tho crcditors of 
the Junta de Viveres ; but thwe were t l i s  uncultivated lnnds 
in Alcmtejo, and I pointed out the irnprobability that any- 
liocly would toke such Innh in p a p e n t ,  and the injury t o  the 
pufilic crdit liy makinp tlie sclienie publio if not lilreIy t o  be 
successful, JIy opinion is that there is nobody Ln Portugal 
posseused of capital who entertnins, or who ought to enter- 
ta in wch an opinion of the state of  affairs in the Peninsulti 
AS to Iay out his rnoney in tlie purchaso of crown lands. The 
lnss of tt httle, not in the XJeninauia even but elsewhere, 
would cxpose his estate to mufiscation, or at al1 ewents im ruin 
by a freslr incursiciu oE the enemy. Even if any man could 
believe that Portugal is secure apinst the invaaion of tlie 
rnemy, and his estate ancl person against the 'violmm, mm- 
t inm a d  frantcls' (these were Funclml'a words rwpectjng 
tlie nIlied army) of the enemy, he is not during the esistence 
of tlic ww, ~ccording to the cande de hnchd's notion, 
rxempt from tiiose evib from Iii o m  countrymen and their 
nlliea. Try tliis experiment, offer tlie estates of the crown 
for sale, e,nd it wjll be seen whether 1 httve formed eb corred 
judgment on tlii subject,' Then runalng with a rapid hand 
over nimy minor thougb htricste f d h i e a  Eor raising the 
vdue of the Portuguese paper-money, he thus k t e d  tlie 
grent question o€ the churcli iands. 
First, as in the case of crown lands, thee wonld be no 
puicliasers; notliing could render it palatable t o  the eierm, 
and the inflnence of the ciiurcli would be; exerhed against the 
allies, instad of being ns liitlierto strongly exerted In tlieir 
favour. 3t would be uselws if the experiment of the crown 
Imds succeeded, ancl if thrtt fsiled this d e  muld not succeed; 
but tlie attempt moald alieruite a pomefiiI party in Ep&n as 
mdl 8s 'in Portngaf. Jforcover if it ~hould succecd nnd be 
honcstly cnrricd into execution, it mouid entsiI a bnrthen on 
Ihe fimnces of fivc in tha Iiundrcd on the prchnae-money 
ior the supprt of tho ccclesinstical ownesc a€ thc cstatm. 
The beet modo of otitaining for the stnte eventually the 
hnefit of the ciiurcb property would be tci prevent tha 
monasteriea rtnd nunneries from receiving novioes, because, in 
c o m e  of time, tlie pope miglit consent to tlie #de of thc 
estrites, or the nation might assume posscssion wlien tlie eccio- 
siastical corpomtions bccnme extinct. It wns no dicdmntage 
to Spnin or Portupi tlint I~rge portions of lnnd slrould lie 
hdd hy the chnrch. The bishopa nnd monks wcrc t,h only 
pmp~ietom mho lived on their estntes and spent the reveiiiics 
nmorigst tlic lahoiircm; irntil the linbits, ofthc new Iandcd pw- 
prietola clii~ngererl, the transfer of Ianded prnlierty from tlic 
clegy to the lapen would be a misfortune. 
This memoir, gent from tbe treaches of Burgo#, q~~nslied 
Funcli d s  projects ; but that intriguer's obje~% was to p t  lid 
of his brother's opponents in tha regency by exciting pow- 
erful interesta a@st thern; wherefore, failing in tliis pro- 
posai, he oidered Redondo, now mnrquis of h r b a  and minister 
of finance, to repair to  tlie Drazils, intending to supply bis plnce 
mith ona of bis own faction. Wellington and Stuart were at 
this time dogedly oppoaed by Brba, but as the credit of the 
Portupese treasury was supported by bis character for probity, 
t h y  farbade him to obey tlie orrler, and representeti the 
matter so forcilily t o  the prince regent tliat Funclirt1 was 
soverdy reprimanded for Lis audacity, And it ww nuiidst 
tliwe vexatioas that Wellington retreated, and iu 
Cmmripond. 
,, snch dcstitution tliat he dcclarcd al1 former dh- 
alt. $tu& tress for money hnd lieen ~light in comparison of 
119s. I& present misery! Britisli naval stores had 
been triicked for corn in Egpt ;  and the Englisl~ rninisters, 
finding R I I N S ~ ~  wzis gnthering qccie from al1 qunrtem, desired 
hlr. Sttinrt to prcvcnt Engli~h and Arncrican rncrchnnt cap- 
t.nins cnrrying coin away from Lisbnn; a rcmcdid measurg 
intlicnting tlicir total ignorante o€ thc niaturc of commercc. 
Tt mms not attcmptecl to bc cnforccd; but thcn it wes they 
trnnsmittcd their plnn of ~iipplying tlie army by rquisitions 
tlie parrticulsrs of wbieh mrry be Iiest gnthercd from tlie 
anslrers to  it. 
Mr. Sturart, firm in opposition, sliortly observed that it was 
by avoirling and ieprobnting such a systern, dthough par- 
wed nlike by the nnti\-es and Iiy the enemy, that the Eritish 
cliaracter md credit liad been ectablished so firmly as h be 
of tlie grentest use in,.the operationa of the vra. Wellington 
cntercd morc dceply into tho suhjcet 
Nothing he mid codd be promred from the oountng in 
the mode proposed by the ministers' memoir, unless reaort 
wns a l s ~  had to the Pmnch mode of enforung their requi- 
sitions. Tlie proceedinga of the French amies wem misun- 
deretood. It waa not true tlint the French never p ~ i d  for 
snpplies. They Pevied contributions where money was to bo 
Tind, and mith thiu pkid f o ~  pprovisians In other pnrt~; and 
mhcn rcquiaitions fo i  moncy or dotiiing mcre madc they 
were tnken on acconnt af the regulur contributiona due to 
the govemment. Henvier indeed they wem tlutn even an 
usurping government entitled to demand; y& it wns a 
regulnr go~emiment account, and the British could not dopt 
a similar plan without depriving thcir nllics of their own Icgi- 
tirnntc rsaouroes. Requiaitrona wcro enforced by terror. & 
magistrnte was orrlered to provide for the troops, who would, 
in cwe of failure take the provisioii~i and punisli the villtige 
or irlistrict in a vkety  of waya. Were it expedient to Pullow 
tris mude of requisition tliere must be two armim, one to 
figlit the enemy, one to enforco tlie requisitions; for tLa 
Spnniartl~ would never subrnit quietty to such proceehgs. 
Tlie conscription gave the French a more moral descriptiun of 
soldiera, and if tliia second ttrmy was provided the Briti~h 
troops could not be trusted to i&ch an exact m m r e  of 
punidirnent on a clisobedient villiage; they would plunder it 
as me11 as the othem, but their principai object would be to 
get at and drinlt as much liquor aa they could, nnd tten 
destroy al1 property Fdling in tlieir way ; bl-le objecta of their 
mission, the b r in~kg suppIiea to tlie army and Xictlng 
an exact maure of punishrnent on tLe magiahatea or diti- 
trict, would not be aewmplislied at all. Moreuver tIia lioldem 
o f  suplilies in Spin, iieing wiused t o  wmmerciaI lialiits 
monld rcgard payrnent for these requisitione by bills of any 
degcription to be rather worae than the mode of oontribution 
fol!owed by the French, and would resist it as forcilrrly. And 
upoa mch a nice point did the contest bang, that i f  they 
accepted tbe bilIs and diixovered how to get cast  for them by 
dicounting higt, it would be tlie moat fatal blow poscible fo 
the credit nnd reaourceR of tho Briiish army in the PeniPiwIa. 
The war would then soon censo. 
The mcmoir assertcd, that though sir John Moom hd hwn 
well furni~thed with money &e Epaniards wmld not give him 
provisions; and thie was urgd as au argumcnt for enforcing 
reqtiisitione. But ím say Moore m furnished wiih monep, 
itself +he index £o the ministem' incapacity, WeIling.ton told 
Zhem m s  not h e .  <Moore had been eren worse f~mished 
than hirnrielf. That g m d  had bomved a little a ver;v 
littIe money at &lamanca, lmt had no regular mppIy for tlie 
rniIitary chest until the m y  bad nearly reached Coruña; 
and the LSpmiards were not ve y m n g  in their reluctnnce to  
meet his wantg for the debk of his m y  were still unpaid in 
tl1e latter end o f  1812.' In h e ,  8uppk coufd only be 
procured from the wuntry by pyment on the spot or soon 
efter the fmnmction, anl~ss the Spanish govemment would 
yield a part ok' the go~emment contributions and the revennea 
of the roya1 domaining to be xeceivod from the people in kind 
at a aeaaonable rate. This he had obtained in the provhce 
of Sdamanca, and the system might bo cxtendcd td othcr 
provinca as %he legitimate governmenf, waa re-e&hIishd. 
Rut this only pndially met tho evil, it wouId give soma mp 
plim cheaper than tliey conld otherwiae he promired, but 
thcy rnust, afttftem~~rds be paid f o ~  at; Qdiz in specie and lew 
money would come into the rnilitrmy chest, which, m before 
noticed, WM only ~upported by mercantile specnlations. 
Buch were fhe dismissions forced npon Wellington when 
sll his Bculfies were mnted on tlitt Eeld of battle, and nicb 
wari the bardiness of bis intellect to sustain tbe additional 
1;iliour: such also mere the men, d l i n g  themselves &ategmen, 
who then wielded the & resource8 of G m t  Brihin. TLie 
expendihre of tliat county for the year 18 12 was above oae 
h u n h d  millions, the ministms whe controIled it were yet 
so ignorant of the elementq pnnciples of finance, as t o  
thmw upon their general arniCLst the clmgar and turnult of 
iiuttle tlie task of cxposiiig such fdliacies. And to i+educe 
tliese persons fsom t11o mognit,uutle of stntesmen t o  t h ~ i r  
nni~trnl sinaIIncrs of iiitrigt~ing debaters is called po1itic-d pre- 
j~idice! Eut tliougli liriiver niay eenitI.de meri to  trumple upon 
rcason for n time they eannot emape ultimate retribution, ahe 
rcassiimcri her may and history dclivers them t o  the justice 
nf posterity. Perverse however as the Engli~h ministera 
mcre, the Partngume and Spanish governments were morc 
so; and thc tempcr of the Ilpnniah rulers mas at thia time of 
cven greater imprtnnce, because of Napolaon'a misfortnnes. 
"Te opportiinity given to kziko tt deeitiive blow at his power 
in tlie Yenins~ilri, demnnded an e d y  and vigorous campaign, 
snd tlie experienca o£ 1812 h d  tuught wellin$on no xid 
eoiild be IinrF from Bpain unlcss rs cl~nngo waa marle in tlie 
rnilib~v ~sstern. Hence wlien nsmred the FreneEi. mmieti liad 
taken winter-qnarters, lie resolved in penon to wge tlie 
Cortes tn give bim the real as well as nominal command of 
tlieir troops. 
Dnriiig tlie pnst mmpaign and especially afker Abispal 
liad resipccl, tlie ~veakness of the Spanish pernmeilt 
became more deplorable; notliing was done t o  ameliorate the 
m i l i t q  q d e m ,  an extreme jealmy actuated the Cortes md 
tbc regenq; md d e n  the formm offered Tellington the 
commnncl of their nrmie8 Mr, Wdesley nddsed him to acoept 
it, mere it onIy to give a point upon wliici~ Bpnkrds true t o  
the: English alliante and the nristocratic causc might ralIy in 
case of reverse. Tbe clisobedience o£ Ballesteros hsd h n  
indeetl promptly punislied, but tbe vigour of the Cortes was 
the resrdt of offended pride, not of aonnd poIicy, and the 
retreat oF Glie alIies m the ~igna! for a renewal of those 
d~rigerous intrigues whicli flie battle of Xalarnanca had 
arrested withoiit cntshig. 
Lord JVcllington renched Cadiz the 24th of Deceder. 
He rnw received mithout enthnsiasm, yet with honour, md 
Iiis prmence seemerl ngremblo to the Cortea and the people; 
pnrty pn~sions  ubsidetl, and his nscendrnncy of mind proeured 
ptient: Iiearing, even when in private he urged the leading 
men t o  tnrn tllcir attention to thc rwtr, t o  plme in abepnce 
their factious dispntes, rind abom al1 thinps to upMrl the 
inqt~isition, Iest they shoulcl drive the clinrch part y into the 
armu of tFie eneniy. Hia exliorbtionn hnd no effect savc to 
iiiiconmge tlie seriiles tn look more to Rngl~nd;  yeh tlicy tli(d 
not prccciit tlic C0rtr.r yieldhp t a  liiiii t!ic cntim cox~trol of 
fifty thoumd men to be raid from tlic Engli~h mibsidyj with 
an engngmnent thrth he ~hihould have power of dismimnl nnd 
the right to recommend for promotion; that no genmI sliniild 
be appointed without hia hnowIedge and consent, and that al1 
ordsrs and rgorts  should pass through Z i i .  
At his retomrnendation also tbe Spanisli foroea were re. 
organized in four numbered active armiw nnd two reserves. 
The Catalana mere to form the first army. Elie's troops includ. 
ing tlie divisions o£ Xarsfield, Duran, Bassecour, tlie Empe- 
cinado, fiche, and Pilla Campa, received tlie name of tlie 
second amy. f i e  forces in tlie Morenn, forrnerly uadm 
Mestems, constitutd tlie tlilrd army nnder Del Parque, 
Tlie troop of Estrsmndura, Leon, Gallicia and the hturins, 
x. including Moriila's, Pcnne Villcmur'rs, Downie's and CnrIa 
d'Espnñn'~ sepasate division~, mere called thc fonrth army und 
giren to CnatnAos, whose nppintment t o  CntnIonin waa can- 
celIcd ~ n d  Iiis former dipity of caphin-general in Edrema- 
dum nnd hllicia restorcd. !l'he pnrtidm af Longa, Minn, 
Porlier and the other chlefg ,4n the northern grevinceg mere 
aftemrirds united to this amy m aeparate divisions. 
Abispd, made captain-genera1 of Andalusia, commanded 
the hst reperve, and Lacy, replaced in Catalonis by Coponq 
waa ordered to fom a w o n d  reserve in the neighbourhood of 
San Roque. Such were the new dia~lositiona; bnt when 
Wellinghn had completed this impohnt negoti~tion Borne 
inactivib was for the first time discovered in his own pro- 
ceedinga. His &ay was prolonged without apparent ieason, 
and it waa whispered thnt if he resembled Czsiir, Cadh had pm- 
vided liim aitli a Cieopatm; yet he soon retilrnecl to thc army 
by Lisbon, W ~ B  he was greeted with very grerit honoura 
and tlie most unbounded entliwiasm, especially by trie people. 
His departure from Cadiz revived al1 the political dissensions, 
The Iibemls and serviles became more rmcorona, and tbe 
csecutive WAB a l m p  on the síde of the Inttcr, thc majority of 
the Cortcs on tlie side of tIie former; neitlier enjoyed the 
confidente of the people nor oF thc nllics, nnd the inhigucs 
nf Carlotttta dvnnced: a dcsire tn m&e her sole regent waa 
mrinifcsterl, and sir Renry Wclledcy, tired of fruitlcss oppo- 
eition, remnined neuter. One cause of this feeling was her 
vehcmcucc a~aiaiat tha insurgcntfi of Buenos Ayrc~, ~nother 
thc rlisgrst given to the merchnnts of Cdiz  by thc diplo- 
mntic proceedings, or rather intrigue3 of lord Etrangford, 
mitll thnt revolterl s t n h  Th princess denonnced EngIiwid ns 
lwrsuing a smugg-ling policy, and not witheut trutli, for 
Wclliiigton's counscls hatl been iinhcedd. Lord C~t lerwgh 
offered indeerl a nem medirttion, the old commisaion being to 
proceed iinder tlie restrictiuii of not toucliing ot  Mexicri; 
nfiitlier n new miasion composcd entirety of Spaniards wsts to 
proceed nccompaniecl by an English agent without nn osten- 
silile cliivaCter. Tliis proposal eiided as the otliers bd done 
ancI j ealouay of Eriglland incrensed. 
Eurly in 181 3, Cnrlotb, cliligently served by Pedro Xouzq 
lind gniined adlierents amongt  tlie litiernls in the Codeg for 
slio ivtis redg to sacrifice even tIie rigl1tF1 of  her posterity; 
and ns slie promiscd t e  rneintain al1 ancient abuaes tlio c l e w  
avtl serviles were not nverse to her. %Le dccree to aliolisti 
tlie inqtiisition, now tho test of political prty, p w e d  on the 
7th or Jlardi rind tlie regency nrcre odered to Lave it read 
iri the cliurc1ies. Tlio clcrgy o[ CadEw revitited tlie order. 
T l i y  iiitiin ntcd tlieir refusa1 tlirougli tlio merlium of a puMi~ 
lctter, aud tlie rwiicy encournged tliem by removjng tlie 
governor of Cmliz, admira1 Valdez, a kiiown liberal mil oppo- 
neiit of tlie inquisition, appoiiiting in his stead Alos a, warm 
advocate Tor t h t  horrid iiistitution. But in the rindication 
of oflicid powcr tIie Spaniards are prompt sud decided. 
rlu~wstin Argiielles moved and it was instrtntly mrried, tlint 
tlie sessions of tlie extraordiiiary Cortes shouId be dcclared 
pcrili:inent, ivith a ~ i e w  to measures worthy of tlie ntition 
enil to prevcnt tlio evils ivitli whicb tbe state nas rnenaced by 
the oliposition of the regency and tlie cIergy tn the Cortes. 
A rlecree was tlien proyioscd for suppressiiig tlie acbual 
r%ency nnd replacing it mitli a provisiond government, to be 
corn~~osed of tlie tliree eldest councillon of stnte. This beiiig 
cnnfurniable to tlie constitiition  vas mrried by a rnnjority of 
eiplity-six to fifty-eight, wliile anatlier proliosition, tliah two 
meniben of the Cortes pubIicly elccted shonId be added to 
thc regeuq-, was rejected as an in~iovation by seventy-two 
against sixty-aix. The counciElon Pedro SLgnr, Gabriel Ciscar, 
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and the cardinal BourBon, whbishop of Toldo, wepe tlien 
installed as regenta 
A comaiittee, appointed to consider how a governrnent fdt 
by al1 parti& t o  be imperfect could be improved, now retoni- 
mended that t h e  cardinaI-~rchbisliap who waa of tEie blood. 
roya1 sl~ould be president of th regency, laving Cadothb 
claims unnoticed; nnd CCmr and A g r  h d  been formerly 
rernovcd from the regency for iucapacity, it wae generally 
suppofied the intention wm vfrtnnlly to makc the archbishop 
sole regent. Soon however Carlotta's influenee m s  again 
felt; for a dispute arising in the Cortes between what were 
called the dmerimns and the liberala about the annu~l 
Acapulco-~bip, tmenty o£ the former joined her pwty, and it 
vas resolved thah h i e z  Pedron, a distinguished opponent oi 
the inquisition, should propose her as the head of the regency, 
M%en almust sure of a majority the echeme ww detected, and 
tlie people, who liked her not, became so furious tbat her 
partimnu were silenced. The oppaeite side proposed on the 
instant thnt the provisional regencg should be made perrna- 
nent, which wm carried; and thw, chanm rather than choiee 
ruling, an old prelate and Gwo imbecile muneillom were 
entrusted with the government, and fact;ons intriguea and 
ranmur explodd more frequently as the pressure from above 
hecarne 81igh;bt. 
More tlztin aI1 othem the clergy were violent and daring, 
pet thc Cortes wm not to be frightened. Fonr canons af 
cathedds were arrested ia Mq, and ordem weic issued t o  
arrest tlie archbShop of St. Jago and ndny liislops, bemusa 
of a pastoral lettei pullishd against tha abolition of the 
inquisition; for iccording t o  tlie haliits of their cmft of al1 
sects, they deemed religion trampled under foot when the 
power of levying monegr anrl spilling blood wna rlEnicd to 
ministers professing the faitli of Christ. Nor did the EngIish 
influence fail t o  mfer ; the democrntic qirit advanced hastily, 
thc Cadiz prws tccmed with mitings to  cxcite thc licople 
a p i n a t  the desip=na o€ thc Endish cahinet, and to rnise B 
hatred of thc British general annd his troop, They wcre not 
al1 Falsehoods, nor unrnicceadol, because ths deaire to preaerve 
the ioquisition dispIayed by WelEington and his brother, 
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dtbongh ahing fmm milibry comiderations, a m r d e d  too 
mnch with the known tendency of the English cabinet's 
policy not to excite the suspicions of the whole liberal party. 
The bisliops of Logofio, Mondonedo, Astorp, Lugo and 
Salamanca, md tlie archbiiliop of St. Jw were nrreskd; 
several other bishops fled to Portugal aad were fliere pro- 
teckd as martyrv in the cause of legitimacy and despotisrn. 
The biiiliop of Orsnss and the ex-regent. Lardis~iid liad 
befose this emped to Alprve and tlie Tm os Kontes, md 
from t l io  lntter the prelate kept up rrn adive intercourse with 
Wliciu, where the Cortes were far from ppuliir; indeed the 
flight of thc bisliops crenhd general anger, for tha liberal 
pnrty ras  Btrongm in the Isla than in other parts, nnd by a 
curions anomnly the rnilitary wcrc generally their prtrthnna 
wliile thc peoplc were partisans of tlie clergy. Ncvertheless 
the secda oF frecdom, thoiigh m w l ~ l y  sown by the Frcnch 
on one aide and the Cortes on the otlier, took deep root, md 
Iiavc ~ i n c e  spmng tip Into strong planta in due time tc. 
burgeon and bear frnit. 
When the bishops fled from Epain, Bravinia, the pope'a 
niincio, asmrmed such s tone that the good offiws of sir 
Renry Welledey mald only for a time screen him from the 
vengexnce of tl ie Cortes, and finally the latter, encomged by 
the Englislk nemspapers, dismisaed him and sequestered his 
Iienefices. IIe also took refuge in Porhigd and wi%h tlie 
expelled clergy souglit to render the Cortes d o n e  iu Spain. 
IIe formed a strict ~Kttnce witli. tlie Portuplime nniiciri, 
Ticente BImIiiedii, and tliey interferetl, not with tlie caucenis 
of Spaiu only but with tlie cctliolics in ths  13iitidi amy, 
anrl cven extended tlicir intrigues tu  Iieland; wIiereupan, as 
justice nrsas never the English policy towards tliat country, 
nlarm pervatled tlie mbinet, nnd the nuncio, ~irotected wlien 
oppoced t o  tlie Cortea, was comiderd troublesome nnd indis- 
creet reprdiilg tlie Irisli. 
This atute o€ fcud I d  to a crisis of a formidable end deci- 
sive nature. Many pemons in the Cortes held seeret inter- 
course 6 t h  Jmeph, being desiroua to aclmowledge bis 
dpasty if he would accede to the g c n c d  poIicy of tlic Curtcs 
iu civil governmcnt. He hnd ris nIreudy sliown orgaiiiaetl a 
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large native force, and the coasta of Xpain and Portugd 
~warmed with French privatmm mannecf witli Xpanish sea- 
men; the victory at Salamanca mithered these resources for 
the moment, but Wellington'a failure nt Eurgos and rctreat 
revived tliem and gme a heaq ~hoek to puMic confiidence in 
the power of Englanrl; a shock which the misfortun~ of 
Napoleon in Rusia onIy could have prevented from being 
fatd. T h t  wondderful man had indeed, ~vlth the activity 
and energy which made him the foremoct hero o€ the aorld, 
mised a Tresh army to march into the heart of Germany ; but 
for thia be was foferced to withdmw so manp ola soldiera from 
Bpain tliat the French conld no longer act on the affensive. 
T h i  stayed the Peninsula ceuse on the brink of n preci- 
picc, for in thnt mmirious and fbntheutic wnrk, eaIled ' R w -  
m d  1628 -8,' it appears that earIy in 1813, 
the wer-factiouif conde de Montijo, then a general in Ello's 
-yI secretly made propomls to pass over rritli his foms 
t o  the king; and Boon aftemrds the whole army of Dei 
Parque, then adadncing into La, Mancha, made offers of e like 
nature. 
Tliey were negotiating with Joseph when tlie emperor'g 
orders compelled him take up the line of tha Duero; bnt 
bebg thns advertisetl o£ Frencli weakness feared to continne. 
their negotiations; TVeIington then ruivrinced, nnd ns thia 
fecling for tha intrnsivo monarch mas not p e r a l ,  resistance 
revived with the Rrltish succeagcs. Bnt if Nrtpoleon, &fa- 
nono in Rnasia, llad strengkhened his ~ m y ,  this defectfon 
mould have tnken place and have been follawed by others; 
the king a t  tlie h a d  d a Spmish army woiild bave re- 
canquered Andalusia, Tellin$an sould hiave Been confined 
to the defence of Portugal, and England wonId not h a ~ e  
purclimd the independence of that ccountry with her o m  
permanent ruin. Thi  conspiracy is not however related with 
entire confidente, becanse no t m e  of it is to be fomd in the 
kiagk papera hken at Vitoria. Nevertbeless there are abun- 
dant proofs tliat the work called ' 3 m . m  d m~,' 
inarimuch as it relates to Joseph's transactions in Spain, ww 
compiled from liia corre~ponrlence; many documentrr uLo taken 
tit Vito& wem lost at tlie time, md in a case involving lima 
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he wouM pmh~bly have destroyed the proafs of a tmhn 
vhicli b d  failed. Napoleon in liis memoirs speaks of aecret 
ngotiatians witli fhc Cortes aliout tliis time, and he is como- 
borated by the correripondcnce of the British embasay at 
C:&h nnd by the intripea against British infiuence, 
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IR Portngal the Flnglish general dwimd t o  ripply al1 resourna 
to tAe wnr; hut he had to nin counter to  the habíts of the 
peopIe and the gwernment, to detect the intrignes of mbodi- 
ndes and of higher powers, t o  oppose factious men in the 
local government, to stimnhte the slugg-kh apathy and wmbai 
the oftm honest obstinacy of those who s e r e  not factions. 
And al1 tliis vithout power of recompensing or cliastising 
and even d i l e  formd ta support tliose who merited rebwke 
vinst the mora formidable intriguem of the court o€ Bmzil; 
far the best men of Portugal were in the local government, and 
he wns not foilcd 80 much by thcm as by the sluggish nation~l 
~vstern, d1111 for good puqoses hut vivacious for mischief. 
And at Rio Jmineiro the personal intrigue5 fostered by thlie 
peculidy scheming disposition of the Engligh envoy lord 
Xtrmgford,-the weak yet dogged hribits of the prince,-aod 
the meddlmg nature and violence of Carlotta, stifled JI great 
nationlil viems. There also the Souzas, a famiIy deficient 
neither in activity nor hlent, were predomfnant, and the 
olijeet of al1 waa t o  stimulate the government in Portugal 
wgstinet tlie geneml's m i l i t q  policy. To this liad been opposd 
the influence af the Engliih government, but that resourea 
wns rhngerous ~ n d  only to bo resortcd to in exkmmitics. 
When to nll these things is rtdded n continua1 ~ t r u g l e  with 
tht! knavery of merchantrc of nll nations, hiui difficultics must 
be admitted, his indornitahle vigour his ptstience and his 
exfrmrdinary mental resources iulmirerl. An inatnictive 
lesrion in the study of nations is thus presented. Urelling- 
ton wm not ~imply a general mho with greater or  le^ mans 
was t o  plan rnilitary operaticinq lesving to otheni the seb 
fiiig of political difficuIties. He had also to regenate  
a people and force them against the m o n t  of the'i preju- 
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a& once the poplace m$ tbe gtivernment; t o  iafuse spirit md 
order mitElout the aid of rewards or pnnishmenta, and to 
excite enthusiaem throngh the medium of corrapt oppressive 
institutions wlde he suppressed dl tendency t o m d s  rev+ 
lution. Tlius ody could he rnaintain the war, and ac it wmhs 
Geyond the pmer o£ man to continuo auch a struggle for any 
lengtl~ of time, he was more than ever anMous to gatlier 
#tren@ for s decidve blow, wliich the enemy's situation now 
rendered possible- It rmy indeed be wondered at that he ao 
long supported the preesure, and more than once he was like 
to yield nnd would hava yielded if fortune bad not offered 
lfim certuin happy milihry clianceg, yet such as few but Km- 
self could have profited from. Xn 181 0, on the Buwm 
mountain and in the lineq the milihry succew m mther 
omr the Portugese government tl~an tlie cnemy,-at huta- 
rem in 1811 the glory of a m  swcely cornpensated for the 
de~titution of the t r o o p ~ a t  Fuentes Onoro osd, on the 
Cap, afler the mond unsncceasful siego of Budrqjos, t h  Per- 
tugucsc nmy had nenrly dissolvcd ; and the mtonishing sieges 
of Ciudnd Rodrigo and Badajos in 1824 were necessny to 
mve the cause from d$ng of inanition. E ~ e n  then the easly 
deliveranee of AndaIusia was frustrated, ftnd time, more d u -  
able than p I d  or life in war, was lost ; the enerny became fhe 
stmnge.~;t In the field, and despite the victory of Salamanca 
the political evils were felt in the repuke from Bnrps and 
the douhle retrea* from tbat plaee and Madrid. Accumulated 
miscliiefs mere now ta be encotintemd in Portugal. 
1t"has been shown how obstinatelp the regencp opposed the 
plans of financia1 refom; for thinking Portugal out of danger 
nnd tired of their British allies they had no desire lr, BttiR+tg 
fa nid, nor intleed any wish t o  see Xpin delivered Compond- 
from iier diEcuIties. To hams the English encen31SSn 
general and drive liim away or force bim, and throngh him 
tiis govemment, to grant them loms ar new aubsidies waa 
tlieir object. But Welliigton knew that Portugal eould, and 
was resolved it should find resourcea dthin itself. JVb- 
fore, after the battle of Snlainenm when a freah mbsidy 
was demandcd he would not listen; and wh3n that gcheme 
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alreadp expoad, of feeding or rathcr s t a h n g  tlieir troops 
througk tlie rnediurn ef a tresty with the Spanish gavernment, 
was proposed, he checked tlie shameful uid absurd plan by 
applying a part of tbe money in the chest of uds intended for 
the oivil serrice to the relief of the Portupese troops. Yet 
tho rsgcncp did not entircly fail in thcir nim, manp pemons 
>fr. Stnart's depcndent upon thc. subidy were thus deprived of 
~nrw~pnna. their papentq  their complaints hurt the 'Rntirih 
etice, WSS. cpedit, and t.he British inffuenoe with the people, 
whose faithful attwhment t o  the alliance no intrigues had 
hitherto been able to  ehake, was reduced. 
Into everp brunch of government tlie regwcy then infused 
their own captious spirit. Tliey oomplained falsely t hnt 
genetal Campbell had insttlted the nation liy tiirning some 
Portupese residents pti51icly out of Gibraltar in compnny 
with Jcws and Moors; thcy rcfuscd thc mhcrit dclivcred to 
them in Iien of thcir R U ~ I J ~ ~ ? ,  usying i t wm not fit for food 
though the 'Englifih troops were tlien living on the =me 
grain, thongh their own troaps were glad t o  get it, and no 
other waa GO be hnd. When awooden jctty was t o  be tlirown 
in the Tvu for the con~enience of landing stoccs, they snp 
porttsd one Caldas, a rich proprietor, in his refusal t o  permit 
weTlingbmib the trees wanted t o  be felled, dleging tlie rjglits 
arrespulld of propesty, although he was to be paid largelp 
mce, itISS. 
and thcy bd tdliernselves then and always disre- 
gsrded the rights of property,-especially when poor men 
were concmcd-seizing npon whatcvcr wns reqiiiPciE for tlie 
public semice or the snpport of their o m  irrcgiilnritim, 
without pilpcnt and in eihameful violation of 4aw and 
hnmebnity. 
The commercial treaty and the proceedhp of fhe Uporto 
mine compmy, an oppressive corporation nnfair in aU <ts 
dedigs, irresponsible, establisbed in violntion of that trenty 
and supporterl without reprd eitlier to the interests of the 
prinee regent or his British allies, furnislied them also with 
continua1 subjects for disputes, and notliing was tori alisurd ar 
too gross f o r  their interference. Uníler tha mnnagement of 
Mr, Btuart, who had vigorously enforced Wellington's pl,lans, 
their paper money had obtairled a reasonable arid increasing 
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eirculation, thcir mstom-hoase reaourcee hnd increesed, the 
expenses of tlieir naqy and arsenal l l id been reduced, and it 
was evidcnt that sn extcnsive vigoroii~ applicntion of the same 
principies would overcome al1 financia1 difliculties; but there 
were too many personfil intetests, too much sharnefiil profit 
m d e  t o  pcrmit such a reform. The navnl whbli~hment 
in~teed af hing entitely transferred t o  the Erazils .waa con- 
tinued in the '.Cagus, and ~ i t h  it. the arsenal as its natuml 
appendage ; and tliough fhe inFamous Junta de Vive~es Bad 
been suppresad by the prince regent, the government, under 
prdtest of paying its debts, sfll disbursed ten thousand pounds 
a month in salariea to men whose ofioea had been f o d l y  
~bolialied. 
About thia tihe dso the gening of the Spanish porh in 
thase provinces from whence the enemy had been driveii, 
deprived Lisbon of w monopoly of trade enjoj-ed for tbe Iast 
tliree ynrs. Tlien the regency feeling tlie conseqwent diminu- 
tion of revenue, with inexpressible effrontery insisted tliat the 
grain imported by Wellington, wliich had saved their m y  
a-nd natioa from hmine and hrnished their own mbsidy, 
should enter the public warehouses under apecilic reqlatione 
and pay duty for so doing. And BO tenacious were they tbat 
be was forced to menacs a formal appeal to the Englich 
eabinet; for he knew tlie subordinate officers, knavídi in the 
extreme, would have sold the secrets of t l~e  army mapzinm to 
the speculat.ors. And tlie Iatter, in wliose banda the furnishiig 
of the army would under the new plan of the English ministers 
be pliiced, being thus accurately inetmcted of its resources 
would have reguluted their supplies with p e a t  nicety, sa as to 
have famiahed the soldiers and paralysed the operations at the 
greatest possible expense. But h e  supply of tlie army under 
any sptem was now extremdy precarious; for besides tha 
activity of tlie Amerimn primteers, English ships of war used 
to capture vessels secretly employed in bringing provision 
under licences from Mr- 8taart and Mi.. Forster. The mptain 
of a, Scotch nierchant vessel, eng@ in the s ~ m e  trade and 
hanng no letter of marque. liad the piraticd infiolence t o  
sei~e in the very moutli of the Tagus an American vessel 
sding under n licence from >Ir. Forster; tkus violating at 
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once the licence o£ the Engiiah miniskr, the 
indqendence ob Fc~kugnl, and the general la17 oi M8E. 
nstiona. The American trders were dimayerl, 
the Porbupese government jnstly indigiirtnt, and the matter 
altogether embamassing, b e c a w  no measure o€ punishment 
could be inflicted w i t h t  exposing the aecret system which 
bad been the principal support o£ tlie army. Congress horv- 
ever Boon p s w d  an act forliidding neutrals to ship flour in 
t,hc Amerirnn pon%; and this lilow, chiefly aimcd rrt th Portu- 
gueae ~11ipq fnllowing upon t h e  non-importntion a& and 
coupled with the illegal violrnce of the Englisb vessela, nmrly 
dsied up this source of supplp and tlircm the wmy principally 
upon the Brneil tradc; whicli by tlie negligente of tlie Admiralty 
mas, as Iiefore uoticed, exposed to  the enterprise o£ the Unite~l 
Stated privrnteers. 
During Wellin@on3a campugn in Spain khe military adminis- 
tration of Portugol WM in the hands of tlie regency nnd al1 
ihe ancicnt  buse ea rcvived. Thc army in tlic ficld rcmived no 
succonrs, the field artillery disappeared, the cavalry was in the 
worst condition, the infantry reduced in nurnbers, the eguip 
ments scarcely Et fer service, the spirit of the men waning to 
despondency; there mws no money in &he military chast, no 
re~~iii ts  in the iedepVts, and the tmnsport ~ervice was neglectd 
nltogether. Reresfnrds scverity did aot shop rlesertion, because 
want, tlie parcnt of crimes, Id proved too atrong for fear; ths 
. county awarmed with robberh no fault was punished by the 
regency and everywhere knnves triumphed. Al1 persons 
wliose indolence or timidity led tliem to fl y from the defence 
of their conntry t o  the Braxils, were there received and 
clierislied xs m a r e s  b t,heir persional affections for the prinw; 
they were lauded and called vietims t o  tlie injustice of Derek 
f o d  and the encroachmentei of the English officers, Tlis 
prince aIso pemitted officers possessing family iritewst to  
retirc from servico retnining tlieir pny anrl mnlr; thus off'ering 
a premiiim for hnd mcn to cnkr tho n m y  with intent t o  quit 
it in tliis dis,mceful mnnner. Multiturles did so, promotion 
carne too qt~icbIy, nnd the nobiity, wliose influence over th8 
poor c la~ses  s a a  great and might have been benefichlly 
employed t o  keep up the rea l  of the men, diirzppeared rapidly 
from the re~ments:  tbe foul stream of knavea and cowarh 
thus continually pouring throagh the m i l i t q  ranka destroyed 
al1 cohesion and tainted eveqthing as it passed. 
Tnteresta of the =me nature polluted the civil administra- 
tion, Rich people, especiatly those OE great cities, evaded 
taxes and disobeyed regolations for th6 militarg aervioe, and 
during.Wellington's absence, Engli~h under-commiwariea and 
that retinue of villttins wliich invariably p t h e r  on the rear of 
amies, being in some rneasure freed from the dread of his 
vigilance and igonr,  Piolated orden in a dnring manner. 
The hasbandrnen mere crnelly opprerrsed, their farming anirnaks 
were carried aff to fiupply food for tbe mmy,  and agricnil- 
ture was t h s  stricken at the root; &e breedu oE horned 
mttle and of liorses rapidly and alarmingly decreased, and 
butcher's meat wm scarcely to be prucured wen for the tmps 
who remainerl in Portugal. 
Thcse irrepfaritieri, joined to the poss misconduct of tIte 
rnflitary detachmenb nnd convoys of síck men on al1 the 
linea of communication, produced great irritation and enahletl 
factious persona to declaim with effect: writings and dones 
mem circulnted tlgainst the troopq the real outragea were 
eqgeratd.  others were invente& and the drift of al1 mas to 
rendcr t1ie English odious to the nation at Imp. Nor was 
tliis eanfined to Poi$upl. A p t a  were busy t o  tlie same pur- 
pose in Lontlon, and d e n  tlie enthusiasm which TTelIington'a 
presence at Lishon liad created mongst  the people was known 
at Cadiz tlie presg there kemed with ralase. Divem qents of 
tbe  democrntic prtrty in Spstin ame to Lisbon to aid tlie Por- 
tuguese maIcontents, libela acmising Wellington of a des& 
to subjupte tbe Peninsiila for his own iimbitious Gews 
mere published; and as consistency is never regarded on such 
occasions, it was insinnateil. that be encouraged the excesses 
of Iiis troops out of pemnal hatred to the Portupese people: 
tlie olrl bmeness of sending eirulent anonymous letters to 
him warr alsu revived, In fine the republican spirit Lad p t  
beyond Sp~in, and the Portngueae regency, krrified at its 
approach, appealed to hfr. Stuart for the assistance of England 
to check its formidable progresa They forbade Portupesa 
newspapers t o  admit obsemtions on the political eventa in 
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S& t.hey checked the intmduction of Sprrni~h dcmomtic 
puhlications, they ordered their diplomatists 'it h d i z  to encou~ 
rage writings of an opposike tendency, sbnd supporb tlie eleb 
tion o£ deputies known for their loae af despotism. This 
last measure mas hoivever b;llRed by tlre motion of ArpcIIe. 
which r e n d e d  the otd Cortes permanent. And Jlr. St,aarb 
judging the time unf~vourahle, dvisert reserve ia tlie exertior! 
of p w r  against democrats until militriiy . siicccsses, which 
tlie stnte of the continent nnd tlie mcnl~ncss of tl~e Frmcti 
traops in Spain pmmised, should enalile tlie victors to piit 
down such doctrines 6 t h  effect: advice which was no[ 
unmeaning as shd1 be l~ereaftcr slio\~m 
A11 theae mdipant efforta WclIington vie~ved with indif- 
ference. 'Every leading man,' he said, 'was sure t o  be 
accused of criiiiind personal runtiitiog and jf Iio nras conscious 
of tIie cl~arge Seing f~ l se  it did no liarrn.' IGs position was 
liowever rendered more dificult, and otlicr rniseliiefs existed 
of long ñtnndin~, nnd springing from a diffcrcnt source, but o: 
a more serious dinracter; for tlic spirit of cnptioiia djriconteiit 
had reaclid the inferior mqistrncy, mho endeavoiired to 
excite the people against thc rnilitary gcnera1T.y. Complairits 
carne in from al1 quartma of outrages on the part of tlie 
troop~i, some tot, trne, many false or frivolous; and when 
courts-martid for the trial of tlie ~ c u s e d  were msernbled tlie 
magistrates refused to attend as ivitncsscs; liwwso Portuguwe 
custom rendered such m nttendnncr! dcgratling, nnnd hy Portu- 
guese 1aw a rnndstrate'~ writtcn testimony woa eficient in 
courts-martid. In vain they were toId English Fnm vo~ild 
not panish men upon auch testimony; in vain it was pinted 
out tht tlie country would be ravag~d if the aoldiers discc- 
vered they mi@ do evil wit11 impunity. It mas offered to 
seud In emh cnse lista of *Portuguese witncsses t o  be sum- 
moned by the native authorities; but tlie ma$strabs aiisivered 
tliat this metliud w5s insoleut, aud witL siillcn rnulignity cun- 
tinued to acciiinulato chrges qains t  tlio troops, to refuse 
attendanee in the courts, nnd to cal1 tlia suIdicrs, tlieir own as 
wcll as the British, licensed spolirttore of tth emmiinity.' 
For a time the pncrons nibture of the poor people reriided 
thac oombining causebi of diswntent ; ncither m1 injuria 
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nor exaggerations, nor the fdsehood o£ those who attempted 
tu stir up -,m&, produced my visible efíect upon the gres$ 
bullr of the population; get by d c p c s  affection for the 
British couled and Wellington expresseci his fears tliat a civil 
war would commence bctween tlie Portupese psapie on the 
one hand, and the troop~i of both nations on the otlier. 
WIterefore Iiis activity was redoulired to draw while he could 
still control nffairs al1 the militzry strength to a hed,  and 
malre such an irruption into Spain as would eskabLslt a nee  
base of operations lieyond the liower of futnl dissensiona But 
wlmt mnde liirn tremble mas tho eourse whicli the misconduct 
o€ the Port.upese go~crnment nnd tlie incapneity of the Eng- 
lish cnliinet forccíl upon thc native furnislicn oP supplics. 
Tlioso pcrsous, coming in winter to Lislron to havc billa 
pnid, coutd gct no money nnd in their disbss  wld the 
Iiills te upeculators; the l'ortugucse boldcra at a tlisconnt of 
fiftccn, tlie Spnnisb hoIrIcrs rat a diccottnt of forty in tlic h- 
dred, The crerlit of the clicst immediatcly fcll, prices r o a  in 
proportion, nnd ns no rnilitnry enterprise could mrry the nrmy 
bcyond thc fliglit of this hnrpy, and no revenucs could satis5 
its craving, tlie contcst must havc caased if AIr. Stunrt had 
not fountl a momentn~ partid rcmerly, by pulilicly pamn- 
teeing the payrncnt of tho bills nnd ganting intcrcst unti1 
thcy eould bc tnkcn up. Thc expcnsc wrtg tlius aupcntcd, 
yrt the incrense fe11 short of thc cnbanccd cost of  siipplies 
which this restrictd prnctim of the bill-holden eniiaed, and of 
two evile the least mns chocien. It m q  eeem ~trange that 
siich transactinns should bclong to thc h i ~ t o r y  of  t11c military 
opcrations in the PeninsuIn, that it ~honld be tlie gcneral'a 
insteatl o€ tlia ministerys task to encounter such eviln, and 
ta Find thc remcdy. It was so liov~ver, and no aclequate 
notion of Wcllington's hcrci~lean labours mn be formed 
witltont fin intimate knowledge of his finfincid and politiml 
dificiil tia. 
The Pahguesc militnry disordcrs had brought Bcrcsford to 
Lirrbon wliile the sicgc of Burgos mns still in prtigrcss, mand 
now, undcr JVcllmgton's dircction, he strnincd evcry neme to 
restore tlie tamy to its former efficient state. To recruit the 
regiments of the Iine he di~banded al1 the militia-men fit fvr 
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aervice, seplacing them with fathem of familim; t o  restore the 
6eId adillery, lle e m W e d  a11 the garrison arki!ler-men, 
calling out tlie ordenanca gunnm to rnm the fortrefises and 
oonst-bat.teriea; the womt cavalry regiments h~ r e d n ~ d  t o  
render the best more eficient, Iiat thia iarm nevcr nttained nny 
exoelIence in Portugal. Lord Wellinghon rtnd Mr. Stu& nt 
tIie same time grappIedmith the civil administrntion and thcir 
efforts prodaced a considerable inmense of revenue. The 
regency wuld not deny thia lienefimsl effect, nor tbe existente 
of tFie evils they were urged h remedy; tbey admitted tbat their 
cushm-lionse aystem wm incomplete, t h 3  their useless navy 
consumed l q e  suma wnnted for tho army; and tlint the 
tnxea, espmiulIy thc 'D&ma,' wero partially collacted and 
anprdi~ctive bacause the rich pcopie in the grcat towna, who 
had bene6t.ed largely by t,he war, escaped tlie imposh wliich 
the poos people in the conntry, who hacl suffered most from 
tlie war, priid. They ecknowledged dso t ha t  d i l e  the sddierb 
hire u.as in arreara, tite transport senice neglected, and al1 
persone having just claimaupon the pvemment suffe~ed sevete 
privationa, tlie tas-gattherers were nllowed to keep a rnonth's 
tribute in thcir h n d s  evcn in thc districts closc to tlic cnmy; 
bnt they would not J ter  their qs tcm,  and hrbri, thc minister 
of finfince, mmhated Welllngton~ plam in detnil wikh siich 
unusual obstinacy that iT became evident notliing could be 
obtained save by externa1 pressure. Wl~eieEore, as tlie season 
for military opemtiona approached, %Ir. Stuart caIled upon 
lord htlere~bgh to bring the power of England t o  bear at 
once npon the mnrt of ñ i o  Janeira; and TYellington, driven 
to extremity, sent tlie Portupese prime-regent oue of those 
clear pawerful and nervous statemenk, wliicli left tIiose to 
whom thcy were bbddrcssed no niiernative but submission, or 
un ncknovldgment thet scnse and justice werc to  bc divre 
prcied. 
1 cdl p i i r  bighness'~ attwtion,' he %id, * to  the state of 
Tour troops and of al1 yonr establiahrneiits; tlie army of ope- 
rntions has been unpaid since Septernber, tlie garrisons since 
June, the militia since Feliruary, 1812. The transport servjce 
has newr been regnlarIy paid aed has received nothing since 
June. To tliese eviia 1 have in vain called tFie atkntion of 
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the locd government, and 1 am nom going to opcn a new 
campaign with troops to mliom greater arrertrs of pay are due 
tlian wlicn tlie lrast campign termfnated, aIthough the mbsidy 
from Great Eritain, gmnted especially for tlie maintenananrx of 
those troops, hw becn regularly and exactly furnished; mí1 
althoaph it has been proved tlint the revenrie for the Fmt tliree 
montliq has eircccded by n tliird any former qitarter. Tlie 
honour of your higliness's arma and the cause of your allies 
m e  tlius aerionsly affeeteíl; +he nniform refusal of t11e gover- 
norri ~f the kingdum to attend to any one of tlie memures 
which I Iinvo recommend~l, either for pemnnent or teinpord 
relief, hris ~t In8t obligcd me 'LO go 'O 115 mmpleinant into your 
r e ~ l  higliness's presmce, fur here X w n o t  prewd against tbe 
iuffiience of the chief of  the treasury. 
I liave recommended tlie entire reform of the mistoms 
system, and it hm only been pnrtiiilTy ctirried into effcct. I 
hme advilvised a method of really collecting tlic taxeg, and of 
making the rich mei.cliants nnrl mpitttlists puy tlie tenth nf 
their nnnunl profits ncl nn e?rtrnortlinar;v contriliiition for tlie 
mr. 1 drclnre tliict no person kn~ws hetter tlim I do tlie 
nmrifices nnd tlic wffcrings of  goiir pcople, for blicre is no ona 
for the lnst four y~ms han lived so mucli nrnongst tliosc pcople; 
but it ia a fact, sir, tliat tlio great citica and cven somc of the 
mtillcst plaees limc gnineli hy khc mar, anrl the mcrcnntilc 
c l ~ s  hhw cnriclied itself; tlicre are divcrs pcmons in Libon 
and Oporto who hnve imaiiaed immcnsc sums. Naw your 
governmcnt i ~ ,  bboth frnm rcmotc wd rcccnt cirmimstnnce~i, 
unablc to  drnw rcsonrccs from tlie capihlists by lonns; it can 
onIy drnm npon them by taxes. It is not dcnicd tllnt tha 
reqgulla tributes nor the extrrtordiurtry imyosb on tlie mercan- 
tile profits are evadecl; it is not denied tliat tlie rneasures X 
hnve proposcd, vigoronsly carricd into exccution, woiild fur- 
nish the government witli pe~uaiary resourccs; and it remains 
for tlmt government to inform your liighncss xvhy they hiive 
neitlier enforced rny pltins, nor nny othcri; wliicli tlre necessity 
of tlie times mlls for. They hnr to Sccorne unpopular, liut 
euch is t h e  knonlcdgo I have of the peuple's good sense nnd 
loynlty, sucb my zed  for the ause, thnt 1 Iiuve ofered to 
become resporisible for tlie liappy issue, and tu t d c e  upon 

wish, and it is common to al1 your faitbful mmnts,  that yox 
will retnrn to tbe kingdom ancl tzke charge youmelf of the 
pvemmenií.' 
These ~igorous measures t o  bring tha regency to t e r m a  
succeeded only pwtidly. In May they promulgated a new 
~ystem for the coIlection of taxes mliich relievd the financia1 
pressure oa the army for the moment, but did not content 
Wellington, because it m s  made to square with ola habits 
and prejudices, and thus lcft tEie roots of al1 the evila ah-e 
and vigorous. Every moment furnished new proda of the 
hopelessness of regenerating a nation throngh tlle medium of 
a clorruptsd government; and a variety of circumstnnces 
more or less serious continwd t o  embarrass the march of 
public dairc. I n  tlie Madeiras the autliorities vexiitiousIy 
prevented tlre English money agenta fmni exporting specie, 
nnd thcir conduct mas approved of at Efo Jnneiro. At Bisno, 
in Africn, t he  troops mittiaied for mant o€ pay, and in the 
Cape de Verde b l a n d s  disturbnnoes arose from the over- 
exaction of tnxes; for when tlie pcople werc seak the 
regency was vigorous, pliant only to tlie powerhl. T h m  
commotions were ttifling nnd soon ended, yet expeditions 
mere Rent agninat the ofi'eiidcrs in both pliices, fina the troops 
thus cmployetl irnmdiately committed fnr wome excesaes ibnd 
did more rniacliief than tlint which they were aent to auppress. 
At tlie eiame time severnl French f r i g t e s  finding tlie coast of 
hfrica tingartled, cnifxed aiiceessfiilly apinst tlie Rrnlsil 
traile, and aided thc Amerienn privfiteers k~ mntract tho 
alreurly too-atraitaned reaourceri of tlie nrmy. 
Not,wwithstantling these diñicultim the exertioas of the Bri- 
tisli officcrs Iinrl mstorcd tlie nnmbem, discipline and qirit 
of the Portiigucsc arrny. Twcnty-sevcn thousand excellent 
soldicrs wcrc ripio undcr arms and r c d p  to  commence thc 
cnrnpnign, althuugh the nntional discontcnt wns dniIy increnh 
bg; iand indeed t l ie  very feeling of security createa by tho 
appearanoe of such an lrrrny rendered tbe citiseno at lnrge lemc 
willing to  bear the inconvenientes of the mi. Distant 
dnnger never dects  the multrtude, and the billetbg uf 
t r ~ o p ~ ,  who from long habita of war little regarderl tLs 
rirlits oí tlie citizena in eompnrison witb their own necee- 
vor, Y. D 
Bitie~, being oombined with requkitions iind ~v i t l i  a r~niiting 
syñtem becoming e v q  yenr more irksome, fomed  an ogse- 
grite of ínconveniences intelem!>le to men who dcsired ewe, 
ltnd no longer drewrled t o  find an enemy on tlieir hertrtli- 
ptones. The powerfiil were more affecterl thsii tlie poorer 
elnsses, because of their intlolent liabits; but; tIieir imptienw 
aggravated by being debarred o£ f ie higliest situations, 
or supplanted by British interference; and, urilike tliose uf 
Spain, the Portupese nobles hnd Iost little of tlicir Iiereditq 
intlnencn. Discontent; was thus extenrlcd widcly, drcnd of 
French pomer was gone, unlimitcti confirlcnw in thc strengtli 
and wourcea of Englrind liad succeedetl ; nnd tliis confidente, 
to use tlie words of Mr. Stuart, ' being opposed to tlie irregn- 
larities which have been practised by individualils, and t o  the 
difference of m m e m  md of religion, phced tlie Qriti~h in 
tlie aingular position of a elasa wliosc ~x~rt i ens  wero neces- 
sary for the country, but wlio For tlic alrove renfioiis werc in 
every other respcct au distinct fmm tlie nntivcs ~4 personq 
~vith whom, from some criminal cause, it mna ncceqsary to 
suspend cornmunicxtian.-Rence he judged t h t  the return 
of the grince-regent would he a proper epoch for tlie Eritisli 
to retire from al1 situations in Portugal not strlctly miIitaryi 
for if anything 8hould delay tliat event, tfie time wm approndi- 
ing when tlie success of tlie army anrl tlie tranquillity of tlie 
country would rcnder it n e c c s s ~  to yicld t o  tlia first mnni- 
festntion~ o€ nntionaI fecling. In fine, notwitlistanding khe 
peat bcnefits conferred upon tlie Portmgucse hy tlie Ritisli ,  
tlie lntkr were, and it will always be so on the like ocessions, 
-rtloS by the upper clmsee as a captain regnrds galley- 
alaves, their strength was required to speed tlie vessel, biit 
they were feard and hated. 
To P~rtugsl the priuce would not return, 1)ut Csrlotkn 
being resolute to come, lier apsrtmenk wrm fiiilslied and 
her mIuablc cffects ahunlly arrivctt. 111 licxltli ivnq tha 
pret~.xf;, tlie real oh,ject to bo nmr S~iain ; fnr indcfatigablible, 
nntl of B violcncc alq1roncTilng insanity, shc h d  sol4 wm het 
phte and jewela ta raise money wherewith to compt the 
ieading members of the Cortes; and if tht should not pro- 
mige succesa she proposed to distribute the rnoney smongst 
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tlie Xpnish padiJaa to obtain milihry support for her 
schemes. F~rtunateIy tlio prinoe, dreading the intriguing 
advisera of lik wife, would not. euffer her to quit Rio Janeiro 
uiitil the wish of tlie Britivh cabinet upon tlie subject was 
liiiown; and that \vas so decidedly d v m e ,  it waa thonght 
lictter t o  do witl~out the prince himself than t o  bave liirn 
accompanied by Carlotka: so both remained in the Brazh 
aud tiiis formidable clend pnssed araay, yet left no sumhine 
on t l ~ e  lancl. 
It was at this period tliat tlie offer of a Rudm auxiliarf 
force, h fora  alluded to, w s  made to we11ington by admira1 
Griw and accepted by him to tlie itrnount of fifteen tlioueand 
inen; yet it lecl to no result, because the Eussian ambtissador 
in London dedared the emperor knem noihing of it ! Alex- 
anrlrr tlicn prposed i~ mediate ia the dispute between Gwat 
Rritain and America, but tlie EnglisL rninisters, while Iauding 
Iiirn as a parngon of magnanirnity and just ice in r e p d  to tbe 
wnr against Napoleon, rcmembcred tlie m e d  neutmlity antl 
quadmple alliance, and wisely dccliued trusting Endanas' 
itisritime pretensions to h i ~  faithlesa gasphg policy, Neither 
would they listen to Aastria, mho nt thia time, probably as a 
cloke, desired to mediate a general peaoe. dmidst tbis 
politiml con fiision the progress of  tlie milihry prepmtions 
was visible; and contemporriry witli tlie Portupese, tlie 
Slnnish troopa under WelIingkon's influence and providence 
aquired mOTG consistencc bhnn they Lad ever befare pos- 
xssed:  a mighty pomer m in nms. Bat the flood of wtir 
wliich tho English general ftlially poured into Spain, and tEie 
diamels 3ry ~vliieli he rlirectecl the overwhehing torsent, can- 
not be described nntil tlie political situstion of Joseph and 
that secondary \i.nrfnre rvliicli occupied tlie Frencli m i e s  whiIe 
Wellington \vas re-organizing his power are re iatd  
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fw WaT iE iu not aro much positiye strength a9 relnkiw riitua- 
tions which gv8s the victory. SosepVs poeition thua judged 
w u  wmlc, be could not combine the mntmds at liia diaposal, 
nor wicld them when combined by otliers. Frnnce h d  been 
auddenly thrown fnto a new and emlinrrmsing attitude, more 
embarraming tven t h m  it appeared to her enemies, or than 
her robust mrlike proportions nourislied by tweIw yeam of 
vidoy indiated. Nnpoleon, the most indefatigable anil 
active of mankind, tnrned hiri enemy'~ ignomnce on tbis hmid 
ta p A t  ; for scarccly wris it knom that he liad rmched Paris 
by tliat wise tbat mpid journey from Smorghoni, whick 
hffled hig enemies hopes and left them only the power of 
fmhh a b u s ~ c z r c e l y  wm his arrival 3 Prtris known to tlie 
world, wben a new and enormona army, the constituent parts 
o£ which lis liad wit11 bis usual foresight crertted wliie yet in 
the midst of vid.ory, was in marcIi from al1 parts to unite in 
the heurt of Gemmj. On thii rnagical rnpidity he mted 
his hopw to support tho tothring fnbric of his cmpirt?; but 
his design was, whle prcscnting a rncnwing front on every 
side, 80 to eonduct bis operritions, that if he failed in his h s t  
stroke he migie still contract hTa qstem without violent con- 
cimion. Bis milihry pomer ma rather broken and divided 
t h n  lesaened, for the number of men emplqd 
Ín 181 3 waa p a t e r  thm in 18 12 ; in $11; lxtter 
muvtcr TOU& 
fonr hnndred tbousand, in the former more than 
seven hundred thousand, and twelve handmd firld-piws, were 
engaged on different points, adusive of the armies U1 Spain. 
On the 'STistn14 tho Oder, the Elbe, ha had pomrful for- 
freascq and prrisons or rather n d e s ,  of strcngth ind g d -  
n w  to re-wtablish his ascendancy in Euurope, if he ooiild 
munite them in OnB qstem by placing ip new h& in tlie 
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centre of Qermany: thua also he could retain thme dKee wbo 
felt &he ztttraction of hia enemy's aucoeps 
But tliia .mas a gipntic contesf for his adversariea deceiv- 
ing their subjech ivitli fdse promisea of liberby lid brought 
wtiole nations agcinet him. More than eight hundred thou- 
aand meu were in arms in Germany alone; secret societies 
were m activity d over tlie continent; and in Fmnce a con- 
spiracy was commencerl by men wlio desired 1atIier to see 
tliair wuntry a prey to foreipers and depcied with a Bour- 
Iion king, tlan independent and glorious under Napoleon. 
l%'berefo~e tht great monarcli had nolv to make applicatiou 
on itn irnmen~e scale, of tha rnaxim wliich prescribes tt ~kilful 
ofienstve a13 the be& defence, and he had to ausiain two 
u-arfares j the one depending princi pally upon moral force to 
hold tlie vagt fiibnc of b i ~  fornier policy togetberj tte other 
to meet material exigencies. The fimt, infinitely the mmt im- 
portaut, was to influence Germany and Franco, and tbe Penin- 
sula contest sunk at once into an accessory, I n  this atate he 
required constant rnpid intelligence from Spain, bemusa the 
ascendancy lie yet maiutained over the world by bis nstonnd- 
ing pnius, might have been broken in a moment,, if Weiling- 
ton sudrlenly atandoned the Penku1a t o  throw hia army or a 
~mrt of it into France. Por then would have been dermged 
al1 tlie empero?# dculatIatiom; then wouM the defection of al1 
liis a1lies have ensued; then ñ-ouli be have been compelled 
ta concentrate both Lis nem forces and his 8panish troops 
for defence, abandoning al1 his fortreases iind his ski11 l a p  
tliough scattered veteran srmies in (3e-y mt2 Poland, 
Tt would have been destruckive of hia moral power to have 
commotions r a i d  on his owo tlireshold when he was mmming 
tlte front of a conqueror in Germanp. 
To obviate this &nger or t o  rneet it, alike ragnired tbat 
isia armies in the PenEnsula should adopt a new and ~gorous 
system, under wliicli, relinquisliing al1 real offensivc move- 
iiients, they should yet appear dariag and enterprisirig while 
preparing to  abandon their former conquests. 13ut the 
emperor vanted to fortify his young levies mith vefersns from 
Spain and thwefore recalled the young p d ,  and with it 
many tbowand men and officem of the llne most remarkable 
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for coursge d conduct. In Iieu the reserve at Bayonile 
entsred Spain, being repliic~d with anwtl~er, again to be 
rglaccd in Xay by furtlier levies; and twcnty thousnnd 
conscripta were appropriakd for immcdiiite scrvice. Th i ie  
weakened in niimbers, considernblly  so diiring tl~s transit, 
the armies were also in quaIity rlcteriomtcd at a critid 
moment; for Wellingkon was hing powerfuIly reinforcetl, snd 
tlie partidas, aupented  by Eiiglisii supplies libemlly and 
now usefuily dedt out, were in tlii: uostlrcrii parts nctiag in 
concert with tbo naval sqiiladrons; during tlie operatioas of 
.the Frencli on Qie Tormcs thcy bnri revivcd iiisurrection in 
Nantre and Biscay, where recent gross al)iises of militnv 
aotliority had been perpetrated by somc of tlie local com- 
manders. 
TLe French troops were indeed onIp relieved from the 
cmliing pressum of Wellington's uperritions to  struggle in 
tlie m e s h  of tlie perilla and incurrectiorial ~varfrve, Nor 
wari i t ~  importnnce now to  lis menwred by former efforts 
Thc cliiefs, more docile to tlie sugg~tinns af tlie Biaitisli cliief, 
D,, possessed fortified posts and liarbours, ttbeir bands 
Fe1tre'8 were smelling t o  tlie site of amies, tliejr mili- 
oficial Cm- 
nu;~~namce. tary knowledge of tlie couatiy and of tlie Prencli 
MES. aystem of invnsion was more mctured, tlieir 
d6pb$ better hidden, and tIiey cculd at times benr tbe 
shock of battIa on nmrly erlunl tcrms, Neiv and Inrge bnnda 
o€ a ,far n o r a  respwtnble nnd influcntinl kintl wcre ah 
formd or foming in Navame nnd Riscuy; wherc insiirrectiona! 
juntas were orgauized o€ men from tlie liest fnmiliea volun- 
tarilgr enrolIed and not obnoxious Eike the partidas for 
mpjne' and violenta. In Discay zlone sereml Liat t ulions, eacli 
mustering a tliausand men, were iii tlie fielil, and tlie com. 
munication with France was so interwptcd, tliat tlic rniniatcr 
o€ wnr only hcard of Jmeph receiving his rlcslintches of the 
4th of Jnnittiry nn tho 18th of Marcli, and tlicn tlirough the 
medinm of Siiehek? The contributjons could no longer be 
collected, the m~gpzines couId not be filled, t11c fortresses 
were endangered, the armim lid no base of operations, tho 
jusurrection WM spreading througli Aiagoii, auil tlie b n d s  
o€ the interior were also iiicreasirig in nuulieis tlud activity, 
Tlie troop, sorely pressed for po*isions, merc widely dis- 
serniiiated and everymliere occupied, and each general w w  
avmw to concentrate his own forces w aid his neigbbur. 
In fine the problem was beoome extremeiy complicatel-, and 
KnpoIton only seems t o  have seized the true colution. 
When informed by CaF~relli of the &ate of afairs in the 
nodi,  ha t h s  ivrote to t?ie lring, 'Hold Madrid unlg S a 
point o€ observation; fix your qniarters, not as monarch bnt as 
general of tbe French forces, at Valladolid; concentrate the 
iirmies of the soath, of tlie centre, and of Portugal; tlie 
rillics will nat  and indeed cannot make any serioas offeasive 
inovement for sweral montlis,-wherefore it is p n r  business 
to profit from their forced imctivity, to put d o n  tlie inmr- 
rcclion in tlie nortlern provinces, to free tlie commnniwtion 
rvith X;"ranceI and re-esttlblish ri good base of operations M o r e  
tlic mrnmencement of irnother cempaign, th t  tlie Frencli 
nrmy may be in conrlition to  fight the nllies if tlie latter 
advnnce towarda France.' Veq+ important indeed did Napo- 
leon deem this ohject, and so earnest wns he to llave coxtstant 
and rapid iiitellige.ence that couriers and their eacorts were 
to bs despatched twice s meeli, tra~~elling day aad night & 
the rate af a leque an liour. Cafhrelli also was t o  be rein- 
forced even by the mEiole army of Portiigal if it was neoes 
naiy tu effect the immediate pacification of Biscap and 
h+ilrnrre; and d i l e  this pacification was in progre= Joseph 
m t s  t o  liold .the resE of Lis forces in a position oilensive 
bmrds  Portup1, making Wellington feel tbat hia ivhole 
powcr wns required on tlie frontier ; tlint neitlier liia main 
body nor nny considemble detachmect mula siafely rmbxrk 
to distiirb France, and tliat lie must cover Lisbon strongly on 
tlie fmntier, or expect t e  see tlie French anny memcing tht 
t .  The~e  instnictians, well nndcrñtood and vigo~ously 
rxeciitorl, would certainly Iiavtvc puf doim the insurrection i a  
thc renr of tlio Ling's poaitinn. And tlic ~yiring moiild then 
linvc sccn tlirtt monarch at thc ltersd of ninety thousnnd mcn, 
Iiaring tlieir rctrcat upon Frailcc clcnr of al1 impdiments, 
nnd consequently freo to fight the nllics on the Toma, the 
Duero, tha Pisuerga, and the Ebro. 
Joseph unalile to view the mtter thus, would not mahe 
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hia kiigIy notions subservient to rnilitary miente, nor his 
military movements to an enlargcd poliq. Neitlier did he 
perceive that hitl beneficent notions of government rvere mis. 
placed ~midst  the din of arma. Nitpoleon's orders were 
imperative, but the principie of tbem esmped Joseph; he 
was not ePen acquainted with tthe tme &te of tlie nortbern 
Khig'e Cor- provinces, nor wou3d Iie at first credit it w11eu 
respondence, told to bence mhile thoughts were intent 
MES. upon liia spanisli politicnl projccta and thc accrct 
negotit-diom mith Del P~iq~ic 's  amy, the portidne and inrmr- 
p n t s  b e m e  masterri of al1 his lines o€ conlmunicntion in 
the north. Tbe emperor's orders despatched enrly in Jmav, 
and reiterated week after week, onIy arrived the end of 
FebruqI and their execution did not take place until the end 
of March, and then imperfectly; tlio time diua lost a s s  
irreparable; nnd yet, as Napoleon rep~achfully observetl, thc 
hulletin which rcveaIed the estent of liis disnsters in Rus& 
inight done hnvc taught the lring mhzt to do. But Josepli 
wna nmrly as immovable in his resoltitiow as Napoleon; 
the firmness of the one being homevrr founded upon extra- 
ordhary srngacity, while the other's resteil on tlie want of that 
quality; regarding vpposition as a clisloyal malevolenoe, be 
judged the refrachry generala to be enemies to  the emperor 
and t o lilmself. Bellle, Caffarclli, Sucliet, nlilige incurred his 
displc~~ure, and the miniiiter of wnr 11180, bocniise of a letter 
in whfch Iie rebuked the king for haring removed iSouhm 
from command. 
Peltre'ei style, as towarde a monarcb, was offensive. Joseph 
attributed it to tlie iduence of Boult, nncl complaining to the 
emperor, =id-'The duke of Dalmstia or hirnself niust quit 
Spin. At menea he liad forgotten Lis injuries, auppmed 
liis jast Indigiiation, and instead of sending 6ouIt to France 
harl @en him the direction of tho opemtiong lioping shame 
for the p ~ & ,  combined mith liis avidity for glory, would urge 
him to extraordinary erertiom; nothing of tlie kind had hap- 
pened. Soult n a a  not t o  be trusted. RestIess, intrigiiing, 
amliitious, he would szcrifice everything to  bis owii  tidrwwe- 
nient, tied possessed that ~ o r t  of tdent wliich would 1ead him 
to mount s d o l d  when he tliought he was asceading a 
tlirone, because be wouId want courage fo afrike when the 
crisis urrived.' Tiiea, witli a ooarse sarmsm, he acquitted 
liim 'of treacbery 3 tlie passage of the Tomes becatlue there 
fear done operakd t o  prwent h i i  from bnnging the alliee to 
a decisive action; but he was trmheroua and prohablg con- 
nected with the conspiracy of MaZet at Paris.' 
l t  wm with sucli liingvage Joseph assailed one of tlie greabtest 
cornm~ntfers and most faithful semanta of his brother; and 
thus greeted that brotlier oai his arrival at Pmis dber the dis- 
asters of Russia. In the most calm and prosperoua sb te  
tliese charges mi& have excited jedous  math in the strongeat 
inind; but wben the ernperor had just lost liis great army and 
fomd the smoking embers of an extinyished eonspiracy at  
his palace-gates; wheu liis frienda were failing, hic enemies 
acnimulatiiq, it seemed smrcely possible tliese accusationa 
should not. have rnined Soult; yet they did not even ruffle the 
temper of Kapoleon. Jfagnanimous as sagacious he smilecl 
at Josepli's anger, removing Soult from 8 p i n  because thug at 
feud mith the king he could not act beneficially; but be made 
him comniander of  tlie imperial guard, and afterwards selected 
Eiim froin al1 his generale to retrieve ttffaim when Joseph was 
driven from the Peninaula. 
It has been slown that wlien Wellington took w i n h -  
quartem, tlie Frencli wupied a Iine stretcliing from Valencia 
to the foot of the Gdlician mountains. Sucbet on tl1e extreme 
lcft wm opposed by tlie allies ah Alicant. Soult, commanding 
the centre, Lad bis hed-quiarters at Toledo, having a a&&- 
ment near tlie Sierra Murena ~iatcliing De1 Parque and two 
otlrers in tbe valley of tlio Tagua Of these last ane was at 
Sulavera, one oa tlie Tietar; tlie first observed Morilho and 
Penne Villemur, who from Estremdura meiiaced the Iiridges 
oii the Tiqus; tlie second wntclied Bill at Cofia From the 
Tietar Ohe French communieuted by tEie Gredos mountains 
with Avila, wliere 'liby's divisioa of the nimy of Portugal was 
posted; p d y  for the s a l e  o£ food, partly to watcli Bejnr and 
tlie upper Tomes, becnufie t . 1 ~  allics, possessing the pasa of  
Dejar, might have surldenly unitd aorth of the mountiiina 
and breakinp the French line have fallen on Madrid. On tlie 
riglit of Eoy, Reille's m y  occupied Salamnncn, hdesma and 
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Alba on the lower Tormea-Vallnrlolid, Toro, and Tordesillas 
on the Duem-Benevente, Leon and otIicr poiuks on the 
E s l ~  Behind the xiglt of tliis great line CaffrreIli's army liad 
retakeii its old positions, and tlie army ol tlie centre wrs fixsrl 
as before in and around Jlarlrid; its oliemtions being bounderl 
nortli of the Twa h y t h ~  monntnins mhicli invest tliat wpital. 
and south of ttiah rivtr by tbc diatricts of Arnnjucz, Tawnooii 
~ n d  Cuenca. 
Josepii issoed a ropa1 regtilrition m~rking the extent of 
country which ea11 amy was to fomge, and ordered n certnin 
and considerable menue to be collected Iiy tlle civil autlio- 
nties for tbe suppod of his court. TIie subsisteitw of ths 
Frencli a m i e s  \vavas tlius made secondnry to tlie revenue of tlie 
crown, and soldiers in a time of insurrectjonn1 mar wwe to 
o b g  Spnnish civilims; nn absiirclity hcigl~hcned hy tlio pea- 
linrly wtivc Pignreua nnil prompt militiwy nicthod o€ tlu 
French, m contrnsted with the dilatory improvident promise 
breaking mand viaionary systern of tlzc Epnninrds. Bence) 
Xlngs COF scarcely was the roya1 replation bsued ivhen tlie 
resjmnaenoc. gmerals Iirolre througli it iii a vnriety of warr 
nrss. and the lsing as usunl Licmme involvcd in ven 
ncrimonioua disputes. If he orrfercd onc t o  detnch troaps in 
nid of another, be sfia told lie sliaiiid rntlier send ndditionol 
troops to tlie first. If lie reprirnan.ntlerl n general for misin; 
contributrons contrary to the regulations, he ans amered 
that the soldiers mnst be fed; and alwnys tbe autliority of the 
prefects and intendnnts \vns cli~regnrdd in pnrsunnce of Napc- 
leonk orden. For tht  monürcli contiiiudly rerninded Ibis 
brother, tlmt .as the war waR cwried on by tlie French nrmies 
thcir intcrcsts wem paramoiint ; tliat tlic lring of Slinin muld 
Iinvc no ~luthorib over thcm, nntl miist iicvcr iisc Iiis militq 
authoritp as lieutenant of tIie empire in Md of liis king$ 
views, for with tliose the Prcnch soldiers could tave nothios 
to do,-their welfnre conId not be confided to S~iaiilsh minis- 
ters, whose capncity was by no means apparent, and who~e 
fidclity wns not cerhtin. 
In rcply Joseph again plcaded his tlut,irs f,nmnrds his sub 
jects, nnd his ~cntimenta, cxplaincd with fccling and p a t  
Eicneficenoe of daign, were woithy of nll pwise xbstrrtctedly; 

44 FENINSULA VdR. 11813. 
11y keeping al1 tlie Spanih families and authorities in wfeb 
and mrnfort, would draw al1 tiiose who favoured hig  cause 
from al1 pnrts of Spain, nnd would enoourage that attachment 
to hia pemon whicli he bclimed many SpaninrtIs to enkmin, 
And wliile be dedared the violence and injiistice of the  
French arrnies to be the sole cause ot the pmtracted resiatance 
of tlie flpitniards, a declamtiori fdse in fitct, that violenee 
hcing only one of man? causes, he continually urged the wcec- 
aity of beating the English before pacifying tlie people. 9 s  
if jt were po~ilile, alf-liand, tu hui WelIingtoe and bis 
veterana, ~mbedclclrd as they wert: ia tlie at.rong country u? 
Portupl, whiln Briti~h f l e i h  with fraops rtnd succoars of al1 
lrinds, liovcring on botli flanlrs of thc Frendi, wcre feeding 
and ~ustaining tlie insurrection of the Spaninrcls in thdr mar, 
hapoleon mas milting cnough to drive th English fmm the 
Penin~uIa and traiiquillire tlie people by 3y regulw govern- 
ment; but with profouiid knowledge of war, of politics, and 
o€ humm ~iuture, lis judged tlit: first muld only be done by a 
netbodical combination, in unison with that rule of ort whicb 
prwcrihes the satablislimcnt aníl sceiirity of thc baso of opb 
rations, ~iccurity wliich ,;auld not be ehtnincd if tlic bcncvolent 
Pisions of the king were ta siipersede militnry vigonr. He 
hugheri ia 6COrn mlien bis brother aasured Eiim that the Pen- 
insular~ wjth al1 tbeir fiery passions, tlieir fanaticism and their 
ipnmnce, would receive an equable govcrnment as a benefit 
from ttie hands oE an intrusive monarcb before tIiey liad lost 
nll hopa of resishnce by arms. 
Joseph was not Iiome~sr totally devoid of grounds for bis 
opinions. Be m e  deeply affected by the misery which he 
witncsscd, his Spanish ministcrs wcre cnrnest and importunat~ 
and rnmy Frcncli gcntrnls gnvc him toa much rcaaon to com- 
plain nf their violen& The length and muttrtion~ of tha 
i v a r  liad crmted a Inrp party willing enough to olitain tran- 
qdl i ty  at the yrice of submission, d i l e  others were ari we 
bave seen not iiidisposed, if he would bolil the crown on their 
terms, tú sccept his dynas. as one essentially springing fmn 
deiiiocracy, in preferente to tlie despotic base aud super- 
stitious family wliich tlie nation wrts mlled upon t o  nphold. 
It waa not - m t u r d  therefore for liim t o  desire to  retain his 
capital whtie the negotiations with Del Parque's amy were 
atill in existcnce; it was not tltrange that bc shonld be dis- 
pleased with Soult, efter reading tbat marshal's honest but 
offensiv~ lettcr : and certainlp it m liighIy mtlitablo to his 
charncter as a man and ae I king that lio woald not silcntly 
suffer bis mbjects to be oppressed by the generals. 
1 nm in distress for rnoney,' he oftcn cxdaimed to Na- 
polcon, 'such distrcas as no king cvcr cndured bofora, rny 
pinte i s  ~old,  rind on state ocwions tho appcnmnce of m a p i -  
ficence is supported by fnlae metal. My rnrniskra and house 
hoId are actually starving, misery js on every fme, and men 
othcmise willing are thus detcrred h r n  joininf: la liing so 
little abIc to support thcrn. ITy rcvenuc is ~eized by tlie 
genemls for the aupply of their t r o o ~ ,  and I cannot rts a king 
of Bprain, 6 thout  dishonou~, partnkc of thc mources t l i t is 
5om by rnpine from suh,jech wliom I havo s ~ ~ o n i  t o  protect; 
1 ciannot bc king o£ Spain and gencrnl of thc French; lek me 
resign both ond live pencenbIy in Frnmce. Your mnicsty does 
not knnw d i n t  ficenes are enncteil, you will ~hihiidilrr to henr 
that mcn formerIy rich rmnd dcvotcd to onr cnuse linvc hcen 
drivcn out of Zarngozo and dcnied cvcn n rntion of food. Thn 
maquis Cnvallero, a wuncillor of stnte, ministcr of justice rind 
known pcrsonally to yonr mnjcsty, has Iicen tlms uscd. Re 
has heen secn actually hMng for a piecc of brend!' 
If this &vnllcro ivna thc old minicter of Clirirlcs thhe 4th, 
no miscry wns too grcat a punislimcnt for Iiis tyrznnicnl rule 
under thnt monarch; yct if, ww not from the Ficnch it should 
have come; and Josepli's dixtrchis must have been aevem, 
Iiccause that brave ond honcst man Jondan, a mnrshal of 
Frnnce, mnjor-gcnernl o£' the amica and s personal favourite 
of tbe lring's, complrtined that the non-paymeot of Jourdmb 
his appointments had reduced him to absoIute E n m ~ m d -  
peuury, and after bomwEng until b i s  crdit wns 
exhausted he cxiulcl with difliculty procure subsktence. It is  
now time to continua the secondary warfare, wbich being 
*red over two-tliirds of spain and simulhneous, must be 
claased under two heada, narneIy, the operations north, and 
the operations sonth of tke  T a p a  
CHAPTER IV. 
'IY December 1812 Copons became captain-general of Cata 
lonia inskad of Eroles, hut his nrrival beinq delatycd tlie pro- 
&ce wns not rclieved from Lacy's mischievous sway until 
Pebruriry 1813, wlien Erolea, taki~ig tlie teinliomry commaiid, 
re-establisherl tLe hed-quarters at Vicli. The Freneh, being 
tlien nnmolwted save by tlie Eii,rrlish ships, pnsscd m enoi- 
moile convoy to Frnnce, lmt Ernlee vrrm not long idle. 
Februnrg. Tliroiigh a doub.fe spp lie sent a forgcd lcttcr t o  
the govemor of Taragona, deairing him to detach 
men with carts to transport atores from Xitjes; at the same 
time pretending a design to inmde the Cerdtañ~, whicieh brouqht 
a moveable column tu that qaartcr, he witli Mamo and 17illa- 
mil, by forced marches renchd Torre dem barra and met tlie' 
British equathon. Tbe intentien \ras tto cut off tFie Yrencli 
dctnchmcnt on ita march to Villa Nuem antl tPim to d h c k  
Tnmgonrg but fortune mles in wer ; thr! pvernar mccivcd a 
letter from Mm~rice Mothieu of a diferent tenor from the 
forgd letter, and with al1 hmh regnining his fortress ballced 
this well~ontrived plan. 
Xarsfield, at enmity witli Eroles, was tlien cornbining his 
opmtions witii Villa Campa and they menaced Almitz  in 
Awn; tiut Aiiiletier wlio wns at Teruel t o  watch Villa 
Cmpz and protect Sucliet's cotnmunications, immediately 
marclied h Daroca, Severuli a m e  from Zarago'xia t o  tFie wiue 
point, snd the Spaniards, alarmed by tbeir junctioq dispe~ed. 
LSa~firJd then rcturned to Cntnloniti, Bnssecour rtnd the Emp- 
cinatlo remainerl ncar Czienca, nnd Villa Campri as nsud hiinp 
npon the southem skirts of the Albamcin morrntain, r edy  to 
pounce on the Eliro or tlie C!undalguivir as dvantnge rnight 
offer. SucZiet was disqyieted. He could not draw reinforce- 
rnents from Catalonla, because NrtpoEmn, tmo to his principie 
of securing the base of opernfions, forbad bim t o  weaken tlia 
arrny tlicrey and afontmrle's brigade wna detached from 
Valencia to preserve the comrnunicntion betwecn Sapntum 
md Tortoza. Arapn, his place of irms mil pdncipnl mBgri- 
xine, tieing infestcd Iiy Mina, Duran, Villa Camptl, the Empe- 
cinado snrl Sarsfield, wa.9 hecoming daily more nnqniet, 
whemfore Pannctier% brigade wmained hetwcen Segorb6 and 
nnrocx tn riid Severnli. Tliiis, nl tliongh tlie armies nf Amgon 
and atnlonin miiqtcred more tlim tncvcnty tl~ou~nnd men, flint 
iif h r a p n  alonc Iiaving forty tliousand witli fiftp field-picccs, 
Srichet could not fight wit l~  morc than siaken tliouannd 
infnntry: two tliou~and cuvnlry and pcrlinps thirty gris bcyond 
tlko Xumr. Ris riglit flnnlr wns nlwrtys liablo t o  be turned by 
Rcqueñn, Eiis left by ttio sea, and his Eront \vas meiiaced by 
firty tlioiisand mcn, of ivllleh tEireo thousmnd were cavalry w i t l ~  
fiRy pieces ol  artillery. 
She component parb of tliis force were tlie Anylo-Gicilinn 
army eigh teen tliousiind, including Wlii ttiiiglmin's aiid Stoclie's 
rlivisions,Elio's amw, twelve thonannd escliisive of tlie divi- 
~ione of Bwseconr, Villa Campn, rind tlie Empcinado, wliicli 
tliough detaclied Pidonged to liim,-Del Pnnpe'a rirrny rein- 
forced by new levics from Xndnlusie, on papcr twenty 
tbousnnd. Nurnericdly this wns rt formidable power if it liad 
lieen dirccted in mnss ngninst Siichet ; but on l i i ~  right 8oiilt 
frum Toldo i~atchcd 3)cl Parqiiq and tlie defcction of tlie 
Ii~tter waR then being negotiated with tlie king. A column 
from Madrid J P R ~  dso ~ n t  to Cucncq wliich drcm off Rawr, 
cour antZ tlie Rmpccindo, mnd tliose chicfs Iiarnsscd Jwcplis 
powtions. Eorly in .hnuiiry, %u]~'R hrotlier, scrlcing tn apcn 
n communication with Sucliet by Albacete, defented eome of 
Rlio's ~mlry with tlie Ioss of fifty men, and pursiied tliern 
uiitii tliey raI13wl ou their main body unrler Freyre antl ofkrerl 
Irtittle wi!h nine Iitindred liotxenien iri fruiit of tlie delile lerid- 
ing to blbscete, Soult, disliking their ñppearance, tlien 
tnrned off to the riglih and joined a Frencli post esta- 
blished in Valdepena at the foot of the blorpna, whcre some 
skirmishes had also tnken place witli Del Parque" smlry. 
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The elder Sonlt t h n ~  Eearned tht  Freyre, with Ewo thoasand 
five h u n d d  borsemen, coverd al1 the rmds leding from 
L Alancha to Bdencia and Murcia; tliat Eliot infnlitry WHS 
at Tobar& md Hellin, Del Parque's lied-quiirtere at Jm; 
tliat the pssw of the Morena were griarded, md rnognzines 
fomcd at dndujiir, Linarca, and Carcloba, mliilc on tlie othcr 
side of La Mancha, tbe Empecinado had come to Hinojoso 
with fifteen hundred homemen, and the colnmn seut fmm the 
army of tlie centre \vas afraid to encounter him. 
These dispositions and the strength of tlie Epninrds, not 
only preventea the younger EouIt from peiietmting into 
Murcia but delayed the m m h  o£ a column under Daricau, 
destined to comrnunicate with Suclict and Iiriiig up the 
detncbments bnggnge nnd atorcs which the nrmics cif thc 
south and centre hnd lcft at Vnlcncin. Vie scouting parties 
of both sidea liowever met a t  diferent pointa, rand on the 
27th of January a sharp m d r y  fight happened nt El Corral, 
in whieh the French commander watq killcd aad tbe Spaniards 
tliough far tlie most numerous were defcated. Meitnwhile 
Darbu, wl~ose column liad Iieen reinforced, reaclied Utiel, 
opened the comrnunication with Suchet by Requeiía, cut off 
some smd1 parties of thc enemy, and tlim continuing lis 
march reccived a p a t  convoy, mmisting of twu theusnnd 
ñghting men six hundred trnvellers and the storcs and 
haggage belonging to Soiilt'a and the king's :'siirmies. This 
convoy had marched for Madrid by ttFie mity of Ztuagoz~, bat 
was recded when Daricau nrrived; md under liis escort, 
aided by a ítdetacliment ef Suchct's army plmd at Yniesta, 
it m11ed Toledo ths Iatter end of Faliruriry safcly, tliotigh 
'Villa Campa m e  down to the Cabriel river to trouble thtl 
march. 
During these different oper~t~ions umerous nbinird reprttr, 
principally originating in the Spnish and English nemprtpem, 
qbtainerl credit in tlie French armies; euch as, tliat sir 
R e n y  Welldey and Tnfmtado had seized the government at 
&diz,-that Clinton hiid by an intrigue got possession of 
AlicmE,-that Ballesteros h d  sbown Wellington secret orden 
from the Cortes not to acknowledga hi as generalissirno, 
or even aa a grmdee,-tbat the Cortes had removed the 
rgencp because the Ia&r permitted WeUingtoa to appoint 
intendanh and other officers f o  the Spanish provinccs,-that 
Hill had devnistated the frontier ancl retired t o  Lisbon, thovgh 
foreibly ~pposed by Morirlo,-that bt aepherv of RJFesteros 
h d  rfiised flie standard of rcvolt,-thnt Wclling$on wras 
advancing; and froops liad been embarked al; Lisbon for a 
mnritimr: expcdition, witli other stories of ri, lilte mture, 
wlridi Bcem to hnve disturhcd al1 the French generale mva 
Soult, whose information os to the real strite of affaim con- 
tinued to  be Fiure und accurate, He oEea detectd four OF Ave 
of Wellington'~ emissaries, ona a Portug~ese oficer on his 
o m  atar,  anotlier, mlled Piloti, wlio served and betrayed 
h t h  sides; and an amazon mllcd Francisca da la Fuerte, 
\\.ho, though only twenty-two years olaj liad alredy corn- 
maiiclcd s partida of sixty men with Borne auecess, and wlas 
now a spy. Buf in tLe I~tter end of Februmy he was 
remlled, and his commnnd fe11 t o  G w n ,  whose movements 
lidong ratlier tri the oprations north of the Tnys. Where- 
fore retumiti: to Si~cliet~, awn emct notion of his rcsovrces and 
of tlic ndnrc of the countv ahdl bc given. 
Vmlencin, tliougli nominnlly his strongliold wns not renlly 
so. AU the dcfences constriicted by the Xpaniards were 
razcd, and only tlie old mnlle and a smalI fortificd post iiitliin 
tlie town, sufficient to resist a sudden ~ttack and mpabls of 
lceeping tlio population in m e ,  were presemed; the place of 
nrms ivas Saguntum, and between that tlnd Tortozs lie Ld 
two Surtresses, Oropesa md PenisooI~ Anotlier liiie of com- 
munication, but for infantry only, ws tlirougli Rforella, a 
fortified post, t o  &equinenm; and there were rmds froiii 
Talencia, and Sriguntum, lending tlirough Segorb6 to Teruel a 
fartified post, and from thence t o  Zaragoza by PIm 2, 
Daroca another fortificd post: these roada wem 
eastwwd of tlie Guadalnviar. Westwarrl of tliat river Suchet 
had a line from Valencitt to Rf~lrid by Rcqueña, whiclh 
mns nlso fortifid. Kom if the whole cnmmnnrl Iie loiiked 
to, t h  forccs were very numerous, but t l is~ mmmand W A ~  
wide and in the field liis army m s  not vcry numeroiis, 
Valencia F Y ~ B  merely n puink on liostile ground. mi~intniiid 
uit1i a view of iqosing upon the allies md dsnwing f i nk  
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tbe reaourceei of the country as Iong as circumskancas mmtd 
permit. 
The proper Iine fm covmng the city and tlie rich country 
imm~liittely around it was on the Xucar, or rather h y o n d  ik, 
at San Fdippe de Xativa and Noxente; where a double rmge 
of mrinntalns affordcd strong defensive positions barring tlie 
principal roads leading to Valencia. Them Sucliet 
f i n  1 p. 67. had formed m entreuclied caml~, much talked of 
at the time yet sligbghter tl~m fame ~epresented it; khe real 
etrength wae in the natural formotion of tlie gronnd, wliich was 
Y" ruggetl. In front of his Icft flank thc coast mnd was 
b1ockc.d by the wtlc of Denia, biit his riglit coiild be tnmd 
from Yecle and Almanw throngli Gfrentea nnd Requeñrt; and 
he wm forced to keep strict watch and strong detachments 
always tomrde the defile of Mmanm, lest Elio's army m d  Del 
Parque's shonld marcli that way. His entrenelied c m p  wastlie 
permanent position of det'ence, lint lie sought to kceyi Lis troops 
more ndvmced; because the country in front wns fuH of fcrtile 
valleys, or rathcr covcs wit.hin tlic hills, wliich run in ncarly 
pamllel mngee and arc iemrrrkably rocky and precipitous, lilre 
walls. Tt wm of greaf importante to commanrl tliose copes, and 
as the principl point in front was thc flourisliing town of 
Alcoy, he oocupied it and from thence tlirew off smdlcr bodies 
to Biar, CmhIla, Ibi, and Onii, whiciii were oii the same strong 
ridge as tlie po~ition covering the covc of Alcoy. On his 
right tliere m another phin in &ich Fucntc La Riguerg 
Villena and Tecla were delineakd at opposite poinh nf n 
triangle; and as thk plJi1 and the maller vzlleys miniatered 
to Suchet'a wants bemuse of his mipcriar mvstlry, the sub- 
siiiatence of the French troops was eased d i l e  the canton- 
ments and foraging districts of the Sicilhn army were con- 
trzicted: tlie outposh of the allied army were in fmt confined 
ta a fourlh and f i f k l i  parailel mnge of mountains covering 
the torms of Elda, Tibi, Xixona, and Villa doyosa an the sea- 
cons t. 
Snchet thns nssnmed an insulting supcriority over an m y  
apparently moro numems than his own. But outward 
apparanca are deceitful in mar; he waa mlIy the strongest, 
becauae want, ignorame, diisensioe and eaen t m h e r y  were 
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in his adversq '~  eamp. Del Parque's army remilined hhind 
the Morena, Elio's was at Tohrra and Uellin, and of th 
Angio-Sicilim army the British only mre availahle in the 
hcvr of danger. 71Then CampbeU quarrelled with Elio the 
littter re t i rd  for tl time towards Hurcia, but afta Wd- 
lington's journey to C d i z  he again carne foward; hi cavdry 
entering La Mancha skirrmshed with the y o u n ~ r  fiouit: and 
communicating witli Bassecour and the Empecinado delqed 
ths pmgms of D&au towards Talen& Campbell thw 
rmaiiied quiet ia expectation that lord William would come 
with more troops; but in Pebmarg fre~h troublea broke out 
in Sicily, md in the latter end of that montli air dohn N m y  
acsumed the eommand at dicant .  !bus in a few months 
five cbiefs with different Piews md prejudicea had successively 
h v e d ,  and tlie army wati still unorgnnixed imd unequippetl 
Tor vigorous, scrrice. The Sicilians, Calabrese, and Frcnch 
bclonging to it mere engcr t o  daserb; ono TtoIian rgiment 
hnd becn broken for miacondud. by Maitlnnd, thri Brit-ish and 
Qcrmans w c r ~  humilintcd iu spirit by inactivit.y, 
and tlie LSpaniarh undw Whittinghglinm and Roche $,pSfntlFYes 
were starving; for Wellington howing how the 
Spanisli government, GEiough ree~ving  a subsidy, ~ o n l d  if 
perrnitted throw o ñ  tlie feedi~ig of their troops, forbde their 
Iieing. supplied from the Britisli atores, and. the Spiptanish 
inteudants neglected thern. 
X m y  improved the equipment of the troops, and witii 
the aid of Elio put them iu better conrlition. The two 
armies together furnislied thirty thousmd dective men, oT 
which three thwsand were eavalrp, and they hsd thirty-seveti 
p n s ;  yet very inadequately horaed, md Whittinglirtm's ant1 
Elio's crtvalry were from want of fo~age nearlp u&t for dutp. 
TIie trrinsport mules were liired at tlie enormous mte oE une 
hundred and thirty thouriarid pountla iinnually; 
Gcneml 
and yet t l~e mpply ma4 bd, Eor herc as in al1 Uwkikin'a: 
othcr parta of Epain corruption ~ n d  mime of 
autbority prevailed. The rich sent tlieir finc animale to 
Alimt for sanckuary md bribed the dcaldes; thc mules of 
the poor don8 weis prcssed, the ormy ivas iIl provided mi1 
tLe country wabi hwamed. But the truops of Whittiughnm ind 
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Ruche mnld not be rclicvcd, s w e  by enlar~ng tlieir cnnton- 
rnents ; wherefore hf~~rray after some Iiesi tnti on resolved to 
drive the Frcnch fmm the rnounhins in his front, ancl follow- 
ing the plan of Lis qwrter-master-genernl Donkin designe& 
m the fimt step, to surprise fifteen liuntlred men which thcp 
had placed in Alcoy. 
Fiw rods led towards the French posit,ions. 1'. On tlie 
Ieft the greet rond from Alicank pas~ing throiigli Monforte, 
Eldn, 8m, Villanu, nnd Frientc de In FTigicm, mlicrc it joins 
the m ya1 road frmn Talenciñ tu Madrid, wliich nins tlirough 
Almana TTh i a y  tmed both tlie ridges occupied by the 
armiea, 2'. A gond road leding by Tilii to Clistdla, fmm 
whence it sent off two branches on the left hananil, one leading 
to Ehx tlie other througli the pws of Biar to Tillena; two 
otlier liranclie~ on the riglit Iiand went, tlie one ttivugh Ilii 
to Alcoy, tlie othr  tlirough Oiiil t o  blre m e  plnce. 3'. The 
road from Alieant to Xixone, a hd road leading aver a steep 
rngged ridgc of tliut name t a  Alcoy. At Xixonn also them 
was a nanow way on tlie riglit lianrl through the mountaina 
to Alcoy, wliich mas fallomed by &elie when he a t k k e d  
that place in the first battle o€ Qstalla. 4'. A carriaproad 
nuining dong the seacoast as far a.q Yilla Joyosa, from 
whence a n a m m  mountain-wq leads to the village of Con- 
sentqna, sitnateil in the wve o1 Alcoy arid Ldlind that 
town. 
On the 6th of 31arch the dlicd troops moved in four 
columns. On thc Icft, onc movcd by Eldn t a  lvntcli the peat 
Madrid rod; on the rigiit, iine zomposerl of Spanish troops 
moved under coloriel Gnmpbell frorn Villa Joyom to gek to  
Coasentapa behind Alcoy; a tliird under lord Frederick 
Bentinclt, issuing by Xbi, was ta turn the French riglit; th6 
fourth u%s t o  march. from Xixona straig1:lit ngainst Alcoy 
and puisue the rcIuaider ol EIabert's division, wliich waa 
Iieliirid that tawn. Lord Frederick attwked iii due time 
but aB Gmpbell did not appwr the su i~r i se  fiiilcd; md when 
tlic Prench saw tIie mnin botly winding down the Bcrm in 
front af dlcoy, thcy mtircd, pursucd by Donliin with the 
spcond bnftalion of the tweniy-smenth rcgirnent. The hend 
of lord Frederick's column was &ea$ engaged, the  rear had 
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not amived and tha mhole of Rabert's divjsion being concen- 
trnted a mile beyeod Alcoy offered battle; XIurray instead of 
puuliing briiikly {un\-ami halted; and it wm not until seveml 
demands for support b d  readied him tliat he detached tlie 
fiSty-eigiittt to tlie a~sistance of tlie troops eugqed, wdio hacl 
lost about forty men, chiefly of the twenty-seventl. IIabert, 
fea~ilng t o  be cut off by Consentopa snd seeing the fifty- 
eigl~fh coaiing on, tlien retrentcd ancl tlie allies occ~ipied 
Alcoy. Murrny's want of ngonr did not eacape the notice of 
tlie tmops. 
After this affair the armies rem~tined quiet nntil the 15th, 
when Thittingliam forccd the Prencli posts witli some los3 
from Albayda; ~ l n d  Donkin, t'tlcing two battaliow and some 
dragoons frnni Ibi, d~ove  ha& ttlieir niitpn~tn from Rucqrente 
nntl AIwfiarn, vi:lngca situated iieyond tlic rnngc :e,Ian l, 
a'l. botintling the c o ~ c  of Alcoy. Re scyinssed tlic 
liills liiglier up with tlie dmpons  niid n compnny of the 
grenzdicrs of t~venty-se\-eiitli urider ixqitaiii IVnldroii, and 
returiied by tIie in~iiii rontl to Alcoy, lir~vilig iii liis course 
met n Frencli battalion tlirougl~ wliicli tiie gallxnt Knlrlroil 
broke witli Iiis grenndiers. Tlicn 3Iurray, aftcr mudi racilla- 
tion, a t  one timc reaolving ta advance at anotlier to retreat, 
thinking it impmsible to  farce Suchet's entrenclied cnmp anrl 
Iiis secontl line Geliind the Xucar, a difficiilt nver with rnnddy 
brinlrs; lielieving also tlrat t l ~ e  principal Pre11cli niagnxiiies 
were at Brtlencia, lie conceived the Idee of seizing the Ltter by 
a mnritime expetlition. He tlioiigl.lit tlic gnrrison, wtim~terl 
nt eiglit Iiuiidrctl infniitry nnd on c tlioi~snnrl. cnvnlry, wuuld IE 
unribic to resist niid tlint tJic inli~biti~uts wauld risc ; Siiclict 
could uot tlien detncli meu enough to qncll thcm ~vitliout 
exposing liimself to defeat on tlic Xucur, urld if he ntovecl 
with a11 Iiis force lie muld be closely foilowed by tlic allíes 
nnd driven upon Rcqueñih 
On t l ~ e  18th Rocbe's division reinforced by some troops 
from IBio'ri nrmy and a Eritisli greuadier bathlioii was 
selected for tfie mnrifime nttack; the rest o f  tlie nmy \VAS 
concentrattd at Castnlla, witli exccption of Wliittinglinm's 
troops mlio remmined at Alcoy, foo Suchct m snitl to Zia 
advancing rand 3Iumy resolved to  fight km. But to form ti 
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11lan md t n  exemte it vigorously were ic?tli Murray vwg 
diffcrcnt tliings. An abIc o ñ i m  jn tlie cnljinet Iie I r d  no 
qmlity of a geneml in tlle ficld. Bia indccision wm remñrk- 
alile. On the moining of tlie 18th Iie resoIved to  fight in 
front o€ Casbllri, in tlie eveniag Iie assumed a weaker pmition 
Iiehind tliat t o n ,  abandoning tlie ciimmaiid of a road m- 
ning frorn Ibi in rem a~f Alcoy, by ~vhicli Wl~ittingliam might 
Iinve been cut off: when tliei stmng r~mtinñtnmces of bis 
qunrter-muster-gen~rní intluced hirn ito relinquiali tliis gronnd, 
Iie ndopkd n tliird positinn ncithrr so Ktrong nx tlic first nor 
RO defective as the la*. Iti t l i i ~  rnanrier aK~ir s  wore on unti1 
the 26tli, when Roche's division anrl ttie grcnadicr battalion 
rnnrclied to A I i w t  to edark,  with orders, if they ftaiItid st 
Valencia to seize and fiirtify Citllera at the mouth of the 
Xucar; and i£ tliis also failed tu Iiesiege Denia. But now 
tlie foolish ministerid tlarhngernaitu aliout tlie Bicilian m y  
worked niit t.Iieir nattimi rcsult. Wcllington, though p 
mitkd tc  rctain thc hnglo-Siciiiraii army in Spnin bcyond the 
p15od R ~ s ~ ~ I I c ~  by lord Willinm, hnd not thc fiill oommand; 
1ie s a s  clogged with referencc tci the state of Sicily until the 
middle of hfarch; then he Iiecame mwter, hut this mas still 
irnknom to lord WilIiam and to BIurray. Thw there w e ~  
three conmauding oficcrs. Wellingtun for tha 
hlurr~ty for the particular opemiio~s; and lord William w~ 
empolvered tu isicrease or diininisl~ tliu troops, and even upon 
cmcrgency ta witlidmw the wliule. A n ~ l  now continud 
difisension~ in Sicily, tFie king liaving siiddenly rmurned the 
govtrnment, msdc him rcenl two tliousiind of tlie hst. troops, 
xnct amongst them tlle p n a d i e r  battpllion designecl to atbdt 
Talentia, wwherdore that enterprise fe11 to tlie growid. 
??reating of  tliie event, Murctiy, or some person d t i n g  
Phillipam under his autliority, makm the following ohervit- 
J i i l l t ~ ~ ~  tions. ' The most careful oomliination couId not 
Cnleiidrv. llave seleded a moment wlien the dnnger of sud 
nuthoriky wae more clearly demonstrrsted, more severely felt, 
Had tliese orders been remived a very short time before, tbe 
allied army would not l w e  been cximmittd in &ve opere- 
fiona; Iiad they reached sir John Murmy a week hki, f h e ~  
Is ever rwson to  believe that tlie wliole conntry frorn Al imt  
to Vaienc.ia would llave p s e d  d e r  the authoriky of the 
allied amy; and that mmlizil Xuchet, cut off from his maga- 
ziiies in tliat province and in Aragon, mouId lmve heen 
oornpdled t o  retire through a mauntainous and barren 
oiiuntry on Nadrid. But the oder  of lord WilIinm Bentinck 
.mas psrernptorg, and ths allied army mhich even before was 
scarcely balance4 W ~ S  now so inferior t o  the enemy that it 
became an indispensable necessity to adopt a p t e m  strongly 
defensive, ancl a11 liops of a briIlimt commencement of tlie 
campnign vanished.' 
Upon tliis curious passage it is necessarg to remarlq 
1'. That fSuclirt'si great mngmines were not at Talencia but at 
Rnguntum; 2". Tliat itm ttie &le of Denia the fieet ivoukd 
have bcen descriad and tlie strong gamison oi Saguntum 
could 11avc reinfowcd tlio traops in Trnlencjn; Montmarie's 
brigrtdc dso woulrl soon have come up from Oropcsa. Tliese 
mcre doubtlcss contingcneica not mncli to bc rcgardcd in bnr 
of ~uch  an cnterprise; Ziut Sriclict sould not have been forced 
to retira by 4-Ieqiieiín upoii Madrid; lie ~vouId liwe retired to 
Liria, ttlie road to ~vliicli deered more tlian five d e s  dear of 
lrtilencia. He could llave kept that city in check while p a s  
ing, in despits of Murrnr; rrnd at Liria Iic would llave been 
ia I~is nattirril position, tlint is t o  saty, in full comrnand o€ bis 
principal lines of communication. Moreover: however de- 
rigrcenblc to Xucliet pcrsonally it might have been hu be forced 
Iiack npon Madrid, that event would bave been extremely 
dctrimentd to tlie general miise, as tending to rcinforce the 
king ngainst TVellington. But the ~ i n p l a r  ptlrt of the p5 
magc q~oted,  ia tlie asecrtioa that the delay of a week in 
lord IFTi'i:liam's order \yould h a n  ensured mich a nohle stroke 
egain~t tlie Erench army. Eord PTilliam anly requircd tho 
trnnp~  to proce!eed in tlic fimt instnncc to 3hlion. Whnt a 
dull flngging. spirit tlien was hifi, who dnred noi delay 
olictlience fo such m order er7en for a weclc! 
The recxlled Iroops embarked for Sicily the 5th of April, 
and Sucliet alarmed 3 the offensive position of the ailies, 
wliicli he attrilittted to the genera1 state of affair~, because the 
kin@ mar& to Castille permitted al1 the Spani~h miea 
cif dndalusia to reinforce Eli4 resolved te strike first; md 
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with the grmter avidib, b w ~ i s e  tlie S p ~ n i ~ l ~  genemi Mijnre 
had been pushed witli aa sdvaiiced g~iard of tliree or fonr 
thousand men to Yccls and mns qiiite uiimpported. TliL 
movement liad been concerted in l iardi Mtli N n m y ,  ahli 
was to occiipy Villena ancl Se prepared to fa11 upon tlie 
French left if Mij~rea was attncked nt YecIn; in return tho 
Spnninds werc t o  fall on thc Frcnch right if hlurray wa 
attnckd. Elio nncglcctcrl t o  atrcnfit~rn his diti- 
sion at Y e c l ~  mith cnvnlry, wliich hc hmd pro. &[SS. 
mised t o  de, nor dM Murrny ocmipy Tillena in 
force; nevertlieless Mijares rcmeincd nt Yecla, Elio with tbc 
main body occupied Hellin, and thc m~rnlry mme poafed on 
the side of Albacete nntil tlie departure of the troops for 
Eicily~ Roclie t l~en joined tlie army rit CastalIa, ant! Elio's 
main body occupied Eldu nnd S:&x to covcr thc rnrtin rowl 
from JIodrid to Alimnt. Wiirrrfort: nn tlie ni$t of thc 
11th Suchet aiddenly ilssemMer1 siixteen hattalionsi .nf infanti?; 
ten squrtdrons of cavalry, mrl t~volve pieca of rirtillery ak 
Puente la Higuera, and rnarchcd straight upon Caudetc, 
while Harispe's division by n cross road cndeavoured to  sur- 
prise the Spnniards at Yecla, The 'Ixtter retired figl~tiii; 
towwds Jumilla by Qie liills, Iiut the Frcnch nrtillery anil 
skiimi~hlier~ foliomed close and tlie Spaninrtls mere piercd io 
the ccntrq onc pnrb brolie nnd fled, thc othcr pert surren- 
dered. Tmo liunclred were killeil, niid fiftcen Iiandrcd, 
jnclnding wounded, fcll into thc linnds of tlie victom, who l o t  
eighty men md officcr8. 
Sucliet'g mo~cment wae lrnown in tlie nig11t of the 10th 
at Castalla A11 the Anglo-Sicilinn army wxq in positioii, 
because Whittingharn bd come froni Alcoy, lenving onIy a 
detachment on that side; and while 1Inrispc was defeating 
Mijares at Yecla, Guchet remained at Cnudcte wltli two divi- 
aioiis and the lieavy cavalq in order of linttle, Iest Murrq 
shouId advance by Biar and Villena. Tlie In.t,tcr to~vn, pnq- 
sessing un old m11 md a mtlc, WM occtipied by thc s@- 
ment of T'clce-Malaga n thonsnnd stronc, alid jn tlie cotirse 
of the d ~ y  hfurray also mme u p  d l i  tIte allied cavdry snd 
a brigade of infantry. Here he was joined by Elio witliout 
troops, and when tomrids evening, Hmispe'8 figllt being mer 
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and the yfi~onem seenred, Suchct ~Tmnce ~etircd 
with the cavnlry throngh tha pnsq of Rini. 11 iiifmtrg 
iintler colonet Adnm in fmt of that rlefile. nr: wislicd nlso 
to dram the Bpnnish ptrt-ison from Trillen 
not srtffcr it, rind yct during thc niglit, rcpe 
nncp, camc ta  Castalln entrcnting Murray 
brtttnlion. It wn9 too latc, Suchct h d  broken tho 
the town tlie weriing beforc, and the mstlo with 
equipped aníI finest rcgiment in the Spanish army hac 
snrrendered, 
Sir Jolin Blurr~fg finril position m s  about thr 
Trom the pnss of Bittr. His left, entire@ cornposed 
tingham's Spanrnrdg ms entrenclied on a rugyed sie 
ing abmptly a h v e  Castnlla, which, with its olrl w t l e  crown- 
ing aa isolated ñuqar-Ioaf MI, d o s ~ d  tha  rigl.lit of that wing 
and  as occupied in stren&h bp genemi hlacl~nsic's division. 
A sprice betwcen Ivhittinghams troopq rsnd tlie town mis 
teft on tlie sicme for thc aclvanceci guurd, then in the pass of 
Riw. CCEIP~~! :~  i t s ~ l f ~  covcred by the castie, was pepnred for 
defence anrl tlie principal qrproncheci mere commandecl by 
at~ong l,nttcr!rica, for llurrny hnrl cnilccntmted ncnrIy nlI hin 
p n a  al; tlii~ poink Tlic c ~ n ~ l r g  ww partly bcliind partly iii 
front of tlic kown on nn extensive plnin whicli wrw inkr- 
spcrsed wi t l~  olivo plnntntions. 
Thc right ming, ccmpriscii of Clinton's diviaon nnd Rochc's 
Spaninrds, m on compnrativeiy IGW gmund, and extended 
tv tlie rcnr at rlg11t nngIe.9 witll tlie centre, bnt well covered 
by n 'Eiarrnnao' or Lcd of a torrent, tlic prccipitous sides of 
nliicli aere in some ~ilnces one liuudred feet deep. 
Sucliek coiild apliroach tliis position tiirou~r;li tlie pass of 
13I~r, or tm tlixt defile by tlie wxy of &x; but he sup- 
posed Eliu to be on tlie last rond, whicli vas also uniiiritiiig 
becaiiae it involved a flank msrcli nlong tlie front of hliimafs 
position; antl that general, possessing tbe defiles of Biar nnii 
Alcoy, miglit llave safely pushed to tlie X~tcnr by Firentcs la 
Higuera or hy Alcoy, eeeing tliat hlicnnt m e  secure nnrl tliat 
Elio coulrl endy hnve eaciipci1. Tlie nllics wcre fnr too 
inactiVc to fnke the initial, pet Suchet advnnccd cautioiisly, 
for the ground oKereti niany meam to strike ;e decisivo 
:nving Iiis 
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Iilow. Murmy h d  no such tliought, his advanced guard 
remaiaed on the defensiw in tlie pass of Biar, being com- 
posed of two Itdian ~egirne~tfi, nnd a Iiatklion of tlie twentp 
rievendi, 4x0 companies of Glennan riflemen, a troop of foreign 
liussars and six gunfi, four bGng mountaiii-picces; if; occiipied 
etrong gound, but af two o'clock in tlie afternoon of tlie 
l2t4 the French skirmisliers swarmed up tlit? steep rocks on 
eitlier flank with wprising vigour and agility, and dien they 
liad gnined the summit tlie stipporting coluinos advancd 
The allics fonglit wlth remlution for two hura and tlien 
ribandond the I)IL.~S Wltli tlle loss of two guns and thirtp 
yrisoiiers, retreating hawever i~ p o d  ortler t o  tlie main posi- 
tion, for they were not followed begond tlie mouth of the 
defile. Xext driy, about one o'clock, tIie French cavalrg 
jssued cautiousIy from tlie pass extmding to their left in inhs 
plain as far as On2, and tliey mere fulloiued Iiy tlre infaniq, 
who imrnediately oecupied a low ridge aliout a milc in front 
of thn nllies' lcft; the CRWL~IT thcn gnined poiincl t o  the 
fmnt, skirtcd the of tlie allies and mcnaced tlie mad. to 
Ibi and Alcoy. 
Nurray had rinIy occupied his gronnd during the night, 
liut he liad previous1-y studied snd entrenclied it in partk 
Bis right wing m s  quite refused, and so protected by ';be 
barranco that nearly a11 the t roop~  eould havo lieen employed 
aa a reserve to the lcft wing; wliich \vas also ~trongly post4 
and preacnted a fmnt abont two milcs in cxtcnt. Eut not- 
witlistanding the strength of his position Iie slmnk from 
the contest, and d i l e  the h e 4  of thc French oolumn was 
adwincing from tbe defile of Biar, liei tlirice g w e  Donkin 
ortlers t u  put the amy in retreat; twice tliat oofcer remon* 
strated, but tlie Iast commanJ ww so pemmptory that 
oliedieiioe must h v e  foIIowed, iC at thak moment tlie finng 
between the piquete aiid tlie French Eight troops bad nut 
licgun. 
BATJZE OB CASTALILA. 
Suchet's dispositiona wcre slowlply mnde, as if &e also m 
inrlisposd t o  figbt ; and as a crookett juk of tlie sierra liid aU 
tlie British trwps and two-tlirds of tlie whole army, hia fvst 
measure \vas to send a column to tnrn if and dismver the con- 
ditions of the positioa Two other heavy columns were 
formecl opposite the l& wing, snd hia atrong cavalry p 
diially clrised on tlie Baranco. Tlie right of the dlies wa-rt 
impregnable, and Suche$ kecping hia reserve in the plna 
snd tlie exploring colurnn near CmtaIlit to protect hia left 
from a sally, opened his guns wainst tlie centre and right, 
1vLi1e ~creral columns of attttack m d e d  their left on hoth 
sid- of the jut before mentioned. WFlrhittinghamFs p u n d  
being rough and stwp the bettle there resolved itseIf into a 
slíirniisli of Iight troops; but though ;he mmm. was 
entrenclied and the Symiards fouglit uot amiss, &ir left wm 
beden froin tlie mountain. Mcanwhile on the other side of 
t h ~  jut tlie Preiich ascended slowly, yyet so firmly thlit it was 
evideiit good figliting oiily would send them down ag8in. 
Tlieir skismisliers, s p r e ~ d i t l ~  over the moiintlain and here and 
tlierc attaining the summit merc partially rlriven d o n  qain, 
hit where the main b d y  met tlie ~econrl httnlion of the 
twciity~wentli tliere was f i  terrible csmli. Tlle gmund had 
nn ubriipt declinntian wliicli enñblcd tlio French to f o m  line 
unclcr wver, close to tlie Hi.itish, who were lying down in wait 
foi. theniomenf of clinrghg; agrenudier oficerseized the occasion 
to arlwancc anri dicll len~ mTaldron, mlso cnptnin of pnnrlisrrt, 
to n duel. Thnt q i l c  viprairs Trid~rnan itisturitly Icap~l  for- 
ward, tthe hostiIs lines loolred an, tlie swords of tlie cliampions 
glittered in tlie sun, tIie Frenclimun'a head was cleft in twain, 
und the twenty-seventh, risi~ig up mith a deafening shout, 
fimi a deadly volley nnd clinrgeed with such a shoclr that, 
riiuugre their liravery and nuriilierti Suchet's men wcre over- 
tliron.n, tind tlie side of tIie sierm way euvered with lrilled and 
\vouiirld. liurray erruuevudy attributerl tLis brilliant exploit 
to coloiiel Adiim, it was both tlie desigp and work of colonel 
Reeves. 
When tliis column ntaa overthroivn, t ~ v o  secondsry attacka 
wwe mnde ta cover i ts retreat, but tliey nIso failed and the 
Frencli nmy %vas thus separated in three parta; nemalg, the 
beaten troops a110 were in disoriicr, the rcserve in tlie plains, 
the ca~nlry fiir on the left, fcnded off by the bcd o€ tlic tor- 
rcnt, tlie ouly hridgc over which was conimnnded by tthe 
allieri. A vjgorous sal1 y from CastxIla aild a, general counter- 
atbck would hnve driven the French infitntry upon the defile 
of Bias before their cnvdry could lime nidcrl tlicin; but Mur- 
my, who kild remained dnR~ig the act,icin Iicliinrl CashlTl~s, g.ve 
them full time to rally md retirc in order; for filing by tlie riglib 
through tbat t o n  and there el~anging his froiit mith tedioii~ 
pedantry, he formcd two lines across tlie vallcy covcred by 
h i ~  cavalry. Mackenzie only, brenlciug out by tlie leih of Cm- 
t91Ia with tliree Bntisli antl one Gerinari b:~ttiilion 3url eight 
gunfi, followed the enemy brislrly. AI~anivliile Sucliet p1unged 
into the pnsa, infantry cavnlry and tumhrils in one mus, 
lewing only ia rear-plird of tliree battnlions witli eighi guns 
to cover tha pnss~ge. Answering ,min for p n  tliey stood 
their ponnd, the clatter of musbctry commenced and one 
vigorous cliarge aould have dashed them npon the army 
tlien wedged in the defile: but Waclcaiixie's dvance liad been 
ordered by Donlcin witliout Murray's knoivlctlge, and the 
Iatter instead of supporting it scnt repeated orders towitli- 
dmw, nnrl despitc of a11 rernon~t~mncc compcIlcd She troops 
to come baclr. Xttclict tlms relieveri took H. position across 
the defilc with 11is flanke on tlic heiglita; and tliougli Murrny 
sent swie companiea to menacc Iric left lie retained his 
ground and in f ie  night retreated to Ft~ente de 1s IIiguen, 
fimt bloming up the cmtle of Tillciiu. Tlie 34th ñTurrap 
mm11ed to Alcoy, lvliere some of Wliittinglixni's force liad 
remained to watch a Frencli detucliment lioldiiig tha pass'of 
Albnyda, by ivhich he proposed to intcrcept 8iiclict's retrcnt; 
but his movcments wcre slow, liis rirrnngcment4 hnd, ths 
troope p t  into confiision, he hdted the 15th at Alcoy, and 
a feeble demonstmtion b a r d s  Albayda terrninated liis opera- 
tions. 
Jn the battle the alTies, including Tiociie's division, had 
geventeen thoumnd combatanthi; tlie Frcncli ltad fifteen tl~ou- 
wd, if a detaclirnent left beyontl Biar kto match tlie Spsriiards 
hSuehet o ak Sax be reckoned. Suclict says the nctian wtls 
the kin&, forced on by the light troops npinñt hirc m-ish, and 
3iss. thnt he lo& only cight hundrerl men. Yiis &ata- 
ment is con8med by the historian Vacani; but M u m y  d e d  
It B pitched bathle m¿i sud the French lost thee thonsand; 
tlie reader m q  clioose : but in fwour of Suclict's reraion, 
neither the time uor the incide of atta& was conformablbla 
to his t n h t  and cxprienco if he kad d ~ ~ i g n ~ d  a pitcliod 
tinttle. And tliough the action was strungly contcated ah 
the principal puint, it Xp ~ w c e l y  pos~ible that so many m 
three tl~ousnnd men could Lave been kiUed and wounded. 
k'ct ciglit hundred seems too fe~v, because tiie loss of the 
victoriow troolis Mth itll d v a n t z p s  of ground was more 
tllau six hundred, If Suciiet l i d  lust three thousand men, 
tiiut is  tu say a fourtii ~f liis iiifantry, lie must Iiave been 80 
crippId, tlitit whak with tlie narrow defile of Riur in tlie rear 
and tlie distnncr: of  hitr cawlry in tke plain, to buve escaped 
at $1 nns extremely rliscrcrlitablle to Riurray'~ generdsliip. 
Au &le cominanilcr liaviiig n superiur furce, aiid tlie allies 
wei e ceriaiiil y tlie most numerous, would iievcr hxve suffered 
tlie pam of niar to  be furced on tlie 12th; or if it wcre forced 
lie ivould have liad Iiis arn~y well in h n d  tiehiiid it, ready to 
fnll tipon thc head of  tlie French cuiumn as i t  issued inte 
tlie low ground. But so little vigour lid RIurrdy that he 
itsoEvcd if tlie Fretich qzin ildvancd to ahaudon the Eeld 
aud retire to hlicaut ! 
8udiet violxted severa1 maxims o€ art. For Gthout an 
adeqriare oliject lie fonglit a bnttle, ha~ ing  a clefile in 3ii3 rerar 
and on gmiind whcre l i is cavalry, in which lic \vati superior, 
could not act. Keitlier B e  general state of tlie French affnlrs 
nar tlie pnrticiilttr ci~cumstxuew invited a decisivc offensi~e 
nmvcment nt tlie Gitne: wlierefoie Iie should Iinve been mn- 
tented wikh liis first suoce.ssm agninst tlie 8pnniartls and 
ngninrit Colonel Adnrn, iinless some pallinlilz ~dvnntage had 
heen offercd fo him by Nulnrray. X ~ i t  he latter's position wns 
vmy strong iiidecd, xnd thc Frencli a m y  ~vac coopcd up 
bctivccii tlic pass o€ Biar antI tlic nllicd t,roops. Rad Elio 
exccuted a rnavement whicli Aiui~ny proposd in tlic night of 
tiic 12th; nnnicly, to push troops into tlic mountgns from 
Sax to strengthen Wliittinguiin'a left nnd mcnncc the rigfit 
flniilí of tlir cnemy, Sudiet'~ positien would Iinvo been very 
dangerouo; Elio Lowever kept liis arniy uIoof nnd acted witli- 
out conccrt tliluugh only a, few miles distnnt. Tliis might 
Lu~e been al-oided if thc castle and town of Villena had been 
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in 8 g~d d a t e  of defence and the p ~ s  of Biar omupied i, 
fome behind it: the h o  amies would. then hnve been hieeure 
of jmction in adyanw and tho plain of Viem would haTe 
been commanded. To the courage of Ghe t ~ o p  thmfore 
bdong~ dl the merit of the sucoess obhined, for there m 
generalship, and tbough E I U C ~  blmd  ras spat rip pmfit 
denved from victory. 
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OPERATIOS5 NOETH OF TRE TACiUR 
bw this side, a4 in the sonih, one part o€ the Fmnch fronted 
Wellingtonk forces, whife the re& m~rrecl mikh the partirlas, 
wntclicd tlie Rnglish flects on tlie coast, snd cndcawured to 
maintain si free intercnurse with France; hut the extent o$ 
countrp WM g.rcakr, the lines of commiinicntion longer, thc 
war altogctlier more difficult and the various operations mmc 
dissevarcd. 
Four cli~tinct bodies acted nortli of the T w s .  
1'. Tho amy of Portiig111, aix divisions nnrIcr Rcille, 
observed the nllies from Iiehind thcTormcs, the Gallicians from 
behind tho Esla 
2". Tlmt part af the ibrrny of tlia south which obsewed 
Hi11 fmm bciiind the rCictnx, and the Spmiard~ of Estremadura 
from bchind tlio Tagus. 
3". TI-re m y  of tlie north under Ca&reIli, wlio~e businwe 
m t o  wratch tlie Englili~h ~qundrons in the Bny of Biucap, to 
scour the grcat line of cornmunication with Fmuce, and pro- 
tect the fortrcsne~ af Naverre aud Bi~cay. 
&O:", The army of thc centre uiider Drouet, whose task wns 
to fight tlie partidw in tlie central ppart o l  S~iliin, to cowc 
Madrid nnd connect the other amies by iynie~nns ooF movenbls 
columns radiating from tliat mpital. If tlie eperaiions o€ 
these armies Ix follo\i.ed in tlie order of tliefr iinpurtmce, 2nd 
their beiiring on tlie main ackion of tlic caililifaigii iiiarlred, it 
will grad~iülly be understood Iiow it was, tllut. ir1 1813, tlie 
Frencli, although apparcntly in their full strength, were sud- 
denly irremdiubly and as it were by a whirlwind swept. from 
the Peninsula 
D'~Lmgnñc's and Barroid, Frcncli divisionq, Palombini'a 
1813.] x.. CHAP.
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Italiinq Ctisa Palacio's Spaniard~, Trielhud's dmgoong, und 
Joacph'a Frcnch parda fomed tEie nnny of the centre; 
V&. which, in returning from the Tomes, hnd one hundred and fifty nen, from the rash use of 
alcohoI, frozen to death in the Gaadarama pasa Palombini 
had bew at 6mt detached to forago the c o u a t ~  towards 
Quadalaxara, and he brongl~t abuilclance of piwvisiom to 
the capital; he would then have gonne to Znrngom h 
remive recruits snd storea just arrived from Italy, liut tbe 
army of the north ww so pressod tliliat lio 1Emlly merched 
to its succour; moving however by tlie circuitou~ route 
af Valladolid and Burgos to scaur tlrc country. The king'~ 
.gnnrdti replnced his dívision nt Alala, rtnd sharp exmrsions 
were made on mery side a g i n a t  tlie padidw, wha being now 
remited and trtught by French hserters were very wary and 
fonght obstinately 
On the 8th of J a n u q  Espert, gwernor of Segoma, beat m 
SaorniE not far from Cuellsr. On the 3rd of Febmry, 
geneml %eher~r, marching upon Medina Ccli, routed a regi- 
ment of horse called the vcilunteers of Madrid, iind took six 
hundred prisonsrs. The Empecinado sitli two thousand 
infnnty and a thouwnd cnvnlq interceptcd him on hia return, 
but Vichery hent him lvith considerable slaitghter and mdade 
the retrent good 6 t h  a Ioss only o€ seventy men. The perilla 
chief waa then reinforced by bornil  and Abril in tlie hilla 
abont Guadalaxam; and when Drouet sent fresh troops against 
him, he attacked a detnchment under colonel Prieur, killed 
fwenty men, took tlie baggsige and recovercd a Fieavy contri- 
bution. The French were alsa continually harassed in the 
w1lep of tbe Tagus, notabIy so by a clnef cnlled Ciresta, who 
was sometiniea in the GuarlaIupe mouuhiils, sometimes on 
, 
&e Tictar, sometinles in tlie Vern de Racentiaj and was 
oupported at times on the sido of tla Guadalripe by M o d o  
nnd Penne Villemur, Rill's vicin ity Iiowevcr disquietcd them 
most on that sidc; his enterpriscs Iinrl mde a profound 
irnpression, nnd thc slightcsG cllzngc of his quarkrti, even the 
apparmce o€ an English uniform beyond tlie line oF mnhn- 
ments, caused a concentration of troop to meet one of his 
audden bloivri. 
Nor waa the nrmy of Portugal tranquil. The Wlicinns 
menm~d it from Puchlln Fenabrin sand tlio gorgcs of the  BEcmo 
-Silveira from tlie Tras r ~ r  Manks,-thc mountains sepnratln(r 
],con froni the Asturins werc full of Zianrls,-UreIlington wnis 
on tlic Apicda, itnd HiIl, moving fmm Coria by the pasa of 
Rcjkr, miqlit mnke a surIdcn incursion towards Ada.  FinnIly 
tlie cornrnirnicntion with thc mmy of tlic north wns to br! Irrpt 
up, antl on e v e q  sidc tho pnrtidns were cnterprising, eespcciallg 
tlie Iiorsemcn in thc plnins of Leon: Reille hoivewr varrcd 
down thesc last. 
'En~ly  in Janunry Foy, rcturning from Astorgrt to relieve 
ZEvoal tlicn nt Avile, ltilled sorni? of hfnrqiiinez' wvnlry in 
San Patlro nnd more of tlicm nt  Mota la Toro; md on the 
13th uf tbnt montli cnptnin 4IntIiia l~illetl or toolc four liuadred 
of tlie sarne partidii nt Velderm. A convoy of ger i l la  stores 
coming from tlie Atitlzrins wns intemeptd by Boyer'~ detacli. 
meilCs; ~ n d  ona Florian, a celebwterl SpipitnisL linrtisun in the 
Frencli servlcc,destroyed tlie h n d  vf Garido jn tlie Avila district. 
The same Flurian oii tlio 1st oE Februtiry dcreated tlie hIerlioo 
and auotL~r inferior cllief, and Roon aftcr ~imsing tlie Tomes 
eaptttred some Spanisli dragoons who liad come out of Ci~irlnd 
Rodrigo. On tlie 1 s t  ni' llnrcli he crtislied tlie band of Tonto, 
and nt  the sane time Mnftliis, arting on the side oof tIie Carrion 
rirer, a p i n  siirprised ñiarqiiincz' barid nt Melgvrr Abaxo, 
wlijcli nrns t1iue rcdiiced to two hiinclred men nnd cmsed to be 
forniiclnlile. Previous to this some Cmlliciiin troops ttt Castro 
GonzaTo on tlie I?dn wcm attncked by Boyci; ivho beat tiiern 
tliroiigli Rcncve~itc with the losa of one Iinndrcd xnd fifty men, 
antI tlien diiving the Spanish prrison from hekla ,  Sena11ria 
raisetl cnntri1iiitions witli a rigour and irrnciby snid t o  Iie 
liol~it~iriil to him. Hiti dctnrhmrnts nftrmiirds ~~enetint~rd into 
tlic Astttriiis, inrr rlcrd Oviedo nnd vcxetl tlic cotiii try in despito 
of Porlicr nnd Gwceiin ivllo rvcrc in tlint province. Poy nho, 
brin: nt  lZviln nnd unriisji aliout LIill, entlrnvonrrrf on ttic 
30th of Yeliruiiry to siirprise Uc,jnr wltli t l ~ e  view nf ascer- 
hiliiiig iE :itiy Iii~ge Liudy w:is cuIlected lieliind it, but Eie U'RB 
vigoruiisly rrpitlseil by tlie fiftietli regiment and cixtli mcndores. 
Tliis tittaek riiirl tLe moverne~its of Flurinn Iicyo;.rl tlie Tornics, 
induced 1Veilington to bring up anotter divisioii w the 
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&ed,a, which by e reactian m d e  the French believe the allies 
were rmdy te arlvanoe. 
As CiifTarelli wuld not induce ReilIe to send him reinforc6 
menta tbe insurrection in the north gniained strength, ~ n d  tbo 
cornmunicationri were entirely interccpted until Pnlombini, 
driving away Mendixabel and L o n s  from Riirgos, enablcd the 
peat convoy and al1 Napokoii'a devntches, wl~ich h d  becn 
long accumulating there, to rewh Madrid in tlie la tkr  end of 
PeLruary. Joseph tlien reluctautIy prepared to abandon bis 
capital and concentrate the srmiw in Cristille, but he neglectd 
thoss easenthl inpetlients of the oniperor'a plan, rupidity and 
boldoess. By thc first, Nnpolcon proposed to guin time for 
the suppression of tlic insiirrection in thc nortliern provincce; 
liy the second to impose tipon IVellington rana keep him on 
the defemive. Joseph did ncitlicr, lie \vas slow and assumed 
the defensive hirnself. He and tlie other Frcnch general$ 
expected to be attacked, fm they h d  not fathomed the 
EngIish general's political dlifficulties; and French writer~ since, 
misconceiving tho charcter of his ~ v n r f m ,  Ziavo attributed to 
slowness jn the mnn what WLU rertlly tho  long-renching policy 
o€ a, grctit commandcr. Tbe allied army m a  not so lithe M 
the French ~ m y .  ! h e  lxtter arricd on occrasion ten dap' 
provisioos on the soldiers' badrs, or it lived upon the wuntry, 
and waa in respaet oE its orpkat ion and customs a superior 
military machiie ; the former never carried more than three 
days' provisiuns, never lived upon the couiitry, avoided the 
m principie of making tlie war support tlie war, paid or promised 
to pay for cvcrything, and often curricd in its rnnrcbes even 
the corn fur its cavalrg. Thr difirence of ttiis organimtion 
multing from the difference of policy hetween the two natiaii~~ 
was a complete bar to any p e a t  and sudden excuraion on the 
prt of the British gsnera1, a id must always be considered in 
judging his oprrations. 
If TVellington had passed the npper Tormes with ti coasider- 
able force, drawing Rill to him thougli  Bejar and inoviog 
rapidly 11y SviIu, he rniglit have hoken  in ulion tlie dcfensive 
system of tFie k i q  md beat 11is nmiics in detail; and mucIi the 
Pmnch fcnred such o blow, whicli would Iitbve bccn quite ia 
tho rnanncr of NapoIcon But his vicwa wcn: dimtcd by 
other than mere militRr;v principies. Tbua striking he. was 
not certain his blow woiilrl be decisive, his Porti~g~ese forces 
woiilc? h a ~ e  lieen ruined, his British ~ o l d i e n  flerioiisly injiired 
by the nttempt; and the rcsources of Frauce would liave 
mpnired the l o a  of tlie enemy sooner thmi lie conld liuvo 
rccovered the ivmkiiess which mu& necessnrily have followed 
mch an unsensonnble excrtion. Hia pl ~n miis to hring ít grcnl; 
and enduring potver early into tlic field, for like Pliocian be 
tlesircd to have nn army fitted for s Iong racc, nnd would not 
start on the sliort coursc 
Joscph conceiccti aiid rircndcd sud n sudden attttnck, bnt 
wuld not conceivr. t l ~ e  spirit o€ hi brotlier's plans. I t  was in 
rain Nnpoleon, while ndrnitting tlic bnrl moral effcct of nbnn- 
doning tlie cupital, poiiitctl out thc cliffemnce betrvccn flying 
from it tsnd i~inlíing a forivnrd movernent at tho herid of an 
nrmy; tlia king mnintained tlint RIndrid was a bettsr military 
centre o€ operntiona tlian Valladolid, beca~rse it liad Iinaa of 
cuiiiniunicatiuii by Fqovia, Aruiidn de Duero, and Zaragoza. 
h'utliing could be more uninilikiity tliun tIiis vie~v, unlesv he 
was pqiared to marcli direct upon Lislion if tlic alliea marclied 
uprin tlie Duero. IEis extreme reluctmce to quit Madrid 
iriducetl slrilviiess, nnd the xctun1 position oE bis troops aG the 
r n o m e ~ t  lilcetvise presented oliritadea to  the immeaate execu- 
tion of the cmperor's orders; for as Dmicrtu's ¿Ii&ion not 
returnetl from Valencia tlie Frencli outposts ton~ards the 
Morena coulcl not be mitliclram, nor could thc army of the 
centre rnarcli iipoii Vnllntlolid i~nt i l  the nimiy of tlie soutli 
relieved ib at htarlrid. Moreol-er Soiilt's coiinsels troiibId thc 
king's judgn~ent; for that rnai-sllal azreeing tliat to abaoíIon 
Meilrid wns to nliandon Spin, enrlenvourcd to reconcile pos- 
session of tlic! cnpitnl with tlie empcror's vicws. 
Hc proposcd tii plnce tlie nriny of Portugd nnd the m y  
of tlic snutli in position dong tlie slopes of tlie AviIa moun- 
h i n ~  itnd 011 tlie iipper Torni~s~ mnienacin~ RocFrigo, wliile the 
Birig witll tlic nriny of tIie ccntrc rcrn~tiucd at Afutlrid in 
ieucn-e. 111 tliis sitiintion tlicy rvould bc aii overmatch for 
any forcc the nllies could tiriiig into the fidd; anii ttie luttcr 
could not move Iiy tlie vailcy of tlie Tapig or upon tlio Duwo 
witliuut daiiger of a fliink uttack. Joscpli, tleccivcd by 1lia 
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Spnriish rninister~, snid thnt the feeding af ~iich n force woiild 
ruin his people; but the comfortnble stnte of the horises and 
the p a t  plaina of standing com seen by the allies in their 
after march from tlie EsIsla to the Cxrrion proved that the 
people wcre noi mucli impoverislied. sSoult, well wquhted 
ivitli the resources o l  tliat country snd a more pmrtised master 
of sucli apemtions, looked to tEie military question ratlier than 
n concilirttory policy, nnd positively afirrncd tlie m i e s  mnld 
bc-subsisted; pet Iic dncs not nppcnr to  hnve considered hom 
tlie insiirrcctinn in tlie northern provinces wns to be siip- 
pressed, whlch WRB tlie principal object of Nnpoleon'a plan. 
He no donbt expecterl tlie empemr would aend troops for that 
pul-pose, but Kapoleon knem tliat al1 the resources of Trance 
wmild he reqiiired in anotlier quarter. 
Hatred and susliicion wonld Jiavc matle Jasepli reject any 
plan auggested by Soult, and he was gzilFer1 t h b  the xnmha1 
should declare tlis troups coiild cxist witIiout monny from 
Frnnoc; yet his mind was unsettlcd by thc proposal md tho 
coliicidence of idenq ns to holding Madrid; for even when tlie 
armies were in movemenk lie vracilhted, ~at one time tbinking 
Mafnrshal fo stay at Madrid, at anotlicr to march sit lt  the 
Jourrlan'n army of the centre to Burgos inatead of Vallad& 
oficial Cm- 
wspondenw, lid' Hojvever npon the 18th of Narch he qiiitted 
~ISS .  the capital lexving tlie Spauish ministers Angulo 
ancl Almenara to govern tlicre in conjunction witli G w n .  
TIie m y  of the south then moved in two columns, one under 
Conmux ncross the Gretlos muuntxins to Avila, tlie otliw under 
Guxiin apon Madrid to rdievo the mmy of tlie centre, wliich 
immedintely marched to Aittnrle do Duero nnd Lema with 
orclc~s to settlc nt Biirgos. Villatte'g division and al1 the 
outpo&s withdmwn from Ln hlnncha xcmninorl on the Al- 
berclie, ancl tlic rnov~ments north of tlic Tng-11~ wcrc only 
molested by thc bands. In La Mmchx tlie retiring troops 
w r e  foIlomerl by Del Pnrquc's ndvnnwd guarrl nuder Cmw 
SIiirgean, but tlie Frencli c~~a-~nIry check4 It roughly at the 
b d g e  of Algobar. Cruz Murgeon then rstiretl, md the 
Empecinado was defcnted on the side of Cuenca in rtn attempt 
t o  mit off some cavalry who were escorting tho niarquis of 
hIices to collwt his rents previous to quitting Madrid. V b e n  
the stores were removed from Madrid> Villabe marched on 
8aIarnrrnca, Gazan enterad Arevalo, and khe army af the south 
was cantnneil betiveen the Torrnes, the DueroJ and t'he Adajri, 
~vitli exception o£ ten thousand chosen men left to hold 
Mdrid  under Leval. Ris orders m r e  to keep guards at 
Soledo and on tlie Blberciie, lest the allies should suddmly turn 
tlie left; and as roa& lieyond tlie Alberclie led over the aredos 
mounkainins in rem of the French axlvanced posta an the upper 
Tormes, tfiese Iast were withdra~m from Perirahib and Puente 
Gongosto. 
Rsille nom pdual lg  reinforced Cprffarelli, and concentrated 
his remninjng forcc aboitt JIedina de E o  Seco with caralry 
posts on the Esla; but tlie men xecalled by tlie emperor mere 
then in rnarch, the Frene11 were in confusion, and fbe people 
instigater1 by Wellington'q cmiasa~ies and cxpecting grmt 
evcnts witlihcld provisions. Tlic partida ivlarfnre also liccame 
as lively in tl ie interior na on thc const, hut Mtb worsc for- 
tuno. Ciaptnin Giorllano, s Spnninrd of Joscph'~ gu~rd, lrilled 
one Iiundrerl iknd fifty of Snornirs peoplc ncnr hre~rtlo, and 
tlie indcfatignlile Florian, dcfra'cinp Mornle'rr bsnd, a~ized a 
d6pbt in tlie vnlley of  tlie Tietar nnd bent tlie ñledico; then, 
crcrasing the Gredos mountnins lie destroyed near Segovia the 
band of Purclim : tlie liing's SpenifiIi gtinrds also cmshed soms 
smaEler partidas, nnd llenoveles witli Iiis wtiole &ff nraa a p -  
tured ut C~rvnj?jalw ttnd cxrried te TsllaJuliJ. TIie Empeci- 
nado coming tu tt ie Iiilla almve BepuI~edu joined Merino and 
mrnpelled tEie people u€ tlie Acguviil district to abandon tteir 
Iiouses; but lieing inenaced by tlie Freiich tlioso ciiiefs repined 
tlieir anclent hnunts and Dsouet then removed hi hmd- 
quarters t o  Cueilar. 
In April Levd bemme so uneasy that he gave several false 
nlarms, wliich cansed an uurcasonnble concentm- 
tien of  the troops st Valladolid, nnd Drouet Ap'l' 
abandonacl Ciiellar m d  Scpdveda. Del Parque .7weph's 
rand tlie Empecinado were said t o  have re-esta-. 
blished tlic bridge o€ ofhranjuez,Elio to be xdvnncing 
in La BInncha, Hill to bc in tlie vallcy of tltc Saqa  dvancing 
by iyfombeltrnn to sciec thc Gii~rinn~rna. Al1 thia mas Tul= 
The Empecinado, AbueIo, anrE Dd l'quc, mero bdeerl at 
Aranjuee; and Fimin, Cuestn, Riveru, anc! the Mdico were 
collecting mear Arxoliispo to  maslr tlie marcli cif tlie Spanisli 
divisionp from Estremarlura ii~iil tlie reserve from Andalusia. 
The prince of Anglona aIao lind sntcred La Rlnnclis with hi3 
cnvalry, but rt wns to  oovcrtlic morcrncn:nt of Del Parque npori 
Murcia; itnd when tlie t,me stnte of )affnirri became kno~n, 
Leva1 drove away bbt! Empccindo, clriiseiI Fimin from tlie 
valley of thli T a g ~ q  and re-estiililishctl liis posts in Tuldo and 
oii the ,klbercI,e. Joseph was then oiily rrstrained from 
ahndoning Madrid aitogether by hirr ikir of tlie einperor, and 
Iiis hope rif still: getting some cuntriliutions h r n  tlience to 
support his court. With mluctnnce hlac lie obeyed 3alioleoii's 
reikmted ordcrv to cross thi! I)iiriro wlth tlie nrniy of the 
centre, snd rcplacc the detwhed ~livi~ions of tlic ariiiy of Por- 
tugal. Re wished Droiiet mther than Fkille to reinforce the 
north, and notliing could more clearly sliow how entirely the 
subtle spint of Iiis brotlier's instmtions had esc~per! his per- 
ception. Iibr it wiis essential to Iiuld Jfndrirl, to watch tlie 
valley ef t,lie T a p s  and enable tlie Prencli wmies to fa11 bbac 
on Xarapxa iP thii arose; more esseiitial to give moral 
effect to tlie offensive fronb sholiomr towards thc nortli of Por- 
tugal. For tha last reaaon it was propcr nlso tlitit IIille nnd 
not Drouet, who wns still in Mndrid, sliould rcinforce Ciiffnrelli; 
hecause tIie latter'~ march from tliat capihl weuld aeetn a 
retreat and disclnse its object; whereris Iiis movemcnt aught 
to maslc the object and bear the appearance of ttn offensir-e 
one towards Portugal. 
In the contracted positions now ocmrpied the difficulty of 
subsisting waa increaried, eacb general was dissatisfid, diapute~i 
multiplied, and tlie court claslid witlt tlie unny at every turn. 
Leval rtlso inveiglied againet the 8panish minister~ and minor 
authorities left at Madrid; nnd no douht justly, since their 
conduct was precisely likc thnt of thc Portugncse nnd Spanish 
sutliorities towards the nllies. Jnseph's letters to hia brother 
became daily more bitter. Napoleon's re,..uIatione for tfie 
tmps'  mbsistence clashed wjth bis, and tliongli his budget 
showed a dcficit of many rnillions, tht! emperar dimgrding it 
reduced the French subsidy t o  two milliuns per rnonth, wnd 
forbd itai applimtion to any purpose Bave tlie ptiy of the 
soldiera. When Joseph asasked how he m 0  then to h d  
resources'i he was, with a, just sarcosrn on his political aand 
military blindness, dcsired t o  seek whnt he wanted in ths 
nortti wliich was rjch enougb to nourisli the partid= annd 
insurmctional juntns. Thus puelied to the wall, Joseph pre- 
vaiIed un Gazau secretly to lenci Eiim ftfky tbousnnd francs 
from the military cheb hut with the otlier generais he mull 
not agree, nnd for tlie viguur necescjwy t o  meet the coming 
campign discoid wm sulistitukd. 
811 the moverneiits for ooncentration ciispleased tlie emperor. 
He condenned the army of the centre for stealing out of 
Madrid by the road of Lerma, ss only calculatd to expose the 
real viems, and draw tlie allim on lisfore the communications 
with Franoe were restored. The manner in wliich the king 
lidd the armies on tlie defensive in bis new position cliscon- 
tented him st311 more. Tlie allies he said mere thns told t b ~ y  
might without fear far Portugal embatk troops to invade 
France; wliermfi by a confident offensive movcment hcked 
with tlie formation o£ a bnttering-train at Burgos, hdicating 
tbe siege sf Fdrigo, Wellingtoii woiild have Leen alnrrned, 
Frnnce aecured froin the dnnger of insult, und the rnemurag 
for suppressing tlie inmrrcction in tlze northern provinces have 
heen rnmked. To quell tliat insiirroction w~ o€ vital im- 
pnrtrince, yet It IintI now existed for sevcn rnonths, in five of 
which the king, liriving nincty thousnnd men, was unmoleskd 
liy Wcllington, nnd liad only climed Rome inferior Iinnds of 
the intcrior mhiIo t l i i g  wnrfnre was consolidating in bis mar, 
and his grcat adversary was organizing the m o ~ t  pomerful 
m y  wliich had yet tnken the ficld in liis fronf,. It is tlii~s 
kingdoms are lost. The progas  of t b i ~  nortliern insurrec- 
tion shuI1 now be sliown, h'eglected by tlie kinn, it was to 
tlre 1st misunderstood by him; for wlien Wclliiigton was 
actnltlIy in movcment, when the disliersed FrencEi nrinies were 
crowding to the rear to avoid the ponderuus mass tlie English 
general was pusliing forn.ard,-even then the king, who had 
done werytliing to rcnder defeat. certain, wag urging upon 
hTapoleon tlie propriety of first benting tbealallies rnd nfter~~rirrls 
rducing the intiurr~ction hp the establishment of a Spanisli 
ciyil governmcnt beyond the Ebro! 
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arrived the 21at of February ; but Caffarelllli returned witli 
gens-d'ames and imperial giisrris to Fraiice, leaving the 
Spanish chiefs marrGers of K11varre and Bisay. Tlie peopla 
ROW rcfuscd war contributions in money or Irind, thc harvest 
was nat ripe ~ n t l  the French mere ~orely disiresaed, because 
the ~v~itther nablcd the Englisli ~li ips  to liiig the coast and 
intercept wpplies from Frnnee by aes Tlie communications 
wcrc al1 liroken ; in front liy Lnngn who wrts ngain nt the 
dcfile of Pfincorbo ; in m r  hy Mina wIio m n ~  in tlie hilla of 
Arldinn; on tlie Icft by a colIertion of banda nt Caroncal in 
Nnvnrrc. Alibí& govcrnor of Pnm pclunn, severcl y chccked 
theso l&, but Mina soon rcstoreil alhirs; for lanving the 
voliintccm of Guipusma to watcli tfic drfilcs of drlnban he 
asscmbled 1111 tlio bands in Kn\-nfic, dcstroyed tlie bridgw 
Icading to Taffrtllnfrom Pnmpdunn nnd from Vuentc le Reynn, 
and tEiougli ALb6 tmico attncltcd liim 110 got stronger, and 
Gringing up two English guns from tlie cuaiit bmieged 
TaK111t-L. 
Nnl)oIeon, discontenterl witli Ciiffnrelli, gave CIauael tlie 
command In t2ie nortli with discretioiinry pomer to draw 
troops from the army of Portugnl as he judged fitting. He 
mns to cormspond directly wit1i tlic einperor t o  woid losa of 
time, but was to  ubey the lring in nll things not clnsliing with 
Mapoleon's orden, whicli containecl a complete reriem o€ what 
hnd prissed and wlint mv fitting to be done. ' The partidas,' 
the emperor said, ' were strong, orpniaed, exercised and 
seconílcd by the exnltatioa of spirit rvhicli tbe bnttle of  &la- 
mana lind produced. SLe insurrectiond jiintas had Geen 
revived, tlie posts on tlie coa&, abnnclonett by tlie Frendi and 
~eieed by tlie Spnninrds, gwe free intercount! with tlie Eng- 
Iish ; tFie Iinntls en joyed al1 tlie reaoitrees of tlie c o t ~ n t i ~  nnd 
the g ~ t c m  of warfnre bail hitlicrto favoi~md tlieir progress. 
InstcncE of fnrcstalling tlieir enteryii-is~s tlic Prencli awaitcd 
thcir nthcIrs, nnd wcrc ulwnya bcliinri thc mcnt ; tlicp obcycd 
t.lie encmy's irnpulsion aníl tlic troops Iverc fntigncd ivithout 
gaining thcir olijcct. Clnriscl: must nttnclc siiddenl~; pureue 
npidly, rtnd comliine liis rnoreuieiiL~ n-itli refcrence to tlie 
fmtnrca of  tIie country. A fcw gootl strulres apinst the 
Spaniards' magmines, hospitals or dépfits of a r m ~  would 
inevitably tronble theb opcrations ; m d  aftei me or two mili- 
t a r~  mccesses poIitid measures would sufice to disperse tlie 
authoritiu, disorgariize tlie hsurrectioii wd bring tlie young 
men who had been enroIled by foree back t o  tlieir homes. 
Block-houses were to be cnnstructed on well-cliosen pointa, 
eapecidly whme many mads mct; tho foresh would fumish 
the materiala eheaplg, antl tbcse post8 slioiild mpport eocli 
other and f m  cliains of commnnicntion. 'CliTitli respect to the 
greater fottresses, Pampeluna and Santona were the nwst 
hpor tan t  and the enerny knew it; for Mina !vas intent to 
hmifih the first and tlie Englisli squadron t o  geh Lold of the 
secand. To sapply Pampeluna it needed only to clear the 
communlcntions m the countly around m e  ricli and fedilo. 
SQntonn requiretl comhinationri. Tlie empcror w i ~ b e d  to 
supply it by sen from Rnyonne nnd St. Sclinstinn, but the 
French marine officers would never attcmpt the pmsage even 
with f~tvou~abie winde and when the Englisb squadron were 
amy, unless al1 the internediate ports were occupied by tbe 
land forces. 
Six m~ntbs  before these ports had Leen French, Caffarelli 
had ligl~tly abandoned them while he marclied ~ v i l L  Souham 
against Wellington. 8ince tliat period tFie Englisli and 
Spaniards held tliem. Foi  four months tha mnperor hi? 
uncerisingly ortlerod thc rctnking of Bcrrnco nnd Cnstro; bnt 
whether from the difficulty of tlie operation or tlie neccssity 
of amwering more pressing calls, no dort hnd been m d e  t o  
obey and the fine seanon nom permitted the Englisli shipri to 
aid in the defence. Gastro wac %id to be ~trongIy fortitied 
by the English? no wonder, Carxrelli hrul given tliem sufficient 
tims aud tliey know its valiie. In one inoiitli every pwt on 
the coast from tho mouth rif tlie Bidasson to 6t. Ander sliould 
be agnin re-occupied, and St. Ander garrisoned stron~ly. 
Eimultnneons with the coad opcmtions ~hould be Clnusd's 
attack en Minh and tlie diosing of the pnrtidns in the interior 
of Biscay. Tbe dministration of the country also demanded 
reforrn, still more did the organization and discipline of the 
army. The north mis tlie pith of the Frcnch power, J1 
wonId fail if that failed, mhereas if it were strong, itz admi- 
nistration sonnd, its fortresses weIl furnivlied, its state tran- 
q d ,  no irreparable misfortune could Jlappen iu 0 t h  parta.' 
Clanse1 msumed command thc 23nd of Febrtrn~, Abb6 
wm then confinea to P~mpelunrr, Minri, mnqtar of Navnrre, 
wns besirffng Tiafi11ln; Prañtor, Lnngn, Campillo, Merino and 
otliers rangcd through Biseny and CastiIlc nnmolcstcd; and 
tlie spirit of the eouutry  vas so chnnged, that fatlicra sent 
tlrciir sons to  juia partirlus liitlicrto curnposed of robbcrs nnd 
deserters. Clnusel dcrnandcd Giventy tliousand men from 
RcilIc, but Joscpli, who ww tlicn in Xadrid, proposcd to send 
L)ron~t witll tlie urniy of tlie centre i n s h d .  CIuuscI would 
not accede; tiventy tllousniid traops were, he =id, iw?:ted 
beyond. tlie Eliro; trva indepenclent cliiefu cotilJ not ti& toge- 
tlier; and if Drouet wtw onIy to remliin at Bugou he would 
dovour tl ie restliirces witliout ~ i d i n g  tlis operntiona in tlie 
nortl~. Tlis kirig miglit dioose anotlisr comrnantler Iiut tlie 
troops must be sent. Joseph yielded, yet it ivas t1ie end of 
March before Bcille's divisions moved, three upon Xavamw 
and one upon Biirgos. Meanivl~ile Clnusel rep.nired to Bilbau, 
whem Rouget Iintl eigbt liundred men in garrison besides 
Paloiuliini's Ltalinns, 
Thia place wns tilocknd~d Iiy tlie partidnct. The Pmtor 
d t h  tliree tliausnnd men ivas  in tlie tiilla of Guernica and 
Namrni% betmeen niltino and tlie fnrt of Derrnco ; and AIcn- 
diznbcl Iinving cight or kn tlio~isnnd mcn in tl ic mountains 
m~nacsd Snntoiiu nnd Bilbno and protcctcd Custro. How- 
ever tlie French prrison in Durnngo wns strring, new works 
round P,ill>no were in pro~csq,  ond on thc 22nd Clousel 
moved with the Itnlians and a ficnch rcpjment to ascnult 
Castro. Cainpillo nnd McntEiz:ibel a m e  to jtu sumur nnd 
tEie garrison matle n sully, but the former nfter mine sliarp 
figlitiug rrgnined the hig-11 vallqs iii disunler. Ttle escuhile 
of Custro woulll tlien Iinve ensneri, if Meudizttbel liad not come 
to Trucios, only scvw miles from tlio Firncli wmp, and tlie 
rnstor witli tlie voluiitcers oE Biscny xuil Guipuvcoa iiicnnced 
Bilbrui. Clausel mnrclied aitli liis Frencli rcgiments to the 
lathr place, Ienvjng Pulolnbiiii to oppos~  hlcntliznbel, but 
finding Bilbao in snfcty Iie setit nouget witli tivo bnttalions to 
~einforce tlie Xtiilims, s l i o  tlien drove 3Ieudixntiel from 
Trticios into tlie bills aliout Viilmaceda. 
Gxqtru mhs now tn be nttnckerl in form. Pnlomliini occu- 
pied tlic hciphts of Ojciin and hmnlcs ,  from whclicc he 
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comrnunicrited mith the &son o€ Snntoñn, introduced B 
convoy of money and fresh provisions tl~ere, received ammuni- 
tion in return, dnd directad tlic governor Lmeth t o  prepnre 
a battming train of six piecea for the si~ge. But then he 
returnad liastilp to Bilbao which Tvaa menaced liy EI Pastor, 
whum he tliought too strong to be ineddlml with until 
promised i reinforcenient from Uura~igo, ~vlien he gaTe 
bnttlo and wna dcfcated with a 105s of cidity iaen. Two 
dnya nftcr the reinforcemcnt joinerl nnd lie bent tIie Pastor, 
whose men dispersed, some to  collect q n i n  nn P~lomhini's 
mar wliile otliers went to *.he interior. Une column however 
retired by the coaat on tha sicle of St. Sebaqtian, and Palom- 
bini pnrsiied it, expocting troops frorn tlie fortresa to line tbe 
Deba and bnr wtreat, bnt an EnglLsli squadron carrisd the 
Spaniards off from Lcquitio. Meanlvhile El l'astor, having 
mlried, descended tha Deba and drove tlie Frencli back t o  St. 
Sebasthn; Palombini waEi tlius compelled to make for Bergara 
on tlic Vitoria roarl, where he laft liis woundcd men and a 
garrison, nnd on the 9th fcll on t,llc valt~ntccrs of Guipuscon 
at Ascoytin, birt wm repl~lseíl and fcll linclr t o  Rergara. 
f i x t  day he took clinge of nn artitlergr mnaoy going from 
St. Sebastian for tlie siege of Castro; yet he left Bilbao in 
p a t  danger, for tlie Biscapn volunteers madc on the 10th a 
faIse attack at a bridgc aliove t11e entreiiclied camp, while 
Tapia, Don Pelos, and Campillo fe11 on seriously from the 
side of Valmaceda However, 3lendizatiel wlio commtinded 
the wliole mede such Iind ~Iispositions t l i n t  hc )vas repulsed $ 
Honge$ and then Palombini, who henrd the firing, hnstily 
deposited his convoy and rcturning folIowed tlic Biscaynn 
vo.olunteers t o  Guemicrs driving them upon Rerrnce, where 
tliey dso got on board the English sliips. 
During these events Clausel remained nt Vitoria to amnge 
tIie genela2 $m, and Mina on tlie 1st of dpril defeatea one of 
liis wluinns near Lcrim with a losa of six IiunJred meu; ihe 
wns also disappointed &out liis minforcenientu; For though fonr 
of ReiIle'~ divisions rind Eiome unatt.ttacliec1 regments joined 
him, tlicy onIy supplicd scvcntcen instmd of twcnty tlrousnnd 
mcn; ~ n d  ns thc rcgiments rnerely mplamd mcn wliich had 
marchcd to mjoin tlieir own annies in front, this mccour 
dwindlcd to  tliirtcen thonsand. IIencc, notmitlistanding 
Pitlornbinh activity tlie insuil-ection i r a s  in April more 
formidable than ever; tlie line of corraqpondence fiam Tor- 
quemada t o  B~igos  m c  quite unprotected for wnnt of troop, 
and tlie line fmn  Eurgos to k u n  was not so ivell gunrded 
tliat couriws coiild pass mithout powerful escorts, nor alwnys 
tlien. TIie fortifications of Burgos werc to Iinvc besn im- 
proved but tliere IVW no money to pny for khe rvorks; the 
French coalcl not coltech pmvlsions for inappzines or~lered by 
tlie king, anrl tivo gcncrals, Ltt 3Inrtiiiicie and b y ,  were dis- 
puting for the commitnrl. Porty thonsand Spranish pxrt~sans 
were in actian, Tt>ff.'~lla aurrenrlcrerl to hrinn, and lie and D~irnn, 
Amor, Tiibiiecn ~ n r l  tlie militia of Logoño, Fiolrling botli sidea 
of tlie Rbiri lir.tivcen Cnlnhom Logroño, nnd Guardin, could ' 
in ono tlny iii~itc ciglitccn tlioiisnntl fciot nnct s tliat~snnd 
. horscmcn. IIcnrliznlicl, Lon~n ,  Cmpillo, Rcrrcra, E1 hstor, 
nnd t,l~lic voliintccix of Biñcny, Giiipu~on, nnd A l a ~ n ,  jn all 
Bistecn thoiisnnd, werc on tlie const ncting in conjanction 
~vi t l i  tho EnglisEi sqtintlron~; Snntnntler, Castro, nnd Bermeo 
iverc still iri tlieir liancls, xntl rnariltiino exliditions were 
prepariiig Itt CuriiEn aud iir tIie Asturias. 
Tliis pnrtisnn war tliiis pwsented tliree rlistinct liranchss, 
t h ~ t  of Niiv:trrc, t l in t  of tba comt, xnd tliat on tlie Iines of 
commirnication. Tlic Iast nlons oacupied aboie fiftcen tliou- 
aaud Frencli; nainely, ten tbousand from Irun to Bugos, 
fifteen hundred to rcstorc the line of correspondciice between 
Tolosa and Pam~ieliina, mliich hncI been destroyccl; and fmr 
thousund hetweeu JIonrlrngon and Dilliao, tlie gnrrison of tlie 
1atter place incliirled. Nenrly dl the army of the north wwos 
approprinted to tlie gnrrisons ancl lines of communiaation; 
but t l ~ e  divisions of Abté nncl Vandermnesen coiild be iised 
on tlie Rir3e of Pi~mpeliinn, nnd there were rliqposnhlc, Fnlom- 
hini's Jtnlians nnrI tlie divisions sent by Plcille. Brit one o£ 
thcse, Snrrut's, vn.4 still in ~narch, nnd al1 tlie ~ ick  oF the 
arniics in Cnstillc wcrc nom pouring irtto Nnvrirrc, vrhcre, 
from tho  103s of the contriliutions tlicre mns no money to 
provide for thcm. Clniisel bnd Iiomever nmeliomted tlie civil 
and military ndministratiuns, improved the .rvorl<s rif Gueterig 
commenced Zilock-liou~es between Irun and Titoria, and 
sheken the hnds nbout Bilbao. Now dividing hk form 
tient Pnlombini te besiene Cmstro, nnd directed Foy a 
Snmt t o  oover the opemtion and oppose disemiiarl~ations, 
This ReId force and the troops in Bilbao furnislied ten 
thousand men, and in the middle of Apri? Cl~usel beat Mima 
from Taffalla and Dtel la  and assembled at Pirente de la 
X e p a  in Navarre the remainder of the irctive amy, composed 
of Taupin's rand Bmbout's divisiona of the mmy of Portugal 
Tmdermaesen'~ md Abbé'g divisions of tlie army of t l ~ e  north, 
in al! tliirteen thonsnnd men. Be q e d  L'Ruillier, wlio c m -  
manded the rerierve at Bayonno, ta ~einforce St. Schmtian and 
Gueteria rand push troops o€ ohservation into thc wllcy of 
Rwtan ; md he ~ l s o  warnd tle commantlcr of X~mgoza t o  
watch Mina oii tlint side. From Puente Ia R e p  he ma 
t i m e  excursions, bat lost rnen useIeqslgr, for the fipadar 
wodd only fight at advantap; and t o  hunt Mina witliout fi: 
barring al1 Lis passages of flight was t a  destroy the Prenph 
soldiers by fatigue. Eere tlie king's dilatory  vare re M 
neriouely fdt, because the winter smon, wlien tlie t opa  of t 
mountains being covered with tinow tha prtidas couid OL, 
move nlong the orrtinnv roadg, was most favourable for the 
French opcratinns and it pmwd away; CIau~usd now dcspnircd 
to eíTect nnytliina and ww even ping to separate his forces 
and m m I i  t o  the coast when, in May, Mins took pod in the 
valIey of Roncal. Tlio French general inritantly sent Abb6s 
muid Vmdermuesen's divisions and the mvalry agninst him a t  ' 
once by the upper nnd loww p&s. Sucidenly closing upon 
the perilla chief they killed or wounded a thousand of his 
men and dispersd the rest ; one part fled from the mountains 
on the ~ i d e  of Banguessia witli the wonndd, mhom they dropped 
at different place9 in care of tlie conntry people; but Chplan- 
g m q  Crucliaga, and Carena, Mina's l ie~tenurita~ geing off, 
wclr. ~ i t h  a ,culurnn, in t l~e opposite dire~4ion anrl by diff'erent 
routw to  tlie valley o€ the Aragon, passed tliat river at St. 
Gilla and ninrle tlieir w q  towardfi the sncred mouut~iii u£ Lcr 
Peña nwr Jam The Prench cavolry following them Lig 
Villa hiil, entered that town tbe I4tli on one ~ i d e  whl- 
WLna witli twtilve rnen entercd it on tlie otlier; yet Ite e s c q  
tu IInrtcs whcre anothcr inefectual nttcmpt was mnde t o  si 
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price hirn. Abbd's columns thcn descended thc smsller vaIlcp 
learling towarda tlie upper v~lley of tlie Aragun, while Van. 
derrnaesm's lnfmtry and thc mwlry enteied the Iower pr t  of 
tlie same valley, and t he  former npproaching Jaca aent his 
woirntled men tliere and got fresh ammtrnition. 
Mina anrl tl ie insurgent junta trying to regain Navarre by 
tlie left of tlie Amgon rivei mere like to have bcen taken, but 
ap in  escehped towarda the valley of tlic Gallego, whither al80 
tlie geater part of their troops now sought refuge* Claiiael 
forhore t o  foroc t11em over that rivcr, lest they sliould remain 
there and intercept the comrniinication fmm Zerhgoza by 
Jaca, the onIy free Fine the French now possessed and ton 
distant to he watelied. Abbé thercfore retiirned t o  Ronya1 iri 
search of tlie Spanisli dCp6tq andVnndermaesen entered Sos 
at one end ns Mina, who hsrl now one hunrlrd and fifty hame- 
men and ivm h y s  intent upon regaining Navarre, passed out 
at  the other. The light cavalry overtook Iiim nt Sos Fuente3 
and Iie fled to Cnrciwtillin; but there, unexpcctedly meeting somo 
of him own squaílrotw whicli h d  wandered over tlie mounkins 
rifter tlie action st Roncal, be gave battlg wa4 defenkd ~ 4 t h  
the loss of fifty rnen and fled once more tn Arnggon, wliermpon 
tlie insurrectioiial juntsdispei~ed and cliscensions arose between 
Mina snd the minor cliiefs under his eoinmand. Clauael, 
anxioua to increase thia discord, sent troops into al1 tlie vallep 
to  seek out the Spanish dE11Bts and athclr tl~eir scntkred rnen; 
and he WB mcll served by tlie A~agonese, fox S~zchet's wise 
dministration was still proof npinst the jntiurrectiond jiintw. 
During tliese eventfi four hattalions left hy Mina ia tlie 
Amescoas were chwd by Taripin, wlio had remninetl ~t Ratells 
wlien tlie other divinono mxrclied np the valley of Jtoncnl. 
Soon liomevcr Mina re-nsscmblcd nt R~rhnstro in  Arngon a 
strong column, crowds of dcscrtcrs from thc otlicr Spanisli 
nrmicti auginrntctl his forcc; und ao coniplctely l i d  tie organ- 
ized Navmc, tlilit tlie: pipwnct: of a ~irigle solclier of hia in R 
village suaced to have any couricr witlioiit n ñtrong wrt 
stopped. JEnny bniids alse wcrc still in the Xiojn, and tmo 
Ii%eucli battaliunx raslily fomging toivards hri in  were nearly rsll 
dmtmyed. I n  fine tlia losses were well bal.laiiced, and Clxusel 
dernanlled more traops, especiatly cavslq, to tocoour tke Rivja 
Nev&bdees the disperglon of Mina5 troops lowered bis r e p  
tation, and the French gened so improved this dmntW by 
address, tthat many tou~nsIiips witlidrew fmm the inwrrection 
nnd recalling their youog men from tlie banda commenced the 
formation of eig11t free Spanish cxinilianies to  serve on tlie 
French mda Corps of tliis aort w r e  rnisd mitli so n~uch 
facjIity in e w r y  pnrt of Bpain tliat it woulcl sccin nntions ns 
well ris indivicluals 1iu.v~ nn idiosgnrrnsy, nnd in tlicse difinge- 
ahle warriors we again see the Mnndonius and Indibilis o í  
ancient dvs .  
Josepl), urged by CIausel, now sent Na~imine's dirisian and 
mme liglit cwiilry o£ the arniy of Portu,d to  occripy Pam- 
pleip, Eurgos, and Brjviesca, and t o  protect the grest corn- 
munication, wliicli tIie diverging clirection of the operations 
had u p i n  exposed to the pnrtidas. But tlie kench  liad not 
been less suwess~ul in Biscy tlinn in Navarre. Foy reached 
Bilbao tlie 24th of April, sud fiuding nll thiq m d y  for the 
siep of Ciistro marclied to S n t o n a  ta liaseen tlie preparatiom 
nt that p1,lnce; he nt,temptcd also t o  surprise Cmpillo rand 
\ Hcrrera jn tlic hillc nliovc Santonn, iiilt ~vns wor~ted in tlie 
mmbat. Tlie two hnttering-traiins then endeavoured to pro- 
I ceed from Bilbao xnrl Santona by sea to Cmtro; the English 
vessds, coming t o  the rnoutli of tlie Durango, stopped those nt 
Bilbao and compelled them to prmeed by land, liut tbua p y e  
nn opporhnity for tliose at Santona to m&e the sen-run 
in safety. 
Tbis place, sihiatcd on a promontory, was garrisoned by 
tn-elve Iiundred nien under tlie comniand of Pedro 
Alvsrer: ; three Englidi sloolis of wnr eommnndd 
by the mptains Bloye, Brmen, and Tiiyler, were at liana, 
some g-~n-boats mere in tlie liiirbour, and tweiity-seven guns 
mere rnounted on tlie worlts. An outwnrd wall witli to~vcra 
extended from sea to sea on tlie low tisck wliicli cannected t1ie 
promontory witll tlic rnainlttnd, snd tliiti lino of defence was 
~tre~gtliened by aome fortified convenk; then carne tlie town, 
and beliind tlia bwn nt tlie extreirity of tlie promontorp shod 
the mtla 
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On the 4th o€ Of~ty, Foy, Sarrut and Palombini h k  post 
at diFerent points tu covcr the siege; the Itdian general St. 
Paul invested tlie place; the engineervacani conducted the 
works, ha\!ng tselve p n s  at bis diaposal. The clefence wm 
lively and vigorous, m d  aptair, Snyler with gr;reat labour 
landed a heriv ship-pn on a rocky island to the right of the 
town, loolcing from tlie sea, wliicl. he worked witli effect apainst 
the French counter-b~ttterics. On tlie 1 ltli a mcond gun WM 
mouuted en thie islnnd; biit tliat day tlis brewl~lng-bxtteries 
s e r e  a p m d  nnd in n few honrs brok~ the mll, wliile tlie 
counkr-bntterirns sct firc tc onme hoiiscri with sliclls. Tlie 
E n g M  guns serc then rem<ivd from tlie island und the msault 
was ordered, but wm delriyed becnahe a forqing party tient into 
thc hille cnme Aying bacl~, pnrsucd by a crilnmn of Spania~ds 
wliieh had passed unpermived tlirough the pnaitions of tlie 
Prench. %Iiis tbrcw thc beaiegcrs into eonfitsion as tllinking 
the covcring nmy had bcen bcntcn, yct thcy soon recovcred 
md tlie assnult and escnlnde took plnce in thc nigl~lit. 
Tho attaclr was rnpid nnd ficrcc, thc \vnlla wcrc carricd md 
the garri~on driven ihrough the town to tlie cnstle, wliich mns 
inaiuhineri by two conipnnies whila tFie fiying troops got on 
board the Englisli vcseels; fianlly the Itnlians atoimcd the 
mtle,  but every gun had h e n  destruyetl and tlie two c o m p  
nies safely rejoiued their countrymen un Iiozrtl tlie ~liliips. Slie 
, EnglisL liiid teii seamen wountled, tIie Spriuiads lost a, hun- 
dsed and eighty, orid the rerneinder aere immediateiy co~iveyed 
to  Bermeu Erom \vlience tliey mawlied inIand to joiii Longa. 
Tbe besiegers lost only fiftp kiIled aiiiI wouniled, antl tlie 
ILdian soldiers commilted great excesses, setting Tire h tlie 
town in many places, Foy and fiainit mwched after tlie 
siege, the former t1iroug-l: the district. of Incattacionea to Bil- 
bao defeating s batblion of  33isca-y volanteera on his route; 
the Eattw to Orduiio mith ttie design o£ deatroying Lonp;  
hnt that chief crosaed tlie Ebro at Puente Lnm, and findiiig 
tlie troops sent by Jaseph were heginning ta arrive at Bnrgoa, 
recrossed the river ancl after a long clinse esmped in the maun- 
tains of Eqpinom Sarrut, 11tLYing mptnred e fcw p-curringas  
and one of Longds forest dEpbts of nmmunition, returnd 
towardm Bilbao, md Foy immediatdy rnarched from that p b  
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againd the two remaining bzttalions of Riscny votunteers, 
whicfi under tlieir cliiefs Mugartegui and Artola were at 
Tillaro und Guernica. 
These bnthlions, cncb a tllousnnt1 strong, raised by 
scription and ofñccrcd from the best fnmilieg, wcw 
cllanipions of Xismy ; hut thoiig11 lirave and well-equ! 
tlie difñculty of cmriig them anrl tIie voInntcem of Guip 
wm not grezlt, because ncitlicr woultl leave their own pecul 
p&iucea. Ths tliird IiattaIion hrüi been d r d y  disperced 
tLe distiid of Inmrtncioncs, and Foy, Iiaving in the niglit 
the 29th comhincd thc marcll of sevcrat colntniis to surr 
Villoro, fcIl nt dnybrrnk upon hf~igartcgiris bnthlion nnt 
persed it with $he los9 of nll its bogpgc. Two h u ~  
mtumed to their hornes, antl tLe Preneh genemi tlien mui 
mpidly againr-t Artolra, who I ~ S  at Gu?ueriiica. TIie Itali; 
being dili ilt 13ilbao were directed to fiank that chief on i 
vest by Yungin, wliile a Freiicll coEumn flitnked liim on I 
ast  by lfurquiner, hLrtuIa fled to Lequitio, but the column 
fmm Illarrlui~eq cnming ovcr the mountain, fe11 upon l i s  right 
just as he mas dcfiling on z nnrrow wny dong tlie sea co~st ;  
he eñcaped hirnsclf, yet tivo hundxd Eiscnyanfi m e  kilIed 
drewned, thrce Iiundred with hcnty-scven officeis tak 
A rsar-giiard of two wmpanies got ofl in tbe mountnins, so 
few gained m Eaglisli vessel, aiirt tliis success mhich did uuu 
wst tlie French a man was attributed to  Gurnget ,  tlie daring 
ofioer wlio won tlie pm-O of the Duero at Tordesilh duriiig 
WeX1jcgton's wtreat. 
Tbe voIuntecr battnlions of B k c l  bcing thns disposed of, 
al1 tl~eir m , g n i n m  hospiti~ls anJ rl6pRB fcll into Foy's Iinuílq 
tliejunta dispemcd, thc privatecm qtiitted tlre coast for Sriii- 
tander, Pastor abtrntloued Guipi~sctia, znrl thc Italians reeo- 
vered Decmeo from mhicli the g:irrison ficd t a  the Englisb 
ships. Tliey nIso dcstroyed tlie worlís of tlie little island of 
Isam, ri.liich, eituated tlrree tIioi~and yards from tlie sliore 
aud having no nccess t o  tIie sumniit savc by a skiircüsc cut iu 
tlie rocli, wm deemed itnpregii~ilile niid u s d  as a d6pliUt ior 
th.s English stores. Tliis was tlis last memoratile exliloit of 
Pdombini's division in the nortli. Tlmt general himself liad 
alrendy gone to Itnly t o  join Fupoleon'~ rcacrvcc, iaud Iiis 
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troops being ordered to marcli by Arqon to join Sucliet, wera 
nctunlly in movement when new events causd them ta remain 
inGuipuscoa. Thegwererepiited brnve ancl active soldiers, but in 
deviistatiug ferocity ddiffcrccl little from tlleir Rornnn sncestors. 
During tliese doubre operations of tlie French on the c o ~ t  
and in Navnrre tlie partidas had fallen ulmn the line o£ com- 
munication witL Fmnce; tlius worlring out the tliircl branch 
of tlie insurreckional wsrfare; and their sumss went nig1,li to 
balance al1 tlieir losses on each oriol<. Mendizabel was wjtli 
Loriga's partida npon the line between Burgo3 and ITimndn 
de Ebro; the volunteers of Alava and Biscay and part o€ 
Pristor's band were cnncentratecl on tlie mountainn of Ai-laban 
ahove the defiles of Salina: and Descarga; Xcrino and %lazar 
m e  up from tlie country between tlie Ebro and tlie Duero; 
and the tLrec liattdione Icft by Nina in tlic Amcscors, after 
escaping from Taupin, se-msemblecl close t o  Vitoria. Every 
convoy, eevery courier's escort mas attacked at one or other of 
tliess points, and Xendixabel algo madc suddcn descentq 
towndri tbe coast. On the 25th of April, Longa, who hsd 
fonr tlionaand men and severa1 p n s ,  wm repnlsed at  &mifiion 
between Miranda and Trcvino, by soms of the dra f t~ l  meii 
going t~ France; ht on fhe 3rd of hIny Iie compelEet1 a large 
convoy coming from Castille with an escort of eiglit Iinndred 
men to rp.turn to Miranda, and even annonntletl tlint pInm 
on tIie 5th. Tlion~cnot~ commnndant of tbe govcrnment, 
imniediately detaclied twelve hunrlwl men nnd three gung 
frnm lTitnria t o  relieve tlie convoy; but then Minn'a b n t b  
liona endca~oarerl to cscxlde Salwtierq snrl thcy wcre 
repulsed with difliculty. Tlie volunteera of Alava gistherd 
ahnvc tlie pasa of  Snlinna t o  intcrccpt tIic rcscued convoy, 
biit ftriding tlic Inttcr would not dir  from Vitorin wcnt on 
tlie IOtli to riid in a fresh attack on Salvhticrra; being again 
repulsed, they returned to Arlalim and cripturcd a courier 
iritli a fitrong escort in tlie plus of  Desmrgn nmr Villa Real. 
A E'rench ragirncnt sent tu siiecour Salvntierra finally drove 
these volunteem towards Billiw, whers, as aIreatly slio~vn, Foy 
routed tliemj but Longa contiuud to  infest tlie post of Armi- 
Bien until Samt  arriving from the siege of Castro c h d  
him also. 
a 2 
Notwithstanding theae mecesses Qausel, mhose troops were 
worn out with fatigue, declared it would require fifty thousand 
men and three months' time t o  que11 the inmrrection entirely. 
And Napolmn more discontented t h n  ever with tbe king, coma 
plained t ta t  the auecesses of Illausel, Foy, Sarrut, ánd Falom- 
liini hd brought no safety to hia muriem and convoys; that 
hia orders about posts and írrfantry m c o h  had been neglected; 
that the reinforcements sent t o  the north from Cadille hrui 
p n e  slowly and in succession insteatl of at once; finally thrrt 
the crtntioiis movemcnt of conwntration by the otlier amiea 
ma inexcusable; B ~ T I c ~  the inactian of the allies, their distan&, 
fheir want of tEansp&, their ordinary and even timid c i ~  
cumspection, in ang. operation out of the ordinarp conme, 
enabled t h  French to act in the most convenient mani 
Tlie growing dissensions between the English md 
<X,paniards, the journey oof Vellington to Cdiz, the changei 
his m y  mere, LG =id, al1 favoumbIe ciscumstances for .,,, 
French, bnt the king had hken no nti~mtrige of them: the 
insurrection continned annd the olject of intercst m* nom 
changed. Jwpli ddended himself wíth more ~ehemence 
than reason qainst tliese: chargeq but mTelling.toa soon vi 
cated KapoIeoa's judgment and the voice of controversy 
smothered by the din of battle; for the English general m 
again abroad in hig strength and the clang of hb arms 
mounded t h g b  the Peninsula. 
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W H ~  the Frencli powerwas being disor,pnized in the mnnner 
just reIated, Wellinghn re-organixed tlie dlied army with 
grenter strength than before. h g e  rehforcements, espocially 
of cawlry, hud carne out from Englsnd, the eirieiency of  t1ie 
PorEuguese was reatored in a surprising manner, and discipline 
11td been vinriimtd in Soth ~ervices with a rough but snlutnrg 
linnd, &nk liad not screened otieuders; some hud been 
arrested, some t r i d ,  Roma dismiwd for breach of diitv; 
tlle iiegligent were terrified tlis awloils encoumgsd; every 
deprtnient wns rcformed, and it was fid time. Contidential 
oificers commissioned to detect ubuses in tlie genen1 110slGtals 
niid dEliOta, those rtsplums fur rnalingerers, diseoveretl nnd 
drove so mnny skullrers to tlieir duty, that the second divisioii 
done recovered six lmndred bayoneta in une mrintli; and tliis 
acoiiring wns r e n d e d  more efficient by tLe establisliment o€ 
permanent and amtiulatory rgimental liospitals; a wise me& 
sure founded on a principie diicli wnnut be too wirlely 
extenrlerl; for as the clinracter of a bwtttalion dependa on i t u  
Sitness Eor service, a inor~l forcs will dwgs lietir upon tlie 
execution of ordew under regimeiital control wliicla it is in 
vxin to IooIr for el~wliere. 
The Douro liad been rendered navigable m high as Castillo 
de Alva above tbe canlluence of tlie Agueda; a pontoon-tmiii 
of thirtp-five pieoes had been formed; mrts of a peculiar con- 
struction had bee; bttilt t o  repair thc great losa o€ muks 
during the retreat froni Biirgos; .md a reciriit of tliese animals 
r a s  also obtained by einissiwies, wvho purcliascd them ~6t.h 
English merchmclise even at Madrid under the Iienrd of tlie 
eiiemy, nntl nrlien CJausel \vas rinahle for watit of trnnsprtrt to 
fill tlie rnrqgzines of Burqo~! The ponderous iroa csmp- 
liettlcs of tlic aoldicrs hnd bccn laid a~ide  for lightes vessc;~ 
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camied by mcn, the rnules being destined to mry tents instmd; 
it is however cloubtful If thew tents were really usefril in wet 
weather, bemuge when soakd thcy became too Iienvy for th- 
animal and sddoin arrived in time at the end of a march 
theieir greatest rtdvaiit.nge was when tlie soldiei-s halted for a fei 
d g s .  Many otlier changes and irnprovments liad takm p h t  
and the Anglu-Portukwese troups, conscious of a superior 
organizxtion, were more proudly confirlont tIinn ever, wtile the 
Frencli wcre a s i n  depressd by intelligence of tlie ctefection 
of tlir! RUSS~~HR, following nn the riisnsters in Russin, Nor 
lind tlie English gcncrd fiiiled to nrnend the condition of those 
Ppnnisli troopn wliich the Cortes l i d  plnced at lliis disposal. 
3 y  a strict and jealous wxtch over the appliation of the 
sirbsidy hs kept thim dothed and fcd d~~ring tlie wivinter, and 
iiou- had several powerful bodies fit to act in conjunction with 
his omn forces. 
Thus prwred he mas anxious to stnlre, anxious lo  forestal1 
the effwts oE liis Portupese political difficulties as well as to 
keep pace with Napoleods eforts in Gcnnany, and hii army 
\vas rcdy to takc the ficld in April; but hc could not ooneen- 
trate kefore the green fornge R*W fit for use nnd deferred tbs 
eseeiition oT his plan until Alay. It m 3  n wida plan. Tha 
relative strength for battle mas tia longer in fwour of tlie 
French; tlieir foroe bar1 been redaced by losscs in fhe secondary 
Appenciix 9. wnrfiire, and by draft.4 since Wellington's retreat, 
frnm tivo hiindred and k ~ t y  to tivo liundred and 
t h i r t ~  thousimd. Of the last number thirty thmsmd 
were in hospital, and only one hnndred and ninety-seven 
thourutiid ineq including the reserve at Bayonne, were present 
ivitli tlie eagles. Bixty-eight tliousnnti, incliiding Uck, wew in 
Amgon, Ci~hloniit, and Vulencia; t l ~ e  remaiiider, with the 
cxccption of  the ten thouuand left at ?iiadrjd, were dktributed 
on tlic nortlicrn linc of communicntion figm the Tomes to  
Cayonn~ : it Iins bcen shown how smttcred iind how oocupicd. 
Vellington was somewliat thwarkrl hy the duke of Yorlr, 
witli whom he was not on very cordial terms; instead of 
rporiving rcmounts for tlie camlrg, four o!? his regimenk were 
mithdrawn becanse of their Ioss of horses, lmving him wevlcer 
by twelve hundred thw he oirght to k a ~ e  Iiwn, But he knd 
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prepartd two Iiundred thousnnd allierl tPoops for the campaign; 
nnd on each flnnk there mrc n Rrit,ish fleet, now a. wry 
effcctive nid$ bccaiisa tha Frcnch l i n e ~  of rettrent run prallcl 
to mbnd ncnr thc  en-cmst on cwh side of Spiiin, nnd cvery 
pnrt opcncd by tho admnco oí? thc allics would form a dépbt 
for subsistente. 
This r n m  of troope mna rirgrinizcd in thc folIowing rnnnner 
gouth of the T ~ ~ T I R .  The fimt nrmy under Copous, nominnlly 
ten thoiimnd, was in Cat~lilnnia. The eeeond army untler Elio 
in Murcia twrnty thousnnd, irlcludin:: the divisions of Villa 
Gitmpa, Rassecour, Diiran, and Empecinarlo. Tli e Anglo- 
Sicilian a m y  under Mtirrny near Alicant, sixteen tliousand. 
Thc tthinl nrmy under De1 Pzrqiie in tlie Morena, twelve 
tbousantl. The first wmy of reserve uiider llbispal in A n h ,  
lusia, fifteen thonsand. 
Tn the north, tbe forirth army unrler Ca~taños inclnded 
tlte fipnni.sh divisions in Eatremadura, Julian Sanehez' partida 
the Gttllicianci nnder Giron, tlie Asturiirns under Sorlier nnd 
Bmcxña, the partidas of Lonpx and Nina It mas computed 
at forty thousand, to wliich mmñy be adtled minor banda ñnd 
roluatrers in aarious parta. Tlien m e  thc noble ilnglo- 
P o r t u p a e  amy, ~scvcnty thousnnrl fighting men witli nincty 
picces of strtillery. Antl t l ~ e  real diffewnce beheen tlie French 
and the dlies waa p t c r  *\inri it nppearcd. The French 
rcturns incIutled offfcers, serjmnt~, dnimmera, nrtilleryrnen, 
eiig$neers, snd maggoners, whcrcas thc Ariglo-Portupese 
wcrc al1 sabrcs aud bayoncts, Moreovcr thii return of the 
Frencli number wns dnt,cd tlic 16th of Rlnrch; nnrl m thero 
wem drafta mnde after thut period, anrE Mnuscl and Fofs Iosses 
and the reserve at Bayome are to be dehcted, thc nmber 
of sabres snd bayoneta in June m probsbly not more than 
one l~undred and sixty thousiind, oiie h d r e d  md ten tbüu- 
anad being on tlie nurtliern line. 
The cainpaip of 1812 bad aliown liow strong tlio Preiich 
lima ool Qfence wcre, especially on tLe Duero, ivliich they litid 
since entrenched in diffcrent par&, and most of tlie bridge8 
orer it had bem destroyeri in the retreat. But it was not 
arlvisabIe fo operate in tlie central prorinces of 8pain. The 
countiy therc waa exhausted, th0 lines of  aupply wodd he 
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Ionger and more exposed, hha m y  further removed from tbe 
ses, tlie Gallicians could not be easiiy Lirought down to co- 
operiite, the services of the northem partidow would noi be so 
advantngeou~i, and the nltimato result wonld be lws dcchi 
thari opcrrttions against the peat line of communication w 
France. Wherefore on the aorthern line the operations wt 
to run, and those defencea mhich conld acarcely be forced 
mere te  be evaded. On the Iomer Duero, tlie 
Flan 2, p. 88. French army muIcE be turned by n wide move 
ment across tlie upper Tomes, and from thence, skirting tlie 
mountaina, towards tlie upper Duero; but tbat line altl~ough 
most consonnnt to the mlcs af art because Uie army wouid 
thua be kept in one mnss, Icd through a dificult cnd msted 
country, thc direct md of the C*allicim would be losb, and it 
vas tliero the Freneh looked for *.he attack. Wellington 
therefore resolved t o  opemte by bis left, and so disposd his 
troops and spread such rgsorts, and mado such falsilse more- 
ments m t o  mask his real design. For the gathering of 
partirlas at Arzobispo, the demonstrations in Estrernaiinra,and 
La Manclia, the positiom of Hill a t  Coria nnd tlie p s  of 
Bejar md tlie mapzinea formed tLerg were al1 of Lis urdering 
bnd indicated a mom by the Taps or by Avils. Tlie greaker 
rnwsines at Gelorico, Yiseii, Penamacor, Almeida and Rdrigo 
in ne manner beHd this; but half the army widely cantoned 
in Portugal, apparently for lienltli, wns ~enlIy on the h e  lino 
of operations which was to mn tliroirgh thc Trm of NonGea 
It was also designed t o  p s s  the Diiero on the Portiiguese 
fmnticr, íand Wellinghon wwld liavt? done m with the whole 
army in rnass, if B e  necessity of keeping his right so far 
advanced in Spain during tbe &ter had not barred tliat 
measure; for a ooncentration on the Eeft would have exposed 
the countrp on his right to incursions, and discloaed his real 
design. Wherefore with a modifid project he proposed to 
operate witli hfs left, ascending tlie rigl~t of the Duero to  tlie 
Esla, crossing that rirer tu unite witli tlie Gtillicisns, wliie the 
rest of t,he army adwtncing from the Agueda should farce tlia 
passnge of the Tomes. By this combination, wliich he hoped 
ta eff& so suddenly thnt tho king should not have time to 
concentrata in oppoaition, thc front OS t l i ~  nlliw ivonld ba 
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changed to thrir xigbt, the Daem and Carrion turned and the 
enemy thrown ín confusion over the Pisuerga. Then moving 
fomard in mw, tlie English general could fight or turn any 
position taken by tbe king ; gaining at eaich step more force bg 
the junction of the Spanish irrcplars until be reached the 
insurgents of Escay; piniig iilso new cemmunimtion~ with 
the fleet, and consequently nelv depata at every p r t  apened. 
In the first movement the army would be divirled into t2iree 
parts, each too wedc to meet the wliole Freneh fom;  and the 
Tras os liontes operation, upon the nicw execntion of which 
the whole depended, wo111d be in a diicult mountainous 
country. Henee exact and extensive combinations were esBen- 
tia1 to success, but failure would not be dangerous bemuse 
each corps had a strong countv to retire upon; tlie woiat 
&e& would be loss of time and the opening uf other opera- 
tions, whea the liamst wou1d alIom the French to act in 
masses. The problem \vas t a  be aolved by hiding the project 
and gaining time for the Tras os Montes mnrcli; and to do 
tliis, minor combinations and rcsources for keeping the Prencti 
armies scattered mil emplayed wem t o  be freeIy nsed. In 
tliat vim, the bndge cquipage was aemetly p r e p a d  in 
Abranks, and the buiiock cnrts to draw It carne from Spain 
by hmego.  !t'he impro~ed naviption of the Douro seemed 
more conducive to suhist rr movement by tlie rigl~t, and yet 
furniahed large boats by wliich t o  pasa the left over th t  river ; 
thei wide-sprend cmtonments permitted changea oC quartersi 
under pretence of siclrness, and thus the treops mere gwlually 
closed upon the Douro dtIiont suspicion. IFiII md the 
Spriniard~ in E~tremadura and Andalusix almays rnenaced tha 
vnlley oF the Tapa, and mntribizterl t o  drttív nttention from 
tlie tnie point; but more than any other tliing the vigoroua 
excitemcnt o€ and austenance of tlie nortliern inntrrection 
ocmil~ied the enemy, ~cattcrcd his forma, and rcndered tlie 
8UCCCSs of the projcct ncrirly ocrtnin. 
Keithcr did WclIington fail t o  give ample employmcnt to 
Suclict'e forces; for I~is  r v i n g  wcie sprerd for a long fiight, 
even to ths Pyrenesn, and Iie hnd no desirs to find tliat 
marshal's army joined aith tlie 0 t h  Freiicli forces on tlie 
Ebro, The / p x  eq-es of h'apoleon had scnnaed tLis point of 
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war aleo, and botli the king rtnd C h e l  liad remived or 
t o  e~tahlish the shortest anrl most certuiu line of correa1 
d e ~ c e  possitle with Sucliet, becausa tLs emperor'a plan I 
tcmplated the arrival of thnt marshril's troops in the no 
hut Wdlington found another tmlc for it. For nftcr 
Rght of Ci~ntnllri, Freyrc's cavalry Joined thc Anddu 
reserve iinder hbispd, and Elio wlio remained near Alicant 
waa fo be joined by Del Yarque. These and the Angla. 
Sicilim tmops furnished more than fifty tliousand men, 
including the divisions of Duran, Villa Campa, the Empeci- 
nado and 0 t h  patti~ns, who were always lying oa Suchet's 
riglit flank hnd mar. With mcli a force, or even hdf, iE of 
gmd tsoops, the simplest pliin would llave been t o  tum 
Sucliet'n right f l d  ami bnng him ta action wit11 Iiis hck tu 
tlie sea; but tlia Splanish armiEs iveru not efficient for such 
work and their in~tmctions wcre atliiptcd to circums~ncee. 
To mjn thc open ptlrt of t he  kingdom, t o  ol-itnin a perm~nent 
footing on tlie coast heyond the Ebro, to force tbe enemp 
from the Eomer h e  of that river by wting iu coujunction 
with tlie Catalana,-tliese were the three ohjects In view, and 
to attajn tbern Wellington desired hIumy t o  sail q & t  
Taragona. Suchet musb, lie  id, &crease his Talen& force 
to wVe it; Elio and Del Parque might lhen seize khat Iringdnm - 
if Tarnpna MI it would bo good, if it was too atr  
hIurrciy codd return by sm md secure the country piner 
the Epanish generals. 
Elio md Dd Pfirquc werc howcvcr enjoined to keep Btrid.1~ 
on the defensive nntil Murrriy'e oopcrntions drew Sncltet away; 
thcy were not able to fight alone antl their defent would 
enable tlie French marshal to raid the king in the nortli. Ten 
thausaucl men were judged sufficient to reduco Tarugonrl, but 
if 3 f m y  couId not ernbark tht number there was ano t l~e~  
m d e  of operating. %me Bpanish bzttalions sent by sw 
would enaiole Cepons to  hold the eountry between Tmagona, 
LeLida and Tortcizs; mennvkile H m y  md Eiio werc to 
menace 8iicbet in front, md Del Parque iu conjuilctioti witli 
tlie partidw was t o  turn his righk by Bequeña; this opera- 
tion wns t u  be repeated until Del Parque gained a connexion 
~vith Copons by the left, md the pwtidtls liad cut off Suchet's 
den 
Ion- 
. --  
mu- 
rth ; 
the 
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interconrse with the northern provinces: eiiher of these 
plans mould entirely ciccupy that marshd and keep him in the 
soutli. 
Wellington was not aware that Reille's divifiions were 
beyond tlie Ebro; tlie spies, rleceived by tlie multitudc of 
r1et;tclirnents passing in and oiit o f  the Peninsula, ssupposed 
tlie troops whicli reinforced Clnusel t o  be fresh conscrlpts 
fiwm Trance; tlie arrangements for tlie apming of the min- 
paip wcre tlierefore m d e  in tlie expectntion of meeting ti 
very powerfd force in Leon. IIence Preyre's cavaIry and tlie 
Andalnsian reserve roceived orclers tu  mar& iipon Almar=, 
t o  pass the Tngus tlierc by o pontoon-bridge cshblislied for 
them, and then crossing the Gredos by Bejar or Mombeltran, 
to march itpon Valldolid wliile tlie partirlas of tht quarter 
rihould hirnss the nzarch of  Lerd from Uadrid. The Sl~ariisli 
troops in &tremadure were to join tlime forces on tlia 
Aguda wliicli were destined to nitike tlie Iiasage of tha. 
Tormm; and t l ie Glalliciziis wcre to come do\~,n on the Esla 
to  uilite with thc Sras os Montes coi l~s .  Tlius seveiity tliou- 
sand diiglo-Portuguesg eiglit thousand Sl~atiiurds from Estre- 
madura, rind tmelve tliousand Güllici:ms, iu al1 ninety thou- 
a 
sund figEiting men, would be suddcnly placed on a uew front 
and marcliing abreast \vould drivc tl~lie surpriscrl aiid scparaterl 
masses oE tlie eiicrny reffuerit to thc PJ-reiineees. A gmnd 
dwiigii mil gandly it 1vn3 exeeutdt For lii$ iii I~cai-t 
and strong of band Wellii~gtoil'a aetcrans marclied t o  t l i ~  
encounter, the glories o£ tivelve victories plnyed nbout their 
bayonets, and he their leader was so prliud and wnfident, that 
in pnssing tlie strearn mhicli r n u i . 1 ~ ~  thc frontier o f Spain, he 
rose in Iiis stirrnps and waving his hand cried out 'Furewell 
l'ortugl!' 
But wliile stinining evcry neme and eagcr to sk.rili5 eager 
dso to escape Portuguese politics and lcceli pnce ivitli Napo- 
leon, he was callll~tl npon to (lismiss rspin tlie policp of a 
dcacent on Itdy, mil a neiv ministerial project for witlidram- 
inx his German troops t o  act in Germnny! ! Lord WiIliiim 
Bcntinck liad bcforc fclinquislicd l i i  vielvs with reluctancc, 
but now, thinl~ing nKbirirs favournblc, agnin proposed to  Innd 
at Xnples and put furward the dulce oE Orlea~is or the sr&- 
duke ??rancia. He nrged tlie weak atate of 11urat38 kingttoin, 
tlie favowalile disposition of the inliabitantsJ the offer of 
fifteen tliousaud aildiary Russians made by admira1 Erieg, 
tlie irhoclr to Nnpobon's power and f i e  cFcctun1 diversion in 
favaur of Spnin. He supportd his opinion by an intercepted 
letter of tlie queen of Kaples to Napoleon, and by otlier 
authentic documents; and tlius at tliie moment of execution 
Wellington'g mt plans were to be disarranged to me& aew 
schemes of wnr, one of which 1iB liad nilrezdy di~cussed and 
disapproved of; and liowever prornising in itself it would 
inevihht~ have divided the powcr of Eiigllarid and meakened 
tltc opemtions in both countries. 
Ris reply TVM dccisive. To ~ M ~ d r a w  thc Gcrmnns wonId 
onIy lmd to mischicf, rana liia opinion as to Sicily was not 
climged by Murat's letkis, as tlilint monnrch evirlentIy thonght 
bimself ~trong enougli to invade the islnnd. Lord William 
should not lznd in Itnly with less than forty thonaand men 
well equipped, since it must overcome $1 opposition before 
the pen~iIe woiilrl juin or even N G S e  to  oppose. It mas s h k d  
tbat tlie people looked to be protected from tbe French ~ n d  
prcfcrred Englmd h Austria. No doubt of tlint. Shc 
hustrians would dernanand proviaions rinrh moncp nnd in&t 
u p n  govcming them in rcturn; tlie Engli~li woirld as else- 
where, defray their own expcnses and pro'tiablg give a subsidy 
in addition. The south of Italy nws  possiliIy tlie best place 
next to the Spnnish PenTnsula for thc operations of a Biitish 
nrmy, and it rernained for the go~eriiment to choose wlietlies 
they would adopt an attxk on the former upon such a sale 
as lie liad alluderl to. Eut ol ons tliing they rniglit; be oer- 
tain; if it were commenccd on a srudlcr swle, or witli my 
other iiltentiou tlian to  persevere to the Imt and by ruiging 
, feeding md clothing rtrmis~ of the nativea, t,he plnn woulcl 
fail and tlie troops ~vould re-cmharlr ~,+lth 109s and clisqwe. 
TTiis remonstmnce f ix~ . l  tlie vrrcillnting rninisters and Wtl- 
l i~$on  waa allowcd to proeeed witli ]lis own plans. 
Designing to open tlie campign tlie beginning of May, antl 
the green fomge being weIl advrtnced the 2lst of April, he 
directed MWEL~,  Del Parque, Elio, and C o p n s  t o  commenm 
their operations on the eastern wast; Abispal aud Frcyre 
rere expected at Almaras the 24th; the Estremadnran divl- 
siow had rwiched the Coa, and the Anglo-Fortuguese force 
rvas pdually closing to the front  Eut heavy mins broke 
np the rads, u¿i the cumlirous pontoon-train h ing  damaged 
on itzq way did not reach Babugal before the 13th, and was 
not repired before tbe 15th. Thus the opening of tlie cam- 
pip was cielayed, yet the check proved of little canseqnence, 
for on the Fsench sirle nothing wiis prepared to meet the 
rlanger. Napoleon l i d  nrged the king to sand his heavy 
hqgage and &ores tu fhe rem, to  fix hia hospital8 aníl d6lifits 
at Burgoa, Vitorira, Pumpeluna, Tolosa, and San aie'titxstian; 
Joscph alIowed tlie impediments to  remdn with the armim, 
md the ~ i ~ k ,  poured lsleng the communication~, were t h w n  
u p n  CEausel at tlie moment wlicn thnt geneni1 wns scarcely 
aLle to mrake head against the northern insurrection. 
Napoleon M early and clearly fixed h e  lcing'a anthority 
as genernlissinio, snd forbad him to  exercis~ his monnrchical 
autbority towards the French armies, yet Jo~eph wm at thie 
moment in high dispute with di h i ~  generala upon tkose very 
pinta, 
Napoleon had dirwted the king to enlarge and strongthen 
the arorks of  Burgos, and fom magazinec there and at Xm- 
tone for thc armica in the ficld. At tliis time no mugminea 
had been formed at either place, and although a comrnence 
ment hrad bcen nade t o  &rmgthen Burgos, It w a ~  not capable 
of sustaining fnur lioure' b o m b h e n t  ltnd offerd no support 
for th0 &es. 
Napoleon hd rimired a more secure and shorter line of 
correspondence than that by Zarapxii slionid be mtrsblished 
with Sucliet; for Lis plan embrace4 tliongh it did not pre- 
amibe, the march of t l i a t  general upon Zaragoza, and he had 
repeaterlly warned tlie lring hew dangerous it would he to 
hsve Suchet isolated and unconnected with the nortliern 
operations. Nev&heLss the line of correspondence rernaind 
the same, md the allies muld excise Suchet's onrmy &om the 
north. 
Knpdeon had long and exrnestly urpd the king t o  put 
down the iiorthern insurrection in time $o maks hmF agninst 
the allres on the Tormes. Now, wlien tho Engliish gmeral 
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iVa6  red^ t o  act that inpiirrection was in fdl adivity; and al1 
tlie army of the nortli and great pmt of the army of Por- 
tu@ were employed to suppress it insted of bcing on the 
lower Duero. 
Napoleon l~ad clearly explairied to 91e king the necessity 
of keeping liis trcolis concentrateted towads t he  Tormes in an 
offensivs position, and dosired hiin te hold X~l r id  80 as that 
it could he abnndoned in a moment. Ths cnrnpuign wns now 
being opcnd, tlie Frcncli amies wcre sca'ctered, Loval was 
cneiimbeted nt J l ~ l r i d  with n pnrt o€ thc civil administrh 
tion, Gth l a r 9  stores para  oC artillery and the cate of 
families attathed to Joseph's court; while the otlier general3 
were atretching tbeir imtlginations to  devise wlitcli of the  
serreral. projecta upen to  him 1Vellingt;on wouId rtdopt. WouId 
lie force tlie passage uf the Tomes and the Ducro with bis 
wbale armp nnd thus turn the French right? Wouild he 
marcli slraiglit nImn Xtidrid ~i tIier by tthe district of , i d a  or 
Sy the vallcy o l  tlie Tagira or Lp totli; and would he then 
operate agiiinst 81e north or upon Znragozfij or tomrds tlte 
south in co-opcrntion with tI10 Anglo-Sicilinn~~ 7 Everykhing 
wm wip~e, nncmtnin, ronfi~scd. 
Al1 the gcnemlls compluinctE thnt tlic Tring's cnnrlnct vas not 
militiiry, antI Nnpoleon told hirn if Iie w011ld command ~ i i  
army he must give himself up entirely to it, thinking of no- 
tliing else; hut Joseph waa aImnys demmdiiig gold when he 
slioiill have tmstcd to iron. His ski11 was unequal to tlie 
amngements and eombinations for taking an initiatory and 
offensive position, and he could neither discover uor force his 
arlversary to ahow his real design. Tlia FrmcIi being tlirom 
upon a timicl defensive system, every rnovement oF tlie allies 
pmduced a lam arid tlie didomtion of troops witliout an 
ohject. Del Parque's marcli towards Alwraz, and tliat itf tlie 
Spanish di~i~ions frorn Egtremaduru in thc lahter end of April, 
mcibc ~icwerl  ris tlie coniuicncment of n general mvvcmciit 
a g i n s t  hldritl; bcmusc tho firct w m  oovcrcrl by tlic atlmnce 
of soma cavdrp frito 12 Rfanclia, anntl the second by the con- 
centration of t1ie partidas ,in tlie vnlley of the T~n~gus; the 
wliole Frencli a m y  wm tlius shlren by tlie demonctration of a 
few liwsemen ; for vhen Lcval took the alam, Bitwn marched 
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tow~rds tlie Gndniamn with tlime divisinm, und Droue 
gnthercrl the nrrny of tho ccntrc aronnd Xcgo:oviu. 
Enrly in Jlny a flftli dividon of Reille's troops wns employi.,l 
on tlie linc of communication at Pnmpliep, Burgos, and Bri- 
rietics, and he rernniaed at TalIadolirl with anly one ilivision 
of infmtry nnd his guns, his cavalry bcing on the &Esla. 
Drouet wa8 then at segovi~,  Gwnn at; lircvalo; Conroux was 
nt A~i la ,  h v n l  at Madrid with outposts nt Toledo. The Kng 
who WSLS nt Vdlndolid codd not blicrcfmc oonccntrnte more 
tlim tliirtflve tfiousantl infantrg nn the Diiero. He had 
i n d e d  nine t.?iousanrl cxccllcnt cavalry anrl morc than one 
hundrerI p i m g  of artillcv; but with ~ u c h  dispositiona, to 
coiicsntrntc for n bnttlc iii drance wris not to bc thouglit of, 
aniE tlic first dccidcd niovement o€ tllc nlTies wm mnre te rol1 
his scattcrctl forccs bnclr in confusion. Tlius tlic Iincs af tlio 
Tomes nnd the Ducro scre effuced fsom the system of opera- 
tions ! 
hbou~  the middle of Mayz D'Amqnnc's division cnmc to  
Vnllndolid, Villattc's divison, rcinforccd by somc cnwllry, took 
tha  lino of tlie Tormcs froni Alba in L ~ l c s m n ;  thrce divisiosis 
were nt Zamorn, Toro and other places on botli sidw o l  Bie 
Duero, xnd Ikille's cavalry mas stiIl on tlie Esla. TIie front 
of the  Prencli \ a s  themore defineti by tliose rivers, for the 
left w1b9 covcred by tlie Torinca, t.lie centre by tlie Duero, the 
right by tlie Esla Gazan'~ Iiead-quaiters were rrt Arevnlc, 
Drotietk nt Segovira, ~ n d  tlie point of concentmtion m a  nt  
Qnlladolid; bnt Conroux at Avila, and Lcrnl at ttI~lrid, mcrc 
tlirown cntircly ont of tlie circle af opcretions. It was at 
t i i is  inomcnt t h t  lVcllin@rin cntrrcd irpon wliat lias bccn i i i  
Engiand eullcd, not vcry npliropriatcly, thc inorch te Vitoriii, 
tliat niardi bchn but onc ~iorticin of tlic action. Tlic concen- 
tration of the arniy on tIic buuks of the Ducro vus thc coiil- 
siiencement, tbo inovemcnt towmde tbc Ebro iand tIie ptacsngo 
af tliat rivcia was tlic iniddlc, tho liuttic o f  Yitoriia i i u s  tiie 
whstru~ilie, iind tlie ortiwiiisiy of tlie Pvrcuecs tlii: eud uf tLe 
splenrlid drama 
IN tlic latkr end of Apml the Estremaduran troops were risirem- 
b1d on tlie Tomes, Cnrlos d'F!!paña liad moved on Miranda 
del Castannr, and the campaign was going to open when n 
formidable obstncle menacing utter ruin arose. Some specie 
swt from E~gland discliarpd tlie British soldim' arrenrs to 
Novernber 1812 ; but the men whose period of serrice liad 
expired and who had reinlisted, were entitled to bonnty 
amounting Ga eight hundred thousand dollilrs, and as deatli 
m s  so rife tliey deaired to linre it. But f w  from being able 
to meet triis demmd, WeIliugton could not pay lii muleteetg, 
on whom his operntionq depended, their arreibtri, mmy hnd 
cle~erted in consqncnce and it R-as fwrcd otliers voiild follow. 
Tlie Porhguese troops 81~0, bcing still neglected by their 
government anrl seeing the English soldiers partially paid, 
thought a systematic difference was gojng to be established 
lietween tliem, and thousands whose term of semice was 
expired murmured for their discliarge, which could not be 
Iegally refused. Wellingtoii instantly threatened tu apply tlle 
aulisidy to paying tlie troops, whieli brought tlie ~eg.ency tu 
riglits, md then be appealed te $Le hunour and patriothm of 
the Portupese soldier~ whorre term lzad exgired. Sucli m 
a p p d  is never d e  in vajn to the poorer classes uf any 
nation, and, one anrl all, those Firave men remalncd with their 
coloure notwitlistanding the ahnincful treatmcnt tIiey htid 
endurerl from their govcrnment. This noblc emoticin would 
prove that Reresfod, whme syatem of military referrn vas 
chiefly founcled upon severity, might have bettw attuiiled hs 
oject  in another mmner; but harchnesa ia the ~ g e n w  of tlie 
~iriPtomtic grinciple of government, and the iuarslial only 
moved in the straight path marked out for liini by tlie policy 
o£ t h e  day. 
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%%en this dangerone affair was terminahd &st~ñoa m- 
turned to  Gallicia, and the BP.:tisli w d r y  of tha lcft ming, 
which had wintered about the Mondgo, mssed the Di~ero, 
some lat aporto, some near Lamego, and entered the Sras os 
3fonte~. Tlie Portiigtiese cwalry had been quertered al1 
the FFinte~ in that provjnoe, anci the enemy ~ u p -  Re 
posd that Silveim would a4 formerly advnnce .porta alSS. 
from Rwgnza t u  oonnect Gdlicis wit,b tlia rtlliea. r'm a? P. 
tlle Aguedn, and a very difercnt poiver wm menwing tlie 
French on tIie aide of llraganza For abont the mirldle of 
Kay the mvalry mcrc followsd by many divisiuns of infantry 
nnd hy the pnntoon equipnge, thns forming with the horsemen 
and artillery a mas3 of mora t11m forty thou~and men nnder 
Gmham. The infantry and p n s ,  rayiidly pIaecd on the rigiit 
of tho Dnero by means of largc boak assemblcd between 
Lamego and Cactello de AIvg harched in sweml columna 
towards the Fomer Rs15 one eri1amn however hwing ivith i t 
two brigdcg of cnvalry went by Braganza Oo the 20th Hill 
carne tb Bejm, and dhe 22nd Gmham heing well ~lvanced, 
Wclling.ton quitted Frcneda and put his rigl~t wing in motion 
tewards the Tomes. It; consiskd of five divisiona of Anglo- 
Porhi,"izmc nnd Rpanish infantry, fivc bri-deri of ea~~alry, 
including Julian snneliax' horecmen, pmsenting mith tlia artil- 
lery a mnss of tliirty thoiimnd men, Being divided, one 
part under HilI mored from Bcjar upon Alba de Tomes, tlie 
other under Wrllingten upon Salnmnnca 
On the 21th YiIlatte mithdrew his detachrnent fmm 
hdcsmn, and the 26tli, & ten oklock in the morning* tthe 
heods of tlie allid cotumns appeared with admirable concert 
on al1 tlie ditl'ewnt routes leading to the Tormes. Morilla's 
division snd Long's camlry menaced Allin, Hill mming froni 
Tzamames bent t o ~ v a d s  tlie fords nbwe Sulamancn, and Wel- 
lington coming from Matilla marched straiglit agginst tfiat 
"ty. 
Villatte, a good oficer, bamimded the bridge and the streets, 
rient hia baggago t o  the rear, cnlled in h i q  detachment from 
Alba, and beinn resoFved to discover the real force of hin 
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above the ford of Santa Marta. Too Iong he waited, for the 
ground on the left bark enabled Wellin.$on te conceal tlie 
movements, and already Fnne's horsemen Mtfi six p n s  weie 
pasing tlie fonl at Eanta Mnrta in the French rear, wliIle 
Victor Alten's cavalry removed the barricades on tiie bridge 
snd puslicd tlirough tlie t o m  to attaclr in fmnt. Villuttt! 
thua mddenly aasniled ninrchrd townds BabiIa lbente ni~d 
gaind the heights of Chbrerixoa b e f a  Fane p t  ovm tlic 
tiver; but erc [he defiles of Aldea Lengua could be reached 
he !vas overttrken by 60th columna of camlry Tlie gins 
opened upon bis spuares and kilIed sbout forty men, tlte 
horsemen charged but werc repulsed ; then tlie &en& infantry 
again fe11 fast before the round shot, and nearly it bundccd 
died from tlie intolemble heak; yet with unq~ielled couragetlie 
daunkless survivom won their way in the face of tliirty tliou- 
saad enemies! At h i i l a ,  Fuente theymwere joined Iiy the 
troops from Alba and tlie pursuit was rabnndoned by thcir 
dmiring and applanding aclvcrsarim; hnt tivo hnndred had 
R fallen dcad in t he  ranlcs, M mnny morc unable to keep up 
were made prisoners, and one gun being overtumed in the 
Aldea Lengua defile retarded sil otbers, which were captured 
with their tumbriIs. 
On the 27th mitnd 28th the left of the allies approriched 
Zamora, the righi approaclied Tora; the latter Uius co~ered 
the line of Roiirigo, tlie foriner neared the puint of the Duero 
where a bridge of commu~ieation was: tu be thown. Kel- 
lington tlien l& Hill rn cornrnnnd and went o ñ  suddenly, 
being disquietecl for hia combination on the Esla Tlze 29th 
hc ptisscd tho Duero nt Mimnda In a bwl~et  dvng on n rope 
~tretchhed from rock to rock, thc rivcr fonming hundrcrla iif 
feet below-the 30th he re~clicd Cñw~jnlex, and joined G m  
hrtm who had civercome many obstacles in his pasaage tliroilgli 
the R a s  os Mantea. His troops, extended from Carrajalesto 
Tabar., were on the left in communication Níth the Gallicianq 
but the opemtions were disarrnngcd by the diffrculty of cross- 
ing tlie Esla. Tliat river sliould h v e  Iieen passetl tlie 29t4 at 
which time the rigllt wing sliould llave been close to Zamori 
aud the passag~ o£ the Duero insursd; the French would thus 
have becn surprised, scparabed, and beaten in detoil. Thg  
were indeed stiIl ignorctnt that an army was oa the Eala; btit 
that rriver mas pn,rded by their piqiiets, the stmtlm waa full 
and rapid, tlie banks stecp, ths  fords h a d  to find, deep and 
~ i t l ~  stony footing, and the nlarm had spwad from the Torrnea 
tlirougli a11 the eantonmcnts. 
At daybrealr on the 31st, English liiissaw, having infantry 
holrling by tliejr ctirrups, entered tlie stretim at tlie ford of 
Almendra and Gralim appronchcd tbe right h n k  with al1 
Lis forces. A Frencli piquet of thirty men was siirpriserl in 
thc v i l l a s  of t'illa Perclricea by tlie Iiussars, tlie pontoonR 
were immediately laid down, and the columns eommenced 
pssing, bnt severa1 men even of the mvalry hd been drownetI 
nt tbe fordn. Next day the he& of the allies entered Zthmom, 
whicli $he French evacuated after destroying the bridge. Tliey 
retired upon Toro, dpsf8myed the brirlgc tliera dso and win 
fe11 back, but their rear-guard wlis overt.aken near the vi?l;tgt: 
oE Morales by the husaar bxignde unrlcr colonel Grant. Tlirir 
Fiorwrnen irnmerli~teIy prassed a bridge and smamp nrider H. 
cannonade, end then fwing n'hout in two lines gave battlr; 
whereupon major Robmt~ mith tlie tentli hussiirs tianked hy n 
squadmn of tlie eighteenth tinder majar Hitghefi, tlic rcst of 
tliat reginient lieiug in rewt-ve, hrolre both tlie lincs at one 
clinrgc, pnisiicd for two miles nnd made twci h n n d d  yrri~aiiers, 
yct thc Frcricli findilly iallictl on tlieir infrnntry. 
This secured tlre junctian of the winp, for tlie Ducre wns 
fordiihle, anrl Wcllington, anticipating fnilurc n t  onc point, bnd 
prepared to tlirew a ktoat-bridge nt Espdncintn bclo\v tlic 
confliience of the Esk; he couid also lay Iijg pontoons juxt 
iibove Tora, because Julian Sanchez hlid surprised a cav:alry 
piqtiet and driven the outposte frnm tlie forda iif Pullos. Tlie 
Freiicli ooluitins were now concentratirip it migl~t be for battle, 
and the lefk wing of tlie d i e s  halted tlie 3 4  to lct tlie Gsllician~ 
come into line nnd to close up their own mar, The riglit 
ming pssed the Driero, tLe artillery rsnd baggagc by a f o d  
tlie infsntry at the bridge of Toro, ingeniously repaired by 
the lieutenxnt of engineers Pringle, wlio dropped Jtcdrlei.8 nf 
ench side of the broken arch and laid plnnks across just aliove 
tlie water level. Thua the line of the Duero wns  rnnstercd, 
nnd tliose who nndcmtond ww mny sny if it wn9 iin efort 
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worthy o€ the mnn and hia nmy. Tnice the combinations, 
follow Graham's columns, some of wliich mawhed a hundred 
and fifty, aome tmo hundred md fifty miles through the wild 
Tras os Xonta. Through those regions heId to be nearly 
impracticable even for srnall c o y ,  forty thousand men, 
infuntry, avdry, artillery, and pontoonq had been mrried 
and placed as if by a supernatumI pomer upon tha Enla before 
tho encmy knaw ovcn tliat they were in movernent ! Wari it 
fortune or skiil thnt prwided! Kot fortune, for the dificultiea 
were such thnt Grnhnm crosscd tlie Eslra lnter than Vellington 
intended, and yet so soon that thc enemy could make no 
advanbge of the delay. Had the French even been con- 
centrated the 31st behind the Esla, the Gallicians were thea 
a% itenevente reinfometl by Penne VilIcmur's cavalry whicIi 
liad marched with Graliam; and the Astunana were at L o n  
wltere the Esla m5 fordable, and tlie passrtg~ of tlmt rivcr 
muld have been effected by similar comliinations on a smallvr 
=le; for the Fr'roncti liad not nurnberti ~imulkaueously t o  
Mend the Duero against Hill, the lomer Edn ogainpt Graham , 
and the U ] I ~ A P  E ~ l n  ag.ainst tlie Rpnniards. Wcllin,nton Iinrl 
nlso, as wc; hnvc scen, prepnred means t o  bring Hill ovcr tEie 
Duero belom the con4 iience of $he 'Eda : nnrI al1 these stii.. 
prking exertions liad been mnde merely t a  gain a fair field of 
httle ! 
But if Napuleon's instnictions hzd been worlred out by tlie 
king dnring tlie winter, this g e a t  rnovenienf could not have 
succeeded; fer the insurrection in the north would have bern 
cmslierl, or so far quelled, that &ty thousmd Frencli infantry 
riud ten tliousrind crivdry witli one Iiundred and twenty pieccs 
of artillery would have been disposabI.1i1e. Such a forw held in 
an orensive position on tlie Tomes rrodd bave oompelled 
Wcllington to adopt a diiTcrent plan of mpnign .  If coii- 
oentrn.kd hctmecn thc Duero nnd thc R ~ l a  it would hnvc 
bnffld Iiim on those rivcrs, becnnse opmtions effectunl q i n h t  
tliirty-five tlieusnnd infantry woulrl have been pmerlcss 
winst sixty thoumnd. Joseph ssnid he conld not put down 
t11e insurrection, he could nat feed sucli large nrmies; ra thou- 
sand obstacles arose on every side which lie coukd nok over- 
lome; in fine he wdd not execute his brother's instructions. 
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ley could bave been executed notwíthstsnding. Activity, 
e talcing time by tlie forelock, would have queliad the insur- 
ction; and for the feeding o€ tIie troops, the buniilesa 
Tierras de Campos where tlie armiea were nom operating 
wem covmd with ttie ripen* harvect; the only dificdty 
ww to subsist the French who were not engnged in ths 
nortliern provinces during the winter. Joseph could not htl 
the rneans tliough Soult told him they mere at l iad ,  bbacauss 
difficulties overpomered him; they would not have over- 
vwered Napoleon ; but the rlifference be tween a common 
:neral rtnd a great eaptain is immense, the one is victorioua 
hen the other ia defeated 
Now ms ttie field clew for the shock of battle. WeUington 
had ninety thoumnd men, with more than 0 huiidred pieces of 
artillery. Tselve thouanad wem cavalry, aaild the British and 
Partugume present with the colours were, hcluding mrjeants 
and drunirner8, above seventy thousxiid s~brea  rind bayonets: 
tlie rest of the army was Spaniah. But rin the wings Iioverwl 
the irregulars. ~ I c ~ B z '  lioraemen, a tliousarid strong, were 
on the rigbb bepond the Duero; Porlier, Barcena, Xalmti~ an11 
Manzo on the left, between the upper Esla and tlie Carrion. 
Sorni1 moved upon Avila, tIie Empecindu menwed LewI. 
Findly tha reserve oE Andalusia liad crossed tlie Tngus at 
Almar= on tLe 30th and nunimous rninor I imds s~i.nmed 
itround as it advanced. The Frencli could colIcct nine or ten 
thoirsaod horsemen and one hundred guns, but their infantry 
 as only tliirty-five thousand strong cxclusive of Leval : heme 
tlie way to victory was open, and on tlic 4th \Vclling.ton 
marcl~ed forwnrd with a conquering violence. 
Joseph conld not stem er evade a torrent of war the depth 
and violence of mliicli be nras even now ignomt of; and a 
d igl~t eketch oF bis previous operations will sliow tliat a11 hia 
rlisposition~ mere marle in tlia dark a n d  only clil- FrPnch 
ciilfited to bring liim into troiiblr. Rnrly in May rr,apoudeiiee. 
hc mould have rnnrehcd tlir! army of t l ~ c  entre to 
the upper Duero, when Leval's reports chec1;cd thc movement. 
On tlic 15th of thnt mont.h, Q spy sent t u  Bejnr by Uronet, 
now wunt D'ErIon, brotiglit intelligenm, tlint i~ great uumber 
of covntry carh had bsw eollected tliere aud at Placentia to 
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fotIow the troops in a march upon Talavera, but afkr tmo days 
were sent back t e  their villages,-tliat fifty rnulea had been 
purchased nt Dejar and sent to Ciirdwd Ilotirigo, md the first 
and fourth division~ and Geman cavalry h d  moved from the 
ilitcrior to~vards tlie frontier, sriying tIiey were goíng, the first 
ipo Zamorq the lnst to Fucnte Guinsildo,-thnt many iroops 
werc gntlicrcd at C i u d ~ l  Rorlriga under Wcllington und Gris 
triño9,-the tlivifnona at Cnria nnR Pl'lacentin werc expectcrl 
tlicre, the rewrves of Anrlnluñia mere in movement, tlie pnss 
of Baños, before retrenched and broken up, a a s  repairerl, 
that the EugEsli soldiers were paid their arrears, rnd every- 
ljody add a ,md moveiiient woulíl commence on tFie 12th. 
Al1 this was accurate, but, witli excelition of the march to 
Xamom which seemed on1y a Llitid, intlicated a movement 
:ipiust the Tormw aiid t.Iirew no IigIit upon the rwl desip. 
Un tlie otlier dauk, Reilles cavdiy under Boyer, hnving 
~niirlc! nn exploring ñmccp round by Astorgit, La Bancxa md 
Hencvente, Iirouglit intclligence tbnt R Giallicinn expedition 
wns embarlcing for America, anotlier ws to  follom, nind Eng- 
lisli divisions were dso embarking in Portugal. The 23rd of 
3Iay ti. repoi-t fmm tlie same quarter gave notice t h ~ t  Balazar 
and Malizo mre  with soven hundrcd horsemm on the upper 
IikIsls, tliat Porlier \vas coming from the Asturias to join tliem 
witli two thousaad 6ve hundred men, and Giron sith six 
ttiuusand Gullicians hnd rmlied Astorgib-but it n'as nncer- 
tain if Silveirds cuvalr;v would come from Erqnnm to con- 
iiect thc IefO o€ the Englisli witk the Gdlicinns ras it had done 
tlie gcnr hefore. 
Tliiis on tlic 24th of May thc French were still iporant of 
Cmliam\ sovement, and altliough it was known the 2 6th fit 
VallaílolirF, that Vellin$on hnd troops in the country beyond 
tlie Esla, it was not coiisidered a decisive movement bemuse 
the hed-quarters were still at Freneda On tlie 29th ReiUe 
unitetl liis cuviilry at Valderns, passed the Esla, enterect Bene- 
vente and aeiit ptroles towarth Tobara and Curvajalea; fwrn 
t,heir repi~rts nnd otlier suurcea he understood tlie wliole aKed 
nrmy mns on thc Esln; nnd as liis detachmcnta wcro closely 
fnllomerl hy Rrit.i~h xcouting parties he rec~oased the %la snd 
Iroke tlie bridge of Castro Gonzalo, leaving bis liglit horw- 
nien to watch it. But the delay in the passage of the Esla, 
rafter Grnham had rewlled CarvttjaIes, msde Reille doubt both 
tlie strength of tlie allies and tlieir iadination to cross that 
river. He expected the main attack on tLe Tormes, and pro- 
poseed to unite with Dsricads infantry and Digeon's dragoonq 
theu at Toro and Zarnora, h defend the Duero and Iolver 
&la, lenving the Gallicians, whose force he despised, to pasa 
tlie upper Esla at tlieir peril. 
DYArmagnac's division was at. Eio Seco, and blaucunda 
division, wkich had been spread dong the road to Burgoq was 
ordered to concentmte at Falencia on tlie Carrion; but Gazan 
t i i i  tlie 0 t h  flanlc was equally demived by tlis allies' mova- 
ments. The 7th of Nag he heard from the Tomes tliat the 
prepamtions indicatwl a movernent to~vards t l int river. Eevd 
wrote from Madrid tliat he lrad abandoned ToIedo bemuse 
iifteen tkousantl English and ten tliousand Gpaniards were to 
dmnce by tIie valley rif the Tagus; tht ratioas l i d  been 
ordered at Escalona, for Long's camlry, md niqminea were 
furined at Bcjar: and f o m  n third quarter c m c  nems, that 
tliree divisions would pasa tlie Duero to join the Gallicians and 
r~arch upon Valldolid. 
Qazan rightly tliinking the magaxines at Dejar were fo 
sripl~ly Rill aad tlie S p n n i d s  in tlieir morement t o  joia Wel- 
lington, expected at first the mholei would operate by the 
Elti, but on the 14th fresh reports clianged tliis opinion; he 
tlien jud@ HiIl would advnnce by t l~e Puente Congosto 
upon Aviia, to cnt Lwal off ~vhile llrellington attacked Sala- 
manca. On the 24th bis daubts vanished. Villatte told him 
WelIington was over the Agneda, Grham over the lower 
Dauro; and at the same time Dariau, h t i n g  from Bamerrs, 
told bim Gdam's cavdry was only one mfirch from tlie 
Edrr. Conroux was htant ly  directed t o  mrch from Avila 
t o  Arevdo, Tilly fn move with the cravdry of the army of tho 
soiith frorn Madrig~l Sowrds the Srabancoq Daricau to send 
n hrignilc to Toro, Lod to coma owr the Guridrirwima pnria 
and join D'Erlon at Ekgoria. 
On the 26ith, Gezan, thinking WelIinghon slow and crerlit- 
ing a report that he wm sick and tmvelling in a mmage, 
relnpsed into donbt. He now judged tlie passage of tthe 
Aguda a feint, thought the allies' operationa would be in mass 
t o w a d  the Esla, and was poaitiveIy assured by hi6 ernivsnries 
that EiFl would move by thc Facntt? Congcsto against Ecgoviib 
The 27th he hmrd of thc y a s w  of thc Tormes and Villattda 
retreitt, wheieripon evncuatiiig Arevalo be f i x d  his heittl- 
qusrters at Rueda, and directed Conroux, who m-3 marcliing 
iipon Arevalo and ao hmtily that he Ieft s nioveable column 
behind him on the upper Tomes, to come ta tlie Trabitncos. 
G m n  itt fiist designed t e  take post behind that river, but 
tliere was no p o d  position, and tbe 28th he raIlied Conronx's, 
Rey's md Villatte's infantry and Tilly's cmlrg beiiind tha 
Zapadiel. Darimu rnelauwhile concentrated at Toro, Digeon 
at Zmorn; 8 Iiridgeheod sas commenced at TordssilEas as 
Zlie point of retreat, and guards were plaed at Pullos, where 
tiie falda of tlie Duero ivere very Iow tbougli as yet i n ~ p r a ~  
ticable. TIiese movements were unmolested; Hill liad no 
desire to drive thc ficucli over tlie Direru nnd incrcace thc 
number of their troops on the Esla, Tlie 30t11, Gaxan, Iicoring 
that HilE U + ~ R  advancing and the troops on the Rala Iil<ely to 
nttempt the pwiisage of tlint rivcr, ctossed the Direro in the 
night and toolr post at Tordesiilas, intending to concentrate 
the wholo a m y  of the sonth on the rig1:t of that river; but 
Levtll, tliough ha had quitted Madrid an the 27th, wm not yd 
wrived; and a l a g e  artillery convoy, tlie ministers and Spanish 
families, and tbe yictures from the paIaee of Malirid were like- 
wise moving by the Segovia pa sa .  
At tliis time tbe army of Portugal and D'Armagnac7s 
division were extended from the Esla to  the Carrioii, the 
king's guards were at Valladolid, VErlon liras in inamli Lo 
the Puente Duero from Segoviw and Sepulveda, yet slowly and 
apparently not sware of the crisis. Meuuwhile tlie pascqe 
o£ th0 Esla h d  heen effected, and if t1mt ril-eer had been 
crossed 86 foramlculnted by l';fellin,@n, rrnd a pusli m& 
upon Placcntia nnd VaT7adolid mhilc FIiIl rnxrchcd upon 
in Ruecla: thc whole French arm y miglit 11avc been ca~igl~t 
what Nbpoleon calIs I f apm& ddicto' and deshroyed. Anrl 
even norp it would seem Jt'ellington could Lave profited niore 
by rnarcliing than liiilting at Toro tlie 3rd; for t1iougl:li Levnl 
and part of D'Erlon's nrmy were then between the Puente 
Ducro and Valladolid, a Earge division ms at Tudela do 
Duero to protect the convoy from Madrid; another great con- 
voy was still on the left bank of tlie Iower Pisuerga, and 
ReilIe and (&izan's pmcs mere miting on the right bank of 
that rivcr until tlie Grst convoy hzd pnesetl: over tlie Carrion. 
h'wertlieless i t  ww prudent to  p t h e r  welI to a head first, 
ancl the g e n e d  wmliiations bad been BO prtrfoundly m d e ,  
thtrt tlie evil day far tlis hmch  was onZy deferred. 
On tlie 30th Jusepli designed to oppose Tirellington's main 
Iiody witli tiie army oT tbe auutl, wliile the army of t.he 
aentre Iield the rest in check; the army of Portugal b&g to 
aid eitlier na tlie cma mi& be. And such was his inftttuation, ' 
tha t  bcsides pressing on Napoleon the imrnedin-te estnblisliment 
of n civil Spanisli utlministmtion for tiie provinces beh i~d  the 
Ebm, be dernanded an order to draw Clnusel's troops nwny 
from tlre Ebro, t h t  hc might drhe tlie allies bnck to the Cog, 
nnd t a l ~ e  tlie long-ursd offensivo position townrds Portugnl : 
Napoleen being theii at Dresden and Wcliin$on an thc 
Duero ! 
On the Znd, kho Iring, who axpected tlie allies at Toro tho 
Ist, disquretcd that Iiis frone was unrncilesteci, concIuded, :is 
he hd remived no letter from Reílle, that Wellington h d  
turned his riglit and iviis mircliing to~mr11.s tIie Cai~ion. On 
the evening of tlie 2nd Iie Iiewd frotn Ibille, u410 1id retired 
toRio Seco and there ralIied D'Armapac's troupa; Iiut hlau- 
cune's division was still in mar& from difereub parts h con- 
centrate at Palencia. Tlie lialt of tEie 3rd was herefore to 
thc profit of tlie French, for cluring t h ~ h  time tliey received 
t l~e  Madrid wnvoy, iinured tbe concentration of al1 their 
troops, and recovcred Conroux's rnovcarile column mhich joined 
Leva1 near Olinedo. TIiey also destroyed tlie bridps o€ 
T~idcln and Fuente Dtiero un tlie Ducro, tliosc i ~ f  Simancss 
ancl Gnticqon on tfie Pisitergn, and pxsqed their convoys over 
the Carrion, directing them under eswrt of Casa A1~cio.u' 
Spsni~h diviaion iipon nui-gofi. 
Gnmn now moved upan Torrclol>aton nntl Pennflor, DErton 
upon Buenas, Reille upon Pdcncin; nnrT thc splrits of el1 
were rnised by intelligence of the emperor's rictory i t  Lutzen, 
and by a report tbnt the Toulon Rect hrid mnde a succcssiiil 
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dewent on Sicify. It moutd appar that Nnpoleoa certainly 
contemplated an attack upon that island, and lord Villiam 
Bentinclr tliought it would be successful; it m a  prmented 
by BIurat'ri discontent;; insteiid oC attacking he fe11 off from 
Napoleon and oyeaed a negotiation with the Biitish. 
M'ellington adrwced un tbe 4hh, Iiis bridge of communica- 
tion wns ektablisked at Pollos, stores of ammunition were 
formed at Valladolid, sonie liad also been taken a t  Zarnora, 
end the cavnlry flamlrers mptured large mapmines of grain at 
Armlo. Townrds tFie Cswion the merch was rapid, Iiy paral- 
Icl rond~l nnd in compact ordcr, thc GalIiciansi on the extreme 
lcft, blorillo nnd Julirtn Xnnchcw on tlir, extreme right, nnd the 
cnemy m q  ex]wcterl t o  defcnd tlie river; Iiut thc report of 
prisoners antl tlie liasty movements of the Frenc!i soon ~ h o w d  
t,hat tliey we.re in fiill retreat for Riirgos. On tlie 6th their 
forces were over the Camien; Reille had even reaehed PaIencir 
t l ~ e  4th, and there d i e d  Mancune's division ancl a brigade of 
liplit cavxlry employsd on the communicaticins. Ths king 
lind now fifty-5ve tliousand figliting men, exclusive of his 
Sl~tanisli divisioii wliicli waa escort ing tlie convoys and briggap; 
but he (lid not judge the Ciirrion a good position and retired 
Iieliiud Uie upper Pistierp, desiring if possilile to  give battle 
tliere. He sent Jourdan t o  examiue the stnte af Burgos, snd 
expeditcd frcsh letters, for he l i d  nlrcady written from Val- 
ladolid on tlie 27th and 30th of Rlw, to Foy, Samt nnd 
Glnusel, mlling tlieni toward~ the plains of Biirgos. Sitchet 
al30 Iie directed t o  march upon Zwago7~, hoping. be was 
alrearly on hia way; but Siichet \vas tllen engagecl in Chtalonia, 
Claiiscl's troops were on the borders of Awgon, Foy and 
X'alombini's Italiljnns were en tlie wast of Guipuscoa, and 
Ssrriit's division waa pursuing Long  in the Montaña. 
Higlier tlian seveiity or eig1)ty thoustuid Joseph di8 not 
e.stiinnte tlio nllied forces, aud he W&F desirous of figliting 
tlicm ort t h  elwntod plaina of Btirgos. I3ut more t l i ~n  one 
liiindred tliousand men were before and around Iiim. For QU 
thr. pwtidns of the Asturins ancl tlie Montafío were dmwing 
tiigctlicr on his right, Julion Snnelica nnd the partidas of 
Cnptillc were closing on his left, Abiripal mith thc rescn-o 
and Freyre's cavalry hnd parised the Gredos mountains and 
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waa making for Valladolid. Neverthsless Joseph was sitn- 
guine o£ succesa if lie could rally Clausel's and Foy's divi- 
sions, and Iiis deqatches to tlie fomer m r e  frequent and 
u~ifent. Come nith the infanty of the m y  of Portugal1 
Come with t t e  amy of tlie north and we sliaU drive the xlliea 
over the Duero! Such was h i g  cry  to Clausel, and agtlin he 
iirged bis pol i t id  ~cliemes upon his brother; hut he was not 
a ~tritesman to advise Napoleon, nor a, general to contend with 
IVellington; tii was not the mil i tas  genius, nor were his the 
arrangementa fliab could recover the iiiitiittory movement 
n t  sucli a crisb and against such an adve~ary. Wlule still 
on the Pisuerga he received Jourdan's report. Burgoa wtis 
untenable, there were no provisions, tlie neiv work &S mere 
unhished, they mrnmandsrl the 01-4 which were unnble to 
Iirild out a &y: of Clausel's md Foy'a divisions notliing had 
been limrd. It was than resolvcd tu rctire bcyond the 
Ebro. 811 the Frencli outposta in tbe Eiirolia and Mrintaiíc 
wcro ihmecliately withclram, and the grent dEpDt of B u r p s  
was eva~riated upon Vitoria, wliicli wns tlms eucuwbered witli 
tlie artillery déphts of Madrid, of Vallndulitl, and of Burgog 
aud with tlie b:igg~ge md sture~ of so niany ttrmies aiid so 
mmy fugitivo families; snd at ttls miiment itlso amived from 
Friinw a convoy of treasure wliícli liad long waited fur wcort at 
Bay ome. 
Heitnwtüe the tide of wm flowed onivards with terrible 
power. TLe dlies croaaed tlie Carrion tbo 7tb, Soseph retired 
by the high l o n a  to Rurgos witL hxnn's and S)'Erloil's troolw, 
Reille moved by Castro Xerez, Wellington followed li i i id,  
and conducting his operationa coutiniinlly ou the same prin- 
ciple, and pusliing his Ieft ming talid tlie hllicizns nlong byc- 
roads passd tlie nliper Pisucrga on ths 8tl1, 9tIi, and lOtli, 
IIaving tlius turned tlie Iinc of that river entirely, anrl 
outflanked Rellle, he made a short jorirney the 11th ar~d 
hsltcd tlie 12th witli liis Ieft \&E; for he hnd ontmnrclied Iiis 
~iipplics, and h d  to armnge tlie feeding of his troops in n 
country widc of hls line of commi~nicat~ion. Nevertlicletis Iie 
pushed his right wing undcr Rill nlong tlw mni~i road to 
Burgo§, resolved t o  rnnlre tlie Frendi yieId the costle oi  figlit 
fur the posaessi~n; and meanivliile Julian Surichex acting 
heyond the Arltinzm cut 05 small post8 and stmggling de 
taclimenta 
hi l le  xegiuned the great road to Burgos the 9th, and 
took gr~nntl behind the Hormma, liie riglit n w  Hormillas, 
his left o.. tlie ArIanzan, barring tlie way to Burgos; the 
other armiea were in reserve behind Estepar, and in tliis 
ntuation remaincd for three daye, mrl mere np in  cheered by 
intel1ipca of NrapoIeoda victary nt Bniiteen nnd tlie con- 
sequent rtrmigtice. Rnt on the 12th lVellin,*ii's coliimns 
m e  up. The light division, Gmnt's hnsaars ancl Ponsonb~s 
dmpons, immediately turned the French rigl~t, while the 
rest of the troopn atta&d the whola mnge of heights from 
Eormillm to Esbepar. Reille, wlio only desired to a~certain 
their numbera, seeing the horsemen in rear of Lis right and 
h i a  front so strongly menmd,  then mads for tlie bridge of 
BiuiieI on the Arlnnzaa During this movement Gardiner's 
horse-artillery mked l i i  columns arid captain IirIilles of the 
fourtwnth dragoona took severd prisonem and B gon which 
had been disablerl; and it wris snid the 18th hiiusai~s hilring 
outtlanlced e body of Frcnch camlry mig11t have chairgcd 
with great effect but were d h h e l d  by colonel Grant. The 
ailierr now pressed forward towards the bridge of Baniel, 
endeavouring to mt off the rebeat; yet the French repelletl 
the minor attacks with the utmost firmness, bore thc fire of 
tbe artillery without shrinlring, and edii ig the more serions 
attaclcs by tbeir rapid yet orderly mtiyement, finnlly passed 
the river with a Ioss oE only thirty rnen killd ancl a few 
kken. 
Being now covered by the Urbe1 and Arlaxixan rivers, bath 
ffooded, they oould not be easily nttnckcd. and the stores of 
BQVJ were remover]; yct in thc niglit Soscph a p i n  re- 
trental along the liigli xood by Briviesca ta Piancorbo, in to  
niIiich plnm Iio threrv f i  gnrri~on of ~ i x  Iiundred men. Thc 
crastle o€ Biirgm was mined, biit from hnrry, or nqligence, 
or wmt of slrill, the explosion wa4 outwnrds a t  the moment a 
column of infantrgr mas defiling beneath. Xe-reral drerts 
mere Iaid in riiins, tliausands of sliells and otlier combustibles 
left in the place, were ignitd and driven upwards with n 
horrible craslh tlie h i b  rocked abwe the deyoted column, nlid 
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;ut snch an art is war! SO fearfd ia the consequence of 
r, 80 terrible the rpsponsibiiity of a general. Strongly 
and wisely did Kalicileon speak d e n  he told Jo%ph be nus t  
give Iiimself up entircly to the business, ltibouring d y  ond 
night, thinlcing of uotliing else. Here was n, noble arrny 
.ir;~n lilre sheep beforr: prowling wolves, pt in every action 
infcrior gencrals hnd bocn prompt and ~kilful, the soldiers 
?e rcndg nnd dnring, firm and abcdient in the rnorit trying 
umstanccs of hattle. Idmtry arhillcry sud cavalry, -fill 
G exc~llent rtnd numcrouri, md thc country strong and 
buroble for defence; but tliat soul of armics, thc mind 0.f n 
it commander wris mating, nnd tlie Edn, the Torrnes, the 
:ro, tho Carrion, thc Pi~crf;n,  tlic Arlnnzan, seemed to he 
id up, tlie rocl~s thc mouiititins the dcep ravines to he 
illcd; Clauscl's stmne; positions, Dubreton's thundering 
lc hzd clisnppenred lilrc a drcnm, and sixty thousand 
:mn soIdiew thoagh willing to fidit nt every step, were 
c i d  with al1 the tumult nnd 'cenfiision of dcfcbt across tlie 
*o. f i r  wfis tlmt bnrrie~ found of more ovnil to miti@ 
ruñliing vinlencc of their formidnble enerny. 
oscph Iinving prissession oE the impwgnablo rockg the 
Ic md forkq of Y R ~ C O T ~ O ,  now thought he could safely 
-..-it for his reinforcements, md extended his wiiigs far tlie 
snlre of subsistcnca. On tlio 16th D'Erlon mnrclied ik Aro 
on tlie lert, leaviiig ama11 posts of comrnonication betiveen 
tliat place mri Miranda, nud senrling. detacliments tomrds 
Domingo Calqada to watc11 tlie road leading from Rurgas t o  
Logafío. Gszan remained in tke ceiitre with a sttrong 
advanced guard beyond Prnncorbo; for as tlie king's Sope 
was t o  retake tlie offcnsive he retained the power of issuing 
beyontl tlie defiles, xnd his scoutiug parties were piished 
forward to~vards Bfiviesm in front, to Serczo on tbe lcft, ta  
PoSa do Sal on the right. The rest of Gazanma remaining 
tmop were mntaned by divi'iions ns fnr ns Armiiíion behind 
tlic Ebro, nnd ReilXe mnrchd to Espejo, ulao tehind tbe Ebro 
and on Ihe great niad to Bilbao. Being there joind by Sarnit 
frorn Orauña he took a position, plocing Maucuno nt Frias, 
h t  at Osmrs, and Ln N~rtinierc nt fipejo; gnnrding also 
the Puente Zara, and sending atrong ~couting parbies towards 
liedinrc de Pomar md V i l h g o  on one sidc, and towads 
Orcluña on the other. 
Al1 the enciimbrancea af the armies wem now assmbled in 
the basin of Pihria, and the small garrisons of the army of 
the north carne iu; for CIausel liaving reeeived the king's first 
letter on tbe 15th of June, Iind stopped tlie pursuit of Mina, 
and proceeded to ptlier up his acattered columns, inteiidiiiq 
t o  move by Logroilo t o  the Eliro. He h d  witb liim Taupiri's 
nnd Barbout'a djviaions of Reille's army; bnt after pro~iding 
prrisons, only five thousrand of his own army wcm dif;posnblc, 
nnd he corild not bring more tlian fonrteen t,housand incn to 
aid thc Iring'; ncvcrtlicless thc Intter eonfident in the sbength 
of bis hont mas eitill buopnt with the hope of zssemliling R 
force poverful enoiigh to reB1ce the offensive. His drenm 
ñ.as short-lived. 
While the echoes of the explosion ~ , t  Burgos were stiU rjnp 
ing in $he hills, Wellittgton was in motion by his left tou.anlri 
the sources of the Ebru. Tlie Gallicians moved from Apilar 
de Campo high uup on tlie Fitiuer* Graham moved from Tilla 
Diego aad in one mar& pn~sed the Ebro at the bridge3 of 
Rocamuride and San Martiu, Tite centre o£ the army iullowed 
un tlis ISth, and Ulc same day the riglit wing under Hill 
mrclied t.hrougli the Burelio, and crossed & thc Puente Arenus. 
!Chis general movement was mmaslced hy the cnvdry and the 
Spanisli irregul~rs, wlio infested tlie Prencli mar .ron tlie matlq 
te Rri~icscn and Dorninp Cslpda; thc alliefi were thas sud- 
dcnlg plnced hetween the sources of tlir: Ebro mi t,he grcat 
mountnins of Rcynosq and cut tl~e Frcneli entirdg ofP from 
tlie treacoact. Al1 tlie port.4 cxcept Santona and Bilbao wcrc: 
immediatelp evitctiated by the enemy; Santona was inve.ste(l 
by Biendizlibel, Porlier, Barcena, and Campillo; aad Englidi 
~scels entered Santandcr, where s dBp6t and hospital st* 
tionwere estabfislied,becauce the roya1 rod fpom thence through 
Reposa to  l3ugos Curnislied a free communication with tlie 
forces. This single blow severed tlie long connexion of the 
English troopn with Portugal, wlueh was thus cast off by the 


anJ the baggage, when suddenly the light division, moving ou 
S line prallel with Chabam's march,' apperrred on some rising 
ground in their front ; the surprise mas equal on both sides, 
tut tlie Britisli riflemen daslied doim the hill with loud mies 
and a bickering fire, the fifty-secand follawed in support and 
tlie French retrm'ted figl~ting as they h t  could. Tlis rest oT 
the English were in reserve and watching this combitt, tliink- 
Ing al1 tlieir enemies were before tliem, ívlien tlie seoond Frencli 
brigade, foilowed by its baggage, carne hastily out from a 
nmow clefh in some perpendicular roclrs on the right hi id .  
A confused action ensued, for the reserve sciumbled over gome 
rough iintervening ground to attmk tliis new enerny, and the 
French to avaid them made for a hill a littIe way in their 
front; whereupon the fiftysecond, whose rerir was thus menaced, 
whecled r o d  and ronning at fiill speed up tlie liill met 
them on t.he eumrnit. However, the Frencli soldieru, without 
losing their presence of mind, threw o$ their packs and hlf- 
flying, half-figIitingl escaped along the side of tlie inountaina 
towards Mimnda, while tlie first brigade, still retreating on tlie 
r o d  wwards Espejo, mere purgned by the rifiemen. Jfeauwlii'ie 
tlie arunpter animds run wilclly about the rocka with a monder- 
ful clamour; and thongh the escart huddld topther and foiight 
desperately, $1 the baggage beame the spoil of the victors, 
and four bundred of the  French fell or were talren; the re&, 
fhanlrs to their nnyielding resulittion and activity, crrcaped, 
tliougl~ pursued through the rnountnine by some Spanisli irre- 
gul~m. Reilfe being still presmed by Graham then retmterl 
Iiehintl Sl inas  de Añnra. 
A knowlc.dge of thwe cvcnts xeachcd the lzing thnt night, 
yet neithcr Itcilla nor thc few prisoners lia had m d c  could 
aocount for mure tlian six Anglo-Portnpcse rlivisions at tlie 
defiles, No troops hnd becn felt on tlie great roRd from 
Burps. and Hill was judged t o  be marckimg with tlie otliers 
by Valmeceda into Guipascoa, 1t mas bowever clear t h t  six 
divisGons were concentrated on the right and rear ot tiie 
Fmnca, and no time wns te be lo&; wllerefore Gamn and 
DErlon marched iii the night to unite at A~miñon, a central 
p i n t  heliind tlie Xndorx river, np the left bñnk o€ mhicli it 
waq ncccssary to file iu order to ,pin the basin of Vitoria 
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Ent it eoululd only be entered at that side throngh tlie p m  of 
Puebla de Argmzan, rvhfch was two miIes Iong and m narrmv 
as ecarcely t o  furnish room for tbe road. To cover this dan- 
gemus movement ReiIle fe11 back in the night to the Baps 
river, where lie mas t o  dispute the ground vigorously; for by 
that Iine Rrellington could enter tlie basin beCore Qazm mand 
D'Erlon couid thread t t ie  paca of Puebla ; he cxiuld also send 
a corps from Frias to attracl~ their renr on the Miranda side 
while they mem engagcd in the defiIe. And one of theee 
thinp he should have endeavoured t o  accomplish, but the 
t r o v a  find made very long marches on the E8th, and it lvns 
dark Sefore thc fourtb division. remchcd Fapcjo. D'Erlon rnd 
Mazan therefore united at Aminon witliout difficulty about 
ten dcloclr in the morning of the 19&, aniI irnmediately 
commenced the pssage of the defile of Puebla; the head of 
their wIumn appeared on tlie other side at tlie moment wben 
WelIinghon WM driving Xeille back upn  tlie Zndora. 
Reacliing Bayas befure inid-dq the 19tli, tIie allies, if tliey 
could Iiave forcd the psssage at ODIlCB would bave cut ooli 
D'Erlon and h a n  fmm Vitoria; but ReiIle was st~ongly 
po~ted, Iiis front covered by the river, his right by Suinjann de 
 orillas wliich was occupied as a bridge.head, the left securcrl 
by v e y  rugpd heights oppsitt! the villngr: of Pohw. Tliis 
ponit,ion m liowevcr turncd by thc liglit division while tlie 
fourth division ~ttacked it in front, and &ter a skirmish in 
which eighty of the French fell, ReilIe W ~ B  forced ovm the 
Zadom; but D'Erlon Iiad then passed the deMe of Puehlo nnd 
w a ~  in position, Gman was coming rapidly inta eecond line, 
the crises Iind passed, tbe combat waeed and the allies pitched 
their tenta on the Bayas. The French armies nom forincd 
three lines behind the Zadom, and the lcing hearing tliat 
Cluusel was at Logroíío, eleven leagues disbnt, expellited 
orilers to liim to niart:li upon Vitorila; Foy also, wliu wlis in 
march for Bilbno, was directed to halt at Durango, to rally tlie 
garrisons of Bi~icny and Guipuscoa nnd come d o m  on YPoria. 
Bll thcsc ordcrs were roceiverl too late. 
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CHAPTER VIIT. 
THE basin into which al1 the Fnench troopa parm convoys itnd 
enciimbrances were thns poursd, wras about eight miles browl 
by ten in le@h1 Vitaria being at the further end. The river 
Zdora, nlrrrom and with rugged banlís, after p s i n g  ve. 
near tliat toivn runs torvads the Ebro wit.h mmy windings 
and ciivirlks the h i n  unequdly, tlie largest portion being oii 
the riglit bank. A tmveller coming from Miranda by tlie 
royd Xadrid road, wonld enter the basin by the p w  of 
Puebln, through wlilch tlie Zndora fiows between two very 
. bidi rmd rough m o u n t ~  ridges, the one on his right callerl 
tFie Eieights of Puebla, that on liis left the heiglits of MorilIw. 
The road leads up the left Irianl~ of t.he Zaclom, aand on emerging 
&m the pass, six miles to thc left would be ueen the village 
of Subijana de Morillan, fnrnisIiing that opening into tlie basin 
which ReiIlc defended while the other m i e s  pmsed the 
ddle of Puebla, The spires of Pitorin mould appear eiglit 
miles clistant; and from that town tlie road to Logroño goes 
off on tlie right hand, the road to Bilbao by Murgia, anrl 
Ordutia on ttie left hand, erosging the Zadora at a bridge near 
tlie vilIage of Briaga; further on, the roada t o  Estelln and to 
Pampeluna branch off on the right, a rwd t o  Darango on tlic 
Zeft; and between tliem the roya! causeway leads over t l e  
great Arlaban ridge into the rnountaiuiua of  Quipwcoa by the 
formiditble defilcs of Xalinw. Rirt of al1 these roads, thougl~ 
several were practicable for pns, especially tliat to Pampeluna, 
the roynl catisemay alone wuld aufice for tlie retrmt of sucli 
an encumbcred armg. And as the nI l ies  were behind tlie 31ills 
edging the l)&qin on the right of tlie Zndora, tlieir line wiis 
parallel to thc pcnt cnirñewag, nnd by prolonging 'Eheir 
left they coulci hfdlibly cut off t l ie FrencL i'rom tbat 

btigade was pushed ta Dumm on thc roya1 mad, man p. 
8nd sitpported by a French bxttafion anda brigde 
of light horsemen; Digeon's dragoons and s wcond bripde o€ 
light cavalry were ia reaerve near Zuazo de Alava and Eer- 
mandad. Tlie king'a centre, distant six or eight miles from 
(lamara following the oourae of the Zadora, nsa on anotliei. 
front, because tha streiam, turning suddenly t o  the left rouud 
the heighta of Margarita descends to the defile of 'Puebla 
nearly nt right angla 6 t h  its previous murse. Here covered 
by the rher md on an easy range of heightg, h a n ' s  right 
extended from the roya1 road to an isolated hill in front of tlie 
village of Margarita. Hia centra wna astride the royd road 
in front of the village of brinez; his ldh mupied rugged 
p u n a  behind Bubijana de Alava on the roob of tlie Pucbln 
inountain facing tlie defile ; and to eover tliis wing Maransin 
wm posted witli a brigada on tlie mountain. D3Erlon's amg 
was in second Ene. Tlie Principal mass of the mvalry witlr 
many guns and t11e king's gunrds formed a reserve beliind 
the centre near the villnge of Bomecha; and fifty pieecg of 
~rtillery were maahssed in front, pointing ta the bridges of 
Mendoza, Tres Puentes, Vi l lob,  and Nanchreg. 
While tlie king wns malrjng conjecturcg, WeIlilington w r l e  
dispositiort~ for the different operationg which might occur. He 
knew the Andalusinn reserre would be nt Burgm in n few 
days, and thinking Sosqh wonld not frght on tlie Zadom, 
rletnclied Giron witli the .G;nllicians OR tlie 19th to seixe 
Oduña Graham's corps was destined to fallow Giron, bitt 
fiaally penetratecl tliroiigll diíiicuIt mountain ways to Iftirpin, 
thus mitting tlie enemy ofT fram Bilbao nnd menwing Tiis 
commnnimtiona with Frnnce. Rowcver thc rmr of the nmiy 
bnd been so much scnttered that Wcllingtoton haltcd tIle 2Dtli 
t o  rally hiri aolumns, nnd tnl~ing tliat opportunity to examiiie 
tlie position of tlie Frcnch armies otiserverl thnt t h g  werned 
steadfast to fight ; mhereupon cliangiag Iiia own dispositions, 
be %ave GraLam fresh ordew and Lastiiy recalied Giron from 
Drdulia. 
The Iong-expected battle was now at Iiand, and on neitlier 
side were the niimbms aiid courage oof tlie troops of rnean 
account. The abies h d  lost twa liundred killed and woundcd 
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in the previoas operations; ths sixth division, & thoziaand 
five 'linndred strong, was left nt Medinn da Pomar; and only 
sixhy thou~and Anglo-Portuguese sabrea and bqone t~ ,  witli 
iiinety pieees of cannon, were actually in the field. Tlie 
8110;nish auxilinrie.ries wero ubove twcnty thousand, nnd the 
nrliolc nrmy, including ~icrjeantri and artillerymen, cxcecdcd 
eighty tliousxnd combntnnh. The French muder-rol1 of 
tioops wna lost with the battle and an appmximation to 
their strenghh must siiffice. The oumber killed and talten in 
different combattts wais about two fhoucmd men, aud some five 
tlioucand had rnarched to France 6 t h  the two convoys; bnt 
Ramt 's  division, tlie garrison of Titoria, and many smaller 
~'vstts h d  joined, md lience, by comparkon with former 
returns about ~eventy tboaswd men were present. Where- 
fvre declucting the oiricers, artilleqmen, sappere, miners, and 
non-combataiits, always borne on tlie Frericli muster-rolls, 
tJic mbrw and bgonek would smrcely rencli ~ixty thoumnd, 
liut in thc number nnd sixt? of thcir gunrr tlie French liar1 thc 
atlvri.nhgc. 
Al1 the defects in the king's psition were appnrent. Bie 
liest line of retrent was on the pro?ongation of bis right flank, 
wliich being at &mara &yor m= too distant to be supported 
by the ni& boily of tlie a m p  ; j e t  the mfety of the lrtter 
depended upon that point. Many thousnnd carriages and 
impedimenta of a11 kinds were heaped about Iritorilt, lilocking 
nlI the rotids and crenting confucion mongst the artillery 
parcsi snd Marnnsin, placed on the Puebla mountnin, weaa iso- 
lated and weak to hold that gmund. Tlre centre indeed occu- 
pied an e q  ranga of hills, ita front was open witli a slope to 
ttie riiver, and powerful battenm ~ieemed to bar nfl acma by 
tlie bridgcs; lint mnny of the pna ,  bmng pushed with m 
adpnnccd post into n, dcep loop of thc Zndorn, wcrc within 
rnrisk&shot of a wood on the rigli t bank wkich waa atecp and 
nigged, glving the a l l i a  good cover elose to  the river. TRem 
were seren bridges 6 t h  the scheme of  the operabionq 
namely, the bridge of La Puebla on the French left bepond 
the defile; the bridge 0Bf Nanclares, facing Snbijana de Alava 
sud the French end o£ thr defile of Puebla; and three other 
tri-a placed arovnd the deep loop Iiefore mentionetl opened 
upon tlie right of the French oentre, that af Mendoza bcing 
higlicst up the stream, Vellodas lowest, Tres Fuentes in the 
ceutre: laatly the bridges of Gsmam Mayor and Briaga on 
a upper Zndora, guariied by Reilla, completed the number, 
id nanc of the leven wem either brolren or entrenched. 
Wcllington obmrving thme tliigs formed hie army for 
three distinct battles. 
Grnham, rdvmciog from Murguia by the Bilbao road, 
to fnll on &illa nnd latt empt the pasmp at Gamam Mayor 
nnd Asiogn ; by thi rntlvernent tho French would be com- 
pletely turned nnd greut part shnt np hctween the PuebItb 
mountain on anc sidc nnd thc Zndom on thc othsr. Thc first 
und fifth Anglo-Portnpese divisions, R r d  ford's and Fuck'a 
independent Portupese brigadctr, Lonp's Spanish divislon, 
and Ansonk and Bock'a mvnlq, in d1 twenty thouamd men 
with ,cighteen pieces of cannon, were dcstined fm this nttack, 
sntl Cxiron'a Gsllicinns carne up by a forecd murch in support. 
Hill wm to attack the enemy's left. His corp, twenty 
tliousnnd strong, wns composed of Jiorillo'ei Spaninríls, Bi2 
vcirn's Portupese find thc second Britisb division, with soma 
cnvnlry nnd pnrt. ColIected on the sonthern slope of the 
Jiorilins betwcen tlie ]Baya8 nnd lower Zadora, and poiuting to 
thc villngc of Puebla, it was dcstined t o  force a passmge at that 
point, to n~sail  Mamasin, thrwl the defile of Ln P u e b  and 
80 enhm the bnsia of Vitorb, tuming and menncing all the 
Frencli left and seouring the passaga af the hdora  J te 
bridge of Nanclares. 
ln the centre Wel1ingt.01~ personalIy directed tlie Bid, 
urth, wenth,  and Iight divisions of  infantry, tlie pea€ m 
' the artillery, tke Iieuvy cavalry and VUrbnds Portngese 
liarsemen, in al1 tliirty thousand comhtants. Encclmped 
along ihe Daj-s from Subijana Moiillaa lo Ulivnrre, tliey liad 
only to marcli across the ridges wliich formed the basin of 
Vitoria on that side, t o  come domn to their different poinia 
of attack on the Zadora at the bridgm of Nendoza, Tres 
Puentes, Villodas and Nmclares. But no mgged WM the 
country and the wmmonications between the different column~ 
m diilicult, that no e a c t  mncert could be e q e c t e d  and each 
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generd of diasion whs in some degm maahr af Ii 
menta. 
BATTLE OF VITORVL 
At dnybreak the 2X~t, the wmtller being rriiny with a ttliick 
vaponr, the troop~ moved from their camps on tlie Bayas, nnd 
tha centre of tho nrmy advrtncing by eotumns from tlie righ t 
and left uf the line passcd thc ridges in front md ~Io~r ly  
appmched tlie Zadorn, The lert coliimn pointed to hfendoz~, 
the riglit cotumn skirtcd tlie 1forjlla.s rirlgc, on the otlier side 
of wkch Hill s a s  rnarcliing. Tliat general scized the village 
of Puebla about ten o'clock arid commenced t l ~ e  pusnge. 
Morillo leading with his first brigade on n b e - m y  assrtiled 
the muunhiain of  Ln Puebla, where the ascent was so steep tlie 
soldiera seemed to  cIimb rather than walk, and the second 
brjgacle, h ing  to connect the fisst with tlie Britisli troope 
below, only niscenrled half way. No opposition was made 
unta the first bripile rras near the summit, 1)ut then a shaip 
akirmiahing commcncccl, Morilla lvne woundcd, l i i ~  secnnd 
hrigdc jjoinetl, u ~ d  tlic Frencli feeling tlie irnportiince of tlie 
height rcinforced Mnmnsin witli n frcah regiment. RiIl siic- 
coiired Rforillo Fnth the seventy-fimt regirnent and s battalion 
of Egbt infmtry, both under wlonel Catlogrtn ; yet the fight 
wm doubtfd, for though the Britisli secured t l ~ e  summit and 
gained ground along the sidc of tlie monntain, Cadogan a 
b m ~ e  oñicer asd of high promise fell, and Gman sent Vil- 
Iatte's division to mccour his side. 8trongly did these imops 
fight and the h t t l e  remained statioanry, the dliea Iieing scarcely 
able to hola tlieir grou~d. Hil1 however sent fresli troopq 
nnd with the remninder of Iiis corps, threadmg tlie long defüe 
of Puchla, ficrccIp issued forth on thc other side nnd won the 
viilnge of Eul.iij~nn, de Alava ja front of k n n ' s  line : lie thus 
connccted his own right with the troops on tlie rnauntnin, and 
mnintained this forlvllml position in llevpite of the enerny. 
WeIEington had meanwhile bronght the fourth and light 
divisions, the Iieavy cavalry, the hussars md D'Urban's Portu- 
p e s e  horsemen, f& 8ubijana 3101511~ and Hontmik, 
clown by Olabarre t o  tlie Zadora. The fowh division wtic 
placed ~pposite the briclge of findares, the liglit divkion 
opposite tliat o£ Ydodas; both were covered by rugged 
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ground and woods, and the liglit division mas 80 close to the 
water tliak their irskirmishers couId wit l~ liase Iiave killed tLe 
French gunnera in the loop of tlie river at Villodas. The day 
was now clear, and wheii Hill'a liattle began the rifiemen of 
the light division a~iread along tlie bnnk and exciianged a 
biting fire witIi tbc enemy's skirmi~liem. No serious effort 
3 nt first mde, bemuss the tliird and seventh divisions 
fing rough gruund to  traverse were not up; and t o  brave 
hed  the fourth division and the cavalry over tho bridge of 
LT unclares, would have imlirudently cronded the space in front 
af the Puebla defile liefore the other ddiision~ wero r e d y  t o  
nttadr. But nliile thus waiting, a Spanish peasmt told Wel- 
lington the bridgo af Trea Puentes on thc  Iefb oof thc Iight 
iaion waa unprded,  and ofercrl to  guide the troops over 
&mpt% brigde waa instantlp directed towads t1iis point, 
1 being mncealed by aoma mcks from the Frwch and well 
lea by the bmve pcnsant, tliey pacsed the iiarrow bridge at tb 
rnnning pace, mounted a Bteep curving rise of ground and 
halted close undcr the crest uu the enemy's &de of the r i ~ e r  ;
being then actudly bebind the king's advancod post iuid 
aithin a few hundred yurds of his line of httle, k m o  
Trencli can1ry  now apprmhed and two round sliota wem 
ired by the enemy, one of which killed ths poor peasant to 
vliose wurage and intdligence the allies ivere so much 
ndebted; but as no movernent of attack waa made, Kempt 
d e d  the fifteontli hwsars ovar the riverj and they carne at a 
raUop, crossing tlre narrow bridge one by me, horseman afber 
qaeman, yet gtiU t l ~ e  Frencla remained torpid : t l iee was an 
oy tliere, but no general. 
It was nom one o'clock, Kll'a assauIt on the viElqe of 
tiijana de Alava wna developed, and a curling smokq fnintly 
n far up the Zarlora on the enemy's extreme nght and 
lowed by tlie dull sound o f  distant guns sliowed that 
,Laham WRS at morlr. Tlien t i e  king finding liis flanks in 
danger caused tlie reserve about Gomecha to file off tomarde 
Vitoria, and gnve Gaxan orcieeiri t e  retire by siiccwsive masses. 
But at tthat moment bhe tliird nnd seventh diviaions being 
dcscried in rapid movement tomnrds tlie bridge of IIendota, 
' the French p n s  opcned upon tliem, a Lady of cavalry drew 
near the bridge, rtnd the numerous light troops commenced a 
V~~OTOUB muskety. Aome British gnns replied to tbe Prenclt 
calnon from tlie opposite bank, and the vn1ue o€ Kempt'n 
fvrwartl position was instantly made ninnifest; for Andrew 
Bmard, gpringing formard, led the riilemen of the light 
division in the most dnring mnnner betmeen the Fmucli 
cavelry nnd the river, taking their lighk troops and p n e r a  in 
flsnk, and cngaging them so closely tliat the English adil lq-  
mm, thinking hia drirkly clothed troopa were enemieg played 
apon h t h  nlike. This ~ingi i lnr  athck enabIed a brigade of 
tlle third division to pass tlie bridge of Mendoze without 
opposition ; the other brjgatle Eorded the river higlier up, and 
the seventh tiivision and Vandeleur's brigade of the light 
division folIowed ; tlie Prench then abaiidond the ground in 
front of Villodas, and the battle ~vhicb had before somewhat 
slsckened revived e t h  extreme violente. Itil1 pressed the 
enemp haraer, the fourth division pwsed the bridge of Nan- 
clares, the amoke and suund of Graham's athck became more 
distinct, and the banlre of tbe Zadara presented a contuiuous 
linc of fira, The French, senkened ia the centre by tlio 
ltbscnce of 'Vitlatte and diqirited by t he  oder to retreat, were 
perplexsd, anrl no rcfiülar retrogrdc rnovemcnt could be made, 
t,he ~llies were too close. 
Now also the seventli division and Colville's brigade of the 
third &&ion forded tbe river on the left, and were imme- 
üiately and severely engaged with tbe Frencli right in front of 
Margarita and Hemandd ; and almost at tlie same time 
JIrellington, seeing the hilE in front of Arinez neariy denuded 
d troops by the witbdmwa1 of Villath'n troops, carried Picton 
and the test of the third divisian in close coIumns of regimenb 
at a ninning pace diagonally acrosa the front of Iiotli armia 
towttrds that centra1 yoint. This attack m h d e d  by Bar- 
nard's riffemen anrl followed by the remainder of Kempt's 
brigdo nnd the hussars, but the other bripda of tho Iight 
division acted in support o€ thc sevcntli division. Colo 
dvanced from the bridge of Nnnclaress, and the hcavg canlry, 
a splenrlid bodr, passing the rivtrr galloped rip, quadron 
after sqmdron, into the plain ground between Cole's nght and 
Hii's lea. The Frencli thus caught in the midst of tkeir di%- 
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positions for retreat, threw out tt prodigious number o l  skir- 
misliers, wMe fifty piews of artillery played with astonishing 
nctivity; this fire KM an-wered by msny Rritish pníans, and 
th  sides were ~hrouderl by a dense cloitd of smoke and dmt, 
.<Ter cover of which the French retired hy de,we to tlie 
n,s of Heights in front of Gomeclra on which tlieir reirerve 
liad bean posted. They however continued to hold fbe vill~ge 
of Arinez on tlie main mad, and Pieton's troops, stilI lieaded 
by Barnnrd's riffemen, plunged into the stmets ami& a heavy 
fire; in an insbnt tliree guns were captured, liut the post 
wv4s import~nt, more French troops a m e  in, find for a time 
the make and dust md clamour, thc flaal~ing of fire-arms and 
tlie sbeuts and cries of the combatants mixed with tlie 
tliundenng of the gnm were terrible; yet finally the Brititih 
troops issued forth victorious an the furkher side. Dnring this 
mnflict the smentli division, reiinfnrced by lTnndcleur's brignde, 
was heavily rakd liy rt batterp at the village of Yargarita, 
until tho fifty-second rgiment, led by colonel Gibbs, with an 
impc%nou~ clinrgcj drove the Frcnch guns away and crtrrierI 
the village: at tlie carne time tlie eighty7swertth unrIer colonel 
Coirgb mon the viUage of Etermantld. TFicn al1 on Picton'a 
Icft atlvanced figliting, and on his right tlie foirrth division 
aEso mde way, t!ioiigZi more dowlp bcmuse of the niggcd 
ground. 
Wlien P'cton ancl Kempt's brigades hi~d arriad fhc vjllnge 
of Arincw nnd p i n c d  tlic main rod,  the French troops ncar 
Sul)ijana dc Alava wcrc tiirned; nnd hcing hard-preaticd on 
their front nnd Idt ff nnk by Hi!l and the trnops on the Piiehla 
mnuntnin, fe11 haclr for two milcsia ib disordcred mltsq ~triving 
ta  regain the great linc of retreat to Vitoria Some mvnlry 
laiinrlicd at tlic momcnt would h w o  totnlly disorganizcd tlto 
French httln rtnd secured s e v e d  tliousnnd prisoners, bnt it 
was nrrt tried, and the confusd multitude diot aliad of 
tlie Britisl~ lines and recovered order. The ground yas 
esoeedingly diversifierl, in some places wooded in otliers open, 
kere cwered witli liigli eorn, tliere broken by ditclies vine- 
prds  rtnd badets, rind the action resolved itself into n ruiining 
figllit and cannonade for six miles, the dust and ~moke  and 
tumnlt of d ~ i r h  fiiled all the basin, passing onwards towrtrcls 
Vitoria as the dlies advmced t a b g  gun after p in their 
victnriou~i progress. 
At; six o'clock thc French reacl~ed the last defensiMc height 
one mile in front of Vitoria. Beliind them vas the plain in 
wliich the &y stood, m4 Iieyond tlie city thousanrls of car- 
k g e e  and mimals and n@~-i20mb~%11t~, men women and 
children, were cromding toget her in all the maduess af terror; 
nnd as tlie Englinh shoG went boorning ovcr b d  tlic wet 
crowd ~tarted and swemed with ~b conwlsive movement wliile 
a dulI and horrid sovnd of distress srose, but there was no 
hope, no st y f o ~  arrny or multitude ; it wae the wreck of a 
nation ! Still tlie coumge of tlie Prencli aoldier wsas nnquelled. 
Reille, on wliam evcehing now depended, rnainttained the 
upper Zdor$ anrl the armies of the rioutli and centre drarcing 
up on their Iast heiglits, between the villa-ges of f l i  and 
Brmenti4 made tlieir muskets flash like lightniiig, while more 
than eighty piecm of artiliety, massetl togeLlier, pealed uith 
such a liorrid upmsr tht the hdls Iaboared un4 diook and 
strenmed with fire nnd smolío, amicl-t which tlic dnrk figures 
of the Frcnch pnners wcre scen bountling 1rit11 fmntie cncrg. 
Thiu terrihle cnnnnnndc nnd rnuslretry kept tlic allies in check, 
rrnd smoely eoiild tlie tiiird dit?sion, wliich bore the bnint. .Jf 
thfs storm, mriintrrin ita advancecl position. Again thc battle 
beeame stationasy, ibnd the Frendi endemoiired to dmw o f  
their i n f , m t ~  in suceession from tlie riglif wing ; but suddenly 
fhe fourth division nishing iorward cnrried a IiiIl on tlreir left 
and the heights mere at once abandone& Josepli, finding tlie 
ropi r o d  so completdg bloclid by carrE,~ges tliah tlie artiilary 
could not pass, then indicated tlie road of Snlvatierra as the 
line of retreat, and Uie army went off in a confused yet com- 
pact body on that side, leaving Vitorin on its Ipft: tho Eritish 
infantry fulloived Iiard, and the ligliteavalry golloped throngh tbe 
hmn to intercept the new line of retwnt whiclr was through B 
mamh and &he rond nlso waa clioltwl witli mrrinpes anrl fugi- 
tive people, while on emh sirle tliere were deep drains. Thus 
dl became disorder and mischief, the guns were left on tlie 
edge of khe rnarsh, tlie ar t i l l e rpsn  nnd dnvers fled with the 
hoisra, and the ~anquished infantry brenking throagh the 
miaerabla mnltitude went ~ f f  by Meletauco towa1'J.s Salvatierna; 
da. 
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? cavtvalry howevei stilI c t i r e d  the retreat, and many of the 
nerous horsemen mere seen taking up chiidren and women 
carry oE from tlie dreadful pcene. 
hille, of whwe battle it is time t o  treat, a n a  now in great 
ngcr. hmtI poeted by him at the vi!lage of Aranguis, 
d also occupied a height mhich covered tlie bridges of 
iaga and Gamara Xayor, but he hnd been drken fmm 
lnye and height a EttIe after twelve o'clock by generd 
,wak¿i, who coinnimded the fiftli division Longa's Spaniards 
Pack's Portupese. Long  thcn seized G a m n  4lcnor 
on tlie Durango road, while another detacliment gained the 
roya1 cnuseway still furtlier on tlie left, and furced tlle Fragw- 
Spminrda to retire from Durana. Ttius tlre Fimh 'blow on 
tliis side depriverl the kimg of bis begt line of retreat and 
confined hini t o  the r o d  of Pampcluna However hrrut 
recros~ed tlie river in good oder and a new dis~io~ition ivas 
made by lhilIe. One of Samt 'a  brigadea defended tlie 
bridge of A r i w  and the villag@ of Aliecliuco beyond it; tlie 
other was in reserve supporting the first and also La Mar- 
titiiere, ivlio defended tlie bridge of Garuarz Xayor and tlie 
village of tliat namo beyond the river. Digcori'a dmgoons 
werc b e l i d  tlie village of brirqa, and Reillds o ~ v n  dragooiig 
took post beliind tlie bridge of Gauiartl; a brigude of 1igl.lrt 
cavalry on the extreme riglit sustained tlie Primco-Spanisb 
troops, wliicli were now on the upper Zdora in front oF 
Betonio; the remainder of the light cavalry under Curto wns 
ou tlie &en& left extending duwn tlie Zarlora between dnaga 
and Govcs. 
Oavald attacked Qamam with Borne guna and Robinson'a 
brignde of tlie fifth di~ision. Loriga's Spaniarcls were to have 
led, iuid at an early hour wlien Gamara was fcelilp occupied, but 
they di[? not stir and the gillage was reidarced. Bobinson'g 
bn'pcade formecl in tlirec celumns thea mnde the a~sst1It at a 
mnning p m ,  yet thi: flre of artiliery and musketry was so 
h~nvy tlic troops stoppcd and eamrncneerl firing; then tlie 
colurnns got intcrmixcd, but cncourngcd by tlicir oflimrs nnd 
the cxnmple of gcncrnl Rubinson, nn inexpcrienmd man but 
of a Iiigb ~ind daring spirit, they rcnewed thi? chrtrge, broke 
througli the villnge autl men crossed the bridge. One gun 
1 
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wss eaptnrd and tbe passage seemed to be won, d e n  Pwille 
tiirned twelve piecehi upen the village, md La M:wtiniere, 
rallyiiig hiB division u~der cover of tliL cannonde, retuok 
tlie bridp, and it witli difficulty the alried troops ~vuld 
hold the villqc. Howe~er e sceond Bxitisli brigde c m e  
d a m  nnd the b i d 3  wsg npin mrricd rind ag,*nin lost, ond 
tlius the passnge rernained finbidden. Gruliam attaclced the 
viIlqe of Abeehueo mhich covered the bndge of Ailagnj ~ n d  
it wiis carried at once by Halket's Germans, supportd hy 
Rrridford's Portupese md by tlie fire of tweIve guns; yet 
Bere as at Gamasa the Frenclz rnainhined the bridge itLself; 
aria at both plttoes the troops on each eide remined stationary 
under a reciproeal fire of artilley and small wmg. 
Eeilie, though inferior in numl~rs, contiaued t o  intertlict 
tlie pssage of the river until the tunliilt of Urellin$on's 
tiattle, wming s p  tlie Zadura, reached Vitoria itwlf ttnd u 
pert of tlie British 1iorsemp.n rude out of that city upon 
8rbrrut's mar. Digeon's dmgoons lrept this m~nlry in dieclc 
fnr the moment, and RciIlc had prc~iouafy formcd a rerescm 
of inf t lnt l  nndcr gcnt~al Fririon nt Rctonin mhich now 
proved h i ~  safcty. For Sarrut was killed at the brid~e of 
briaga, and Mane the next in command could scarcelp 
draw uff his troops while Digeon's dragoons helrl the Rritish 
mmlry ah poinG; yet with the aid of Pririo~i'ii reserve Reille 
find1y securcd the rnovement and rallied al1 his tmops at 
Brtoriio. E e  had now t o  make Iiead on severa] sides, bec~tu~e 
the iillies mre cuming down from Ariagg from Duma ,  ancl 
from Titoria; yct he fougl~t his way to Metauw on tlie Sa1r.a- 
tima nid eevering tlie general retreat with some dcgree oI 
ordcr. Vehemently nnd clusdy did the British pursue, nnd 
neit1:itlrcr tha mstilute dernetinuur of the Frcnch crayal~,  wliich 
wt~s strengthened on tllc fltinlrs by light troops und made 
sel-cntl ~igoroiis cl iarp,  nor tlis night, whieh nom fcll, corilrl 
~t,rip tf14,ir ~ictorioue w e c r  until tlie flying mrasses of tlic 
ewmy hnd cleared nll obstwles and pmsing Metnum got 
beyond tlle rench of furt1ser injury. Tben tlie battle ended. 
Tlie Fsench errcaped with comliaratively little loss of meril; 
kiut to use Cazan" words, ' tliey lost al1 their eqnipagcs, al1 
tlieii gunsi, al1 their treasure, dl their atores, aU their papers; 
so fliat no mm could prove even how mueh pay was due to 
Iiim; gencr~Is and mbordinate ofñcem alike were reduccd to 
the clothcs on theY baclrn, and most of them wcrc bnrc- 
footed.' 
Never w a ~  an army more hardly nssd by its eommander, 
for the soldiers wert! not h d f  h t e n ,  anrl yet never ms f i  
v ic to ry  more compIete. The trophies were innnrnerbble. 
The French arried o8  but two pieces of artillergr from the 
Ei~ttle. Joitrdan's baton of commitnrl, a stand of colours, one 
hundrecl snd forty-thrce brass pieces, tmhthirda of which had 
Been used in the figlit, al1 tlie parw aad dépdta from Yudrid, 
Valladoli4 and Burgos, mrriage~, amrnunition, trensure, eve'y- 
thing fe11 into the hands of tlie victors. TLe loss in men 
did nol; howev5r exceed aix thousarrd, including some hun- 
dreds OE prisoners ; tbe las oE the allics wlas nearly as geat, 
thc gross niimbers being f i ~ e  tliausand one hiindred arid 
seventy-six killed mounded and missing. Of these one thou- 
mnd rind fifty-nine w e c  Poh~guese and five hundred ~ n d  
fifty Spanisli; hence the lo- of the English WRS more than 
double tiiab of tbe Portapese and Spaninrds together; antl 
yet l ioth fought meII, antl espeeially thc Portirgoese, Iiut 
British troops are the soldiers of bnttle. f l i e  qoil ntns 
immense, and to mich extent waq plunder camiec?, principnlip 
bp tlie follomers and non-combatants, for witli some excep- 
tions the figlitiug troops may be mid t o  have rnarched upon 
gold and silver without stoopiiing to pick it up, tliat of five 
milllona antl a half of r l o l h ~  indicntetl by tlie French ncmiints. 
to he in the money-chesb, a fikieth part only carne to t l i e  
public. Wellington gcut fiftcen oficers mith power to stop 
and examine dl l o d e d  animar5 prisñing the Ebro ~ n d  tlie 
Duero in liopes to reeover the siims so almmeftilly carried off; 
and t l i in  dispaoeful condutt was not eonfined to iynorunt niir1 
vulpi. pcolilc, fiome officars mere Recn mixer1 np witli tlie 
mob contcnrling for the rlisgraccful p i n .  
0ti the 22nrl Girrin nnd L n n p  eiitcrcd Giiipuscnn by tlie 
roya1 roarl, in puiwít of tlie convoy wliieli bnd moved unrler 
Muucune on tlio morning of tlie h l t l o ;  tlie henvy cnvoiry 
and 11i'Urhank frirtuguese remsined ut Vitoriu; but Pnken- 
ham with ~e sixth division a m e  up from hfediaa Pomnr, 
and the remainder of the army folIowed Joseph towards Pam- 
peluna, for he h d  eontinued his retreat up thc IBomndia and 
Arquil valleys ali nighht. The weather waa rainy, the roade 
h e q ,  and tbe Prench rear-parird. unaIi2e to deetrog the 
Iiridga set fire te  the villages behind them to delay the 
pucsuit. Af five o'clock in the morning of that &y Reille 
mllied his two divisians ami al1 his cavalry in front of 
hlwticrra, hdting until asaured that al1 thc French hnd 
paased, when he m m h d  to Huerta in thc valley of AraquiI, 
thirty miles from tlie field of blittle. Joseph reml~licd Ynirsun, 
a towa situated beliind one of the BOUTCCf3 of the Arga from 
which good roa& brranched o f f  to Pampeluna en one side, 
and ta Toloss and St. &tehan on the other, At this place 
he remaiaed tbe 23rd, 8enJlng ordera to different points on 
the Kencli fmntier to prepare provisiona ssd succonrs for bis 
sdering m y ;  he also d i c t e d  Itei1le to proceed rapidly to 
t2ie Birlassoa Rith bis infantry sis hundred select c a v a l ~ ,  his 
artilleryinen and thar horsa. Gazan and DErlon miirclied 
upon Pampelune intcnding to CrO8S the fmntier nt 6t. Sean 
Red de Port. Joscpli having reaclied PnmpcIirnn the 21tl1, 
tlie army bivouncked on the gIacis of t11e fortrew in mch n 
stats of destitution nnd inmbordinatiaa that the govemor 
would not ~iuffer them ío enter tlie town; for hi~i magmines 
were reduced by Mina's Iong blocl~ade, and some d t e m  my 
i b  m proposed to blow up the worlrs and abandon thc 
place: howwer by g e a t  exertions additional pravisions were 
obhined from the vlcinity, the gwrison was nugmented to 
three thousand, and the army marclied townda Frmce l e a ~ g  
a mi-guard at a strong pass about tmo leagues off, 
Wellington having detached Gmliam ivitli a corps to Gui- 
guscoet by the pass of Adriaa, left the 61bh division at Xd- 
vatierra and pursued the k i i g  with the rest of  tlie a m y  the 
23rd. On tlie 24th the liglit diviriion alid Yictor Alten's 
cavaby m e  up with the Frendi rear-guarcl, vrlim two batta- 
lions of riffemen puslicd their infantry throuph the pus, while 
ItossVs horse nrtillery giilloping forwnrd, líillcd several men, nnd 
dismounted one of thc only t ~ v o  pieoes of cannon cnrried off 
f ~ o m  Vitoria. Ncxt dny tlic Prsnch, covered by the fortress 
of Pampelum, went up the valley of Ronoeralies, foilowed by 
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Bo~cru Portngnese enpged the Italians; but the 18th 
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aournal, daimed the advantage, and the whole positio, 
waa so ~trong that QrAam had recourde t, 
flank operationa, mhereupon Foy retired to Tolosa. Giron 
and L o n p  now came up by tbe gre& roa4 and ~ e n d k t b s ~ ,  
having qu i t td  ths blockade of Bntona, arrimd at Aspeytia 
on the Delia, 
On the 25th Foy again offerpd battle in front of Tolo~n, 
but Gmham tumed hia lcft with Loriga's division, aud l lendi- 
mbel tumcd his right from Aspeytia. While they were in 
march, colonel Williama, having tlie grenadiers of t11e fimt re$. 
ment and three companies of Paclrk Portupese, dislodged 
him from an dmntageous hiIl in front and purposely pro. 
Ionged the fight nntil si9 o'clock in tlie evening, when the 
Bpniads liaving reaiched their destination on %he flanks a 
general attack was mnde on al1 sides. Tlie Frencb, cannonaded 
st tlm causelvay and strongly pushed in front wliile Lonp 
drove their 3eft from the heighta, \v0re forced beyond Tolo% 
on the f lanh;  but that tu~vn was strongly entrenched m a 
field-post, and they maintsined it until Gmham brought np 
his guns and bursting one of the gateri opcned a passag fnr 
his troopa Foy  however, profiting from t h ~  dnrknesri, m d e  
hi~l retrmt good with a los3 of only fonr hirndred nien killed 
and wounded, and some priseners who were taken by Mendi- 
zrtbel and h n g a ,  Tlie~ie actions were very swere; the loar 
of the Spaniards m not known, but the Anglo-Portupese hnd 
more than feur hundred killed and wounded in the tmo days' 
o p e r a h a ,  and Graham himself was hurt. 
Be halted tlie 26th and 27th to beat of 'CTeIlington's pro- 
giess, and the enerny'a convoys ihus sesched Pmce; but F q  
occupied a position between Toloas and Ernmi behind tIis 
Anexo, his form being increnssd by ths auccessi~e arrival of 
tha smnllcr gnrrisons to sixtecn thousand bgonets, four Iian- 
d r d  snl~res, md ten piecw of artillery. The 23tli 11c thrcw s 
qnrriuon of two tliousmd ~ i x  liundred good troops into St. 
,bast ian and pass~1 the Urumia; the 29th he paased tbe 
Oyarsun and hdted the 30th, lea&g 8 d l  garrison at 
Passagefi, mhi& however surrendered the next day to L o n p  
On the 1st of July tIie prrhon  of Uuekria escapd by ses 
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to St, Bebastian and Foy passed the Bidassoas his mar-guara 
dgliting mith Qiron's Ordliciane; &ut PdiIle% tmops wem now 
- L Vera and Viristu, tliey hd receiveri ammvnition d artil- 
r from Bayonne, and thus Wenty-five thousand men oceu- 
d a defeasive l i e  from Vera to the bridge of Eehobie, 
ich waa covered by a bEoclc-Iioum. Grahrwn immediately 
ested St. Eebastim, nnd Giron conoentrating tbs fire oi Iiis 
i artillery nnd a British liattery upon the block-house of 
iobie, compelled the French to blow it up and destroy the 
~inilge. 
Clansel. was in more imminent danger thm Foy. plnn 8,  
On tlie evening of t h e  22nd he had approached t h  p.109. 
field of battle at the head of fourteen thweand men, byn may 
which fdls intc the Estellra road at Amcete, not far from &lw 
ti-. Palrenham with the sixtli divi~ion m then at Vitorin, 
sud the French general, lenrning the stnte of ffik, retired tu 
Logmño and halted unti1 the e~ening of the Ztitli. This delay 
aas lilre to Iiave proved fatal. Wellington, wha tl1oug.I~~ 
Clcusel wae at Tudela, thus discoverd Lis real position, anil 
leaving Ha1 to Invest Parnpeluna m e h e d  by TafaUa with two 
lirigadw of light c a d r y  and the third, fouhh, seventlt, and 
light divisions of infantry. She fifth and sixtli divisions, 
tlic Iieavp mvaIry and D'Urban'g Portupese marched at tlie 
wnma time from Saivatierm and Vitoria, upon Logoíio; md 
Niaa also, wlio hd now collected all his scattered battdions 
nenr Estella, and ms tlrere joined by Julian Eancliez' cavdry, 
follonred hard on Claml's rear. The lntter mwbg by Cala- 
h o m  reaclied Tndels on tbe eveniiig of the BTth, and Lhink- 
ing ibis forced marcli of sixty miles in forGp hours witli 
smrceIy a halt harl outstripped dl pursirers, would llave m d e  
for Frrince liy Olite and Tafalla. Wellington wm hon.evcr 
in possession of  those placw expecting Km, when an alcalde 
@Te bim notice of the danger; whereupon recrossing the 
Ebro he marched upon Xi~nqozs, aiid aniving the l e t  of  
Jnly took post on the Gallegox giving out he would there 
mit until 6tichd or the king, if tho lnttcr rcitoak the offen- 
sive, should, come ap. WelEington immediately made a flank 
movemeat to bis own Ieft aa fw as C m d g  and could still 
with na exertion Lave intercepted Clauel by the route oE 
E 2 
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Jaca, but he feared to drive him back upon Sndiet and con- 
tented himself with letting Mina presa Km. That chicf, 
acting with grat abiliv, took tliree hundred prisoners and 
announcing that the mhole allied army was at hand, so imgosed 
on QauaeP tllat Iie destroyd some o€ Iiis nrtillery and Lea~y 
baggage, Isft tlie rest ak Zaragoxa md retired to Jaca, 
Joscph, not being pressed, Liad seat Gaasn again into Xpsiii 
t o  tnke posse~si~n of the wlFey of Bnstnn, wliicli was fertile 
and full of st-rong positiona. But O'Donncl, munt of bbispal, 
had now reduoed tho fork at Pancorbo with thc Mslusine 
resme, pristly by capitulation pnrtly by force, and WM 
marching tomarda Pampelunx; wherefore Bill, without aban- 
doning the siege of that place, was enat~led to move two 
Britisli md two Portuguese lnigades into tlie valley of Dasbn, 
and on the 4th> 5th) Gth, and 7th drove Giman from dl hiri 
poaitions, and clenred tlie vailey ii-ith a loss of only one 
liundred and twenty men. Tlia whole line of t h ~  Spanisli 
frontier, from Ronccvalles to the mouth of tlie Bidnssoa rivw, 
was thus occupied by the victorious a l l iq  anrl Psmyeliino 
and St, Sebastian were invcdcrl. Joscph'a reign waaa owr, 
the cromn had EaIlen from hi liead, and after p a m  of toils 
and combats which had been rather admired than nnderstood, 
tlie English general, emcrging from tlie cliaos of the Peninsiila 
rjtniggle stood on tlie mmmit of the P.yrenew a, recognised 
conqueror. From those lofty pinnacles tIie clangour of Ilia 
trurnpets pmled clcur and loud, and the spIendaurof Lis genlus 
appemed w a hrning Iieacon to wwring rilitions. 
lo. In tliis cnmpnign of six weekg, Wellington murclied 
wimit11 onc hundrcd tbousand men six liuntlred miles, pwed six 
great; r lvei ,  gnincd one decisiva battlc, invristcrl two fortresfics, 
and drove o. hnndrcd and twcnty tlionsnnd vctcran traops 
kom Spzin. Thh immense result could not have been 
rittsiined if Jo~ieph had foIlowed Napobon'~ iristmctioas, Wel- 
Imgton could not then h e  tumed the lime of tbe Duero. 
It couId not have been attained if Joaeph had &cted witli 
ordinary skiü afkr tl ie Iine of the Duero was pa~ed. Time 
ms to him most precious, pt when contrriry ta  his expecta 
tinns he l i d  concentrntcd hiri seattemd armies bchind tlie 
Carsion, he madr! no effort to clclny his cnemy on tlmt river; 
he judged i t an unfit positian, thnt i ~ ,  unfit for a gremt, hnttle; 
liut Iie conld have made Wdlington Iose n day, pcrhapa two or 
tliiee, and heliind the upper Pisumga he might have saved n 
day or two more. RcilFe who WM urith tlie trmy of Fortugd 
on the rlght of tlie king, compTained that no offieers XtiU*s 
of that a m y  knew the Hsiierga aufficiently to maos~ond 
$acc thc troaps in position; the king then Rad 
cnuse to remember Napoleon'~ dictiim, namely2 that t o  com- 
mand an amy well a general must think nf notliing else! 
For why m thc conme of the Pimierp mknown when thr! 
kirq's hmd-qnarters had been for several munths within tl 
dny's jonrney o€ itl 
2". Tlie Carrion nnd 'tlie Pisn~rga bdng givcn np, t h ~  
country ahout tlie Hormaza ~ 1 1 s  occupied annd tlic tliree Frencli 
Rcllington'a right wing nnly, that is t o  say, twenty-tlirco 
thousand infantry and five lirigndcs oE eavnlry, ¿idroe RcillcBs 
troops over the Arlanaan mnd the castle of Burgos wns 
uhnndoned. TIUs m s  on the EOtb, the thrco FrencIi armieo, 
not les# t h m  fifty thousnnd fighting men, had bcen in position 
since tlie 9th nnd the kiig's let ter~ prove that ho dwircd tu  
figlit in tlint country, wliich was fwomble for al1 arms. 
Notliing then conld be more opporturie tlian Wellllingtonh 
advaiicc on the 13tl1, bccltuso a retrogmlla defonsFve 8g.sfem in 
uriñuited to Frencll sorrliers, ~vliose impatient muras leatls 
tliem ialwnys to athck; and tlie nervs oF Ni~puleon's rictory at 
Dt~utxen had just arrived t o  excite tlieir nrdoiir. Wlierefori? 
Josepli slioitld hsve retakcn the offcnsive when 1\!ellin$on 
nppronched the EIormarn; and as the lefta and centm of tlie 
niicq were at Villa Diego and Castzoxerez, the greatest part 
iat tlie forrner, that Xs to say one march distant, tlie Cwenty- 
R ~ X  tl~ou~&nd men immedintcIy in front would prolinbly Iiavs 
hrfin forcrrl hi1.cIr over the Fisuerg~, and tlie king have gainetl 
time for 8nmt3 Foy and CIausel t o  join Iiim. Did thp 
Enqlish geneya1 then oire liis succesa to í'ortune, ta Lis ndver- 
sory's lituIt, mtIier tLuu to Ibis enn skill? Nob so. He id 
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judpd the ki@a militay capcity, he liad seen bis hmte, h 
confu~ion, h i ~  tmuble j and knowing well the moral pomer 
rapidity md boldnew iin such circumstancw had n c t ~ l  darinkiy 
indeed but wisely, for mch daring ia wisdom, it irr the higheb 
p r t  o€ m r .  
39 Wellington's mode of tnrning the line of the Ebro ras 
a fine stFategic illustration. It was by no means certbin, yet 
failure would have still left gieat d v a n t a p .  It waa certain 
he woold gain Santander and fix s new base af operations on 
tlie wast; and he would d l l  btlve bad the powerof continually 
turning tho king's riglit by operating between aiim cnd tlis 
coast: the errow of hk adveranry only gave him additioml 
advantagea which he ~eized. But if Joseph, iu~tead of spreadinj 
his nrmy from Espejo on his right t o  the Logmfio rond on bis 
Ieft, had kept only cnvdv on *he Iatter ioute and on tlre 
mah road in front of ~ancorbo,-ti hc rnassd his atky 
to hh righiitl pivoting npon Miranda or Frina, scouring al1 tha 
roads tomards the s o n r c ~  of the Ebro, the allies conld never 
have pmaed the defiles and descended npon Vitoria, They 
would h e  marched tllen by Iralmaceda npon Bilbao; but 
Josepli couId by the r d  of Ordaiia have met tliern there, and 
witL a force increased by Foy's and Samt's dinsione and tlie 
Itdiaus: meanwhite ClnuscE would h v s  come t o  Yitoria and 
tlie heaped  convoy^ t ive  m e d  Frunce in safety. 
4'- mhen the king ~ccolvd to  fight at Vitorin, he should, 
on tho 19th and 20th, have broken aome of the bridges an 
th Zadora and cevered others Mth field-mork~ to en~ble  him 
to saIly forth upon the attacking army; he ~hotild have 
entrtlnched the defila of PuebIa and oocnpied the heiglita 
above in strengkh; his position on the Imer Zsdom would 
&en bave been famidabIe. But his p i i t  hu1t mas the liiie 
of operntion. Bis re~o i i s  for tlvoitlig Guipuscoa were valid* 
lus true line wae clown tlie Ebro; but Zarogom should have 
been his bme, since Arngon was fertile and more friendly thnn 
any other provinca of spain. It ia true he would thus hnvs 
ahndoned Poy; yet that general, relnforced with the raerva 
from Bayonne, would hwe had twenty t h o u s d  men and the 
fortras of St. Sebastian, and a strong corps must have rra- 
maLned to watch him. The king ñrst reinforced by Clausel and 
timtately by Srichet, would have bad one hundred thousand 
en to oppose tho allieg weakened as they would then be 
the detmlirnent watching Foy. hnd there were political 
ssons ta be told hermfler, for the rader must nnt i m a ~ n e  
'cllington had got thua far without trammels, which would 
,ve probabIy rendered this plan so & d o u s  as to compel 
e Britisb army to ab~ndon Spain albogetlier. Then new 
mbinations would have been made a11 ovw Europe. 
A 4  In the bttle the h n c h  operations, with excepk;on of 
~~eit lek fight, were a seriw of ermm; the most extmrdinary 
being the suffering Kempt'a brjgade and the hunarrs to pass 
tlie bridge of Tres Fuentes, and eshhlish themselves dose to 
tlie line of battle, flanking the troopa at tlie brjdpes of 
biendoza and Villodas. This aIone proves Joseph meant to 
retreat; when Graham's attack commenced, snd isis position 
was tberefore in his own vlew uiitenable. He aliould have 
oocupied the 'Puebla mounhin atrongly, ant! have placer1 tLe 
infantry by corps In suceession, the right refnsed, tomards 
Vitoria, while the cavrtl~ and gnnu watched the bridges and 
tlie mouth of the Puebla defile. He mula tlien have sncco~red 
ReiIle, or marched to his omn front nccording to  circumstímncetr, 
and his retreat wouId have been secura 
69 The enormouA fmlt of Iienpina up tha bnggrrge nnd 
convoya nnd para behind Vitori~ y i i i r e s  no comment; hnG 
the lring added a moro extraordin~ry error, namely, remaining 
to tiie last momenf nndecided AB to liin line of netreat. 
Nothing biit misfortuncs could attend npon mch bnd disposi- 
tions; and tlmt the cnhstrophe m u  not mom terrible ia 
oming entirely to an error which Wcllington nnd Gmli~m 
aeem aZike to have fallen into; namely, thnt h;lle hnd two 
divisions in reserve beliind the bridge8 on tlie upper Bntlora. 
Xot  knowing that Maucune's division had mrarclied with the 
convoy, they tlioaglit CIauseE had only ono division of tlie 
army of Portugal with him, d e r e a s  he had tmo, Tanpin's 
aud Barliout'a; snd Reille'~ rewrves were composed, not of 
divisions but of brigñdes drarm from La Bfartiniere's and 
hmut"s divi~iona, ~I i i c l i  mere defending tlie bridqes: his 
wliole force, including the Fmco-Spaniad~ who were driven 
h ~ c k  from Dunina, did not exoeed ten tliouoantl infnntrg and 
two LLousand fim handred cav111ry. Gmliam had, e~clusive 
of Cfiron'~ Gallicians, nearly twmty tliausand of nll arrns, aiid 
it is mid the river miglit llave been pssed Iioth aiiave ontl 
nelaw tlie points of rtttnck; it is certitjn aIso tliat Longn's 
ilday p v e  tlia Fsmeh time to occnpy Gnrnnra RI~yor in forcc, 
wliich \vas not tlie crtse at first. H~cl  tlie pmsage heen won in 
tiriie very few of t.he Frencli army corild Iirtve escap~l  from 
tlie field, but the truth is Reine fouglit most vigoroualy. 
7". Aa tlie tliird snd seventli divisions &d not come to tbe 
lwint of attack in time, tlie httIc vas not fought after the 
original conception; it is lihIy the real project was to force 
tlie passage of tlie bridges, break tlie rig11t centre o€ the enemy 
fmm Ariliez to Margarita, w d  tlicn eilvelopo the left centre 
with tlio smnd ,  fourtli, and light diviaioiis nnd tha mvalry, 
nliile tlie tliird and seventli divisions pursued the others, 13iit 
notwitiitJtnnding tlie unnvoidnhle delay, wliicli pve  tlie Frencli 
time to commencc their rctrcat, it is ntit eiisy to undc~tand  
hoiv Gaxan's le& eseaped from Subijana dc Alava; seeiirg that 
m-hen Picton broke tlie centre at Ariner, he w ~ s  considerahly 
newr to Yitoria than the French left, wlXc!i was cnt off from 
thc main rod and assailed in front by Hill and &le. The 
having no w l r y  in hand to launcb at thia time and point of 
the battle has been akeady noticed; 7fe1lington says, that the 
country was generally unfavotuable for tlie riction of thiat am; 
iieitlier side iudeed used it witli rnuch effect iit any period of tlie 
luttla; ~ieverthelws tliem are nlrvays sorne suihhle openinp, 
sorrie h~tppy moments to  malte Q churge, aud tlib seems to  
hm*c been a neglected one. 
P. Picton's aurlden iush from tlie hriclgc oof Tres Puentes to 
tlie villqc of An'nm hm bcen mucli jiriiisetl, anrl notliing 
could be IkiOre prempt and daring ; biit tllc merlt of the con- 
ception belongs to tlie general In chief ivha directetl it in 
permn. It was suggested ta him by the denuded state of the 
Iiill in front of thst village, and viewed as a stroke for the 
ocmsion it is t~ be admired. Tet it liad its d i d v a n t a p .  
Fer tlie brigade, t h  mossiiig tlie fmnt of tiotli inrrnieu, not 
only drew a flsek fire from th enemy, h t  wxs expoeed il tlie 
Frencli cavalry h ~ 1  been prompt a11cl rhring to u charge; it 
also pprevented the d w n c e  o!¿ otlrcr troops in their pmper 
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amngemcnt, annd thus crowded the centre for t l e  rest of the 
d o n .  Home~er tliese suddcn movements mniiot be jiidgcd 
by rulw, tlicy are good or bar1 murtling to tlie rcsult. This 
was entirel sncceasful, ancl the Iiill thus cnrried mas wlled tlis 
Englislrmen's hill; not, as sorne reccnt writers have sirpposetl, 
in commemoration of a, victory gained by the Blwk I'rinoe, 
buk becanse oE a disaster \vhieh t l ie r~  bcfel a part of  his army. 
His battle mas fought lietween Kriwi~rette and Najera, many 
leques from Vitoria and beyond the Eliro; hut on this hi!l 
tlie. two gdlant knigiits sir Tliomas nnri sir Wdlinm Felton 
took post with tmo hundred comlinnions, and being mrounded 
by Don Telle with six thausand were dl 1;illed or t.&en after 
a long and lieroic resistmce. 
9'. It lins Iieen observed by French writers, and the opinion 
lias been alao entertuined by mnup English officers, ttitit after 
the batt.le Wellington shouId have pnssed the frontier in masiss, 
and rnarchect upon Bayonne instad of clnstig Clnuñe! anJ 
Fuy on tlie Fight and left; rtnd if, as tlie same authors agsert, 
nayonne was tbm indefensible, the witicisin is jusf; because 
tlie fugitive Prencli army, baving lost al1 its guils and being 
without rnusket ammuiiilion, could not h ~ e  cliecked its 
pursuers fur a inoinent. But if Eqonne hrid resisted, nnd it 
ivas iinpussililo for WeIlin@on to suspect ils red cctindition, 
much niischief inight havc accrued frorn sucli a liasty dvance. 
Foy anrl Clai~sel carning down upun the field of Vitoria wouId 
I ia~e  driven away if tliey diri not destroy tlie sixtli. division; 
they ~vould llave recovercrl nll tlie tropliies ; tIie kiiig's armp, 
rcturniiig by Jaca into Aragon, nould llave re-organixed it.se1f 
from Guclict'a dépóts, nntl thn t  miirslial was actisñlly comiiig 
up with Iiis army from Valencin. LittTe would tlien llave Leen 
gnined by the battle. Tliis questien can howvver be mor0 
profitiibly discussed when the ~ e n t  eventa which follolved tha 
'Gnttle of Yitoris have been described. 
PENINSTJLA WAR 
CHAPTER 1. 
ALTEOVUE the Fate of Epain was virtually decicled at Vitoda, 
the British warfare wns still fierce, dmgerous, and uucertain; 
bmu6e on the fields of Lutzen and Bautzen Napoleon'~ genius 
lrad restored the general balance of success, and tbe negotin- 
tions which foPlowed strrongly influenced tlie operations in the 
Peninsula. Wellington's firat intention was t o  reduce Pampe- 
Iiq.na, ~ n d  the sudden fdl of the Pancorbo forts, wiich opencd 
fhe ~ e a t  Narlrid roacl was fmourable for that project. But 
Portugal being relinquished as a place of arms, a new bme w a  
required, lest a chwnge of fortune shouId force the allies to 
retuni there when tlie gieat rni5h-y establiahmenta mre 
broken ap, the opposítion af tlie native govenunent mcorous 
and tlie public sentirnirnt averse to English aupremaq. The 
western Fymnees, in conjunction with the ocem, offered mich 
a base; but the harbours were few, and one con~enieat for 
tlie anny was requiwd. Whercfore tp rcducc San Xebnstian 
~rns of more irnmediate importrtnce than t o  reduce F~mpelunn; 
nnd it wnri esscntinl to effcct tliis in the fine sewon, Iiecause 
tlie coast ww iron-bound and vcry dangerous in winter. 
Pampeluna wm strong. IIt would have hken three meeks 
t o  bring up the orrlnance sturea and a s k  weeks' attac1~ w11i~b 
required twenty t h s a n d  good soldiers. An investment cwld 
lie maintained with fewer and worse troops, Spaniards md 
Portiiguese; and the magazinw were likely t o  fail woner 
under s blockade than the walls were to mnmble nnder fira 
Xoreover sir John M u m y  hsd juat faiIed nt Taragana, bad 
loat the honoured battering-train entrasid to him, and bis 
artillery equipage wns gnppoaed to be entirely ruined; lience, 
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as he could make no siege, and cmld not act serionsIy without 
having a place o£ a-, Buchet wlio liad numerous fortresses 
free to march on Zaragoza, unite ~ 4 t h  Clausel and Pariig 
menace the righh flank of the allies. TIie blocltde of 
pluna  and siege of San Seliastin~i were therefore de- 
iincd upon by Wcllinghon; thc troops i c turn-  Jniy. 
From the pursuit o£ Clnusel were disposed t o  
i a covering army for both, nnd pensnnk were hired to 
i thc worke of investment for the first, wliich wns entructsd 
bispnl's Aiirlalusian reeerve. Confidcntly dicl thc English 
ral loak for the imrnedinte fa11 af San Sebnstian, anil her 
intent to have it before the ncgotintiona for the armistim 
111 ucrmany should teminate; but miphty pains and diffimib 
ties nwaited him, and ere these can be treated of, tlie progre& 
, 
of tho wrrr in othsr parta mnst bc notimd. 
It wiU be remembered that De1 Parque in coniunction with 
Elio wss t o  a d  on the Xuonr, wliie 3f;rray sailei 
nook 
t o  a t k k  Tara~om. Del Parque receivocl hia 
 arder^ &e 2dtkof April, ha h a i  long lrnom of thc project 
snd his march was onIy ane of twelve days, yet ha did not 
join ELio until the end of May. Thia delay resulted liartly 
from the &te oE his army, partly from his own procrastiiiution, 
pnrtly from Elio's conduct wliich creskd doubts of Iiis fiddity. 
It has been sliown how Iie witlidree his cavalry when Mijarea 
mas abYecEq whence sprfing that general's misfortuneAiow lie 
plnced the regirnent of Pelez hIaIw in Villeña, a helliless 
prey for Suchedhow he Ieft t h e  Anglo-Sicilian army to fight 
the battle of Castdla unnided. He now pefsuuded De1 Parque 
to move tnwmde Gtid, and send a detachment t o  Requeña; 
tbereby threatening Suchetas riglit, but exposing the ispnish 
army to R sudden bhw, and clisobeying hls instructions wliicFi 
prcscribed a mar& by Almunza, 
This false movemcnt Elio represented as Del Parque's oran, 
ht. tha latter, when &Iumy rernonstrated, quickiy nppronclied 
Casbllii by Jumilla, dedsring h i ~  earnest desire to obey Wel- 
hgton'a orden. TLe di~ergence bad b m v e r  alre* ptaced 
Km in danger; his left flenlr was ~ i o  expoaed while corninghy 
Jilniilla, thnt Munay postponcd his own omharl:~tibtion h con. 
mrt with Elio a wmbincd opcmtion, from Binr and &x, 
againat Fuente de la Higiierit mlicre Suchct's troops rvem Sing 
in wliit. Previot~s to tllis epoch Elio lwd iirged Murray to 
disregmd Del Parque and mbarlc at once for Taragonh 
undertaking himself to secure tlie jnnction with his felloiv. 
, 
commander. Nuw, after afirceivg t o  co-operate witli hiurray, 
lie secretly witlidrelv La cavalry Gom firix, sent Wliittinglim 
i n  a fabe dimction, piacod Roche without suppori att Alcoy, 
retired liimself to the eity of Murcin, and at the snme time ono 
of his regiments qunrtered at. Alicnnt fired u p n  a Britidi 
pitrd. Roche was nf;tml[~d anrl lost ciglit,y men, antl Del 
Piirque's flank mna menrtcctl from Fncnte dc la Higuera; biit 
t l ~ e  BBtish cavdry, aassembling at Biar, ~ecwecl  his communi- 
tion with M u m y  on the 25th, and t l ~ e  27th tlie Anglo- 
Sicilians brolrc up from tlieir quartcrs to embarlr at Alicant. 
f3uchet was nom very strong. Unmolesterl for forty days 
dter the battle of CastaIla, lie liad iniproved his defensive 
werka, chased the bands fram liis rear, mlled up kis reinforce- 
ments, rehorsed his cavalry ancl tlrtillery, and foraged $1 the 
fertila districts in  front of tlio Xiicnr. On tlio otlier hund, 
lord WiDiam Rentiuck, alarmed by intdIigcnce of an intendcd 
desccnt upon Sicily, had recallerl more Ri<ti.ish troops; xnd ns 
1ThittiiigI:liamk c ~ ~ n l v  and Eoche's rntire division weie left at 
Alimnt, the force acturilly embarked t o  atta& Taragona, 
including a frcsh English regment from Cartliag-en- scarcel~ 
Bppcndix exceded fourhen thousand present under ams. 
yol.  VI. Lss  thaii eight thoiisand were Britisli and Ger- 
man, and the horsemen only seven liundred. Yeh tlie amia- 
ment wm formidable, for the bnthring-tmin was complete aud 
powerful, tlie matcrinls for gnliions anti fnscines previotuly 
~ollccted at Ivicn, on[I thr! naval sqiindron under odmknl 
FIallowcl coilrristcd nf ñcvrml linc-of-hnttlc ~hipri, frigntcq 
bomb-vessels and gnn-borits, Licsirles the transporta. Thwe 
was however no cordidity between general8 Clinton and 
hlurrayJ nor between tlie latter nncl hia quartcr-mster-general 
Donkin, nor between Donkin and tlie d m i r n l ;  subordinate 
offioea &o, in both ~iervices, dopting hIse notions, sonle from 
vanity some from hearsay, dded  t o  the unenny fceling wliich 
prircvailcd amongst tho chiefs. Ncither admiml nor gened  
swmd to hnvr! h d  snnguine hopes of success even at tlie 
momcnt of emknrkation; and tlicrc wns in no quarter a clear 
nnderstnncting o€ Wellington% able pInn for the opcrations. 
Wliilc Dcl Pnrqiie was yet in rnarch, Suchet, if he hnd no 
secret unndcrstanding ivith Elio or any of his officcrs, must 
hnve been doiihtfuE of t,he allies' intentions, nlthough tho 
strcngtli of tlie bittering-traitin at iilicant indicntcd somc sicge 
of importrince. &Te however remlled Pannetier's hrigde from 
the frnntier of Arwn, and pl~ced it on tlie rmd to Tortoxa; 
and kno~ving Clausel WRS tlien witrring clown the pertidas in 
Nwnm, lia j u d p d  Arqon snfe nnd drew Severoli's Itnlisn 
lirigarle from tlicnce, lewing onIy t l ~ e  gxwisons and a Eew 
thousanrl men unrler Paris as a r%serPe at Zarngoea: tliia was 
thc rewozi the army of Arnpn (lid not caoperate 
to cnisli Mina aftcr l i i q  defcat by (;lauscl in tlic Eook XXIT. 
TJIP~ of Runpl. Decaen $so ~ e n t  some reinforcementa, 
wliercfore, rifter ~nrnplet~ing hia prrisonñ, Siichet could furnish 
tlic rlrnfts reqiiired by Napoleon, annd pct bring twenty thou- 
' 
ennrl men into t k ~  ficld. He )\*as homver ~disquietetl, antl 
notr~itltstnnding Clatisd's operat,ions feared for his t r o n p ~  in
Aiwgon, \\.here Paris hncl bcen nttncked by Goyan evcn in 
Zarvxn; moreover now, for thc first time sincc itrr suhjnga- 
tion, an unfrienilly feelinfi wa4 perceptible in Tralcncia. 
On tlie 31st of Mny Murmy snilcrL Suchct iinrnediakly 
orclcrctl Pnnnetier7s brigntle t o  clase towards Tortoza, but kept 
his o m  posifions in front of Vnlencia until the fleet w w  secn 
to pass the Gfio mith a fnir wind. Tlicn feeIing rassured tlie 
exl~edition nimed nt Catalonia, he prepnrcd ta nicl thnt princi- 
pality; but the  colirmn o€ EUCCQiir lieing dram principnlly 
Srmn tlie camp o€ Xat.iva, forty miles froin Valencia, Iie coirld 
not quit the liitter Iisfore tlie 7th ol auno. Tlieil liowevver 
he took -6th Iiiiii uine tliousand seIect inen, leraviiig Ibrispc 
on the Tucar \villi seveii tliousa~~it nfnntry nnd cavalry, exclu- 
sive of Xevemli's troeps wliicli were in fiill march from Ternel. 
But Murray's arniament, hnving very frtvourahle m-eatlier, 
anchored on tlie evening of the 2nd in tlie Liay of Tnnigonii, 
whence five ship  o€ n*ar under captain bílam, znd two 1~1th- 
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Iioiis af infantiy with gome p n s  under cu onel .e 
detwbed t o  attack San Felippe de Balquer, T h  it 
fort, garri~oned by ta Iiundred men, was oniy i i t y  teet aquarc; 
but the site wtas la ateep iso1ated rock, Btanding in the very 
gorgo of a pnss and blocking tlie only carriage-wrty from Tor- 
toza to Ta'~11pnil. Tho mounhins on either hand, althoiigh 
commaading the fort, mere nearly inaccessible themirelves, and 
piat Iabour was reqnired to form the batteries. Prevot ham- 
ever, being joined by a brigrtde of Copanaa srmy and actiiig 
in conmrt with the navy, placed two six-pounders on the 
heights south of the pass, from whence at six or seven hundred 
yarils distance tliey tlirew sl~rapnel-shelb, 
On tlie 4th two twelve-pomdws anda howitser, brouglit to 
the same point by the sailors, opened their fire; md at night 
the senrnen with extraordina~ exertions dragged np five 
twentg-four-pounders and t,hcir aatorca. The tronps then 
constrncted rr b~ttery For twu howiteers on the d o p e  of the 
p n < l  ridge, northward o+' the piise; and a second for four 
lieavp p n s  on the fort  rock, at a distance of me Iiundred and 
6fty yrtrds. Eartli was cnmied from below; everpthing dse, 
even water, wm brought from tlie ahips> thoiigh the landing- 
place was more than a aiIwnd+hdf ofF; and ras time was 
vaIuable faveurable term were offered to tlie garrimn, liut 
the offer wti~  refused. Tlie 5bh the fiis was continued, j e t  
with dight, succesa, the homitzer-battery on the pe0.t ridge 
vas rclinquished, and fit night a vory violent storm rctarded 
the conatiuction of the hrenching-bzttcriea. 
Previons t o  this, Prevot hnd marned hfurrap tbat his mmns 
wem ioau%cisnt and a second Spmish brigarle was sent to  
him, yet the breaching-batteries were stitI incomplek on tha 
Gth, and out of three pms already mounted one m s  disalilerl 
by a shot from the fork Meanwhile Sucliet, who m niaking 
fomed marches to  Tortoza, h d  ordered tlie gowrnor of that 
place to mccour San Pelippe; and that o&er would undoubt- 
edIy have ~iucceded, if captain FeySon of the Thames frigate 
Sir Henrg had not obtained two eight-inch rnortars, wkch, 
Pefion, being worked by IIr. Jamm of the marins arti1- 
MSS. ley, exploded a mal1 rnagnzino in tbe fort and 
caifeed an e d y  surrender. The besi~gerct who had lod about 
fifty men and d c c a  then occupied the place. 
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lthough the Aeet c3st anchor ia the hay on tbe evening o£ 
!nd, the mrf prevented the disembnrlmtion of the troops 
th next dny. The rnmprt of the lower town liad been 
,ucliet, but Fort R v l  rem;ained and tliougli in 
served, togetlier with the ruhs of tlie Sun 
, to cover the western front. Tho gwernor 
3letti  ms mpposd by Xurruy t o  be disitirectsd, yet 110 
ed himself n 10.1 and enerptio officer; and liia gnrrison, 
en liundrcd strong, fin hundrcd lieing privateer seamen 
Franco-Spmiards, aerved liim well. The Olivo ancl 
Laretto heighta were occupid tlie first duy by Clinton'~ and 
Wbittingliiimk infiintry; the other troops remained on tbe 
luw gmund about the Francoli river, and the town was bom- 
L--led during the nighk by the n q ,  but the fire was aharply 
ned and the flotilla suffered most. Next duy two Liat- 
s were commenced six LunJreJ. yarda from S m  Carlos, 
nine hundred prds from Fort Royal. They openetl the 
and lieing found too cEishnt a third was commenced 
iundred yarda f m  Fort Royal. Thc 8th ri pxwticable 
h WM mde in tlat"30utwork, yet the wault was deferrd 
and some piees remo~ed t o  p l q  from the Olivo; wliempon 
tlie Iiesieget., finding the fire slacl~en, mpaired tlie Srencli at 
Fort Boyal and inoreased tha clefences. , "re mbsequent pro- 
ceedings canntit be understood mithont an accurate knomlerlga 
oF the reIative positiona of the French nnd allied armies, 
Twqona, tliougl.situnrted on one of a cluster »f lieights 
which terminate a mnge descending from the nortbwarcl to tlie 
sea, is, wit.h tEie exception of khat range, surrorinded by en 
npen couut.ry calIed tlie C a q  de Twrr~~m, which is a p i n  
cnvironed by Pery riigged mountnins tl~rough mliicli the seve- 
rn1 rontls descencl into tFie plniii. Wetitrvnrd tlien! n e r e  onIy 
ctirringe wny, orie rlirect, by tlie Col de Balaguer ta 
gana; tbe otlier cirdtouti, lcrttling by Mora, Falce$ 
ikilatich and Reus. The fimt wns bloclccd by tbe takirig 
m Felippe; the second, although uusd by Buclrct for bis 
oys d u r i n ~  tho French siega of Tumgonq was aow irr tiad 
r and at Lest only avaiiablc fur sud mounh-guns. 
Northwasd tliere was a. crarriage-wag leding from Lerid:), 
which nnited with t.ht from Falcet a$ llomblanch. Eastwad 
there was tlie roya1 cawiiiselvay, coining from Barcdona t l~m~igh  
Villa Franca, Arbw, Tendrj lls, and Todembarra ;  this rvad 
sfter passing Villa Francs ~icnds off two bmncbes to the riglit, 
onc pmsing hliron~l~ tlie Col dr! Cristina, the other throiigli 
3fasarhoncg and Col de Leibm, leading iipon 13rraffin antl V~lis 
It mas by tlic lntter branch hl?Eanald p ~ s e d  to  Reus in 1810; 
he h d  however no guns or carriages, and bis whole army 
Inbour~d to  make tbe ivay pmcticable. 
htween tliesu vnrioue roarls tlie mountains were too rugyerl 
ta  pmmit direct croas cornrnunicat.ions; rind troops coming 
from different pidm coulrl only unite in tlie Campa de Tab- 
gona now occupicd by the al l i~s .  Wl~erefore, as M u m j  liad 
Hteen tliousand figliting men, and Coliona, reinfomd with 
two rcgiments sent by pea from Coniña, iw at &us with sia 
tliousand ~ c y l a r s  liesides Mansa's dihion, twenty-five thou- 
knnd combatants were in po~sessioa o£ tlie French point of 
jnnctioa. 
Aftar Lncy's dcparturc thc Catnlrans with tlie sid of cnptaFn 
Adam's sliip bnd destmycd twe smnIl fnrts at Perillo antl 
Ampolla, snd Rroles liad blaeka<led San Felippe de Ealaper  
for tliirty-six days; it was then sumotired by Maurice Matbieu; 
nnd tlie success at Perillo wes more tlian baIanced by a check 
H-IILc~~ Snrsficld received on the 3rd of April from some of 
Parineticr'~ troops. Tlie partidas Iind liowever been actirre 
in Upper Catdonin, and Copons claimed two considerable vic- 
toriea; one gnined by himscIf the 17th of hlay at La Ri~pril 
nekr the Col de Cristinq where lie baastd t a  Iiave beaten six 
thousand French with half their numbers, and destroywi six 
hndred  as they retumed from sncxouring XDtn Felippe" In 
tlie otlier, won by colonel Lmder near Olot on the 7th of Nay, 
it rrns said tn-elve liundrd of Lamarque's men fd. Tliem 
exploits ore by Frencli writers wlled skinnjsls; and the rol- 
lowing description of the Cntalan zrmy, g i ~ c n  to Mnmy 
Cnhnnes, chicf of Cgonshttaf rrndcrs tlie French vcrsion tlie 
mmt medible. 
We do wot,' paid thnt officer, d wima w ten t h ~ a n d  
mma, atended m difered pmnts of ot iize ruming fimt siia 
gh1)owhood ~f Reus a l q  &a R ~ I B  mntains fo t h  zric%mhp 
Olot. Ylas aoldbs cwe 6mwe hzct aaithmt di&pli?ae, wit l~zlt  
~ w d i m t h ,  wit7mt dotltim~, widmci wtilhy, w3hmt m 
: ~ t a h ,  m ' t l ~ ~ t  magdfies, &ti& m.q um? m*timd 
am of trampwt !' 
Copons, when he carne do% to t l ~ c  Campo, frankly told 
irray, that as his tmops could only fight h position he 
i~ ld  not join in any oprntion ~vl~icli c idangemd hisi retrcat 
tlie Ligh mouxhinri. However, with exception of twe l~e  
Iiundred left nt Yich under EroIes, al1 liis forces, tlie be& 
perl~rtps in Spain, were now at h i l s  aiid tbe Col do Balagner, 
ready to Intercept the cornniunications of the different French 
corpa, and t o  barass tlieir mwclies if tlicy ahould descend into 
tlie Campo. Murray could only enlculate u p n  seven or eight 
bunclred serimen and marines to aid lum in pushing on the 
worlrs of tlie skge, or in a battle near the sliort3, and Iie 
~ectetl tliree thonsnnd additiond troops from Bicily. Sir 
ivarrl Pelleiv, commxnding tlie grent MerIitemnean fleet, 
1 promised to divert tlie nttention o f  the French troops by 
a rlesccnt eastmard of Rnrcelona; nnd tlie armica of Del 
Parque and Elio were ta mdce n likc diversion westmarrl o€ 
Tnrtozs Finnlly, a gener~l ri~ing of the somntene~ niight 
Iinvc: Iieen effccted, anrl t h o ~ e  mountninccrri were nll at J l u ~  
my's d i s p o ~ ~ l ,  to  procure intelligcncc to givc tinicly nntim of 
tlie enemy's nppronch or t o  irnpcrle his mnrcli by Iircraking 
up the PO&. 
On the Frencli siclc tlicrc was p-cntcr liut more scattered 
power. Suchct h d  marclictl ivitIi ninc tliousantl men from 
Valencia, and what with I'unneticr's Iii.igda and somc spnre 
troops from Tortolzn. olcvcn or tivelve tliousnnd rnen witb 
nrtiHery iniglit linve come tu tlie succour of Taritguiia froin 
tLat side, íf tlie suildeiz fall of Sxri Yelilipe d~ Ualaper liad 
not  barred tlia ouly cari-iakw ivag ori tlie ivestward. A move- 
ment t>y J t ~ r a ~  Falcet nnd Rlonililancli, reiiiainetl oyen, yet it 
would bare Iieen tcrlious, antl tlie dirrposnble troops nt Lerida 
were feiv. To tlie enstwa~rd tlierefare tlie garrison looked for 
the first siiccoiir. >irturice 31i1tliiet1, reinforced with a lirigntle 
from Uppcr Cat~tiilonia, corild l~ring seven tliousrind men witb 
artillery frorn Barcelona, Decncn couId moye fmm the Am- 
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purdam with an equal number, and heme twenty-five thi 
men might finally bear upn  tlie allied army. 
But Suchet, mea4nring from thc Xncar, hrtd more thaii uiiu 
hundred and sixtJy miles t o  mnrch; Mauriee Mxthieu wwnri to 
collect his forces from vwioua placa and march seven9 miln 
after E-hrray had disembarked; nor conld he stir at al1 until 
Tilmgona waa actually besieged, Iest the allies sliould reirn- 
bark md attack Barcelona Decaen had in 1Jre manner to 
1001s t o  tlie security of tlie Ampurdam, sud he aas one hun- 
d r d  and thirty miles distant. Therefore, liowever active tlie 
Fwnch g~nerds m i ~ h t  be, the English gencrnl could calculate 
upon ten da$ clear opemtions aftcr investment, before wen 
tlie 1 i ~ a d s  of t he  enmny'c columns could issue from tlie hilk 
bordeng the Catnpo. 
Borne expectation slso he rnight have, that Suchet wonld 
endsavour to cripple Dd Parque before he- marchd to the 
suocour of Txrqona; and it ww in his favolir tliat eetistmrd 
and ~vestward tlie roya1 causeway m s  in plaoes exposed to 
tlie fire of the naval syutidron. The ex~ierience of Cudriligton 
during tlie first aiege of Tmgona Iind proved indeed tliat .tan 
rtrmy muld not hr! fitoppcd by tliis firc; yct it  ms an imlio- 
diment not to be Ieft out of the cxlculiition. Thus, tlie 
adrantage of- a central position, tbe possession af the enemy's 
p i n t  o£ junction, tlie initinl movement, tlie good mil of tlie 
people and the aid of pomerful flniik diversions belonged to 
3lurrriy; superior numbers annd a Letter a n i y  to the Frencli; 
for the allics, bmve and fonnidzbIa t o  figlii in a position, 
were not well constituted to  muve. 
Turwnil, if thc resources for an interna1 defence he dis- 
rcgarded, wnq n wcalí plm. d sirnplc rcvctment three fcet 
anrl a Iinlf tJiiclr, witho~it dikh OT conntemrwp> covcrcd it on 
the west ; tlie two outworks of Forh Roynl ibnd Xñn h r l o ~ ,  
sligh* obstaeles at atliest, were not armed nor even repaired 
nntiI after the investrnent; and the garrison, toa mesk for the 
extent of mparb,  vas opprecsed with hbour. Here tlien, 
time being preclous to  both sides, o r t l i n q  niles should Lave 
nppwi-lx l, lieen set aside mtl dnring opemtions trrlopted. 
"01. VI. Wcllington liad jiiilgcd ten thousnnd men sufin 
uent to tdre Tarapona, blarray brougl~iit seventeen tlioiisa~~1, 
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of wliich fourteen thousand were effective. To do tliis he 
had, he aaid, su rednced Iiis equipments stores and means o£ 
land trnnsport that bis army could not move hom the sEp- 
ping; he was yct so nnready for the siege, thak Fort Roya1 
was not stormed on the 8th becauae tlie cngineer wnli un- 
prepared to profit from a successiLI assauIt. 
Tliis scarcity of atoren was anreal; the equiprneiih left 
Iieliind were only draft animls and commissariat field-stores; 
tho tliing wanting m s  vigour in the general, and this was 
m d e  manifest in various ways. Copons was averse ta calling 
out the somate~ies anri Kurrap did not press tlie mrrttex. 
Siicbet liad taken San Felippe de Dalaguer by escalade; 
Rl[urray attacked in form and mitkout suficient mems; Eur 
if captain PeJrton had not bronght up t l ~  mortam, an after- 
thougl~t exhaneous to  the general's arreangements, tlie fort 
muld uot have been re(1uced before succaur mrived froin 
Tortoza: indeed tlie surrirnder was scarcely crditnble to tlie 
French commmdmt, for l is  works were uninjured and only 
a small p& of his p o d e r  destroyed. It mas also said, t l ~ a t  
one tif the ofñcers empIoyed ta reguIate the capitulation liad 
in bis pcket  an order frorn Murray to raise the siege and 
emhrirk, spiking the guns! At Taragona, the troops on the 
Iow p u n d  did not apprortch so near by three hiindred prls 
m tliey migl~t have done; md the outworks slioiilrl linve 
been sbrmed at once, ns "Vellington sbrmed Fort Francisco 
at tlie siege af Ciudad Rorlrip. Francisco mas n good oiit- 
~vurk and oomplete; the oiitworks of  Srirngon~. wem in- 
complete, ill-flnnked, withont pulisdes or cnseiniateq antl 
thsir M1 woi~ld have enablcd the beniegers t o  f o m  r i  ptarallel 
ng~inst the Iiody of the plnce as Sucliet liad done in tlie 
fnrmer s i e w  f i  few houra' firing would tlien Iinvt: braugl~t 
doum thc wnTI find n pnernl msault migh:ht hnvc been rlcli- 
vered. The French had stormed a similar hreacii, in tlint 
frunt alkliuugh defended by eiglit thousiind Spnriish troops; 
and the alfies, opposed by ody sixteen Iiunclred French aiid 
ltalim soldien and senmen, were in come rneasure tiountl by 
honour to follow that example, since Skerrett at the former 
siege, refused to commit twelve hundred British troops in thc 
pliice, oa the specid ground that it mas indefensibk though 
t m 
se strong?y pmisoned. M U ~ T R ~ B  troops were brave, they 
hnd bccn ncting tugcthcr for nearly la ycnr; nnd, after bhe 
figlit at Castalla, had become m enger, that an Itnlim re*. 
ment whicli at AlZlicant was rendy to  go over bodily to the 
enemy now voiuiiteered to lead the assault on Fiirt Royal. 
This confidente ima not shared by their gened .  
Ug ix tiie Sta, hfurray's proceedings were U-judged ; his 
after-operations werc contemptible. As early as the 5th, 
false rcport~ haíl mads Xuchet reacL Tortoza, nnd put two 
thuusand Frendi ir: movement from Lerida. Murray thea 
openly wowed his a lam and his regret at liaving Isft Blicnnt; 
yct he prooccdcd to constrt~ct two hcavy coiintcr-bnttcriea 
nenr tho Olivo, gcnt o detnchment to Vdls in ohscmtion of 
the Ltrida rmd, and dr~irctl Manso to wíltcl: that of Barcc- 
lona. On tlie 9th E& emiasaries said t l ~ c  French sere coming 
fiom the wt d from the a e s t ;  and wouId mhen nnited 
exceed twenty fliousand. nilun-ay immediately sought íin 
interview with the admiral, cleclaring his intention to raise 
tlie siege. Kis. views changed during the confcrence, but he 
sws discontented; Hallowel refused to join iii a surnmons to 
the governor and lik flotilIa agiwn boniliarcled tlis place, 
On thc 10th the q i ee  in BncceEonn gmo noticc tliat eiglit 
er ten thnusnnd Frencll with fourteen p s ,  wtjuld mnrch from 
tliat ciiy t,hc ncxt dny. C o p n s  immcrlintcly joincd M8nso. 
Flirt hIumy, as if he now digilained his enerny, continued to 
ilisembark storea, landecl several mortm, armed tlie bntteries 
at tlie Olivo, and on thc 11th ~pened their fire in conmt 
6 t h  tliat from the shipg of wnr. Tliis was the first serioua 
attack, and tbe Englisli g~neml,  ~rofessing 8 wish t o  6ght the 
column coming from BarceIenh sent tlie cavdry uder  lord 
Frederick Dentinck to Altafalla, and in person soughlit a 
position of battle to  the eastward. He left orders t o  s t ~ r m  
the outworh that night, yyet retuned Iiefom tlie Iiour 
appointed, extredy  clisturbed by intelligence tlmt Maurice 
Dlilthieu waa nt V i l l ~  Frnnca with eight thousaed combatmts, 
and Siichet closing upon tlie Col de Rnlngner. Hig infirmiv 
o€ mind ww apparent to the whole anny. Ak eight o'clock 
he repexted E a  onler to asmdt the outworks, anrl at ten 
a'dmk the starming-party was in the dry bed of the Fmcol i  
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awaiting the ~ i p a l .  when a eountemiand &ved ; tlic aiege 
waa then to be mised and the e n s  removed immwliately 
from thc Oliw. TEa commandcr of thc artillcry reiiion- 
str~ted, md the gcaernl promised to h I d  tha htteries until 
the ncxt nighh; but tlio detachment at Vdls and tlie m~~1ry 
nt Altafalln were ca;Ierl in without notice t o  Copons, tliough 
ho dcpcncled on thar snpport 
All the hewy Rins of fhe brttteries on the low grouníl~ 
and the pan: were rcmoved t o  the b m h  for cmbm-kntion on 
the moniing of tlie 1 2 th, and a t  tmelve o'clock lord Fredericlr 
Bentinck amived from ,4lt~faIls with the cavalry. It is %ir1 
he mas odered to shoot hls horaes, but refused to obey and 
mnved towards the Col de Edap~er. The debchment from 
Valls arriverl next and the infantry marched to Cupe Bnlou to 
emliarlc, but tlie hommen followed lord T'rederielr, and nere 
flremselves followed by fourteen pieces of artillery; cncli h l y  
morved intlependentIy, and al1 mas confiised, incol>erent, ami& 
ing md dlahonourable to the British ams. While the seamen 
were embarlcing tlie guns, t1ie quarter-master-general carne 
down to tlie beach witli orden to alxindon tliat busincss itnd 
collect boats for tlie reception of troops, the enemy being sup- 
posed close tit hand; and uotwithstandiig XTnrray's promise to 
hold the Olivo until night-fall, fresh clirections were given to 
spike t l ~ c  guns there and bum thc cnr r iqes .  Then lourl 
murmum arose on every side tind from botli servioes; army 
and nxvy mere alike indipant, and so excited, that it is =id 
personal insult vias offered to the general. Threc stafl-oEcera 
repaird in a body to Murray's quarters to oRer plans nud 
o~inions; but t t e  acirniral, who &d not object to raising the 
~iegc tl~ough 01)posed te tbo manner of doing it, would noh 
auffer the scnmen ta cliscontinue the en~barlcation of nrtillery; 
pet 11ie urged an attwl~ upon the column coming from Barce- 
lona, and opposed the order to spike the p n s  at tl~e Olivo, 
offering to be responsibIc for carrying al1 cIear of durIng the 
niplit. 
Thus pressed, IIurray agah \vavered. Denying thot he Pind 
ordered the battcring piecea to be apilred, lie aent counter- 
onlers and directed a part of Clinton's troo~is to nhancc 
towards tlie Gayariver. In a few hours aftermnrds he reve~erl 
to hi former idea, and peremptorily rencwed the order for the 
artillelp t,o spike the guns on tlie O l i ~ o ,  and hurn the carriWs. 
R'ór was even tliia iinhappy action performed wihhout con- 
fusion. Tlie differeiit orders received by Clinton in the course 
oC tlis day Iiacl indicated the extmortlinnry vwillation of the 
comrnauder-in-cliiel; and Clinton liiroself, forgetF111 of his onn 
arrarig~inents, witli m obsolete c o u h q  touk of Iiis liat to 
sdute nn cnemy's battery whicli liad fired upon liirn; but tlUs 
wavlng of his hat from thaf particular spot wua nlso the con- 
ventional signal for tho artillcry t o  qdcc thc girns, and they 
wrre tlius spiked prcmnturely. Tl ie  tronps were however nll 
embarked in tbe nig11t of the 12th, and many of the stores 
and horses were sliippecl the 13th without tlie sliglitest inter- 
ruption from the enemy; but eighteen or ninetoen bnthring- 
pieces, whose c a r r i ~ g ~  bad been burnt, were, with al1 tlie 
plratforms, fascines, gabiona and mal1 arnmunition, in 6 e w  of 
the flcet and armg, triurnplinntly carried iuto tlie fortressl 
namid Muri-ay seeiningly u~affecterl by thi r n i s f u r t ~ e ~  
t1aiioweii sliipped Iiimself on tlie svening of tha 12th and 
Evidcnm. tuo l i  liis usual repose in bd! 
While the ~iege wiis thus precipitntcly abnndoned, the 
Kench, nnirblc ta surmount the olistmlce oppo~ed t o  their 
jiinction, unable wen te commiinitate by their emiasriries, 
s e r e  despairing of Tamgona. SucI~et did not reach Tortoxa 
before $he IOth, but a detachment from tIie garrison h d  on 
tlie 8th attclmpted t o  succour b u  Felippe, and nemly captured 
the naval Captain Adm, colonel PrevOt, antl other officen, 
wlio were examining the wuntry. Maurice Mathieu reaclied 
Villa Prmca early on thc lOQ, and deceiving evcn 
Laffaille. llis own people as t o  liis numliers gave out that 
Decaen was cloee beliind mitli a powerfu1 forue. Te give 
efftct to tliis policy, he drova C u p n s  from drhs tlie lltli, 
and his seouting purtics entered Vendrilla rs if ha mm 
resoIved singly te nttnck Nwray, Pellew liad howevcr lrtnrlcd 
liic rnnrinrs ah Rosna mhich nrrcatecl Decaen's mnrdi; nnd 
nlauricc Matliien nlarmed a t  the si1rce.w of fireariorit Tnmgonn, 
knowing notliing of Suclict's movements and too wertlr to 
figllt the allies alone, fe11 bmk in the night of the 12th to  
the LIobregut, liis rnain body nevcr liaving papsed Villa Franca. 
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Bucliet's opemtions were ewn less decisive. His ndvanced 
p r d  under Prtnnetier, rreached Perillo tlie 10th. Tbe 11th 
t hmriny from bis spies, he cawed Paunetier to pasa omr 
: moiintains tIirougli Valdiilos to aome Eieiglits which ter.. 
nate alimptly on the Campo above Motirriig. The 12th 
it oíñcer reaclied the exkrereme verp  of the Iiills, hing tlien 
enty-five milea from Z'amgona His ptatroles descending 
50 the plains met with lord Frederick Bentinck's troopem, 
d reportcd that Murmy'a wholc amy wm at liand; wliere- 
.e he wouId not enter the Cnmpa, bnt at ni@ kindled 
-ge fires to eilcouragc tho prrison. Viese signals wcrc 
oliserved, tlic countrgr people h ~ d  isappmred, no intelli- 
gence eould be procuw1, ancI Sucliet could not with a l a p  
fom enter hose wild hilla where there wxs no water. Thuer 
on both  irles of Taragona the suocouring m i e s  were ba.BIed 
at the moment chosen by Mnrray for ffiglit. 
Suchet now recelvecl alarming intelligence h m  Valencia, 
get still anxious for Tamgona, he pushed on tlie 14th along 
the coast-road toma& Felippe de Ralapuer, thinking to b d  
Prevíit's division done; but the head of his column was sud- 
denly cannonaded by tbe Tliames fi-igate, and he w a s  wonder- 
fully gurprised to see the whole British fleet ancliored oíT &m 
Felippe nnd disenibarKng troops. lfumy's operations were 
indeed ns irregular as thoae of a partkan, yct n~itlioiit partisan 
vigoiu. Henring in the night o€ h e  Iath, from FrevGt, of 
Tannetier'a iaareli t o  Monroig, he, t o  protect the cavalry and 
y n s  nnder lord Frederick Tkntinck, sent Mltclcemie's dinsion 
by sea to Dalaper on tlie 13tl1, and fol lowd with tlie 1~1iole 
army 'clre 14th. Mackeneie drove b k  the French posts on 
botli sides oE tlie p~ss, tlie emliarkation of tlie cavalry md 
' ratillery then conimenced, and sucliet, still uncertain if 
Tiiragona l id  fallen, moved towards Valdillos to bring o ñ  
Tannetier. 
At tliis precise period Murray lieard t h t  Maurice N~thieu's 
colurnu, wliicL t e  alwiiya erroneously supposed to be under 
Decaen, bad retired to tlie Lllibrqrtt, tliat Copom mas agctin 
at Reus, and Taragonii Lad not beea reiriforced. Eluted by 
tliis information, Iia revolved various pmjects in Lis mind, at 
one time thinking to fd l  upon Bucliet, at anotlier t e  cut off 
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Pannetier ; now resolving t o  msrch upon Cambrills and even tr  
menace Tmgona agdn by land, tlien to send a detaclirnenl 
by sea to surprise tlie latter; but finaUy he disembarked hit 
whole force on the 15tl1, and being iporant of Suchet's Iasl 
movement decided t o  strike at Pannetier, In this view, ht 
detaclied Mrtckeneie by a rugged valley l d i n g  from the 
eastw~brd to TValdillus, and t h t  ufficer mched it on tlie 16th; 
but Suchet bd already carried afl Pannetier'~ brigade, antl [lis 
next dny tlip Britisb detacliment W& recallea by Mnrray, who 
h d  rlctcrmined to mcmbark. 
This detednntion was cansed by n fresh d n r m  from tl~lit 
mstwa~d, for Maurice Mathieu, whme whole pmceedingr 
evineed both ski11 and dgour, bearing thitt the siepe af Tara 
gona wm raisd and the dlies mIanded at tbe Col de b l e p e r ,  
retraced bis stepa and boldly entered Cambrills the 17th. On 
that day howerer Nackenzie returned and Numy's whole 
amy vas thns concenirakd in the p m  Buchet was then 
bdiind Perillo, Copons st Reus, h v b g  come there at Murray'a 
desire to attaek Rlairnee 31atliieu; aud the latter would lime 
suffered if tha English general had been eapnble of a. vigoroua 
strolre. It was fortunate for Mnckmie that Ruchet? too 
rinxious for Tdenrin, disreprded h i ~  movcment upon Valdillos; 
but tauglit by the discmbnrkation of the whole English m y  
thrtt tfie fate of Taragona whether %r good ar evil w m  
decided, he hsd sent an emissary t o  Mauriee Mathieu on the 
18th, and then retircd to Perillo and Amposta. Re m c h d  
the l~tter place tlie 17th, attentive only to the mcmement of 
the fleet, and meanwhile híaurice Miltbieu endeamurd to sur- 
prise tl ie Cahlans at &u$. 
Copons waa Ied into this danger by Mumy, who had desired 
bim to haritris Naurioe Mathieu'a rear with a view to a general 
attack, and Ilien clianged liia flan withont giving any notice. 
However he escaped. Tlie Frenclt moved upon Tariigona, and 
Mumy wrts left iree t o  cmhrk or t o  rema@ at tlie Col de 
Balquer. He called a council of war, and i t waa concliided, 
M alseudy said, to  re-cmlinrk, but then Pellew's fleet fippcared 
in the ofing, rtnd Ellowcl, obaeming n sipal  anno~incing lord 
William Bentinclr'ri arrival tl, answcrerl with more prompiitude 
thm propriety, ( w m aü deligk&.' 
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urray'~ command having thus terminated, public discon- 
rendered it impossible to aroid investigtion, yet the 
:uity of liokling a court ia Spain nnd Borne disp~sition at 
e to shield him caused great cleIay. He was at hst tried 
ngland. Acqnittcd of two chargcs, on the t h i d  he was 
ircd pi l ty  of an error in jndgment and sentenced to be 
oniqliwl, but even thnt ulight morkificatian wlls not inffictcd. 
dwision does not prpreclude the jurl,ment oof histo~y, nor 
wll it sway thab of psterity. The court-marbial was assem- 
twenty months a h r  the event, when the war bcing 
dilp terminated men's minds wcre little disposed te trezt 
fdares with severiy. Tliere were two distinct prose- 
rs, h a ~ g  different views; t11e procsdings were conducted 
cfigtance Srom tlie scene of aclion, defects of memory could 
be remedied bp refemnce to lodtiea,  wLch opened a 
aoor for contradietion and douM upon irnportant points. 
There was no indicetion that the membem al tlie caurt wme 
unnnimons in tbeir verdi&; thcy wcrfi cun5ned to specific 
chargea, restricted by l e s 1  nilea o€ evidence nnd deprived of 
the testimony of J l  the Xpanish oficers, who were ce&inIy 
discontented with lfurray's wndueh and wliose absence cansed 
the charge of abandoning Gpona' mmy t o  be mppressed. 
Moreovei the warmtli of temper displayed by the principal 
prosecntor, admird HalIowel, together with hia si@ on lord 
William Bentinck'a arrivnl, whereby, to the detriment of dic 
cipline, he manifested his contempt for the g e n e d  with whom 
he was acting, ggsve Xumy an advantage which he impro~ed 
skilfnlly, for he wns a man suñiciently acute and prompt when 
not at the head of an army. De charged tbe admiml with 
deceit, factioaa dealiigs, and climeprd o€ tlie semice; describcd 
him as being of a passionate ovemening busy dispositien, 
trmbled with excess of vanity, medrlling rvith everytlihg and 
thinLing himself competent te  m m g e  both troopa and 
ships. 
Nevertheless sir J o h  had hiipaiiy failed Soth aa tan inde- 
pendent general and a9 a Iieutenant acting under superior 
arders. On his triaI indeed, blending these direrent capa- 
eities toptlier lrith expert aophistry, he p1eaded hia instmc- 
tions in excuse for Lis errors as s free oommander, nnd his 
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iliscrctionay pomer in mitigation of his disobedience ss a 
lieutenant; but his operations were indefensible in both 
capacities. WeIlingtonqs instmctions, precise and founded 
upon tlre advanhges ofíerd by a commrand of tLe sea, pre  
scritied nn dta& upon Taragona with a defioite object, 
namely, ta deliver Valencia. 1 
' Yoa 1 8  KW,' mibid he, tM  ti^ 12w of tlae X w ,  wmkh 
COWB V M a ,  b too s t r y  $0 fm; il: then hy t L  
omm, mmil t?g mar of tJ& m y  d hB wilZ & Ria 
strmg 1in4 lopotee t  7th conamu~%'cntim, ha eaeU giw ym m 
oppohni9 & t o I i s h  a nao hmqe ofcvp~& fiehind Aim.' 
Tltis plan demanded prornptness snd encrgy, Murrny pos- 
aascd neither. TIie menthcr was so fhvourablc, thnt n voyge 
which mlgl~t have congumetl ninc os ten dngs w a s  peddmed 
in two, tlie Spanish t r o g s  punctua4ly effe&d their junction, , 
tlie initint opemtions were secured, Fort Balaper fell, the 
French moved from al1 sides  t o  the mcconr of Taragona, the 
line of the Xucw was wetikened, &e divenion vas complete. 
In the nighk of the 12th tlie bnlk of the army rpas *in 
afloat, a few houm wonld have sufficcd to embark the cm,tlli-y 
at the Col da Balaguer, and llurrag mi@ have miled for 
Valen&, while Xucliet's advmced guard was still on the hills 
aliove Monroig, and bimseli, uncertain aB to &he fate of Tara- 
pna, one hundred ancl Eftp miIes from the Xucar. JIirmy 
Iind faiIed t o  attain the first object pointed out by Welling- 
ton's inatructiow, the second Tvas within hi rexch; iastead 
of grasping it he Ioikred abmt the Col de Balquer, and 
gave Xiuclict time ta m h  Valencia a g i n ,  in manifest dere- 
liction of the letter md ~ i r i t  of Welling-hon'a instnictiow. 
Wliat was Lis defence? That no speufic period being 
named for his retwn t o  Valencia he was entitled to exereiae 
Iiis discretion! Did lie tben w an indepcndent general per- 
form any aseful or brilliant action to justify l i s  delg'3 His 
tale wae one of loss and dishonour! 'he  improvideiii 
arnsngements for the siege of San Fdippe, and th unex- 
p&d fortune wliicli saved him Gom the sliume of abaiidon- 
ing his gnns there alm, lilive been noted j and when tlie p i n  
of time wtrs suecess be neitlier urged Copons t o  'break up the 
roada, nor pushed the siege of Taragona with vigour. 
1 
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'be feeble formality of the latter operation has Phiriri.'a 
o imputed t o  tlie engiiieer rnajor Tliac- Militnry 
y; unjustly, bemuse tli& ofioer bad only LP1cndmm 
Furnbli a plan of attack agseeai.de t e  tlie miea of art; it 
;lit be a cautious onc, and mwiy persons did tliink he 
ited Tnragom with too mucli respect; but tlie general lvaa 
t o  decide if the selieme of Iiis operations wquired a clwiation 
from tlie regular couree; the unh~mmelled engineer muld 
tIien have tlisplnyed ]lis genius. lfurray mde no sign. His 
inctructions and bis ultirnatc vEews were dilse vithlleld from ' 
Iiis nnval collengue from lis ~ccond in commanrl from hiri 
qnnrter-marrter-genemi ; and while thc lnrit+nnmed functionary 
5va.g quite sliut oiit hoin tlie confidcnce of liis chief, tlia 
admira1 and mnny otherw, both of tlie ormp and n x q ,  
im~ginerl him t o  be thc sccret author of the proceedings 
which were Iioirrly exciting their indignation. Murra,~ lio~r-- 
ever declnred at liis trial tliat he had rqected Dodcin'a 
advice; and indeed that oafffcer l i d  vainly urged him t o  raise 
t l~e  siege on the 9th nnd told him mhere four Iiundred rlraught 
bullocl~s were to be liad t o  fransport liis heavy nrtilleryp On 
tlie 12th also he opposed t.be spiking of the guns and urged 
M m y  t o  drag them te Cape Salou, of wlvliich pltice he 1 1 ~ 1  
giren as early as the ehird day of tIie sirgc, a miiitary plan* 
rnarlcing a position, strong in itself, covering several landing 
plraces, and capahle of beiug flanked on both sides by the 
ships of wnr : it  liad no drawback s m e  n scarcitp of water, 
pt there were some springs and the fleet would Iiave supplied 
the deficiency. 
' It is trae tliat Donlsin, nnacquainted GtL. Wellington'a 
instmctiona and having at Cwhl l~ .  secn no mzpoil to rely on 
hlwmy's r n i l i t q  vigriur, wes werse to tlie enterprise apins t  
Taragona. He tliouglit tlie zllics should llave worked Suchet 
out of Vdericia by olieratiug on liis riglit flnnlc. knd no 
Wellington woulrl h v e  tliouglit if he liad only loolred at 
tlieir tiumbers and wt a$ tlieir quality ; he liad even ~lcetclid 
sucli a plan fos Musruy if the attaclr upon 'l'amgona sliould 
be found impracticable. But be knew the Spüniards too 
ivell to  like sudi coriiliinations for BII amy, two-thirds of 
wliich were of that nution md nut eveu. under one liead; m 
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a u m r  do not sunender without Seing vigoronsly assailed; 
nnd tlie arrival of reinforcements from Sicily was uncertain. 
Tt praa scnrcely riossilile for the governor, d i l e  cioseIy invested, 
o discover diat no fresli stores or g n s  were being Ianded~ 
till less could he judge BO timeously of 3Iurray'a final inten- 
ian by iyhnt fnct, m to ndvertise Suchet tliat T~ttragvna waa in 
danger. Yeither were tIie @pies, if any were in tho allicd 
ip, more mpablo of draming such conclusions, sceing that 
icient nrtillcry and storcri for the sicnc wcre lmdcd the 
first wcelr; and tlie lnnding of more gtins eovld not Rrtve 
demived thcrn, wIien t l ~  feeLlc operations of the general 
imd the univerd discontent furnirihcd siirer pides for tbeir 
reports. 
M n r r g  desiped to r ~ i s e  the siege as e~rIy as the 9th, an3 
nly deferretl it xfter seeiag the ndrnirnl Trom his natural vacil- 
ition. It wns thcrefore mcre casuistry to say, that he 6rst 
obtained certain information of Suchct's ndvance on the nigl~t 
of tlie 11th. On tlie 8th and 10th thraugh varions chamels 
lie knew the Frcncli niarslial wtts in march for Tortoza, md 
his dvanced - gttard memcing the Col de Balaper ; the 
approach of Xatirice Matliieu was dso knom; he shouid 
tlerefore hare Leer1 prepilred to mise the siekw witl~out he l~ 
of guns on t l ie  l2tli. Wtiy were they Iost'd Tliey could not 
Le saved he =id witlivut rkking a bnttle in a Liad yosition, 
anrl Wellingtun I i d  declrnred he would nut pardon a defcat ! 
Thi wvs tlie aftcr-tbuught of a sopbioter, nnd not warrnnted 
by t l o  instructions, wliieh on thnt Ttientl rcfererred only to Del 
Parque and Elio: brit wne it neccsñnry t o  figl~t a buttle tci 
save the gunsl all persona adrnittcd tbey could have been 
embarl~etI iefort: mid-rlay on the 13th. Pnnndier wns thcu nt 
Monroig, Suclict beliirirl Perilla, llnurico Matbieu folling bnck 
imm VilIa Franca Tliei Frencli on each side wcro thcrcfore 
respectively tliirty-siu snd tliirty-four miles distant on tlie 
niglit vf tha 12tli, and tlicir point of junction sna Reus. Yet 
hw fwm tli& junction? Tlie road from lrilla Fwncn by ttie 
Col de Cristina wtls partially broicen ul) by Copons; tiie road 
from Perillo t o  Reus wus uIwayri iriipructicahle for artillery, 
+ aud from the lattsr place tu  Taragoria \vas ~ i x  miles of very 
1~gged countfy. Tlre ellies were in possession of the point 
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of jnnction, Maurice Mfithim was retiring, not ad~ancing, 
And if the French could have mmarchd tIiYty-four and tliirty- 
aix miles through the mountains in one night, and been dls. 
p e d  to at tack in the rnorning without artillery, tliey &at 
~till  have asasrtained the situation of Murray's annp; tliey 
must Jinve made arrangements to ~ a t c h  Copons, Manso, aud 
PrevGt, who w o d  have been on tlieir rear and flmks; tliey 
must hnve formed an oder  of battIe nnd decirled upon the 
modo o£ athck before they ad\lsnced. It is t n i e  tbat tbeir 
junction nt Xteus would hnvc fumed Murmy to mpend liia 
emharkntinn to fight; bnt not, as lie said, in a bad position 
witli liis h c k  to tlie beach, where the sliips' guns could not 
aid Iiim tbnd wliere he might expeci a dangeroiis surf for (laya 
T h e  navai officicew denietl tlie snrf at thnt season; nnd it was 
not riglit to dcstroy guns and stores when the enemy wm not 
even in mar& for REUFI; coolness and mnsidemtion would 
have ennbld Jfurray to see tbere wm no danpr. Tn fact no 
~ emissaries egcaped from the town, and the eneiny liad no spies 
in the camp, since no communication took plme between tIic 
French columns until the 17th. On thc 15th Sucuchet knew 
notliing of the fate of Tamgona. 
Tliis reaeoning leaves out tlie cliance of hll ing with wperior 
forces upon one of the French columns. It suliposa Eiofvwer 
that accurate inforrnation \as possessed by t1ie Frencli gene- 
ruls ; tliat hlauricei Mrttliieu waa as a trong as Le pretended to  
be, Suchet eqer  and resolute to  form a junction witlr hirn. 
Yet in tmth Suchct knew not wliat t o  dn aftcr thc fnll of Fod 
Balapcr, Maurice fihthieu had lcss thnn scvcn tIiowand mcn 
of all nmq he WRE~ not followcd by Demen, m d  Le imngined 
the alliea to hnvc twenty tliausand men, cxclusii~ of tlie Cata- 
Ians. Tha poeition rit Cape h10u wm onIy six miles distant, 
ranrl M u m q  might with tha aid of the draft liiilloeks disco- 
vered bj Donkin llave dragged al1 his heaqv guns there, still 
mainhining t,lie inveatment ; lie might have sliipped bis bat,kr- 
hg-train, and when the enemy nppraselied Gus,  have marched 
ta tI~e Col de Balagucr, where he could, as he aftprwards did, 
embark or disembark in khe presence of the enemy. The 
daiiger of a Rnnk rriarch, Suchet lieing at h u s ,  could not havs 
deterred liini, because he did aend his cmlry and field artillerg 
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hy tbnt v e s  mrI an the 12kIi, and the French ndvanced guml 
from hfonroig hctunlly slrirmished with lord Predericlr Ecn- 
t,!nclt, FinnlIy hc could have embnrked his main bodp, leaving 
nall corps with somc cavalry to Lccp the ptrrison in clieclc 
bring off his pns. Sucli a detacliment, togetlier with tlu 
p n a ,  would have been afluat in a coupIe of 
svi- 
nours and on bond thc ship in four houm; j t  dencc on 
could haw enibarked on the open beach or, if "le triat. 1 
fearful of being molested by the prrison, mig-ht have marckd 
to Cape Balou or to the Col de Balwer j md if the p n s  hd 
B been lo&, the nroessity would have been apparent and 
dihanour lessened. It is clear tliere ww no mili- n e d  
ucri6ce tlie bcttering-pieces, tliose lionourod guns hhict 
ahoo!~ tho bloody rarnparts of Badn,jos? 
Welliiigton felt their loss keenly, Murray spolte of tliem 
iigl~tly. ' TTqj m - e  of 4 ~ w h o ,  dd {ron! h a t t d d  
liti'le impDTtance to  t h  s m @ e  of arMIev, it wlwi h k ~ & n -  
Gipld; ?M had qproued  of eotondA &m l o s i q  h h  g a n ~  at R k ,  
a?zd b FLad a7.m desired c o í m l  P r d t ,  qypmsd,  to  dandon 
hh h&!&mg-~in b f f m  ti¡& fo~t of Jdyw.' # ~ c J b  do* 
la mig7~t et.ramye to a B&kh nmy,  6ut 2 wm tb 
3 with tke &'ental arrmks a7ad th P T ~ C ? ~  o w d  m~cdb of 
h n g e  iedeed! Great ctimmnders have risked tlieir own 
iq and s d c e d  their braveet men, cbarging desperately jn 
son to retrieve even a single piece of mnnon jn a battle. 
.. .:y Icnew tlie ~ I u t ?  of moral force in war, and that of al1 tlie 
various qjrinp and lmrs on wliicli it depends rnilitaiy honour 
ia tlie moat powcrful. Ne 1 it wus not t o  the ndoptiou o€ sucli 
a, doctrine that tlie French oweil their grmt successes; it \vas 
to the a r e  with wliich Xapoleon fosteretl and clierlslied a 
crintmy feeling. Sir John Murray's argument woiilrl have 
bwn more pungent, more complek~ if Iie liad lust liis coIoiirs 
and pleaded tEiat they were onIy wooden s h e s  bearing oid 
pieoea of si&! 
Lom WILLIAM B ~ I N C K  nrril-cd without troops, for haring 
removcd the quecn from Sicily he fcnred intcrnnl dissension; 
and Nnpoleon had directcd Mumt to insarlc the idand with 
twenty thouiiand men, the Toulon squlitlron Iisng to act in 
concert ; sir Rdw~rd Pell~w indeed acknowIedgetl tlie ltttter 
might easily gain twenty-four Iioiirs' s h r t  of Iiis flc~t, and 10x1 
William judged that ten tl~ousand invaders wonld si~ffice t o  
crinquer. lfurat however opened a secret negotiation, and 
thus$ that monwch, Bemadotte and the emperor Francia, 
united t o  destroy a hero connected witli tliein by mnr~iagc 
and to whom they a11 owed their cronrns either b~ gift or 
Appendix i r .  dernency 1 Thia early defection of Murat is cer- 
tain, and liis declariition tliat he liad instmctions 
to invade Bicily was corroborated by a rrurnour, r i k  in tlie 
French m p s  befom tlie hnttle of Yitorin, tliat tlie Toulon 
Acet hd seiled and thlis deecent actnally mdc .  Ncv!vertheless 
t.here is Borne oliscurity about tfie rnatter. Thc negotiation 
waa never completed, Rlumt left Italy to mrnmnnd Nulioleon'a 
cavnlry, md nt the titsttla of Dreaden contributcd much ta  thrs 
success of thnt day. It is conceivalilc tlint hc should rnnslr his 
plans by joining tlie p d  army, md tlinl; his ficry spiiit 
~ l ~ o u l d  in tlie bnttle farget evcrytliing cxoept victnry ; hit t o  
disobey Napoleon as t o  the inrnsion oF Sicil y rand darc t o  iacc 
that monarch imrnedilttely after, wa9 SO unlikely lis to inrlimtc 
r~ther  a ptper demonstration to wlam thm a real attack. 
And it ~voiild seem from tbe short obeemtion of Wdlington 
in anawer to lord TVilliam's detailc<T communication on tliis sub- 
j&, namely, 'Xk& 6 in m danger,' thnt he viewed ;$ m, ar 
thought it put formad by Uilurat ta give more mlue to his 
defection. Bornever it suEced to  hinder reinforcements going 
to M u r r a ~  
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Lord Villiam on lnnrling wm informcd that Sucliet was ak 
Tortom with from eight t o  tmeIve thousand mea, Manrica 
Ylatliieu 14th seven thonsaad at ~ ~ m b r i r i l  To drive the 
ttter badr anri re-invest Taragana was easy, and dtlie p l m  
rould hnve IuIlen because the gwrison had exhausta3 al1 tlleir 
owder in thr. first siege ; but this Iord WilIiam did no% know, 
to  renew tbe rittaclr vigorously was impossible, becauac al[ 
howitzers anrl platforrns and fascines had been lost ; and 
anirnsls and general equiprnent of the army swe too 
:1i deteriomted by continual emhrlcations znd disembark- 
'm to keep the fidd in Catalonia, Vherefore he resolved 
meturn to Alicant, not without Iiope still to fulfil WeIling- 
mn'a hstructions by landing at Valencia between Suchet md 
Rarispe. T h  re-embarkatioh was unmolesteri, the fort of 
BaIwer weis destroyd, and onc of Whittinghnm's reymenta, 
deatined to  reinforce Copons' army, bcing detathed to efect e 
iing northwnrd of Bareclona thc Aect  put to s a  Misfor. 
e still nttended this unhnppy amamcnt ; e violcnt tempest 
~ d e d  the vopge, fourteen sail of transports fitmtk upon 
arsnds off the mouth of tlio Ebro, and the m y  waa not 
reIy disembarkd at Alicnrit before the 27th. &feanwhile 
het, seeing the English flcet nndex sail after destroying the 
S of Balaguer, mrched with mth extraordinq diligente ati 
.ea& Valenda fmm Tortoxa in forty-cight hours, thus fms- 
h e ;  lord Tiiliam's projeet of Ianding at Palencik 
luring hia absence Hariape Id proved the wmhe44 of the 
npanish amies, and demonstrated WeIIington"~ aagacity and 
pmdenoe, T h t  peat mrtn's wasnlng about deferat mas dis- 
tinctly addmssed to the flpanish generdq becauee the cliief 
objeet of the operations was not t e  fight Xuchet, bnt t o  keep 
him from aiding the French amies in the north; pitched 
battles were therefore to be avoided, their issne being always 
doubtful; the presenoe of a nnmerouai and increasing force on 
the French front and fl ank wag moro aure fo succeed. Bot al1 
Spanish generale desired fo fi@t g~eeit battlw, soothing tlieir 
national pride by attributing defeab to m n t  of cnvnlry; 
it m at first doubtful if M a m y  could tramport his horsemen 
to Tamgona and if left behind they wonld h ~ v o  been nndm 
and Del Parque, whereby t h0~e  offioem wodd hsve been 
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encouraggd to fight : heiice the menacing intimation pIeaded 
by Mirrmy. Wellington also judged, tliat as Del Prnrqne's 
troops had been tliree yeara active under ~alleskroq tlieg. 
must be more cxpablo than Elio's in the dodging warfsre suit- 
able for Spaniards; Elio Jso best k m  the country bctweeu 
ilze Xucar and Alimnt; Dcl. P q u e  wae therefore ordered to 
iurn the eneniy's Aank by Rqueña, and Elio t o  meuace the 
Eront, 
To truat Spanidi general6 w a ~  to trust the winda and douda. 
Elio persuaded Del Parque tu adopt t h ~  fmnt atbck, took tbe 
flnnk Iine himsclf, ned detached Alijares to fa11 on Reqneñu; 
siid tliough Suchef hd wdcened his line the 2nd, Del Parque 
!vas not rcndy until the 9th, thm givktg tho French o, woek fur 
tlic niccour of Trnrwm md tho nrrival of Scvcroli at Liria 
H n r i ~ p  harl cight thorrsnnd mcn in front of the Xnmr; tbe Spa- 
iiirartls, indiidi& Rache'a anrl Mijmes' infiintry and Wbitting. 
Iiarn's c a ~ a h ,  were twenty-fi~e tIiousand; theEmpecindo,Yilla 
Campa, and FrayIe Nebot waited in the Cuenca and -41Li~ra- 
g n  rnountdns to operate on the French rmr. The disproportion 
w a ~  grcat, pet the contest was short, and for tbe Spaniarda 
disastrous. They advancd in three columns. Elio, by tbe 
p s  of Almanza; Del Parque by TTillena md Fuentc de la 
1Iiguerh menacing Moxcnte; fiche: and the prinee of Anglona 
f r ~ m  Alcoy, by Onkniente nnd the pass of Albayda, menacing 
h n  Felippe de Xativs and!urning hlaxente. IIarispe imme- 
diiitely took the line of tlie Xucar, oceupying the' entrench- 
ments in front of Iiia bridges aS Alcira md Carca del Rey nenr 
Allieriqiie; and duriag tliiia i e t r o g d c  movament ?iIescZo~i, 
couiriisnilhg tlie mar-guarrl, w1ien presssed by tlie Xpanisli 
Iiomeinea wheeld round and h v e  tliem in grent cenfusion 
upon tlic infrintry. 
On the 15th Yijarcs took the fort of Rcqiicña, thns turning 
tlii? linc of t8he Xumr nnd securing the dcfiles of Gnhrillna, 
tlirotig1,li which tlie Cuenca mad lcads to Vnlcnci~; y i l l ~  
Cnmpa joiued him there and so prevented Severoli from uniting 
witli Harjspe. Del Pwqne ndvanced towaids Alcira in trro 
columiis, one moving by Cargagente, the other by Gandia. 
IIahrt overthrem the first with one shock, Eook f i ~ e  hundred 
11Tisonera and mrehed to atta& tb other, bnt it m dredg 
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routed by Uudin. Aftw t.his each side hdd their respective 
positionrr, while Elio joined Mijares at hqueiia. Villa Campa 
"--u descended to Chiva and Harispe's position was beconiing 
hcal, whon Snchet returned and Del Parque resumed tbe 
ition of Caetnlla, Thus everything turned contrmy ta  
:I14ington'g d e s i p .  Elio operntcd by the flank Dcl Parqua 
the Front, and the lnttcr waa rlcfcnted. 3Turray hd iiiiled 
irely. Ris p~ecipitancg at Trtr<,rrona anrl l i i ~  d e l q s  rst 
.aguer were alike hurtful ancl would h m  e a u d  the d+ 
stniction of one or botli of the Spxnish armiee but for the 
battIe of Vitorh For SucheG, detaching Mnsniet to recover the 
foz% of Requeña md dri~e backVilla Campa, stssernb1d the buIk 
his forcw in his old poaitions o£ San Felippe nnd Morente 
ore the retum of the Anglo-Sicilian troops; ~ n a  as EIio, 
tble to subsit at Utiel, had then returned to-rvmds Lis forrncr 
~rtera the Frencli were on the point of striking a fntal Mow 
pinst  him or Del Purqiie, or Ziott, wben the news af IVel- 
iiigton's victory averted tlie dauger. 
#uchct7a nctivity aud coolness may be contrastsd with the 
~nfirmity of purposs displayed by hIurray. The last J w ~ y s  
mistimed bis movements j the fir& doubled his force by rzpi- 
dity. Sucbet m isolnted hy Wellington'a operations, liis 
communimtion with Aragm wm intmpted,  t h t  province was 
plnccd in immjnent dnngcr, and tht! mmmunicati~n betmecn 
Srdencin nnd Catnlonia - 2 s  exposed to the nttncks of thc. 
Anglo-Sicilian army and the ffcet;-ncarly thirtp tlioiisanrl 
Spnnkrds menwd hirn on the Xumr Fn front,, and T7iFla Qm pn, 
tlic Frnyle nnd the Empccinndo could bring ikn fhousnnd men 
on liis right flank; yct he lcft Hariupe with anly eight thonsrinrl 
mcn to oppose the Xpaniar~ls wliilt: he relievcd Tnrqona, mil 
yet rctnrncd in time t o  snvc Vdencin. 
mhcn lord Wiilim Itentinck brought thn Anglo-Ricilia~i 
troops bnclr to Alicnnt, his first c m  m a  tri mrganisr!  the mcnlici 
of tmnsport, This wns a znatttcr of difficulty. hlurm~~ with n 
miscliievous economy, and strange cl isreprd of IVcll ington's 
instmctione w & ~ h  prosmibed active freid olicmtions in Vnlencin 
if he shodd be forced to retnrn from Cntnlonia, had clischnrgerl 
a k  h d r e d  mules and trvo hundred coitntry mrts, five-sixth~ 
of Es RelJ quipment, befme he milsd for Taragoaa. The 
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armywns thus crippled while Snchet gathered strong in front, 
md Musnier retalring Reque% f o r d  tlie Spminrda t o  retiro 
from that quarter. Lord William urged Del Parque to dvanca 
from Castdla, but he h d  not means of carrying epen me 
(tay's biscuit, and Eliu, prassed by fnrniq ment off towarrls 
Cuencn, . Lord Willinm however, wmmanded the Spnish 
amics M well rts hia own, and lctters passed bctwccn hirn 
and Wellinmn relative to further gerritions. Tl~e  lattcr 
ap in  dviscd a renewed attack on Taragona or on Tortom if 
thc orrlnance still in possession of the army would d m i t  
of snch x measure; bnt supposing this could not be, he m 
commended a general advxnce t o  seize the open country of 
Talen&, the Xritish keeping eloso to the sea anrl in conahnb 
commiinication with the fleet. Lord Willirsm's +ews nera 
different. Re found the Spanish solcIi~n robust and active, 
but their regimental d c e r s  bad, and tlieir organimtion gene- 
rally so deficient tliey could not stand against even a smdl 
French force. The genemis pIeased him at Smt, eapecially 
Del Parque, that is, Iike d't Spzniards, they had fair wods at 
comrnand, and he thought he muld undertake a grand stmtegic 
opemtEon iu mnjnnction with them. 
To f o m  the Iine oí the Xamr he deemed undviaable, 
inwmuch as there were ody two c k a g e  roaas, 10th blocked 
by Xuchet's entrenched bridge-es; and though the river was 
Lord Wiiiiam forclable the enemy'a bank m m fwvmble for 
fintinck, defence as t o  render the passage danprous. Tha 
nrss. h g l o - 8 i ~ i l i i  were unamtomed to great tm 
tical movements, tlie Spraniards altogetlier incapable of tliem. 
%%ereEore, ml i iqui~ lbg  a front ettxcl~ he propmed to turn 
the enemy's right fld by Utiel md ICequeiiq or, Iig a wider 
~ ~ 1 1 ~  rcaching Cuenca, gain the Nadrid road to Zaragoza, 
communimte with Welliepton's army and operiste down tlie 
Ebro. In eitlier case it was necessary to mss  tlie A i h m y n  
mountains, and there were no mrriage msds 8ave thoae of 
Utiel and Cuenca; but tha paam mar Utiel wem stmngIy 
fortified hy the Yrench, and a rnavement on that be would 
nms~nrily 1md to  an attnck upon Sucbet which wos to be 
uvoided. The line of Cucnm wna prefemhIe though longer; 
and by moving in the hamat swon provisiom wonId not 
fnil; the nllies weuld thus force Sucliet to oross the Ebro, or 
rittxck him in n position whmc IVcllington could reinforce 
tliem if necessary, and if defeated they could retire upon hisr 
mmy. Wellington told 'him provLsions would fail on the 
rnarch tia Cuenca even in h e s t  time, and without money he 
would get nothing; momver by separating himelf from the 
ct, he would be unable t o  retum suddenlp t o  Sicily if that 
and ehould be really exposd to  any immiiient danger. 
M%le these lettercr were being exchanged the Angla- 
Sitilima had marclied towards Villena on Dd Parque'a leit, 
a.ad Sucliet was preparing to atta&, w h  intelligence of thc 
k t l e  of Yitoriu, reraching both parties, totally changeti tlie 
wpoct of afaim. Tha Piench general instantly abandonati 
Valencia and lord Willfam entered t h a t  city. Clausel was nt 
Znrugoza md Such~t knew that he desircd to hold it m e 
point for the junetion of the nrmy of Arrqon with tlie king; 
if tlie lntter sl~ould re-enter Spain By reiinquishing nll the 
Valencisn and some of the Critalan. fortreaees Suchct conld 
lime coneen trfited thirty thoiisand men, and C I ~ ~ i ~ ~ c l w l ~ o  liad 
cnrried &some smnF1 garrisona h d  fifteen thousand; thiis 
fo*five thousand excellent troops would bave been esta- 
blished on Wellington's flank when he was hmpered mith 
the investment of two fortresses, and lirible f o  be wsailed in 
front by the re-orguized and reinforced army oE Vitoria 
Tliis prospect invited Xuchef w one side, but on B e  uther be 
wished t.0 inffuence the general negotiation during thc armis- 
tice in G e m y  by appearing sbng in Xpain, and therefore 
resolved to marcli on Zaragoza nnd keep hrp gamisonsi in 
Valencia : a, fntal error. 
He had tliidy-tmo thousand men, BiK thonwd were in the 
fortresses of Aragon, twenty-six thousand remained. Xikom 
these he garrisoned Denia, Sapnturn, Peniscola, Morella and 
Tortoza, whicli absorbed nmrly mven thousand mm, aabove 
twelve hundred being in hgunturn and five thousand in 
Tortom; then dmtroying the Lridges on the Sucttr Iie 
marclied himself by the maat-road on Tortoaa while Musnier 
retired from Rqueña. The Talencinn people, grateful for 
good governmcnt, wmc fricndly; but cre thc nmy conld 
rcmh C m p  tlie poiat of concmtmtion, Clnusel, deceived by 
Nina, hnd fld tu Saca and ihc d e c t  in Arapon ddocisi~e. 
Thc pnrtidna instantly united t o  mcnace Znqoxra, und Suchet. 
sent Paria oders to rtbbsntlon it nnd retire to Cmpc, whicli 
Musnicr h d  thcn mched,  having picketl up Rcveroli's 
lirigailc and t,he prrison of Teruel and Alcnnitn in pnwing. 
On tlie 12th Eiichet was agñin in m i l i t q  communicntion 
mith Miisnier, yet his army vas extended along the Ebro 
from Caspe te "rrtoza, and meanwhile, Mina having seized 
the Torrero, Paris evncziated Zaragoza in tlie night oE the 9th, 
lea-ving five hundred men In the cnstIe with much ordnance. 
LIe was encumlierd with a great convoy, got entangled in 
tbe defiles o€ Alcubiere, was athcked, lost rnen guns and 
linggnge, relinquislied Caspe md fled t o  Huescn, where he 
mllied tbe grarrison of Ayerbe; then making for Jaca he 
reaclied it on tlie 14tl1, at the moment w h  CIausel after anotlier 
ineffectual effurt to join the king had retumed khere. Durwn 
then invested tlie castle oT Zaragoza and the fort of Daroca, 
Tlis sudtien md totai 1 oss of Arrapn made Sucliet resign 
tliat pruvirice m Lis field of operatiom, and he tliere.lip 
sxadly defined liis own reputatiun. A g o d  general not. 3 
gent eommander. About 'I'ortoztt, wliiIe Bragon waa held by 
the enemy he muld not fced, and the allies coi~ld Iand troops 
to scizc thc defilw in his rcnr; whcrcforc, fixing on tlic fcrtil~ 
country of T~ragann for a base, hc ~msscd tlie Ebro, pent 
T~ldore Lnmnrque to fetch off the ~ m * ~ o n s  of Belcliitc, 
Fucntea, Pina, and Bi:jarola, nnrl moving liirnsclf hy thc ma~t 
rrirad from Tortom to Tarngona, renched tliat ~ilxce witli little 
lrurt elthoirgh cunnnwarled by the English fleet. l n  this 
l~osition I~aving m i n d  the \vnlls for destmetion he awaited 
lord Nllinrn Centinck. He t l iuñ establislied himself me11 for 
sin isofated campaip, but let the great stream nf war flow 
liwt unlieeded. Had he continud his niarch on Zaragoza he 
wouId hme raised the mege of tlie cnstle, snvd his garrjson 
o€ Daroca, perliaps liare given a MOW tO Mina, wliose orders 
wew to retire on Tudela m-11ere Wellin@oa desised to  oirer 
battle. But Suchet could have avoided that battle, nnd his 
aplJearance on Wellinghn's Aanlc for a fortnigli t would have 
diiinged tlie aspect of the campaikq as &hl l  be liereafter 
ahowu. previous rapidity lid left $he Valencim rtilies 
fnr bchinrl, thep could not have ptthercd in forcc? time cnough 
fo meddle witli Iiim; nor vas  tJiejr prsuit  so eonductd but 
he might b v e  t u m d  md defeated tliem. 
It was not unta four d a p  after Valencia ww ab~ndoned 
tliat lord William entered it, and seven days he remained there 
to esttiblish a plwe of arma; ou tlie 16th moring by tIie 
ast, m ~ l c i n g  Peniscolra and being in comrniinicrition mitli 
e fleeh, be ayproacl~ed tlie Ebro. But SSuchet had thxt day 
, s e d  that river and iniglit lisve been dose to Zaragoza; Del 
irque's army m atill n a r  Alimnt in a date of disoder; 
id Elio ~ n d  Roelie fouod tlie control of Valencia nnd tlie 
ockade oZ Sltguntum md Denia more than their united 
rces could effect. On thc 20th lord TVillinrn entercd Pinaros 
i d  rcrnhicincii there until the 26th. Sirchet rnighf tlien Iiravc 
Tn ~t Tudcls or S n n g i e ~ a ,  rcnd it ahdl  be ehown that We!- 
i g ton  could not have met liim at the former place as he 
bsiped. 
During this march varrous reports were r~eived.  ' 2% 
rencla 7d &C/ eiadeavw,rd t~ ~eqmin PTW &y Za~qoza. '  
F w g s m  wm de~troyed.' 'The e v d k  of Spnin was 
mtnin.' ' A  Zmge & a c 7 ~ m t  J~ad &y pi t& C&ct7ong&' 
Lord WilIiam, wbo liad fitite time to spm from Sicilian 
affairs ttlien became enger; he threw a flying-lmidge wer the 
Ebro at Ampostra, emlarkd Clinton's division mitlz a, view to 
s& the Col de Balagaer, and follmed Suchet witli the 
rernainiler of hiR arrny, which now inclitded Wliittingm'u 
mvalry. A detwhmeut hom Tortoza menaced hisliridge, liut 
tlie guard wns reinforced and the liasaage of tlio Ebro mm- 
pleted the 27th. Next day Villn Cxnipa arrived with four 
tliousand men and the Col de Dalnguer !vas secured, Tlle 
29th the mrnlry wm threntmied by infiintry from Tortoza, 
near tlie Col de Alba; but tlie movementa generdly ivere 
unopposed, antl the army got possession of th rnounhins 
beyond the Ebro. 
S~~chet  was then inspecting the defences of brida and 
Xeqninenea and 11;s escort )vas necessarily largc, because 
Copons mas bnnging on bis Rnnks in tIie mouiltains ribout 
llanrew; yet liis position nhorit Villa Franca wns esoeediiigly 
stroiig. Tanigona and Tortoza covered tlie front, Earcelona 
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iho rear; the communication with\ Decncn wns secure, and on 
the right fltank stood Lcridg to which tlic smrall forh of 
Xequinenza nnd Nonzon served m outposts. Thc Anglri- 
Sieilinn troops ditl not exceed ten thousand cfcctive men, and 
one division ww on board ship fcom the 22nd to thc 26th. 
Elio and ICoclie were at TTdencia, Del Parquds army, thirtcen 
tliousand lncluding Whittingliam's inftvntry, ww eeveml 
marches in reas; it wm paid frorn the Rritish suhsidy, but 
 as ill-provided, and the duke $vas nam disinclinecl to obe- 
diente; Viila Campa did not join until the 20tl1, and Copons 
\\*as in the mountains above Vich. Lord IVilliam therefm 
remrained ~ 4 t h  tentliousand meii and a Iwgc train of carriages, 
for ten r l l s  witbout any pu~ition of bnttle behind him nearer 
than the Lills &out Xagunturn; hiri bridge over the Ehro was 
thrown within ten miles of Tortoza, whence detachments 
could approrich him unpcroeived tliroiigh ttlie mgged moun- 
bias, and Snchet WM wit11in txe marches. Tliat maishal 
however WM visiting liis fortresses in person, ~ ( 1  hiai troops 
quartered for tlie facility of fmrling wero unpreparetl to strike 
a snddeu blow : judging his cnemyh atrength in effence what 
it migl~t have been ratlier tlmn what it was, he a h t e d  
Decaen's force from Upper Catdonia befure lie offered 
batble. 
But Decaen was hiuiself pressetl. Pellew'a Aeet, menming 
Rosas and Pdarnos, tiad encouragsd a partid insurrection of 
the aomatenea, ~vhicli was siippoi.td 1iy tha diGsiona of Eroles, 
Manso, and ViUamieL Bliaor comlints hull ~ilnce on thc 
side of Xcsala nnd Olot, Erolss invested Br&oIwis, and tliongh 
beaten tkere by Lamarque tlie 23rd of Juno thc insurrection 
eprt?ad. To que11 it Decaen ccombincd a doiible operution npon 
Yich. Dcsigning to attack by tbe soutli liimself he sent M&- 
rnilim Lamarque, with fiftecn hundrcd Frcncli troops nnd soma 
French miguelctes, Iiy tlic moirntain pnths of San Feiice de Pnl- 
larola and Amiaa. On tlic 8th of Ju3y thnt officcr gainecltbe 
heights of Snliid, aciecd tlie rond fmm Olot nntl de~ccncled upon 
Rorls ~ n d  Manlieu, in expectation of Dccnen ~ttaelring from tho 
other &de. Be perceived below a heav body in mwch, mand 
heard the sounrl of mnnon and musketry abont Vich; con- 
cluding thia \vas Decaen he advutnced confidently, tlunking the 
broi 
gat. 
S--. 
11rtns were in retreat. !&ey however fought h i i  unti1 dark 
ioiit advanbge on either side, a n d h  the night an ofices 
rght intelligmce tbat Decaen'a attack bnd been rel i i  
ilied in coasequence of Suchet's orden t o  move to the Ltobre 
9 previous deppatcli lad hen  intercepte4 al1 the Catalan 
i~ile, six or %ven tliousanci, m upon Lamarque's liands, aud 
ie firing heard a€ Ticli was for MTellington's victorie3 h 
'avarre. A retreat mmmenced, the Bprtniartls followerl, the 
'rench p t  enhngled jn JiiTicult ground neai Salud und wera 
forcd to deliver battle; tlie fight lwteted many houq La- 
marque's arnmunition m expendd, he lost four hundred 
men, and ms upon the brinl; of destruction when geneml 
Baurmann carne to his succour with four fresli baktnlions and 
Che Qtdans mere hall? defcntd with pent loss. Aftcr this 
Decnen mnrchd t o  join Suchet, and tha Catalana, moving by 
the rnountains in sepamte divisianq iipproached lord Williiim 
Rcntincl~ 
mhen the dlies pssed the Ebro several officers conmived 
the Gege of Tortoxa woulri be the best aperation. Nenrly 
forty thousand men, that is to say, Tila Campa's, Copns', 
Del Parqiie's, rmiittingham\, some of Elio's forcea and thu 
Anglo-Sicilians, conld be nnited E the defiles on the left 
bnnk o! tlie Ebro would enabre them to bar mccour on that 
side, nnd force Sucbet on to tlie circuitous route of Leridn. 
Wellington lean4  tomards thh operation, but lord TVillixm 
resolved to puah for Taragona, and even looked to assail Bar- 
celona; a. rash proceeding, for Suchet nwaited his approxch 
wit.h an army every way superior. It does not however follow 
tliat to tesiege Toreozs would have been advisable. The tat- 
tering-train, larrger than híurray's liiwes p v e  reason to expect, 
maa indeed sufficient, yet the operation was a serioas one; tlie 
63nit.y mas unhealtby, it would bava been dificult to fced 
flie Spdards, they mere inexperieuced in sieges, this was suro 
do be a long one, not sure of succes.8, and Suchet sseing theni 
thus engnged might bam rnarched to Aragon. ' 
Lord william was 3 tliis time misled, partly by Cntalnu 
~ p o r t s ,  partly by We1lin$oda successes, to  believe tlie Frencli 
Rere p i n g  tm ahandon Crttalonia Re dirl not perceiw t l int  
Suda4 judiciously postal and abIe ta draw reinforcemcnta 
, from Decaen, waa stronger thnn the allies. Tna 
Mustcr-rolIs, two armies of Aragon and Catalonja numbered 
IlSS. 
sixty-seven tliousand men; twenty-seven thou- 
smd, including Priris' division then at JWX~ wcre in gairison, 
f i ~ e  tliousand were sick, the remsinder in the field. In Cata  
lonia tlie allies were only accessories ; they mere t,here to keep 
Xuchet off the flank of the alties in Navarre, md tlieir defent 
wodd Lave been a, grent diester. So entirely was this Wel- 
liligton's view-, that Del hrque was to make forcd marches 
o11 Tutlda if Suchct sliould move or detach hge ly  towardu 
Aragon. Lord William sliould tlierefure have ~eccured tlie 
detiles with bis own antl Vilb Campa's troops, tliat is to  say, 
twenty tliousand men including Whittinglixni'a diviaion; 118 
sliould Lave insulted tlie ,prrisou of Torfo~a, and m d e  
gabions and Euscines, wliicli woultl Iiave plnced Xuchet in 
doulit m to his ulterior objeds whilo Le nwaited the junction 
of Del Parquct, Copons', antl the rest of Elio's troopa. Thcn 
forty tliousmd men) tlirce thaucnntl being cavalry nnil nttended 
by I flcct, could huvc dcscendad into tlic Cnmpo, ~itill lcaving 
a dctncliment t o  wntch Tortoen. If Suchct offered battle, 
the nll i mñirperior in numberq could hnve fought in a poaition 
choqen beforelirind. 
It is inrlced doubtfd if nll t,hmc corps would or conld 
have kept togetlier, biit lord William's actual operntions wcre 
too Iiendlong. He lind prepmd plntfms and fascines for 
a siege in tlie island of Yvica, antl on the 80th wdrlenly 
investerl Taragona with less than siic tliousand men, occupyjng 
ground thrce hundred y t d s  ncurer to the walls the fimt rlag 
tlian 31ilrrny liad ever done. Hc thus preventcd the gar- 
rison from nbnndoning the place, if, ss was strpposed, t h e ~  
liad that intention; yet thc fortress could not be Iiesicged 
tiecaiise of 8ucliet's vicinity and tlie dissemination o€ the 
dlies. The 31st the bridge at Ampostn was accidentallp 
broken, three bundred biillocks were dronaed, nnd the hend 
of Del Parque's xrmy, being on th left of t t e  Ebro, fe11 
Iiaclr a dny's mar&; liowcvcr Wliittingham's divjsion md tlie 
cwi i l s  carne up, aiid ou tlie 3rd, tlie bridge heing restored, 
Del Parque dso joined tlie inveating asruy; Cupons promised 
t o  bririg uli Lis Catiltliius, Stirsiield's division did arrive, Elio 
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m$ ordered to rcinforc~ it wit,h three dditionnl buttnlionrr, 
nnd 7'iIln Cnmpa ohcrrctl Tortoza. Lord William then 
seeiiig Suchets tmops scattcred, thoi~ght of ~urprising his 
posts and seizhg the mountdn line of' the Llobregat; but 
B i o  aent no bntkalions, Copons, jealoua of soma eornmnnictk 
tions between the English general and Eroles, w a s  slow, ITilla 
ps suffercd the garrison o£ Tortoxa t o  bum tlie bridge at 
iostn, and Suchet aurklenly retnrned from Barcelona and 
entrated t i i s  army. 
Uli to tliis time tlie Xpnniards, giving oopions but fahe 
Formation tu lord William and no information tri Bucliet, 
d induced f8ult~ on botli sides bnlariicing cnch other; a 
:-? not uncommon in war, mliich demonds al1 tlie familties 
ie grcntcst minds. Thc Engli~hmnn thinking his enemy 
:nting hsd prrrsscd mshly fo rw~~cl ,  The Frenchmm, 
iing fmm tlie other's hlclness tlie whotc of the alliee were 
and, thonght himself n-erik and awaiterl the Ilmvd of 
ien, whose junction vas retardd by tlie combined opm- 
3 of the Catalana and the English ffeet. Io thi &;tat,e 
ret hexrd o§ fresh successca gaiued by WeiIington, one of 
italian httaliona v a s  cut off at San Sad11rni by Momo, 
lvrd Williani took a position of babtle lieyontl the G a p ;  
.& was isovered by Whittinglizm's dit-ision wliich occupied 
Erafin, tlie Col de Liebra, and Col de Cristina, whiie Iirs 
riglit rested on the great coasbroad. Tliese were tlie only 
mrriage ways by which the enemy could appronch ; but they 
! ten miles ~pi~iart, Copom held doof, and Whittingham 
nk from defcnding the paoses done. Henw w h ~ n  - 
iet, relnforoed by Decaen with eiglit tliouwud mialires and 
~.~:litiets, finally abtlncerl, lord Willia~n, who hd landed 
neitbei giins nor stores, decided to refuse kattle. This must 
have been a pai~ifiil clecislon. He liad nearly thirty thousand 
fighliting meii, incIu&ng n tliousand marines:, he liad assumeti 
tlie oKenaive, invested Tai-agons, wliera tlie nilitary honour 
of Cngland had suffered twiw before; in fine he Iiad pro- 
vokd tlie action which lie nmv decliaed 
Sucliet liad equal numbeis of a better quality; tlie banlra 
of the &ya were rugged to p s s  in retrent, rnucli must 
hxve been left to tlie general oficem at rlifferent poiuts, Del 
Parque wsw an w i w y  coadjutor, md if a y  part was forced 
the whole line would have been irretrievalily lod. His 
reluclanoe waa however manifest, for thong-li he expected tlio 
enemy on tIre 9th, he did not sena his field ;irtilleq- and 
baggw to the rear until the 1 lth, the day vn which Decaen 
reached Villa Franca, Suehet drdreading the Era of the fi est 
endavonred by frtise attwke on the coast road t o  draw t he  
nllies from thedefiles beyoncl Rrafin, townrds which he finn1l.g 
crarricd his wliolo amy; nnd thom defiles werc indced abnn- 
dond,  not os hie lfe&oiiwi date becausc of t h e e  ddminnatrrir 
tions, but hcnnse Iord william hnd prmiously determinetl to 
retrent. On thc 16th finding the pnssm unpindcd he poaicd 
throogh and ad~anced upon TalIs, bnt the dlies were then in 
fulI retreat towarils the rnonntains, tlie left wing hy Reus, $he 
right. wing by Cambrills, Lord Frederick Eentinck with the 
British and Glerman CQVR~ y covered the ferriier so well thrt 
he defeatsll the fourth Frendi liwrira with a losa of forb or 
fifty men, and it is said that Eabert or Ha&spe was taken but 
escaped in tlie confusion. 
Lord U'illiam aow entrend~ed bimself near the Col de 
Balaper, and de l  Parque rnarched witli his rimn and Srirs- 
fiel& t r o g s  to invest Tortoza, but the garrison fell on hia 
mar while passiag t5e Ebro and inflicted some loss. Kor 
aonld lord William liavelong held thii new position for wnnt of 
water, if lieutenant Corbyn of tlie Invincille, unitiiig intelli- 
gencewitli energy, h d  not discovered a copioua spriug and by 
mems of wooden spuuts coustructed witli tlie slendw pine 
t r e s  o£ tbe mountains, conducted t l~e  waters across a steeli 
valley and down the side of a steep mountain t o  the camp, a 
distante of seven miles. Suchet contmry t o  the wishes of his 
army then returned to Tamg-ona and destroyed thc ancicnt 
walls, wliich from the hardness of the Xornen eemertf wac 
tedious and difficult: hc aftcrwnrds resumed hls psitions on 
tllc Llobmst ond scnt Dccncn to Upper Cablonia. Tbe 
general rcmilt of thesc opernticins I d  becn favonrable t o  tho 
dlies; thcy liad riskcd much but tlieir encmy did not strikc; 
Snchet wai kept from Nrtvma and liad lost Tamgona with 
its fertile Campo. 
It is strange that such a general ~l~oulii have d e r e d  his 
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rerful army t o  be so paralgsed, Having tlventy- r m v ~ d  
m thousmd men jn garrition, and tliirty-two nlnsar-mll& 
tll-umnd in hand, he ws ostentatiously mmching ""- 
ind fro in Cakdonia, wliile tlie wax was lieing dscided in 
r n m .  Hnd he been in t l ~  latter provinc~ bei'ore the end 
or JuIy TTellington would have h e n  o~erpowered, What 
waa to be fcnredl That lord William would follow or attack 
ene of his fortrasest Lord WiElizm wuld not abandon ths 
m&, and i£ the French were successful in N a m e  the loss of 
irtress in Cablonia mould have been a triflq and it maa 
ceitain thnt anp would have fallen. Xuchct plendcd 
ger to Frnncc if lic abandoned Cnhlonia. nut to  invade 
~l~nce, guarded r a ~ i  she m 9  by hcr g w t  milihry r e p u b  
tion, md to do so by land, leaving bchind thc fortreases of 
VaIencin und Catalonia tiic latter b~rring al1 the cnrriage rotlds, 
ww chimmi~nl. Sucecm iii N n n m  woiild also have mde ian 
invasion by sw patis as e p~rtisnn desmnt. Moreover Fmnce, 
wrinting Suchet's troops to  defcnd her in N~brttrre, m nlti- 
matcly inv~ded by Wcllington and in a ftrr more forrnidal~le 
manner. This quedition shn?l be trented morc largely in 
anotllier place; it is sufftcient to obs~rve here, thht Clnike, tlie 
minister of war, s man without genius or 8ttacLment to tlie 
emnaor's cause, discoumged any g e n f  mn~bined pIen of 
on, and Napoleon absorbed by his own immense operations 
not interpose. 
,ord William, now intent to 'beaiege Tortoza wisherl WeI- 
lington to a t h k  Xequinennx witli a detdnment of his amy, 
but this the situation of affaim did not pemit; and he soon 
discoverecl thxt to arrsail Tortoza m beyond hi o m  means. 
Bio, mhen desired to asgis4 demandd tlime weelcs' prepara- 
tion; al1 the Spmish troops were in wmt, fiche's division, 
blockading Murvietlro, dtliough so close t o  Tdencia wna on 
half rationri ; and the siege of Tortoza wag necessariIy relin- 
qnishd becaesc no grmt or mstained opeirition could be 
conductd in ooncert with mch genmals and aiich m i e s .  
Sucliet'fi fenr waa m jllustration of Napolcon's maxim, thnt 
war is m &ir of di~crimiiistion. It ia morc wscntinI to 
knom the quality tlinn tlie qunntity of cnomics. Lord Willium 
did not apply hia mind vigoiously to the eampaip he was 
conducting, because fresli &auges injkow to the Britisli 
pulicy in Sicily mlled liim to thah iriland, and his thougl~ts 
wera still running upon tlie invaaion of Italy ; but ths 
1Spaniartlu, demived by the rnovemeats of esmrts mil conroyri, 
reportd that Suchet had mnrcbed with twelw Wousand men 
t o  join %uIt, he once more f i x d  Iiis heraclqunrters nt Tnra- 
gona, snd, foiiowing Wellington's instructions, detached Del 
Parque's troops by forced marches upon Tudelih 
O n  the 5th of Scl>temher the nrmy cntcrcd Pilla Fmncn, 
nntl the Isth, detiichrncnts of Calsbmae, Swiss, German and 
Rriti~h infnntty: a squadron of cnvdrj and ane batterv, jn al1 
tivelve hundred under colonel Adarn, occupied the heighh of 
Ordal. At tliis plato, Gen milea kt advanoe of TTilIa Franca, 
being joined by three of fhslield's baftalions anda Spanish 
squadron, they took position ; it then a p p r e d  that v e y  few 
FreucEi t m p s  had heen detmhed,-tliat Suchet bad comen- 
trakd bis whole force on the Llobregat-thnt bis army 
was superior, because the allies, reduced by the losrt of Del 
Parque's troops, l i d  also left Wlilttingliam's diviaion at Reus 
and Talls te procure fod. &~field's dir~ision was feeding on 
tlie J3ritish supplies, and Iord W-illiarn rtgain looked to a 
retreut, yet tliiiilring tha enemy disinclined to adxmce desircd 
t o  presome Iiis forward poaition a ~ i  long as poasilile. ; 
He hd only two lines to watclt One menncing bis fmnt 
Trom Molino del Rey by the main road, which ddnm bloclíed 
nt  O d a l ;  the other from Marhrel by San Sadurni, menncing 
3iia lcft; but on this routcJ a dimcult onc, lie had pushed Dlic 
Vntnlona under Erolm ontI Mnnso, rcinforcing them mitli some 
Celnbmsc: thcrc \vas indcctl a third line by hvionet on his 
right hit It wns littls lwttcr thnn s gont-pntli. Hc lind de- 
~ i ~ p c d  to tring bis main hody up to  Urclnl tlie evening of the 
12th, yct. from some JighG resson dclriyed unti1 next day. He 
had howcvcr vierred the coiintrp in advance o£ the d&Ie with- 
out discoveriiig m cnemy; his confiilential emissaíies assured 
liim the Frencli were not going to ndvnnce, znd lie returned 
riltisfied tliat Adam's detaclimcnt was safe, and so expressed 
himself t o  tliat oficer. A report of  a cont.rary tendency ras 
made by colonel Remes of the kwenty-seventh, on t.he autfio- 
rity oE a Bpanisli woman wLo had before yroved her accnracp 
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ability a spy; ~l ie  wns now however dishelievcd, and 
intrcdulity mas unfortunate. For Xuchct thus brnvcd, 
liis communimtion with Lcridx threatcued by Yauso on 
eidc of Mmtorel, iw t l~en in mnrch to nttnclr Ordiil with 
amy of hragon, wliile Decaen nncl XInnricc Mnthicii, 
dng with tlie army of cata lo ni^ from RKartorel by San 
mi, were turning the left of tlie dlies. 
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~dam's position tliough rugged roce g-raduslly from a m%- 
cent bridge, by mhicli the & r o d  was cairied over a 
p impracticable ravine. Tbe second battaIion uf the 
nty-seventh weis posteti on the riglit,-tlie Germans, De 
1's Wiviss, and the artillerp, defended an 01rl Epanisli fort 
immding tlie rntain road,-tbe Bpnnids w m  in tlie centra, 
Cdaliretie on tlie left,-tlie cavtlry were iu reserva A 
bright moonlight fncilitated Lhe movcmenta of the Frenclq nnd 
G liftle before midniglit, their leading column uader Mesclop 
pessed tlic bridge without let or liindrance, mountcd tlhc 
~ h t s  with ra rrtpid pace snd drjving bnck the piquch gnvs 
first alarm: the allied troopa lying on tlieir nms  in o d e r  
bktle were liowever rearlyJ nnil the fight cnmmenced. Tlic 
tirst effort wm againat tlie twcnty-se~enth, tlicn the Germans 
md the Spranish bnttntiona were rigoronsly nsanilerl in mcces- 
sion as the French colums got frec of the bridgc, but tlle 
Fnlabme were toa f ~ r  on the left to txke ndmre in the riction. 
? combstt was fierce and obstinate. Harispe mlio commandd 
French coastantly outfl anked the right of the allieg, nnd 
the finme time preqscd tlieir centre, wliere the Spnninrtls 
foug.ht grtllnntly. Bdarn was wouarled early, tlie commnnd 
devolved npon Reew,  and tliat officer seeing liia flan1: turned 
tmd his men fnlling faat; ?TI ashort, finding liirnself engaged 
14th s whole amy on x position of whlch Adrim haci lost t.he 
key by neglecting the bridge resolved to retrent. 
He f i rs t  orclered tIie guns id fa11 liaclc, nnrl to covcr the 
movement ch~rged a column of the encmy wliicli wns prcssinc 
formarrl on tlie high rortd, but be wns smcrdy woundcd in tliiu 
attack ami tliere wm no iccopised cummalider on tlie spot tü 
succeed him Thea tlie afft~ir becarne confnsed. For tLoug& 
tlie order t o  retreat was given the Spaniards wem figfiting 
desper~kly~ ths kwenty-~eventli thouglit it shame t o  abandon 
tliem, tlie Germans and De RuZYs regirnent still held the old 
fort, nnd the guns crime back Colonel Carey now Iirousht tlie 
íklttbrwe inta line from tlie lefk, and mennced the right flank 
af tho Frcnch, bnt he m n ~  too late,-the Xpeniards in the 
centre were broken, t he  right mm cximplctcly turned, thc old 
fort mas lost, the encmy's skirmishers got inh thc allied xenr, 
and af three o'clock the whole clispersed, the inost pr t  In 
flight : the Xptraish cavalry were then overthrown on the main 
road by the French hussars nnd four gum were taken in the 
tumnli;. 
Capt,ain 'Waldron with the twenty-seventh, reduced to 
eighty men, and captain Müller with about the ame n u m h  
of Gernians and Rwisa, bmke through ~everal small partiea of 
the enemy md dwted their retreat in good order by the hills 
on eacli side of the road. Colonel Carey end~avoured to fin 
the mad of Sdurni on the left, but meeting with Decaen'a 
people retraed bis steps, and croasing Zhe field of battla in 
rcar of SucliFt's columns madc fiir Tdlm Nueva de Sitja 
, nnd em b~rlccd witliout Ioss mvc of B fm &rqgTcn, who fe11 
into tho honds of n flnnlring bnttnlion of Frcnch infmty 
which had moved through the rnoaiituins by Regra and 
Avionet. The overthrow ras complete and the prisonem 
, mere at first aerg numeruus ; yet thc darkness enabled many 
t o  escape rind two thousnnd of them xeached Manso and 
Eroles. 
Sucliet puming his march carne np d t h  lord Willism abonb 
eipht o'cloclt. The latter retired skirmishing in excellent order 
beyond Villa Franca; some of the French horsemen assaiied 
his rearparird while others edged to their right t o  Becure tbe 
communication with Decaen, who m looked for by both 
partiw with geat anxiety; liut Iie had been delayed by the 
resishnce o f  Manso and Eroles in tlia rugecl c0unt.r~ htweveeo 
Martorel and San Sadurni. Sucliet's clivalry and artillw 
wlitinued however to infest tlie rear of the retreating army 
nntit it reachad a deep baranco, near tha Venta de Monjos, 
whcre the pusage behg dangerous and the French horsemea 
irn pc 
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rrtunah, t h ~ t  brave and hon& ~ioldier, l o d  Prederick 
,inek, charged their right with the twentieth drqoons, ~ n r l  
ing hand t o  hand with the enemy's general Meyere 
,nded him rand overthrew his Iight c a d y  ; they rallied 
npon tlieir heavy horsemen and adwnced again, mdeavouring 
t o  tui.n the ff ank, but were stopped by the 6re d two guns 
wl~ich Clinbn opend upoa them. She mirassiers liad mean- 
prwed tlie Bmswick liussars QU tlie allie~' rigllt and 
aced the iufantry, yet mere cleckd by the fire af the 
1 regiment. T b i  cavalry action wae vigorous, the 
twentieth and the Germitna fougbt desperately ibnd though 
fcm in nvrnbom loat more *han ninety mon Neverhless 
the R~amnco was mfcly passecl and about three o'clock the 
army having rcached Arborr the pumit  ceasd : the CataFans 
retrentd towards LgunlnrFm and the Anglo-Sicilinna retired 
to Tarngona. IG wm now thonght Suchet would make a 
movement t o  carry ofF the pwbons of Lerida and Tortoaa: 
but thia dirI not happen, and lord William went to Sieily, 
leaaing the; eommand of the m y  ko Clintoa 
OB(]CBQA~OII, 
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1'. Lord William Bentinclr committed emrs, yet he ha3 
been censured without discrimination. ' fle adwd muy.' 
' flt? m ud&d.' Be q o d  ? b h  a d v m e d  g d  ~ I I -  
otlt wpport.' Such were thc opinions expressed a t  tlie time. 
Tlieir ju&neas m y  be diquted. His filist. ohject was to retain 
al1 the French form in Cataloda; his aecond, t o  profit from 
Sucl~etk w&ness if he detached IrtrgeIy. Re coulcl do neither 
bp rernaining inilctive on tlie barren hitla behind Bospipjtalet, 
hccnnse the spaniards would have dispmed for wmt o€ pro- 
visions and the sieffc of Tortoza w a ~  irnpract!mble. It mas 
tlisrcfore boId and skilful to rnenme the enerny, if a retreat 
wau wmre without dnnger or dishonour. The pasition at 
STille Frnnm fulfilted thia condition. Z t  was strong in itaelf 
and ofl'ensive; Pcllew's fleet was in movement ta  mto divor- 
siona in Upper Cahlonia, and dl the emissnries nnd Spmish 
correspondenta concurred in decl~ring, thongh Msely, tlirat the 
French general bad detached twelve thousand men. It h 
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indeed one twt of a sagaciona general to detect false intelli- 
gente; get tlie pmteat are at times demived, md al1 must act 
u p n  what rippmw true. Lord Williamss advance was found~l 
on erroneoua data, but hie position in fsont of Pilla Franca 
WAW well chosen; it enablcd him to feed 'I'phittingham's divi- 
sion about Beus antl Valls; and there were short anrl wsy 
communications from TilIa Franca t o  the s e ~ o a s t .  He ooiild 
only be serionsly ~ a a i l e d  on two lines. In front by the main 
mad, which, though broad, waa from Molino del by to the 
beights of Ordal one ccontinued defile, On the left by San 
Sadurni, rr roatl still more rugged and difficult than the other; 
aud tlie Catalana were 3annched on tIiis side, becauee, without 
quitting tEie mountaing they protected the left aud menaced 
the enemy'a communication ~vith Lorida. HaIF a r n d  to 
the rear would Iiring tlie army t o  Vendrill~l, beyond wliicli tlie 
enerny could not fullow without getting untler tlie fire of the 
ships; neither muld he forestal1 this movement by a rnilrch 
khrough the Liebra and Cristina defileg? bbecauee the I(lah1nna 
falling buck on Whittinghnm's division could hold lum in 
check. 
2'. Ordd md ndn S~lurni were the keys of the position. 
The last. was well semrd, the first not a q  and tliere wa3 t,hc 
real mor. It ms none hawever to push an ad~anoed guard 
of three fhoumnd five hnndred men, with cawEry and artiMery, 
to a distance of ten d e 3  for a fem hours. He had a right te 
expect thc commander would maintain hia post until mp 
ported, or retreat rrithout diswter; sn officer of mpacity would 
liave done: so; bnt whoever relies upon tliB capacity of sir F d e  
rick Adm in pace  or war will surely be rlisappointed. Xn 181 0 
lord Wellington detached general Craufurd aith two or tbree 
thonsand men t o  a much greater distancs, not for one night 
but for many weeks. And that excellent officer, tthongh close 
to Masselia'ci immense army the very wvslry of wliich doubld 
Es wliole numbers; tliough Iie liad the long line of thei 
Agueda a fordabl~ nper £o pnrd; tbough he wae in an open 
country and continiially skirmishing, never lost so mncli m u 
patrole, and nlways remained rnoster of his movements, for h3s 
mmbnt on tlia Coa w a ~  a studied nnd wilful error. It m no 
Snult therefore to push Adam's detachment to Ordal, but it 
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was a fault that lord WiEliam, hstving deterniined t o  folIom 
with hig ahob force, ~hould have rlelnyed f o ~  one aight, or 
delajing, that he did not send some supporting troopa for- 
mrd. It m s  a fanlt not to do so because there was g o d  
reacon ta do it and to  delay mas to tempt fortune. Had 
lord U'illiam been af hand with his maja body when the 
attack on Ordal commeuced, the head of Suchet's force, ~PbiCh 
was kept a t  bay for tliree hours by a detacliment so ill com. 
mauded, would ham been driven into the ravine behind, and 
the victories rallies mould still have had time to  mar& apinst 
Decaen by tlie road along wliich colonel Cury endeavoured to  
join Manso. In fiiie, Sucliet's diepositioiis were xicions in 
principie and ouglit not to Eiave succeedd Es opemted iin 
two di~t inct  lines having no cross cammirnimtiona, and before 
m wemy in poasassiwn of n central position with good com- 
municatione. 
3'. It m nnohhcr fmlt that Iord Willinm dismprded the 
Sponish womnn'a report tu col~ne1 Reevea; his obscrmtion~ 
rnatle in front of the bridga of Orad on the ewning of the 
12th accortled indeed with the repork of his own erniaaries, 
but the safe side should altvays be the nile. Ee also, alt110~1gh 
on the spot, averlooked the unrnilitnry diipositions of Adnm 
on tlie beiglits of Ordal. The summit could not be defended 
againat superior ntmbem with a ama11 corps; that officer h d  
nevertheless extended tIie Calabrese so far on the left they 
muld take no share in the action, nnd yet could not retreat 
without geat  dificulty. A commmde~ wlio understood his 
business, would liave blocked up the bridge in front of t.he 
heigMfi and defended it by a strong detachment, supporting 
th&t detachment by ot l im plzced in succession on the Leiglits 
behind; keeping hia main body alwitys in hand, ready t o  fa11 on 
tbe headoftlie enemy's columnof atta& or to rally the d w n w d  
troop and retreat in order. Tbere were treea and stones t o  
block the bridge, or i t ~  own pnrnpet mould have supplied 
materids; and tbe mvine wris so deep and rugged the enemy 
could not h v e  crossd it on the flnnka in the dark. It is no 
defence to aay Adam took ground in tlie evening after a 
mar&,-that he expected tlie main body up the next morning, 
- b t  lord William assured him he was safc from ntbck. 
N a 
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Every officer iz  responsibIe for the securitg of his pod, and ' 
Adam plnced no infanty piquet on the bridge, nor sent a 
cavafry patrole beyond it; and I have been jnformed by a 
Frcnch soIdier, one of a party sent to explore the position, 
tlint they reached the crwt of the heights withont oppmition 
and returned mfely, wherenpon Meselop's brigade instantlg 
crossed the bridge and at t~ lrcd .  
4'. Owld must h. cailed B aurprise, yet the troop~ were not 
gnrpriaed, they were beatm and diversed because Adam m 
nnskilfiil. Suchet's victory waa complete; yet he h a  in his 
3Temoirs exnggerated his dificultiea and the importante of his 
s u e c a ;  his private report t o  the emperor waa more aocurate, 
The Mwioirs stak that the English grenadiem defended cer- 
t,ain works mhich commanded tht! ascent of the main road; 
and in the accompanying atlas et psrspective view of well- 
mnditioned radoubts with coIoura flying k @ven. The 
reader is thns led to imagine these were regular forts defended 
by select tsoops; but in the p i d e  rqort they 
Appendix 19. 
are correctly designrited as ancient retrenchments; 
being the mina of old Spanish field-works, and uf no more 
advnnbge to the dlies tbm nny natural inequality of ground 
Apui  in tha memo ir^ the attnck of the Fmnch cnmlrg near 
Billa Frnnca i~ reyregentea BU quite succdu1; but the p h t e  
rcport only s y s  the mar m harussed by repeated chnrges, 
which is tme, and moreover khose chargea were vigoroirdy 
repuised. The whde French loss wns abont t h e  hnndred 
men, that o€ the allies, heavy at Ordal, was lightened hg 
escape of priaoners during the night, and ultimately did not 
exceed ai t h o w n d  men including Spaniarole. 
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CHAPTER Ill.
J81
TURNING from Catalonia to Nflvarrc and Guipuscoa, wc shall
find Wellington's indomit.able energy overcoming every diffi-
culty. It hAs been shown .how the Anglo-Portugllese troops
were appointed to cover the siege of San Sebastian and the
blockade of Pampeluna, while the Spanish dhisions attaeked
BantOM on tlle coast., and tllC castles of DflroM, 'A[orel111, Md
Zarngo~a in the illterior. These opcrntions required many
men, find Cnrlos d'Espnna's division, four thousand strong,
wllieh IUld remained at :Miranda del Cnstanar to improvc its
organivAtion wllen Wellillgton advanced to the Ebro, \\'118
now coming up. PassagcB was the only port nCl\r thc scene
of operations suited for the supply of t110 army, but M it w!lS
between the covering aud besieging annies, the stores ami
guns once landed wore in dan",O'Cr from every movement of tile
enemr; the Deba river, between &n ScbflStian flud Bilbao,
was unfit for largc vessels, flnd JlO permanent dcp6t oould be
esto.hlished nCilrer than BiHmo, At tllllt port therefore, and
at St. Ander and Corllila, the great depots of nlllllrmy were
fixed, the stores being transported to them from tlle establish-
ments in Portugal. "But tllC French held Srmtoiill, thcir
privateers interrupted the communication along the eORst of
Spllin, anu Americall privllteer~ uiu t·he slime between Lisbon
RIlU Coruii:\; the intercouNc betweell. Sail. Scbllstiun and the
ports of FnlllOO WIlll sG!lrccly Iliolesttld; and the most urgent
remonstrances failed to procure a sufficient III1.\'u1 force On the
coast of BisCily. It was in these eireUlllst:lllCes Wellington
commenced
THE SlEG': OF SAN S£lI.\STlAN.
This place, built Oil lL low sandy isthmus, Ilad the Imrbour
on one side the river Urumea 011 tlle other. Behind it rose
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tIie Nonte Ory~llo, n rugged conti four hundrcd fmt high, 
m h e d  by tlie occm, anrl its aouthern faoe, covered wit,fi 
liakterbs annd overlooking the tom, ~vm cut off from t h  
lntter by dc.fen4ve walla. It waa cmimed by tlie sma 
e n d e  of La Mota, which was itself commanded at a distanee ( 
tliirteen liiindred yards by the Monte Olia which rose beyon, 
tlie Urumea. The Iand front was three hundmd and fifty 
yards wivide, stretching quita i3CiQSS the isihrnus. It coosisted 
of a high mrtrrin or rampart, very soIid, strengthened by a 
Iufiy msemated flat. baation OF cavalier p lmd in the centre, 
and by hlf bastions at either end. A reglar hom-mrk waa 
, puslted out from tliis froilt; and dx hundred p r d e  beyond 
tlie hom-work the istlinius was clwd by the ridge of San 
br to lomeq at the Eoot of wlricli stood the suburb o£ km 
Alartili. 
On tlie oppoaite aide of tlie Umrnea wera certdn sanrly 
iiills d l e d  tlie Cho$w., througli wwch the SOMI from l'assages 
p ~ s d  to tlie wooden bridge ovei the Liver, and thenoe, by 
tlie anñurb of hnta Cntnlina, along the top of a swwa1l 
~vhicli formed a fmsm bra?p far tlie hom-work. The flenlra 
of tlie t e n  were protected by simple rnrnpiirts; onc wnshed 
by tlic m t c r  oF thc hnrbour, thc otller hy the Gmm* which 
at high tide covered four of the twenty-wen feet comprised 
in its elevation. Tliis was the wealr side of the fortrecs, for 
tIioiigh coovered by the river there was only a single wal1 ill- 
flanked by tmo olrl towers and the: half-bastion of San Elmo, 
wliicli m-as 6ituatd at tth extremity of tbe mmpart close 
under tLe hlante Orgullo. Tnere was no ditch, no counter- 
scltrp, no glacis; the wiill could be aeen to  its base frorn the 
Cliofre liills, at distsnces ~ a r y i q  fmm fire Iiundwd tu a 
tliousand yarils; and wheri the tide was out tiie Urumea left a 
Jry strarirl under tlie rampart as fair os Bt. Elmo, However 
tlie guns from tlie Latteries of Monte Orgullo, especially thiit 
called the hfirador, could see thia strand. l'he ot.her fla& 
TELE secured hy the harbour, in the moutli af wliich was a 
~ o c k y  isllind cdled Santa Clara, where the French h d  esta- 
hlislicd a post of twenty-fivc mca 
13eforc thc battle of Vitori4 SRn 8cht inn  was nearly 
dismitntled; many of the p n s  had been remorecl to fom 
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iattering-tmins or to arrn smaIler p o h  on the cowt ; there 
vere no bomb-proofs) nor paliadeq nor ontworks; the mella 
werc funl and the place supplied by a aingls aqneduct, 
Joseph'~ defeat restored i t g  imporbnce as afortrms. Emanuel 
ñcy enterd  it the 22nd of June, wjth the escort of thc con- 
voy which quitted Titorirt the any befori? the battle. The 
tom waa thna filEed with emipnt  Spanish fmilics, mith 
rninistcm and other perrcone attnclied to tlie cnnrt; the popu- 
lrition, orclintirily cig1;lit thoueand, wns incrcnwd to 
&ten thoiisend and confu~ion prevnilcd. Rey, ~ o i l r n d  
Frcnch pusked by neccasity, immedlntcIy forccrl al1 per- siwcs 
sons not reGrlent,s to march nt once to Prnnce, 881".  
granting thcm onlg a guad of one hundrcd mcnj the prgle 
of qunIity went by sea the others by Itind, iuid fortunntely al1 
amired, fer the partidw would have given them no q~mrter. 
Foy hnd while retrenting thrown P, rehforcement inta tlie place, 
and next day MendizabeSs Gpaniarde nppcared on thc hills 
beliind thc ridge of San Rnrtolomeo riiid on ti10 Chofres. 
Rey thcn burned the woodcn bridge and both t h ~  suburbs, and 
commenced fortifying the heights uf San Dartolomeo, whick 
tlio Rpatniards alightly attacked tlic 29th and were ropulsd. 
On the 1st uf JuIy tlie governor of GucGeria tlbandonetI 
that place, md with detestabIe ferocity secrekly 
left a liglitd h ~ i n  which exploderl the magazine :;~;E!,liefi 
and dwtroyed mauy of tlio inhabihnts. liis 
troops, three hundred, entewd Xl~n Sehristim, and ut the m e  
time a vessel fmm 8t. Jean de Luz ssrived with fifty-six 
cannoneers and wme workmen; the garrison wm tliutr in- 
creased to  three tliousand men, and aU persons uot &le to 
provide subsistente for themsehes in dvance were osdered to 
quit the placa Mendimbel then cut ofl' the aqucduct, m d e  
appronchm towmds the head of' tIie lurned Eiritfge on tIie 
riglit of the Umrnea, and molesteti tlie workmen en tlie 
IieigIits of Bxrtolomeo; and on tlie 314 the Surveillante 
frigatc, s sloep, and some srnnll crnft bIocknded tlie hmbour; 
j e t  tlio Frencii vessels fmm St. Jenn de Lile cniitinud "LO 
enter by night. Tlie snme dny thc govcmor m n d ~  u snlly 
with c2c~cn hundred mcn ta obtsiin newa, niid nfkr some 
liours' slrirniishing returned with a few prisonern. 
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Tlie 6th French veseele bringing a detachment of troop! 
and a considerable convoy of previsions came froni St. Jen~ 
de Luz. Thc 7th lf~ndiznbel tried, unmrcccssfull~, to set firi 
to the convent oC Snn~Rnrtolomeo. The 9th Grnham m i v e (  
with s eorpo of British and Portupc~it? troops, find tlic 13f 
the Spaniasds marched, some to reinforce the force b1ockadinb 
Santona, the remainder to rejoin the fourth mmy on fhe 
Ridassoa. At thia time Beille held the entrantea t o  the Bastan 
by Vera nnd EchdIar, but WeUiiigton drove him thence on t.he 
15th, and established the seventli and Iight di&ions there tc 
cover the passea oper the Peña de Haya, by which the siegt 
might have been intempted, 
Before Graham arrived the French had constructed a re 
doulit on tlie heighk of San Barti>lomeo, and connected it with 
the convent of that name which they also fortified. These 
outworks were supported by posts in tlie mind housee of the 
suburh of 8811 bnMrtili lieliincl, 8nd by rt low circular redoulit 
forn;ed of casks on the main road, half-wy between the con- 
vent and the hom-worlt. Henm to reduce the place, working 
along the isthmus, it was neceesary to carry in mccession three 
lines of defcnce covering tho tom and a fourtli at thc foot of 
Monte OrplIo, h fom tlte mtle of La Mota coiild be nssailed. 
Theae wtirks had seventy-six pieces mounted, and others wera 
a f t e m d s  obtained from Frsnce by sea. 
The besiging army consisted o€ the fifth division under 
Oswald, tbc independent Portugueee brigadea of J. Vilson rind 
BisrZford reii~forced by detachments from the fimt dirision. 
Thus, including the xrtillerymen, some rreamen commanded by 
lientenant O'Reilly of the SurveilImte, md one hundred regnlar 
sappera and mine-, now for the first time use6 in the sieges 
of tbe Peninsula, nearly ten thouaad men were emplged, 
There was dso  a new battering-tmin, originally prepred ta 
hesiege Burgo#, cconsisting of fourteen iron twenty- 
fonr poundem, six eigit-inch brasa howitzers, four Eieges. 
sixty-eight-pound iron cmonades, and four kori 
ten-inch mortars. To these were adiled B ~ X  tweiity-fonr 
poundem lent by tba ships of war, md siñ eighteen poundem 
which hrul moved with ths army from Portugil, rnnlring alto- 
gether forty ~ijeces commandcd by coIonel Diclrson. The 
JULY, IRIS.] BOOX XXL-CHAP, 3. 285 
distance from the dépbt o!? riiege at Pagsrrgea to the Cl~ofres waa 
one mile and a haIf of gobd road, and a pontoon-bridge WBI~ 
Jald over tlie Urna river above thefie hills; but from thence 
t o  the height of Bartolomeo wm more than five milea of very 
bad road. 
Early in July the fortras had been twlce closely examind 
by mnjor Smith, the enginaer who bar1 so ~ b l y  defended 
Tarifa. He p r o p e d  a plan of siege,foundcd upon the facility 
fumished by the Chofrea to destroy the flenks &e the prin- 
d p d  front and form a b r w h  with %he samc batteria; tha 
morks being at the uame time secured, mmpt at low water, by 
the Urumea, Connter-batteBes on the left of that rivcr were 
to rake the h e  of defence in which the breacli waa t o  be 
formed; and againat thc cnstle anrl itg outworks he relied 
principatly upon vertical fire, instancing tha reduction of Fort 
Bourbon in the West Indiea in proof of its cfimcy. nilftie plan 
woii!cl probabIy have redticerl San Seliaqtian in a rensonable 
time without nny mrnarkable Iosa of mcn ; Wellington approvcd 
of it, though hs doubted tlie eficacp of the vertical firc, and 
ordercd the piiege :e be commenced. He renemed his approvial 
when he bad examioed the worko in peiwoa, and nlZ hii ordcrs 
were in the same spirit ; bnt m neither the plan nor liis ordetri 
were followed, the aiege, which ~hould liave h e n  rin orrlinary 
went of mar, hhaa obtained a moumfnl celebnty ; and Wclling- 
ton has been unjustly charged with contemning tlie mnxims 
of the great rnaateiw. Anxious he wm to aave time, yet he 
did not urge the engincer bbeyond the niles. X d e  tlaeplw in 
th p@st &m1 pd do wt h m a  ovw .spd faz to IR& it, 
was the sense of bis instructions; hut Graham, one of Eng- 
land'fi best soldiers, waa cndoived with a gcniiia more intuitivti 
than refldive; and this joincd to liis natural modpsty ancl s 
ce&in eaciness of temper, caused him at t h e s  to abandon hie 
own correct conceptions for the lesa jutIiclous couns~Is of 
those who advised deviations born the original plan. 
I n  tIie niglit of the 10th two htteries mere commencd 
against the convent and redoubt of San Bartolomeo; and nevt 
night four batteries, tn contain tmeiity of the Iienviest p u s  
and fonr eiglit-incli hnwitzers, mere rnarked out ou t l ~ e  Chofre 
sand.hills, at distunces ~nry ing  from six hundrd to tiiirteeu 
hundred yarda from the easitmn m p a r k  of the town. h 
rivcr was gupposed to IM unfordnble, wlicrefore no pamllel mo 
rnride, j e t  good trenches of coinmunimtions, and snhsequent?, 
regular apprtiaches were formed. Two rtttacks were thus 
estahlialierl. One on tlia right bank of the F7rumea for the 
unattaehed Portupese brigildes ; one on the left b~nk for the 
fiftli division ; but most of tlie froops were at first enmmpe 
on the rIght banlr to faeilit~te a junction with tlie co~erin 
army in tlie event of a general battle. 
On the 14th a French sloop entered the harbour with mp 
plies, md the batteries of tlie left atbclr, untler the direction 
of the &man major Hartman, opened against San Bast~lo- 
meo, throning hot shot into that building. The beeieged 
responded witti musketry Erom the redouht, witIi hwvy g u n g  
fram the bwn,  and with a field-piece wliicli khey h d  mouuted 
oii the belfry of the convent itself. The 15th sir Richnrd 
Fletcber took command of tlie enginesrs, but major Emith 
retaind the direction of the attack from tlie Chofre billa and 
ffcllingkon's ordcrs continud te pnss through his hnnds. 
This day tlie batterieu of the Icft attttcli, nidcd by howitzcm 
from tlic right of thc Urumeq, se$ the convcnt on fire, silenced 
tllc muslretry o£ tbo bcsiegcd, md ae damagcd tlie defcnc~, 
that the Portngnwe of the fiftli division mere ordered to feel 
tlie enemy: tkey were however repulsed 6 t h  grmt Ioss, the 
French aallied, aatl the h i n g  did not cew unti1 nightfall. 
A battery for aeven ahiitional guns to $ay against Bart* 
Iomeo uvas now commenced on tlie riglit of the Ururncri, and tlie 
original batteries sct fiw te the cunvent several times, yet tlie 
Anme~ were cxtinguidied $y tlie garrisoa 
l n  the ni@ of the 16th f i y  sounded the U m e a  as Iigh 
aq Snnb Catalina, dcsigning to pnss ovcr nnrl storm thc botte- 
rics on the fiofrcs; but thc fortls discovrircd wcre ~hifting 
snd tha difñculty of eaemition rletcrred liim froin this project. 
Tlie 17th, the con~ent  being nearly in niins, the assault ms 
oidered witfiout ititinting for tlie effect of the new battery 
mised on the otlier side of tlie Urumea. Thc stoming party 
was furmed in two columns. Detachments from Wilson's 
Portupese, aupported by the lig11t company of the ninth 
Dritish regiment and tliree companies of the royala under 
general Hay, w m  dsatined to rtssaiI tbe redoubt; genemi 
Bradford, leading the otlier column, aornposed of Portupese 
supported by t h e e  companics of tlie ninth Britisli regiment 
under colonel Camemn, mas to assail the convent. 
ASSAULT OF SAN BIII(TOLI)BIEO. 
At ten o'clock in the morning two heavy six-pounders 
opened apinst the retlouht, aud a sharp firc of musketry 
from the French, wlvlio had been reinforcetl and oemipied tha 
snhurb of &m Martin, annwnced their resolution to fight 
The dlied troops were msemhled kiehind the mrest o€ tlie hill 
overloolting the convent and thc f ir~t  signal wns givcn ; bat 
ths Portupwa dvanccd so slowly nt both nttnclra that the 
uuppodiing c o r o p i e s  of the ninth refiment, passing though 
them, fe11 upon tlie memy wikh theumal imp~tuosity of Xritifili 
soldiers. Carneron Imding his grenadiers domn hill was 
expowd t o  a Iienvy cannonade from tho horn-work. y& 110 
gained tlie wver of a wall fifty yards rrom tlio conrant awl 
there aaai td  the second signnl. Bis rnpid advance, mhich 
tlireatened to cut off tlie garrison from tlie sul-iurb, joined to 
the fire of tlie two six-pounders and some otlllier field-piecea 
on the fnrtlier side of tlie Urnmea, caused the Fr'rrnch to 
abandon tlie rdoutt;  Carneron then jumped over thc wall 
and asmulted both the conveiit and the huusea o€ t l ~e  saburb. 
At the latter a fierce struggle ensued antl captain ~ T ~ o d l i a m  
o€ the ninith mas killcd in the upper room o€ a house ta 
which he foiight hia way frem below; bnt tllc grenadiers 
cairied the con~ent with 8uch rapidity thri.t the Freneh, annble 
to expIode aome smnll mines, hastily jnined the traoyis in the 
mburb. There the fightinx continued, rind the nffair wnre 
becoming doubtful, whcn thc rernaining eompanies of the 
ninth rcgiment arrivcd and the suhurh with mucli fighting 
was Ton. At the riglit attack the comprsny of thc ninth, 
aithougli retarded by a ravine, a tlrict bedgc, the alomcss 
of tlie Portupese and a iieavy firg entered tlie ahnduned 
redoubt with little loss ; but al! the troops were then, c o n t q  
to Oswald's orders, mhly lwI against tlie cask rerloubt, and 
mere beaten back by the enemy. 
Of tlie French two liundred md forty men fc1L On tlie Br 
tish side, tlie companies of the ninth nnder Cameron u101 
lost ~evcn oficcra nnd sixty men killcd or woundcd, M 
thc whole operation nlthough aucccsshl '(cm aa error. TI 
hattery on the right of tlie Uriimea, mas not opened, wher 
fore, either the a~aii'lt was pi-ecipitated or tlie liattery ni 
not necessary; but the losa justified the conception of ti 
battery. 
When the action cewed the engineers made a lodgment i 
the redonlit, and oommenced two batteries for eight pieces 1 
rake the horn-work and the eastern mmpart of the pIace. Trr 
0 t h  batteriee, to contain four sixtpeiglit pound m o n d r  
and four ten-inch mortars, were also wmmenced on the rigl.. 
l i a d  of the Urumes, The besieged then tirew up traveraes 
on the land front te meet the riiking fire of tlie besiegers, and 
the latter dragged four pieces up tlxe Monte OIin te $unge 
into the Mirndor and otlier batterics on the Munte Ogiillo. 
Tn the night a lodgment vas d e  on tlie ruins of hn 
Martin, thc bntterias at tha right aftnck mcrc arrned, and two 
dditionnl mortnrc draggcd np the Monte Olin; on tlic 19th fi11 
the Iintteria 8t bboth attacks were smicd, and in the night ttwo 
approwhes were comrnenoed from &e snburb of San Martin 
tomards the cask doubt ,  from whence tlic Frenth wem 
clriven. On the 20th tl~e whole of the hatteries opened their 
fire, the peatest part being diiected to f o m  the breacli. 
Smitli's plan was similar to that follon-ed by marshal Ber- 
wick a century before. He prol~osed a l o d p e r  
motes of the 
on the horn-work before tlie bresch should 1 
sir wniled; but lie h d  not thcn r e d  tlie descriptk arss. 
of thrit siege, and therefore uitknowindy fixt 
the breaching-point precisely wliere the walI lid been mo 
strvngly rebuilt after Berwick's rittack, Tliis was tIic fii: 
fault, yet n ssliglit oue, because the w d l  did not resist tlis bar 
teries very long; it was a more serious rnathr that Grahar: 
at the mggestion of tlie oommander of tlia nrtillcry, begnn h 
operntions by breacbing. Smith m s  oppos~I to it, hi 
Fletclier ncquicsced rrltictontly, on the nndcrstnndinp tliat tlie 
rutning of the defencea was only postponed, nn nndersttnding 
riftemards forgotten. 
The result of &e firrit d.'s battery Ras not ~atisfactory. 
The weatlier was bsd, the guns mounted on ahip earriages 
fhiled, one twenty-four pounder was rentlered unserviceable by 
the enemp, anotlier nselesis by an aeeident, captain of engi- 
neers waa ltilld and the bcsiegem' shot hed litt.1~ effect upon 
the mlid mall. In tbe niplit howwer the ~l~liip-guns wem 
mounted on betkr mrringes, and s pnrallel acrom the i~thmus 
was projactcd; but tho p c ~ t c s t  pnrt of tho worlunen, to 
woid u tc~npest ~ought shelter in the suburb of San Martin, 
and when dny bnilíe only one-tbird o£ the ivork was per- 
formed. 
On Ghe 2Ist tlie place was mmrnoned, but the governor 
refused to receive tlie letter, and the firiag was resumed. The 
main wall still resisted, yet tlie parapets and embrasurea 
crumbled away, and the batteries on Monte Oiia plungd into 
the horn-work, with ~ u c h  effect, although at sL~teen bun- 
dred gmds distante, thaf the besieged ha1,ing no bomb-proofs 
were forced t o  dig trenches t o  p~otect tliernselvea. Tlie 
counter-fire, diiected aolely agriineit thebrmching-bntterim, waa 
feeble, but at rniílnight n, sliell tlirawn from tlie mtle into 
tlie by gnve the signel forra snlly, snd dunng the firing which 
enmed several French veaaels with mpplies entered the bw- 
baur. Tliis night nlso tlie bcsie~cd isolntcd the b r w h  by 
cuts in the inmpart and othw dcfonces. On tho other hend 
the beseigem' pardillel across tlie istlimus was wmpleted, and 
iu its progresa laid bare tlie mouth of a drain, four feet high 
and tlireo feet wide, containing the pipe of tlie aquerIuct cut 
off by the Bpaniarda. Tlirough thjs narrow opeiiing lieutenant 
Reid of tlie eiigineera, s young and xealoua officer, creph even 
t o  tlie counterscasp of the liorn-work, and f i n h g  the pas- 
there closed by a door retumd witliout an sccident. Thirty 
barreis of pmder wwe then placed in the drain, and eigbt 
feet wag stopped mith sand-lirys, thus forming a globe of com- 
prewion designed to  blow, ae tlirough a tube, so much rubbish 
over tlie countewcarp as migl~l: fill the n a m  ditch of the 
horn-\i,ark. 
On thc 22nd the fire from the bstteries, unexmpled from 
itu yiclity and accumy, opened wiiat appeared to th0 
besiegers a prscticnble brcach in the eastern ffank wall, 
betmeen the tomers of Los Hornos and Las Mequitas. ~ I C  
counter-fire of tbe besieged then slackenetl, yet the dewent iiita 
the fouq from the brewh was more t h n  twelve fe& prpen- 
dicular ; and the prrison mere seen from Nonte Olia diligentiy 
workig at the interior defences to reoeive tbe assault : they 
added also another gun t o  the battery of St. Elmo. just undcr 
the hlirdor  brrtteq-, te flank tha front attack. On the other 
Iiand the Liesiegers h d  placed four sixty-eight pound carron- 
ades in batl~ry to play on the defenwa of the breach, yet the 
genera: fire slackened becrause the p s  were grwtly enlarged 
at t he vents wit h oonstant practice. 
On the 23rd, the sea blockade being ndl, the French vesscls 
retarned to Fmnce 6 t h  the b d y  wounded men; and thliat 
day the bcsiegera, judg-ing the brmch bctmcen tha towers quite 
practicable, turned the p n s ,  at t he  suggeation of Oamld, to 
break tthe wall on the right of tlie main brmh. Smith 
opposed this, urging, that no dvtlntngc would be gainerl by 
mraking R second opening to get a& which the troopa must 
first: priss the great breach; that time would be lost to the 
besiegers, wnd tliere w s  ri. manifest objaction on munt  of 
tlie tide and deptb of water at the new point attacked. Bia 
cuunsel w a s  overded, and in tlie course oE the day, the ñraall 
being thin the stroke heav~r and quick, a second breach t w y  
feet. wide was rendered p-icable. lFben the fjre oE the 
beaieged being much diminished, the ten-inch mortars and 
ekty-eight pound carronades were tumed upon tlie defences 
of the great breach; and npon a stoclrade which separnted 
tlie bigh curtain on tbe lmd froiit from the lower works of 
the ilanlr ogainst wliich the a t h l r  uFaa conductd The nearest 
houses were soon in flnnies, which s p r d i g  rapidIy destroyeri 
some o f  the defmcee of the besieged and menaced tlie 
whole t o m  with destruction, and the arisault was ordered 
for the negt morning; but when the troopa assemliled, the 
burning honses nppwed eo formidable that the ~ttnck was 
dcfmcd. Tho bnttcrica then plnyed w i n ,  pnrt.ly on the 
second brcnch, pnrtly an Ohe defe'ences, partly to brmk tlie 
wdl in n tliird place between the blC butioii af St. J o h  on 
tlie Innd front and thc main brewh. 
During the night the vigilant governor monnted two field- 
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waa to saeep $he high curtain afier tlie breach 5hould b 
won. 
From the t.renchw t o  the pointe of attack wns more than 
three hundrcd yards ~ long  the contrncted spaca betwecn the 
rctaining wall of the horn-work nnd the rivcr-the ground 
ñwi strewed with rocks covered hy d i p p ~  =weed~,-the 
tide lid left largo and decp poals of wnt~r,-the parnpet of 
the Iiorn-work wtls entire as well aa the setaining wdl--the 
p~rapets of tbe other works and the two towers, which clmelp 
flanked the bremb, although injured were far from being 
mined, and every place tv&s triickly garninhed with musk~teers. 
The diñiculties of the attack were obvioua, and some Portu- 
g e s e ,  p l w d  in a trench beyond the parallel on the isthmus 
and wjtliin sixty yards of the ramprts, were ordered ta que11 
if possitile the fire cif the Iioin-work. 
T V I d e  it wag ata1 dark the stoming eolumns moved out of 
thc kenchcs, and the globs of cumpre~sion in the drain was 
~xploded with grcat cffect agnbt  the connteracarp and dacis 
of the horn-worlr. Thc gorrison aatonished by this unlooked- 
far cvent abandonen thc! flririking pampet, and the allim ruuhed 
onwards, thc atomem for the main brerach lcading and mffer- 
ing more from tbe fire of the hatteries on the right of the 
TJrnniea than from the enemy. Major Fraxer and the e q h e e r  
Harry Jones first reached the breach; and as the enemy had 
fallen back in conhsion behind the mins of the liurning houses, 
those b m ~ e  officers rushed iip expecbing that tbeir troops 
wonld follow,-but not m m y  followed, for it wwas extFemeIp 
dark, and the natural difficulties of the way h d  contracted 
the front and disordered the ooIumn in its whole length; the 
soldiers, straggling and out of wind, mrived in mal1 diaoon- 
nected parties at the foot nf the breach. Tlie formosG gathered 
near their gaüant Ieaders, yet the depth of the descent into 
the town m1 the volumes of liames and moke with di11 
issued from tlie burning liouses Iieliind amed the stoutest, and 
more tlian two-tlirda r i f  tLe column, iPntated by the destnic- 
tivtl flnnk fire, b d  bniken off at the demi-bwtionmto commence 
s muñketrg battle with the enemy on the rampait. 
Meanwhile tlie ~hel le  from tho Monte Orgullo fe11 mpidly, 
the French d i e d ,  and with a amnshing ma~lclretry from t h  
ruius snd Ioopholed liouses smote the head of the ptormers, 
while the inen in the towers smote them on the flanks; and 
h r n  erery guarter came sliowers of grape and hantl-grenatles 
tearing tlre ranka in rr dreadful manner. Frazer was killed on 
tlie flaming ruin$, the intrepid Jones stood tliere awhile lonpr  
arnidst a few heroic soldiers hopiilg fnr aid, but none carne, 
and Iie ~ n d  tliose with liim mere struck down ; tlie eugineeir 
3Iacliel was killed early, mrl tlie nien bewing ldderv fe11 
or \rere dispersed. Ttua the rear of tlie column Iiud got 'mto 
confuaien Iicforc tlie head maa limten, and i t  wtis in vniii 
GreviITe o€ tPie thirty-eightli, Cnmeron of tl~r nintli, mptain 
Ardiimheau o€ thc royalq and many othcr rc-gimental afficera 
attempted to rally their cliscumfitexl troops and refill Ibe brcach; 
it ivns in voin tliat lieutenaat Cnmpbdl, breaking througli tlic 
tumulturiiis cruwd with tlie survivom of his clioseu dciadl- 
m n t ,  mounted t.he ruina-twiee he ascended, twice Iie waa 
wouuderl, nnd al1 asound liim died The roya18 endeavouring 
to retire, ggot intermixed s i th  the thirty-eiglltli and with some 
of the niiitli who h d  uneuccessful~y endeavoured to pass them 
nnd get to tlle lesser breacli. Tlien swayed by differeiit 
irnynlses, pcnt up in tlie nnrruw may between the horn-work 
anti tlic rivcr, tlie nims reeling to aiicl fiw couIrl neitlier 
ndvnnec nor g@ back unti1 thc shdls and mufifretry, wnstantly 
plicd Liotli in front antl flnnk, lind tliinned thc concourse vnd 
the trencfies were regained in coufusion. At dayliiht a truce 
was wecd to foi nn liour, during mliich the Frencli, ivlio tid 
alrenrIy removed the galla~it Jones rtncl some of tlie woundcil 
men from tlie lireacli, now cnrried oft' Zhe more distant sderelii 
leat tl~ey sliouId be dromned by t l ~ e  rising of tlie Nmative M 
tidc; but durinz tlie coiltest some menadiers, rush- ills cnptivrty 
ing out on h e  ireacli, iritli an infumvus bsrbarity 
stitbbed several wounded soldiiers lj-inlng there. 
Five ofiicers of engincers including air Richnrd FIetclier, 
and forty-four oficers uf the line wivitli &ve liundred aiid twenty 
men, liad been killed woiiaded or made prisoncrs in tliis 
assnult, tlie failure of mliicli WRS signrrl, yet tlie causes wew 
obvious nnd may he cla*aed t l iu~.  
lo.  Dcvintion from tlie original project of siege snd from 
Wellin,Ptonya instructions, 
YOL. v. O 
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89 Bad mmgements of detail. 
33 Want uf viguur in the execution. 
Vellington having visited the Chofre trenches on the 22md 
harl coníirmed Iiis 6rst approval oE Smith'a plan, and gave t,Lat 
uficer final directions fur the athck finiahing tlius, 'E'& 
hyligíat mwt he t& fw t7as m~luuIt.' Tliese hstructions 
anJ their ernplmtic terminatiun were repatd  by Xmith in the 
proper quai-ter, and wem not hllowed; no lodgment 7 ~ s  
made on tlie hom-work, tlie defences were nwirly entire both 
in Eront and flank, and tlie assault was given in daikness. 
Smith h d  m r t . s i n ~ d  by calculatiun and consultations with 
the fishermen, tliat the ebb of tide would serve exactly at day- 
break on the 24th; yet tlie wault  was only mde the 25tl1, 
and b e f o ~  daylight, wlien the liigh water, contracting tlis 
ground, increttsed the obst.wles aud forcd the assaultirig 
column t o  march 3n a ntarrom froui ttnd a long line, making 
an uneusy progress and tridkling onwads inetead of dashing 
with a broad surge apinst tlie brench. Tho rules of nrt being 
thus ncgleckd and no extrmrdinury regource ~uhtituted tLe 
operntion f d e c l  
The troop~ filed out of the long nmow trenches in the 
night, a tdttious operation, md *era i m e d i a k l y  
smith, exposed to a fire of grnpe from tlielr o w n  batterieii 
AlSS. 
an tlie Chofres: tliifi fire sliould bnve cceasd wben 
the piobe of compression waa qn~ng;  but wbat with darlrnesa 
and noise it may ncither ~ecn nor heard; and thoagh the 
esplosion drove tlie enemy from the horu-work snd tlie Portu- 
p e s e  dvanced to thc ditcli, wlien a viporons escalado would 
prohbly have siicceedsd, they liad no laddem. The stormere 
uf tlie grcat brcnch marchcrl first, dliing up the way antl ren- 
dcring tlie second hreach, 8s Smith hnd foretoId, uwlew, and 
tlic laddcr-bcarcrs ncvcr rot to their destination. In  fine the 
asmult 1%-ns ill digcsted. 
flierc ni also a ncglcct of moral inflncnco followed by its 
natural conseqnence, m n t  of vigotir in execution. Deferring 
the assault from the 94th to the 25th, exprcs~ly becriusc tlie 
breach was too itificiilt, rendered the troopa unmciy; tliey sus- 
pected hidden danger, and in this moad emerging from tlie 
trericles nere stiuck hy the fire of tlieir own batteries; then 
wading through deep p l s  o€ water, or sbggering in ttie dark 
over alippev roclcs and dme under thc encmy'~ flnnking 
worlrs wlience every ~ h o t  oId with f h I  cflect, how could they 
mnnifest their nbtuml conquering energyP A sccond and 
moro vigarons assault on tlio g e n t  brmh rnight havc baen 
effected by a recopiiaed l d e r  ; but no general or staff officer 
went out of the trencbes, and the inolated exertions of regi- 
mental officem failed. Nor were t l l~re  wanting other sini&er 
influencw, O m 1 d  had in ctiuncil earnestly tsnd jnstly urged 
the dmgers arising from the irregular mode of attack; lint 
this anticipation of ill auccess, in wLch otlier oEcers of runk 
joined, was $so freely expreased out of council, and it is snid 
even in tlie Eiearing of tho kruops, abating that daring con- 
fidence whicli victory Eovea. 
Wellington repired immedistely to St. Sebastian. The 
causes of failure were apparent md he wortld have renewed 
the attack, but was compelled &m want of ammunition to 
defer it, until pomder and arlditionrtl orrlnmce, for wliicli he 
hnd mritten to EngIand ns early as tlie 26th. of  Jun~, should 
arrive. Next day ather events caused him ta resort to a 
blockade, ancl thc battering-train ~vns transported to Pwsnges, 
twn p n s  ~ n d  two liowitzera only being retained on tFie Chofres 
and Monte Olio, This operation wns cornpleted in thc night 
o€ tlie 26th, but at diiybrcak tlic gamison m d o  n sally frem 
tlie horn-lvorlr, surpriued tlie tmches nnrl ñwept oF two 
hundrotl Portupeso and thirty British snldiers. To nvoid a 
repetition of this disaehr tha g u a d  of the tmnches mere con- 
centmted in the lefe parallel, and patroles only were sent out, 
yet one of those also w a ~  cut off on tho first of Aupat. Thus 
tcrminated tlie fimt part of the wege of San Sehastian in which 
the alliea lost thirheen hundretl soldiem and senmen, exclusiw 
of Sp~nisLrls during &Iendiuraboih blockada 
Tsr d a p  &ex the battle oF Titoria, marshal Soult, ander r 
Jecree issued from Dresden, mcceeded the Iring ae lieutenant to 
Nrtpolcon, who thus showcd how littIe bo had been bimsd by 
Jnscph9s accudiona. TraveUing with surprising experlttion, 
lie wns cnabled on tha 12th of Jnly to aseume the cornmand 
rif the tlireo bmten nrmies, nom re-orpnized in one under the 
title of the ' m p  qf,!p&.ia; nnd he had secret orders to put 
Joflepli for~ibly mi& if necessq, but that monnrch millingly 
retiicd. At tliis pcriod general Paria wne hill at Jnca, bnt 
CIausel had entered Fmnce, and Eoult, reinforced from the 
interior, hnd nine divisiona of infantry, raerva, and two 
clin'~lons of mm1ry bairles light horsemen attached to the 
infanfry. Incliiding gaisons,  and twelve Ih lhn  and Spnish 
appendix a, battdions not incliided in the orpnieation, he 
9 8- yol. hd oon hundred and fonrteen thoumnd men ; 
and. m the amies of Amgon and Catíilonia hd abo~e mxty- 
six thonaand, one hundred md eighty thousruid men and twenty- 
six thousand horses mere still menacing Spaia One hnndred 
and fifty-six tliousand were pwsent nnrler arme: and in 
Germnny and Poland sevm hundred t h o u s d  French troop 
were employed ! 
Su& niassea dinected by Napolmn aeemed mfficieat to defy 
t'he world; but mota1 yower, defined bp himself as three- 
fourtlis of military atrength; that power which puny e~saysb, 
declairning for their hour against &he geniue of wnrriors, are 
unable to comprehend aIthough the most important parti of 
the art they dwry, wm wanting. One-hdf of this f o m ,  
organized in peace and setting forth in hope at the beginning 
of a mar, would llave enabled Ntipoleon t o  conquer; now, near 
the close of a terrible ~trnggle, with a rieclining fate md the 
nationsl confidente slaken dthough his genius wae never 
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CHAPTER IV.
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E~ ays after o hll l f V u ll r a
d uce i , su d t ki llS li t t t
apoleo , e Uo he u ill8Se
osc 's n cuooti lls- l'rn lli i ll di
h ile Cllllbk"l1 all e ul flSs m u
o h e ea ar ies, w e-or<,,"lluiz c t
l ll 'army ofSpa n ' au u t
OSCllh roibly ns de ces ary ll w
re h e s WflS stil aCil. ut
lausel ed l1Ill S f <l t
i , ll s f , a eser e t
divisions cavlIl ~ dca b rfIC ClJ
n t u rriso , ta ia /l anis
Al' elldl>; 3, ttal u ganizati
'8. V l. n. ad ne lI u t t sa en;
n , as nn _>\.rago al ad. ove si
x llOus llU (Lll an en t t
ix s s w n. u
i ty-six h re u d s i
any en ousan oops
l !
cll m s rect oo s su n t
fhe rl ; t r l p r, fi y i lf tbr ·
ths ilit st tb; t t i b ssayists,
mi r IlO the s a i s, l'
le t r ll lt t st i rt t art f
t e art t e ecr , as a ti g. e-balf f t is f rce,
rganized. i tti t i t t i i
f w r, l h l a l t r ; , r
t l f t rrible strug le. it a. d li i f t an t
national oonfiilence shaken although his genius as nevcr
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more surpnssingIy diaplayed, hie military power m s  a ~ a s t  
Lut unsound machine. Tlie pulilie mind \ms bewilded by 
cornbinatione tlie ftdl swpe of which he alone could sea 
clearly j generala anil minigters doulited and feared when they 
sliould have supportd Km, neglecting tlieir duty or coldly 
exemting when tlteir aeal shonld have redoubld. The unity 
of impulse so essentid t o  succes~ waa thua lost, and tlie nume- 
rous armica carid nnot with them proportionate strength.. 
To have stnrggled 6t.h tope nnder suda astounding difficultiea 
WRS wmwly t o  be expected from the g r a t e s t  minh. But like 
the emperor to ca lda t e  and combine the most stupendoua 
eK0rt.a with mlmess and accuracp; to seize every favouralile 
chance with nnerring rapidity ; t o  sustain every reverse with un- 
disturbed constancy ; never u ~ e d  to rashness by despair yct en- 
terprising to the utmost rerge of daring consi~tent >& reason, 
waa a display o£ inteIlectnai greatness so surpassing, that it is 
aot without justice Napoleon has teen called, in referente as 
welI to p a t  %es as to the ~iresent, tlie foremost of rnankind. 
Snddcn ancl +de wsa t.he datniction mused by tIie snows 
o€ Ru~sia; it sh~ttered the emperor's rnilitary ancl political 
eiqwtem, nnd the frqneota of tlie forrner were nseleas iintil he 
eould again bind them together, To eRmt tliat he rushed 
with a m army i n h  ihe rnidrrt of Gerrnxny~ for hia l iop 
was to obtain by cclerity a rallging point for thosc veterens, 
who, Iiaving aorvivd the Riimian Mnter nnd tlia aucceeding 
pcstilence, werc disperacd al1 ovcr the contincnt. Ria first 
offort wm moccssful, but mitliont good cavalry vidory cnnnot 
be pushed far, and tlie practiscd howcmen of France liad 
nearly disappearcd : thcir succcssora, badly mounted and lcss 
skilful, were tao few and too weal~, and thus extraortliary 
exertion n a 8  required from soldiera whose youth and inox- 
perience rendered them unfit even for the ordinary lifirdships 
of ww. The measure of Weilingtan's campaign is thus 
attrsined ; for if Sosepli had oppmed bim with only modernte 
aliility, and woidd a great Iiattla, not lws klilian fifly tliousand 
veterana wuld llave rciiiforced the young sioldiers in Gemauy. 
On the side of Spain those veterans were still nurnerous ; but 
tlie rni1itri.y spirit of the French people, previously almost 
worn out by victory m= now abashed by defeat; md even 
the generds wbo had acquired grandeur and fiches bgnnd 
their hopes wem with fuw exceptions averae t o  farther toil. 
Plapoleon's astanishing firmness of mina vas nnderrttood by few 
in high stations, shnred by fewer; and many were tha tmitars 
t o  liim md to fiance, and to the glorie4 of both. Howcver 
his pomcr m 3  still knomous, and whcmver ho Icd in pcrson, 
11;s brrave and ffiithful soldicirr, fighthg with the true instinct 
of nfpetriotism, mnquerd. Whmc ho mas not their iron hardi- 
hood abated. 
Swlt was onc of the few whoso indcfatigable c n e w  rcn- 
dcred them worthy lieiitenmtu of the emperor; md with 
singular .mal alnd nbility 1ic now sewed. His tmop, nominally 
abova one hundrod thnuannd mcn, ninety- ven thoiisand 
being rireaent nnder arma with eighty-six pieoes of artillery, 
wwe not al1 xvnilabIe fer field operationri. Pmpelrina, Xan 
ISehast ian, Rantona, B:ayonme, and t l~e foreign battdiona hrid 
seventeen thousand man; b11t most. of those bnthBona hati 
I 
orders to  regdn their own conntriee With a view to form the 
new Icvies. The permrinent ' m y  cifSpaGt' fumished there- 
fore nnly seventy-seven thousand five bundred men present, 
under arm, seven thousand oE which were mvalry. I ta  con- 
dition was not aatisfactory. The people on the fronfier were 
flyUig fiom the allies, the militiry adminisffation waa dis- 
oganked, ths trcent diamters hsd discoumged the soldiera 
and deterinratd the~r  discipline, Bonlt waa therefore desirous 
o€ somp delay t o  secure his b ~ e  and restare order ere be 
attempted tc mg~in tbe offenaive. but hb inatmctions on tbat 
point w m  imperatively adveme, 
Napoleon's s~stem was perfectly adapkd for p a t .  effortp, 
civil or d i b a ~ ;  yet SO rapid had been Wdlington's advanc~, 
so decided his opediong that tbe monroea of France were 
in a oertain degree paralysed, and tbe amy still reeled and 
m k e d  from tlie bIowa it lid received. Bayonne, a fortress 
of no great ~trei;gtEr in itself, liad bcen quite neglectd. 
it was now being armed md provisioned; and tlie mtoratiiin 
of lui entrenched camp, orignally haced by Vauban to covm 
Bayonne, foliowed. Then the enforcement of discipline, the 
removal of tlie immense train of Spanish families, civil adms- 
nistratom and other wasteful folloivera of Joselil's court, tb 
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rrangement of a general sptem for ~upply of mong  ruid 
rovisioníi, aidcd by judicious efforts to &timulate the c i d  
uthorities and excite tlie national spirit, indimted tliat a 
reat commander mne in tho field. Tlie wldicm' cotifidenoe 
3an revived, and some lending merchants of Bayenne tealously 
:condcd thc gcnerd; but tlic pcoplc of tho south wcrc more 
inclined. to avoid the bnrthen of dcfcndiw their country than 
i anmcr appciils to thcir patriotism. 
On thc 14th Soult exumined tlie Eine of militnry psitions, 
md ordcrcd ReiIh, thcn occupying the pasass of lJcra and 
Echallai, to prepre ponhons for throwing t w o  bridges over 
tlie Bidassoa at Biriutou, That geneml, as we have swn, wns 
driven from those pasea tho nexii day, yet he propared hii 
Iiridges; and such was Eoult's activity tliat on tlie 16th al1 
tlie -comlinittions Eor s gipnkiic oflensive movement were 
íiigested, the means of executing i t rapidly advancing, and 
orders were issusd for tlie prelimiiiary dispositions. 
She army nas divided iuto Birce corps of battle and a 
reserve. Clnasd had the left wing at St. Jenn Pied de Po* 
nnd mas in m-nnimtion by tlie Frenc~i frontier with Pari8: 
at Jaca Droueh, count DErIon, oecupied Mth 
Oouit. 18% 
the centre the heigl~ts near Espdettc and Ainliorq, 
hving rin advanced guarci near l idax .  Edle was in pmi- 
tion with the riglit on fLe mountains overlooking Yern frorn 
tlie side of France. Tlie rssewe under Till~tte,  cornpriaiua a 
separat e b o d ~  of light horsemen and the foreiip battdio& 
guirrded the banks o£ the Eidassoa from the rnoutli upwarcls 
to Irun, nt whcli place tbe stone bridge was clestroyed. The 
two divisions of cavalry under 'h ie l l iad and Pieme SouIt 
were on the banks of tlie Nive md the bdour. 
Wellington's counter-diapositions were as followa. 
Bpg's bbngade of Brltish infantrg, cletached from tlie 
second dividon and reinforced by MoriIlo's Spaninrdq r a s  on 
the extreme Bght. These troops had carly in Jtine driven 
the Frencll from the vill-e of 'ITalcarlos in the vallcy o€ that 
nnme, and had foragerl tlic Frencli territory; but, finding no 
good pcrmnncnt position,retrmted ngnin to  the rocks in front 
¿f tlie pnsses of Boncevalles and Ibuñcta 
On tlie left of E-mg, Cmplioll"s brigade, detached from 
Hamilton's Portngueea &&ion, wm posted in the AIduid 
and supportd with the fousth divimon by Cele, who waa 
Viacayret in the wliey of Wrroz. 
On the let3 of Crwnpbell, Hill defended the Bastnn with the 
remaindcr of the seoontl rlivision and Hamilton's Portugucse 
now comrnnnded by Silveirn. Picton, with the third divi- 
sion, waa stdioncd at Olwe as ti reserve to those troopa nnd 
to Cole. 
On the left of Ri11 t,he seventh and ligh:ht divisiens ocm- 
pietl a chain of mountains running by Ecliallnr to Trew, and 
behind them at fhe t o m  of San Esteran, was postd the 
~ ix th  division. 
Longa's Spaniards continued the lme of dcfence from TTem 
to Giron's position, which extended along thc mount~ins 
borclering t h ~  Bidnssoa to the sea, crossing the preat road of 
h n .  
Behind Giron wani the bmieging nrmy nnder Graham, 
with fhirty-six piecw o f  field artillery; some regiments of 
British antI Portupese e a d r y  were with the right wing and 
centre; but the main body of cavalry and the heavy guns 
were behind the monntains, chiefly &out Tafallia. The gmqt 
hoapitals were in Titoria, the commissariiit dép8ts on the 
coa&, and t o  supply the troopa in the mountains was exceed- 
inply diffienlt md onerous. 
Q'Donael blockaded Pmpeluna with the Andalusian army 
of reserve, and Carlos d'España's d i ~ i o n  was on the march 
to join him. Mina, Julian Smcheg Duran, Empecinado, 
Goyan nnd mrne smaliller bands, were on the side of Znrngozn 
and Daroca, cutting the communication between Soult and 
Sucliet, and the lahter, aa wee have seen, wae falhg back npon 
htalonia. 
We~l in~on's  army in Nawrre and Guipuscm, wwris a b o ~ e  
one huudred thousand men, of which the Anglo-Portn,guae 
 di^ C, furnished fifty-seven thousand yresent under arms, 
seven tliousand being cavalry ; Fiut tlie Bpanish 
reguhm under Gimn, O'Donnel, md Carlos cl'Esppo$a, 
lh1lre of iocluding Longa'~ and Menduabel's nipn, scarcely 
\Vciiioiyton, amounted ta tiventy-five thousand. Arrortli~y to 
PbS. the respactire muster.rollq the truups in Iine 
wtually under ama and facing each other wem, of the aliiea 
eighty-two thausolnd, of the French seventy-eiglit tliousand; 
but as the roIla of the latter indude every man and officer of 
al1 arms helonging to the organixation, and the British and 
Portupese rolls so quoted wodd furnish between ten and 
twelve tliousand additional combahnts, tlflie French force murit 
be reduced, or the aIliea augmented in that proportioa This 
~urplus w a s  however oompensated by tEe foreign battalions 
t e m p m d y  attaclied to Soult's army, antl by tlie numerous 
natienal guarda, ftem warlike mountaineers to fight and 
very useful as guides. In other respects Welligton stood at 
a disadvantage. 
IIis theatre of operatiora W I ~ S  a tmpezoi<l, with sidea from 
forty to sixty miles in length, and having Bayonne, St. Jean 
Pied de Port, St. Sebaatian md Pampdunq nll fodresses ia 
possessioa of the French, at the angles. Tlie interior, broken 
and tormented by srivilge mountains, narrow cragn p m ~ ,  
deep water-murses, precipiccs and forests, appearerl a wilder- 
nesn wllich no rnilitnry combinntions muld emli~ace, snd 
msceptilile only of irreplfir and partiaen operntiona. Biit 
the great spinal ridgc of the Pyrenees Eurni~lid o cluo to tha 
Iabprinth. Running dingonnlly acmss the qndrilnteml, it 
scpnrnted Rayonne, St. Jcan Picd de Port, nnd San Sebdinn 
from Pampcliina; tlius t6e portion of thc allieil nrmy which 
more wpeciaTly belonged h tlia lilockade of Pampelnna was 
in a msnner cut off from that which beIonged to tlie siege of 
San Ekbiistisn. They were distinct amies, each Liaving its 
particular object, and the ody direct mmmunication lietween 
them  vas tlis great ronrE running Iiehind t11e mountains from 
Toloea nnd Inirzun to Pnrnpelunk Ti10 centre of tlle nllies 
w a ~  indeed an a m y  of mc~coo urnd conriexion; but of neces- 
si@ verp much scattered, and witli lateral commnimtions so 
fem diffi~ult and indirect as to prevent any unity of move- 
ment; nor coull Hill move at al1 until an attack rmts 
decidedly prononncecl against one of the extremities, lest the 
most direct gun-runcl t o  Pampduna, which he covered, sbonld 
be unnarilp opened to the enemy. The French general, 
ta l ing the offensive, could therefore by beaten roads concen- 
trate against nny part of the English genernl'a line, which, 
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necesrnriIy a prtgsively defensi~e one, followed m irreplai 
irtlce of more than fifty milm af mountains. 
Wellington liaving lih batterbg-trah and dores &out San 
Sebastian, which was also nearer and more accessiible t o  the 
enemy t b n  PampeTnna, made his amy lean tow.ds that 
side. Bis left whg, including the of siege, waa twentg- 
one thwsand, mith ainplarly gtrong positiom of defence; hiiis 
centre, twenty-faur thousand, wuld in two marches unite 
with the left ming to  coPer tlie siege or fa11 upon the flanke 
of an enemy advancing by the high rowd of Imn; but tlirea 
days oi more were required by those troopa t o  mnmtrate 
for the seeurjty of the Mockade on the righE. Soult how- 
ever jndged that no decisive result would attend a direct 
movement upon San Sebastian, becanse Unipuseoa wm ex- 
hausted of proviaions; and the centre o!¿ the d i e a  could fa11 
on liis %mk before he reached Ernnai, which, hia attaclr in 
front faiiing; wonld place him in a dangerow pwitlon, More- 
over, by menns of his sea. oommunication he knew Kan Sebae- 
tian mas not in extremity; but he had no communication 
with Pampeluna mil feared its fd. Wherefore he resoIved to 
operate by his left, 
Profiting by the Prench rods  leading to Si. Jean Pied de 
Port, covering his movement by the Nivelle and Nive rivers 
and by tlio psitiom of hie centre, he hopd to gather on 
WeZlin@n7s riglt quicker than tht general could gather t o  
oppose him; and tl~us, cornpen~ting by numlieis tlie disdvsn- 
tage of assailmg mounhin positions, force a ivrny to Fampelum 
Tlirit ffortress once succoured, he designed to sebe the road of 
Im1czun, to  fdl u p n  the separated divisions of the mtre ari 
tliey descended from the hills, oi operate on tha rear of the 
force besieging 8an Sebastiun wliile a, corps of obseruation, 
which he propsed to leeve on the lomer Bidassoa, menaced jt 
in f n n t  and folIowcd it in reir&. The siege of San Seliastian, 
$110 bloclíade of PampeIunb and probably thnt of Santona 
wouid be thus mised ; tlie French army, unitd in an abundan t 
country and its commnnication with Suchet secured, would be 
free cither tu m-operate witk that mnrshal or to presa its own 
attnck. 
In this Gew and to m i s l d  WaIlington by ve+ lh right 
simultanetiusly 6 t h  the construction of tlie bridges against bia 
left, h u l t  wrote t o  Paris, desiring him to march when time 
suited, fwm Jaca by tlie h i g h  vdleys tomards Avlz or Xan- 
pessa, t o  drive the parti- from that side, and join tbc left 
of the army when it bhouId have xeaclied Pamgeluna. Clame1 
wna direrted to repuir thc roads in liis own fmnt, and push the 
heads of his columns tomrda t l ~ e  passes of Ronce~alles; then 
to send a strong dehclirnent into tko Vd de Briygorry, new 
the Interal pass of Yspegui, to menace Ell's ffrtnlr which was at  
that pam, and the front of Cmpbell'a brigade in the Alduidea. 
On tlie 20tli Iteille's troops on the; lieights above Vera and 
Same, being cautioudy relieved by Villatte, marched through 
C a b o  towards Gt. Jenn Pied de Port. Tliey were to reach 
the latter eltrly on the 22nr1, and on that day also the two 
divisions of cavairy and tbe parc of artillery were t o  he con- 
centrakd 3 the same place. D'Erlon wítli the centre nm 
still to  hold his p o ~ i t i o n ~  nt E~pelette, Ainhoüe oc Ainhoa ~ n d  
Vrdax, tliua covering and rncsldng the great mo~ements taking 
pInce bchinrl VilIattc whq including the foreign bnttalions, 
liad 6ftccn thous~nd cabrea nnd bayonet s remaincd in obscrv- 
tation on the Bídnssoa. If tlixeatened by superior forccs he 
was to retire slowly and in mass npon tLc eatrenchcd cnmp 
commencerl at Buyonne; halting in successlon on t l is  positiom 
of Ihrdegain in front of St, Jem de Luz, and on the heighta 
of Ilidnrart in rear o€ that town. Be waa mpecirtlly directed te 
shom only French troops at tlie ad~anced po~ts, anti if the 
assalants mads peint mtIi th mal! corps ta drive them 
vipiriusly over the Bidamou ngain. But if the alliw slionld 
in couvequence of Soult's operittions agilinst their riglit retire, 
Yillatte warr t a  relieve Suu 8ebastian and follow tliem Jiriakly 
by Tolosa. 
h p i d i t y  w a s  af vital importanm to the French, but 
heay  and contiuued rains awelled the streama and ruined 
the rods in the deep conntry b e t ~ e e n  Bayonne and the 
hills; the hedquarkrs, wLch sliould bave arrived at ilit. 
Jean Pied de Port on Wie 20tIi, only rertched 
Olhonce, s few milea sliort of tIiat place, tlie Soalt. MSS. 
2lst; aad BeilFe's troops umhle to make vay at al1 by 
Cnmbo, took tlie longer road of Bayonne. Tlie cavalry 
wm retaded in like mannw, and the whoIe army, men and 
horseq were worn down by the se~erity of tlie marches. T m  
days wera thus lo&, but an the 24th more than sixty tbousand 
fighting mea, including cady national p r d s  and gens- 
d'armea, with 3i~fiydk pieces of artillery,were assembIed to force 
the passes of Roncevallm d Byaya. 9 X e  main road le&g 
to tlie formermm repaired, thee  hundred seta of bullock~ were 
provided to h w  the p n s  up the monntain, and the national 
guarda of the frontier were ordered h wemble in tbe night 
on the heights af Yropil; where they were to bereinforced the 
morniag of the 25th 1~y regular trtiops, being to vex and turn 
the riglit o€ the dlies, wliicll extended to the foundry of Orbai- 
ceta Such were Soult'a first diapositions, but as mountain 
warfare io  wmplimted, the ohjects of the hostile forcea wnd the 
naturc of t h ~  country must be shown. 
It ha been anid the great spine of the hi11s nrns diq~nalIy 
ncross the theatio of opcrations. From this spino hugc ridgcs 
~ h o t  out on cither hand, and thc commnnicatjone beheen thc 
ralleyri thw formed on both sidee of the main chain pmed 
over ocrtain compmtively Iow phces, cralled 'COL' by the 
French itnd puertos by the Xpani~rds. TRe Rmtan, Val Chrloa, ' 
8nd Val de Rriygorry +.he npper part af which is divided into 
the Alduides rrnd the Val de Agrn, were on the French side of 
tlio p a t  chain: on the Spanish wide were the valleys of 
Allescoa or Orbaiceta, the valley o€ I.scua or Roncevalles, the 
vtllley of Urros, the Val de Zubiri, and tbe valley of Lme, the 
two lateer l e d n g  dom directly upon Pampelm, which stands 
witliin tmo miles of the junction of their watm. The dispo- 
sitian md force of $he armiea ahaU now be tmced from le% to 
right of the French, and f r m  right to left of the allies. But 
first it must be observed, that tlie main chain, throwing as it 
wcre a shoulder forward from &noevallea towamis Sf. Jean 
PierI de Po*, phcd the entrmce to fhe Bpanish valley o!? 
Ahescoa or Orbaiceta in the power of Xoult; wlio could thw 
by Yropil turn t l ~ e  xtreme right of his adveisav with detach- 
ments, although nnt with aik army. 
Val Carlos.-Two issues led from this valley over the rnairi 
chain, namely tlie Ibañeta and 3Iendichtiri passes, aand tl:ere 
was aIso tbe lateral pass of Atalosti Ieading into the Allluides; 
al1 comprised withii a apace of two or three miles. The high 
road from St. Jean Pied de Port to  Pampelunn, havingascended 
by the left-liand ridpe of Vd ChrIos, nins along the crest iintil 
it reaclies the ~uperior ridge; and then dong the summit of 
that also until ft reschee the p s s  of Ibañeta, whence it de- 
mnds  te hacevalles. Ibañeta may tberefore be d l e d  the 
Spanjsh end of  the p m ;  bat it is also a pass in itself, because 
a namm rod, Ieading tlirough Arnegi and the viliage of 
Vd Cnrlus, there joins t&e main read. 
Clrrusel's tliree divlsions of  infaatry, al1 the artillery, p;nd t5e 
cnwlry, were f o m d  in two coInrnm in front of St. dean Red 
de Port. The hcad of one was placed on some heightg above 
brnepl, two milas from the village of Val Carlos ; the head 
of the otber nt the Venta de Orrisson on the main road, two 
miles fisorn the remrirkable rocks of Cliratan Piñon ; near which 
one narrom wfiy (deacend~ on the right to the v i l F i ~  of lrnl 
Cnrloq nnothcr nn thc lcft t o  tlie f o i ~ i i d l  of Or6nicctn. 
On tho +it-hnna ridga of Vd CnrIm, nncnr the rock of 
A ~ ~ u l n ,  &ilIc's divi~io~m were concentrated with O T ~ I ! ~  tO 
a~cend at daylight sud m r c h  by the rldge tomar& a culminant 
point of the great chain cdTd the Lintloirx; then t o  puiih de- 
tnchonta  tlirongh Ilidetii and Mendicliuri to the villngm of 
Roaoevelle~ tand Espiml. He mns also to wize the passes of 
Ehhorgain and Urtingn on his riglit, and approach tlie distant 
pthsses of Reuecnlid a11d Bellate; tlins closing tLe issnea from 
the Alcluicles anrl mmacing those from tlie Rmtrtn. 
Vd de Ap-k  Xlie Aklwides. Bcd de Bayqomj.-me 
riilge of Aycola, at tlie fuot o€ wl~ich Reille's troops were 
posted, separates Val Carlos frorn tlie valleys named above, 
which were desipnakd as tlie ~~lcluf¿íes in tIie upper 
part, Val de Baygorry in the lower. The issues from tlie 
AlJuides over the grent chain towerds Spain were the 
passcs of Sahorpin nnd Urtiaga; m.nd there mns also a 
road running from the village of Alduidm through the 
Atdosti pnss to Ihitñeta, a diqttanm of eight miles, by which 
Campiscll's bripade eornrnunicat;ed with and conld jnin Byng 
and Morilla. 
Bmtax-Tlim dieitrict, including the vnlley of LcLcrins snd 
$he Ukco Villas, ia separated from tlie Tal de Bayprry by the 
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m l l e ~  with sixteen liundrcd Briti~h and tliree or 
four thowand Spminrds. By+ brigde and lag. 
iwo Spanish buttdfons occupicd &e rocke of 
Altobiscar on t i e  liigh fncing Chateau Bifion; one 
Spmi~li battalion was at tlie foundry of Orliaiceta on tlieir 
right; MorilIo with tiie remnindei ocwpied the heighta of 
Irriulepe, overlmking the nearest houses of  the ~itrwgliog 
village of Val Carlos. 
Tliese positions, four and five rniIes from the FrencFi oalumns 
at Vents de OGsson and Arnegui, wure insecum. They were 
indeccl ateep, but too extensive ; mereover, altllough the psses 
behind tliein led into Ghe Roncwalles tlixt valley did not 
lead dirert to Ampeluna; the higli rond afkr deacendirrg a 
few mil- turned to tlie rigllt and crossed two ridgea and tlie 
intemeninp valley of Umos bcfore it entercd tl~c valley of 
Zubiri, down ~vliich it wTau conducted to Pmpeluna: where- 
fore after passing Zbañeta in retrcat, the allies coulrI not avoid 
lending their fltlnk to ?ceifle's divisiens as fur as Vismyret in 
the vnlley of Urroz. It was partly f o  obviate this danger, 
partly t o  support 0'Donnel while Clnasal's furce ivns in tlie 
vicinity of Jnm, thnt tlie foiirtli divjaian, ~ i x  tliousnnd ~trong, 
occupid Vi~cnyret; Rix miles from tlie p ~ s  oT Zbuíietrt, trn 
miles h r n  Morillo'a positioa, nnd twclrt? milcs from Byng's 
position. But when Claucel retired to  Fmnce* Cole wna to 
observe tlie roads over tbe main clmin from the Alduidea, nnd 
form a rnlly ing point ancl rcservo for C!amphcll, Epg, and 
AIorilIo; Lis instructions being to maintoin tlic lionccwlllcs 
passes npinst a fmnt attacli, buut t o  ayoid a despcmte httls if 
tlia fliiíiks were inswure, 
On tlie leR of Byng and Norillo, Campbell's Portuguese, 
two tliouwiid, were eiicarnped uGove the villnge of Alduides 
on a rnouiitaiu called Mixpira. Tliey watclied tlie national 
guards of Val de Daygorry, preserved the communication 
bet~vveen Byng and Hill, and in some measiire cuvered the 
righlit flnnk of tlie latter. From tlre Alduides Cmpbcll cot1111 
retwat tliroiigli the pass of SnliorgaPn upon Viscayrct in the 
, 
valley of Urroz, f~nd  throngh tlic pas.sec of Urtingft and Beaa- 
cabal upon h g u i  ia the lrnI de Zubiri; finnlly tiy the l a k d  
pasa of Atalosti be could join B,pg nnd tlie fourth di~isiob 
The wmmnnication between all theeie p t s  was rnantained by 
Long's cnvalry. 
Continning the Iine of poaitions to the left, HilI owupied 
tlie Bastan with the wcond British division, Silveira's Portu- 
p e s e  and some squadrona of horse; bnt Bng's and Camp- 
Fiell's Xirigades being detadied, he bad not niore than niue 
thortsand salires and bayoneta. Hls twe BRtish brigadea 
under Willinm Sfewart guarded Col de Maya; Bilí,eirtt was at 
E r a  on Be riglit of Et,ewart, watcIiing tlie pasm of Arrieta, 
Yspegui and Elliorita; tlie two fomer Ei~ing occupied by 
13rotliert;on's cnvitlry nnd tlie sixth cqarlores. Slie direct line 
of retretlt and pcrint of concentration for al1 t h e  tniops was 
Elixon(10. 
From Elizondo tlie Pmpelnna rosd over the grent chain 
wm by Bcllatc and thc ~nIley of h n z .  Thc latter running 
prdlel witA t.lie mlley of Zubiri irc aepmtec2 from i t by a 
w d c d  and ruggal rirlge ; ~ n d  betaecn tlicm therc were but 
three commnnicntions,-tlie one Iiigh upp, Icading Pimm Lanz 
to lhgui, and prolonged from thence to Vi sca~e t  in the 
vnlley of Urroz-the other two lower dow& leading from 
Ostie nnd Olague to the village of Znbiri At Ohgiic tlie 
fhird division, foiir thousand three hundred bayonets under 
Picton, was rcady to siipprt Cole or EXiU as o m i o n  
roq~tirerl. 
Gontiniling the fmnt line from the Ieft oof $ten-art's poaition 
at the Col de Maya, tlie trace run along tlie rnouiitsins form- 
ing the French lioiriidary of the ktaii. There the pames of 
Ecliallxr and Vera were p d e d  by tFie seventh division 
under lord Datboiisie; anrl the Iiglit division under Charles 
Altea Tlie fomer, having foiir t.lioriwnd seven liundrd 
Zi#.yonets, comrnrinicatetetl with Xtew~rt by a nilrrow road over 
the Atcl~iola mountains; anrl the eiglity-aecond regiinent was 
enamped at its junction with the Eliaondo road, tEiree miles 
beliincl tlie pass of Maya  T l i e  light division, foiír thousAnd, 
waa at T1crn, guartling rods  whicli led behind tlie monntains 
tliroiigh Surnbilla and San Estevan to EFizondo. These twu 
divisions being ooly watclied by part of 'C7illatbe's rewrve were 
available for the succour of either wing; anrl behind tliem, at 
tbe toim of San Estevan. was the sktli tlivisio11, six t l i o u s d  
hnyonetri, md now under Tck. This division, eqnally distant 
from  ve^ and blnwi, Iiaving frec communicstiun 6 t h  bOth 
and td dircct lino of march ta Ptimpeluna omr the main chain 
of tlis Pyrenee~  by the P&o de AwrUir, sornetlmes mUed 
the pnss of Boñm Jfcmh, wa9 available for any object. 
Rround Pnmpeluoa, tha point to which al1 the lines of 
mar& converged, O-DonneI's hdlalusians maintained *he 
blocklide, md being afterwards reinforcd by Carlm D'Espt~fírii 
ab a very critilral moment numbered eIo~en thousand, of 
wliicli seven thouwind could act without atrandening tlie 
lilockade. 
Hwdqmrters were at hesawr, !%e line of correspondence 
with the Teft wing m over tlie Peña de Baya; with tlie right 
wiug by San Estevan, Elizondo and tlie ,kllduides; tlie line 
bet~veea Qraliam and Pampeluna waa by Gokueta and the 
bigh rmd of Iiuraun. 
As the Preuch were almast in contad with the alIiea' posi., 
tions at ~ n c e v a l I e q  tlie point of defence nearest to Parnpe- 
lunq it followed, tbat an tlie rapiclity or slo~vnees with which 
Soult overcrime reslstmce iii that qnarter depended hia suc- 
cesx; nncl ir comparative estimate of nurnbers and d i a n o e a  
will give tlie mensiire of Iiis cliunces. Clattsel hnd aixteen 
thous:in d hayonets, hesitlc~i wvalry artillcry and nationnl 
gw.r(Pd~, the lmt rnenncing the vnl lg  of Orbniceta. Bpg and 
Morillo wcre tfieiicfurc, witli five tlioutland infnntry to miritnin 
thc aasaiilt of sixtccn thouaand until Cole could rcinforee 
tbem; but Cnlc, twevelvc miles ofF, coiild not come up under 
four or five bours. Anrl as Reille'a Jivisionr, of eqiiol frtrcngth 
with Qauacl's, could bcfore that timc mine t l i ~  Lindoiiz nnd 
tnrn tlie lcft, khe nllics must finnlly abnndon thair p u n d  fnr 
a new ficld, whcre Picton could join thcm fm Oltque and 
Canipbcll from tlie Airluides. Then with sevcntccn or ciglitecn 
thouvancl byonets and suma guns they miglit oppose Cl~usel 
aiid 12eille's tliirty tliuusllrid. But Picton ut O l u p e  s ~ s  riiore 
than ti day's marcli from Dyng at Altiibiacür; tlieir junction 
could only be effeckd in tlie Suliiri valley nut fnr from Pampe- 
luna; and they could only be reinfurced there by seven thou- 
sand Spanisrds from the blockade, and t h e e  thousand cava19 
from tlie Ebro. 
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Rill, menaced by D'Erlon mith a superior force, and haGng 
the pasa of Maya, half a day's marcli further from Parnpeluiia 
than the passe of Bortcml l~ ,  to defend, m l d  not give rendy 
help. If he retrented mpidly D'Erlon could folIow as rapidly; 
and though Fidon and Cole would thna be reinforced with ten 
thousand men Soult would gain eighteen thoiisand ; but Rill 
could not mow until he knew tht B p g  and Cole were dnven 
from the Roncevalles passes: in fine he could not avoid a 
dilemma. For if be held Col de Maya and afaim went wrong 
netir Pampeluna his own situation would be lmminently 
dangerous; if he beld Irruetn, his next position, the #ame 
danger wta ta he dreaded ; and Maya once abandoned DXrlon, 
moving by Bis own left towards the Alduides, eould join Soult 
in khe valley of Xubiri befom Hill muld join Cole aud Picton 
hy the vallv of Lam, But if ni11 did not maintain tlie posi- 
tion of Irmeta, Zi'Erlon could follow and cut blie sixth and 
seventh divisions ofl from the valley oE Lanz. The exient iiud 
p w e r  of Soult'a cornliintitions are thus evinced. Hill, forcwl 
to await ordera and liarnperd by DErlon, required, it migl:t 
be threil dap  ta get into line near Prampeluna , bub D'Erlon 
aíter gainirig Alaya could in one &y md a liali, by £he pasvea 
of Berderez aiid Urtiaw join Eoult in the Val de Buliiri. 
Meanwbile Bpg, Moriilo, Cole, Campbell, and Beton woulrI 
be exposed to the nttnclr of douhle their own numbers; and 
liowever firm and able those generiils miglit be, they conld 
no$ when thus suddenly brouyht together, be expected t u  
seize tha whole ~ystem of operritionci and act witlii. thut riicety 
o€ jndgment wbich the occtision demmded. It wtia clmr 
tlicrefore that Blll must h in Borne meariure pnmlyaed at 
fimt, and fiiially be thrown, together with the sixth, seventh, 
and ligbt divisions, upon an extemal Iine of operations while 
the French moved upon internnl limes. 
On tl ib 0 t h  hmd, Byng, Morillo, CampbcI1, Cdc, Picton 
and Hill were only picc~s of resistnnce on Wellingten's board; 
tiie sixth, sevcnth, ~ n d  light divisions wem those wit.h whicli 
hc mennt to wiii hic giiine. Tliere wns howcvcr s grent dif- 
fmnw iti  tliar valuc. Ttie light diviaion and the seventh, 
cspiv:inlly tlic former, Iieing fiirt.liest from Pmpclunii, hiiving 
wainies close in frout aiid points to guaid, were, thc seventh 
a d q  the Iight dicision two days behid the sixtli divimon, 
whicli wae free, and, tFie drag of D'Edan'e mrps considered, a 
daj- nearer to  PampeIuna than Rill. Wpon the rapid handling 
of thk well-placod body thefrite of the allies t.herefore depend J; 
if it &ved in time, thiriy t8houmd infantry with mificient 
mvalry and arWcry wwld be estabIished wider tlie imme 
diata cornrnand of Welliri@n,on a position of strength, checking 
th snemy until the rest of the army amiverl. Where that posi- 
tion wns and liow the troope were g a t h e d  and tliere fougl~lit 
eliall now be shorva 
Consbad qfBmalles,-0n the 23f i  Soult issned su order 
of the day rcrnarkable for its force md frankne~. Tracing 
with a mpid pen tlie leurlrng events of tlie past mmgaign, he 
said the disasters had qmng from tlie incapncity of the king, 
not f m  the weaknesa of h11e soIdiers, wliose military virtue 
he justIy extolled, inflnming their liauglity courage hy alIu- 
aiom to former gIories. This address has bew by writers, 
who disgrace Englisli literature wikh nnfounded asporsiona of 
s COuTageouB enemy, heatetl as unssenily boaslting a9 t o  his 
intended operatiom; but the miumny is refuted by tha 
following pamgo fmm his dmpatch t o  tho mhistcr ah war. 
'1 ~Aalk m di~ecdky vpm P q e l u n a ;  r me& in 
*v it r h 1 z  l oeoar~  my .;s~at, to d r n m 8  ~ h s  
mámy's P q s  ka iaue'pwcoa, BGmy, d A h ;  amd to Bnabl~ 
t 7 ~  reseme lo j&m me, whkh &LZ w l k  Xt. SdastGm and 
& l o n a .  If this a M d  hqpm 1 d l  tJtm, C&&P w h t  4s 
lo done, e i t h  to p a 7 b  my a ~ d c  or tb he+ € 7 ~  
m y  of Awm, ht io look eo fm a 7 d  umdd mw 66 
lenaFP.ity.' Here he puts cvcry point hypothctically, md 
thoitgh ccon~cious of superior abiiitieci be did not suppre.ss the 
sentimcnt of his own wortli as a cornmender nnd was too 
proad to dcprecintc b m e  d~ctsiaricci on thc eve of hattle. 
"et wi mt,' ho snid, dflraud the slaenay ~ J M  p a h  ztiILch 
<a Km. TIz d&po&tim of th geramd have bm 
p m p t  afii@d Lvnd consecutive; ths vaihw a& 8 t~ad iw8  of
la2s troop bmwe Bm pan'smtA~,. '  Having tlius ~timnlnted 
the ardour o£ hia tronpa he put himaclf nt tlie head of Clausd's 
divisiona nt dayliglit the 25th, and led them up qpinBt the 
roch of hltobism~. 
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CHAPTER V.
BAttLES OF THE PYRENEES.
[JULT, 18U.
(Jwnlxtt, ojRoowJfitka.-Ou nJ, u an r r
em rkable lint! 3ukness. 'l' n
i~ 11 ra h c di h ca p
i i.l>llSte u spruu Oiu h a t
roln u uc s lil hlicl"S h ir
l l , a h h o u b l ·
sions o nn r l ries. 'fill ess !Ju en u r t r
i roco h r t u lll'l!i lls f
a uruW-'OWl u y, tr u l n e m L us us t !Ji
ations; h cal l' c t e
i PUSSlIgtl ro es e iniste t Wllf.
'I ,hall ove rectly Ujx ampe1una if I trUCCeCd
relieving I wiJ1 opcraic t wards "aft" cmbUTTa88 the
enerTVI/8 troop in G ipwcoa, i3ca and Jllava n IJIwh!e
tluJ rv t oin , "ic/~ will relieve S clxuttian ll
SantQ'IUJ. Jthia shoul ap en I wilt hen crmsider a i8
to be , ither usl~ QlL'n f,/,ack o Imp tlw
arm f ragon, but t l s la'/' loead w<JuU no be
t merit .' ll t e e i t t eti ll , Iln
t u onscious ri r iliti s h i t r ss t
ti e t f lli rth llS ll. m a r llll t
r u to e r iate mv n.dverAAries t e f bflttl .
, Let 118 not,' e sfli , 'defr tlw enem of tlw r ise wlii lt
ie dlW to hi . 1'/u; is sitions J tJw {/rm.cral IWWJ beeJ~
rompt skilful an o secutilJe; tlUJ ooJ.<,u". nd sttadinesa f
hie troopB I oo been prau/Jl./XJ1'thy.' a i th s sti ulated
the ardour of his troops he put hi self at thellead of lausers
divisions at dayligllt the 25th, and led them up s.",,,,,inst the
rocks f Alt hiscar.


Byng, warned tha e~ening More that d a n p  wa0 near 
and jealous of some hostile indications towards tlie pi1la.p of 
Val Carlos, bad sent the fifty-seventh regiment down there, 
and gltve notice to Cole who bad manwliile made new di* 
positions. Thss's brigade was now at Esyinal, two d e s  in 
adwnm of Viscaj~et, six miles from the p a s ~  of Iliañeta, 
eleven from Dyng's, position, and somewhat nenrer t c  Morillo: 
Buson's brigade was close beliind Rosa, CStubbs' Portupese 
behind Ansoii, and the nirtillery Wa8 at Linz&. In t h  
state o€ sñairs Souit, throwing out a multitude of nkimishers 
nnd pusliig forwrard hi supporting colnmns and ,gms as fast 
ns the steepnesA of the road and difficult nature of the ground 
would permit, entieavoured to force Bpg's position; but the 
latter fouglit strongly, the French fe11 fnst among the rocka, 
nnd tlieir rolling ir~uaketry pealed in vain for Loure along-that 
cloudy fiel{[ of bnttle, eIevated five thousand feet abwe the 
plains. Their nurnbers howcver continnally increasecl in 
Front, nnd the nationnl pnrcls from Ynpil, ieinforced by 
Cl~~uiiiñel's detachmenta, slcirmidied wjth the Spanish bab 
tttlians at tlie foitnrlry o€ Orhneeta and tlimtened ta turn 
tlie right: Val Carlos wnei at tlie same time rnenaced from 
Arncgmi, and Reillc, asccnding the roclr o€ Airoln, turned 
Jforillo's left. 
Abaut mid-day Cole arrived a t  Altobisq yet his tmopu 
wcre still diatant and tlic Frcnch neglcetcd thc Va1 CarIos to 
gntlier morc thiclrly on Byng's front ; he inded reaisteii their 
cfFurts, but Reillc madc progess along thc mmrnit of the 
Airola ridge and MorilIlr fe11 limk towards Ibnñeta. Reille 
was then iicnrer t s  thut pnss t h  Bpg mas, when Ros&'s 
bripde, comiiig up the pass of Xendicliuri, surlrlenly nppearetf 
uu the Linrioux just m the Freucli werE closing up A t d o ~ t i  
rind cuttíng tlie communication wibh Campúell. Tlmt oficer's 
piclueb hati been attacked early in tlie morning by tiie national 
bqtar& of Val de Baygorry, but Le soon discovered it was 
only a feint and tlierefore moved liy Lis riplit towaids 
Atalosti when he lieard the firing on tliat side. Bis mrch 
mas secured by tlie Val d'dpaJ which separated Km from the 
ridge of dirola dong wbich Reille I\-BS advanung; but noting 
tLat general's ritrength, and seeing Ross's brigde labouring 
up tIie skeps of Meudichuri, he jud@ it iporant of whal 
was going on above. Wi~erefors sending sdvice of t h ~  
enerny'a proximity and strength to Cole, ho ofered t o  pass 
tbe Atrtlosti and join in the battle if he could lw furnished 
~vitl i  tranaport for hia siek, mcl pmvisions on the new Iine of 
opemtions. But ere this reached CoIe, the h e 4  of Rossms 
colnmn, composed of a wing of the twentieth and a company 
of Brunssickem, was on the summit of the Lindonz, where 
iiioat nnexpectedly it encountered Reille's advanced g u d  
Ross, an cager hardy soldier, called aloud tu charge, and 
captain Tovey of the twentieth mning f o m r d  with his 
cornpany, crosried a sligh:ht wooded hollow and fnll againat the 
front af the skth Frcnch Iight infmtrp dnshed with the 
baponet. Brave men fe11 on both sides, bnt 
AppenUIx 1s. 
numbcra prmiling, these daring soldiem were 
puslid back again by the French. Rosa however gained his 
object, the remainder of his brigade had come np and the 
pws of Atil0st.i wm secured, pet n-ith a loss of one hundred 
artd forty of the twentietb and forty-one Brnnswickers. 
Previous to thia vigorous action, Cole, seeing the Frencli. 
in Tal GrrrIas land the vdlep of Orbaoeta, on both flanks af 
Bpg  wtiose front wm not khe less pressed, had orderd 
Anson to reinforce tlie Spanimds at; the foundry, snd Stuiibs 
to enter Val k I o s  in mpport of the fiftyseventh. He now 
recalled Anson t o  mist in defence of Lindoue, and thea 
learning from Campbell hom atrong Reille wns, mused Byng, 
witb a view Go a final retreat, to relinquish hia advnnced 
position at Altobiscar and take a aeoond nearer Ibañeta. 
This movement untovered the m d  T ~ a i n g  down to the 
foundry of Orbaiceta, but it concentsated al1 the troops ; and 
at thc same time Campbell, although he criuld not enter the 
liue nf battle because Cole was umle  to s u ~ l y  his demauds, 
liJ' P very ukiICul diqday of his Portupese induced Reille to 
tliink their nurobers considerable. 
During tliese movements ths skirmishiig of the light troop~l 
continued ; yet a tliick fog coming up GIie valley preventcd 
8oult frorn making dispositions for a generd atta& with liis 
six dirisions; and whcn night fe11 Cole still held thc great chin 
o$ the mountains, ha* hnd only three hundred and eiglity 
man killed and wounded. Ria rigl~t wrt4 however turncd by 
Orbaiccta, lie had but ten or dcvcn thousand bayoneta to 
oppose to thirty thousand, and hia line of rctreat, heing far  
four or five miles down hill and flanlíed al1 the way by the 
Lindouz, was uneasy and unfavourable. Wherefore puttiiig 
tlie troopa silenhly in marcli nfter &rk he threaded the pnssea 
and guiiied tlie valley of Urros. Anaon's brignde fdlowed as 
a renr-gurartl in tlie morning, Cnmptiell retired from the 
Alduidea by tho pase of Urtiap t o  E u p i  in 81% vulley of 
Zuliiri, the Spanisli brtttalion retrentea from Orbniceta by tlie 
narrow way of Nada aiid reioined llorillu near Espinal. TLe 
fiIwgistrn1 ridge was thus abrandonetl, yet the general result 
wm unsatidnctory to Soult; he tichowledged a Ioss of fuur 
hundred men, he hed not gained ten miles, and the distlinm 
to Patnpelum was not less thm twenty-two witli strong 
dafensiv~ positions in tlie way : md there increasing numberrr 
of intrepid eneniies wera to be expected. 
Ria combiiiations, contrived for p a t e r  sumes#, had lieen 
tharted  partly by furtune, partly Iry errors of exe~lrt i~n 
wliich al1 general8 expect, and t11e exprienced are most ' 
resigned as lcuowing them to be inevitable. Fortune IW SeIt 
in the fog, whieli rose liefore he could thrust forward bis 
heavy masses of troops entire. Tlie failure in execution mas 
Reille's twdy movemeut; Pii~ odew were to gain witb al1 
expeditioc the Lindouz, whicli tied togetlier the beads of the 
Alduides, Carlos, lbncvalles, and Urros d l e y s .  Tliere he 
would have commanded tlie Nentlichuri, Aidosti, Ibañeta 
and Sdorgain passag; and by moving donp the Mag.istraI 
crest couId menm the Urtiaga, hmcalial, and Bellate passes, 
, 
endangering Ciampbell'a and Hill's lines of retreat. Pellotla cHm- 
Eut when lie should Lave ascended the h o l a  he pagses dvs 
Iialkd to incorporate two newly arnPed conscript ' ' Y ~ ' " ~ ' ~ '  
battalions and to ksue provisions; the hours thus Imt 
would havc suficed to seiae the Lindouz before &ss bad got ' 
tlirougli the Mendichuri. The fog woitid ~till have atopped 
tlie spreitd of Soult's columns to the extent designed; but 
fihcen or aixteen Biouannil men placed on the flrtnk and rear 
of Bynp and I~forillo, woiild hnve scptirated them h m  the 
fourth division and forced the latter to retreat beyond 
1 
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SoalE'B Becret Viscnyret,. Soult thought two British divisinns, 
Dmpatch, besides Bpgh brignde and Morillo'~ SpanirarrIs, 
MSS. were opposed to him; he was probnbly inisled 
by wounded men Ii~st~ily que~tioned; who woitld circlare 
- m 
they w e e  of the seeond and fourth di~isions bccnrise 
Byng's brigntle belonsd to the foriner; hnt tliere wcre, 
jnclirding thc fourth division, only elcvcn thot~snnd bnyonets 
ia the fight. 
On tlie 26th Clanse1 followd Cole, and RRillc w ~ s  directed 
to move aIong the; Magistral me& and scize the pnsnea in 
Bill's mr; who woiild he thtrs cruched tetween liiin and 
D'KrIon, or tlirom on tlie side o€ San Eatevnn. D'Erlon 
muld then reach the valley of Znbiri, ~ncl  ReiIle rlescendlng 
tllat of Lmz muld prevent Picton joining Cole. Tliis wonld 
compel those generals to retreat on separnte lines, rrnd the 
whole French army could iasue in order of Iiattle from tlie 
meutha of the valleys on Pampeluna. All the &en& colurnns 
were in movement at dorybreak, but e v e y  bour brouqlit ita 
obstacle. The mist still hiing Iieavilg on tlie mouiitain-tops 
nnd bewildered Reille'a pides, who refusd ta lead liim alung 
tlie m i s ;  hence at ten o'clock, having iio other resource, he 
inoved down the pass of 3Iendicliuri upon Espina& and fe11 
into the rear of the walry and artillery mhfch folIowed 
Claueel's divipions. Soult, dthriugh retartled also liy tLe fog 
and the diiliculties of thc ground, avertook Cole's r e a r - ~ 3 r d  
in front of Viscayret; aud liis leaxling troops struclc liotly ou 
aome British liglit cornpnies incurpornted under colonel 
FVilson of  tlio forty-eiglitlr, One French squnJron paasing 
tlie flank fcll on tlie rcar, h t  Wilson fnccd ahout nnd beut it 
06 riitliout ccusing to fight the infiantry; and thus slrirmisb- 
ing Cole resc1:lied tho beights of Linzorrin one milc bcjoiitl 
Vi~ayrct. Tlicre Picton cnme up withont troops, but hrotight 
intclligencc tlint Camphell i v ~ s  nt Eugiii, nnd tlie tbird division 
~ i t  Z~lbiri, hnving cnme oper tho ndge from Olrgic. Tha 
junctlon of o11 tblicse t r o o p ~  m s  nom secure, t he  108s of the 
dny was Tma tlian two hundred, nnd notliing had been left 
beliind. EJorne~~~r the; Fmncli continued together in front, 
and at four o'cloek scixetI somo hcights on Colch lcft; where- 
upon, retiring to tlie ridge ueparnting the valley of Urroz froa 
tliat of Subiri he offered battle. 
Disquieted by intelligence from D'Erlon, by Reille's failnm, 
and by Camptiell, who in wming frum Eugui d e  a distmt 
display of hia Portuguese on tlie snme ridge, So~ilt put oíT 
his attack until next morning, and in the night a junc- 
tion of al1 the allim was eflected. This m a peat  Kiure on  
the Fmnch side; Cole was unsupported for five hours, his 
troops had been incessanttlg milrching and figlitinp for two 
daya and a night; and every wtiou, by augmenting the 
wountled aníi causing confusion in tlie rmi wonld bare 
incremed the dificulby of retreat. Ikille's false mar& liad 
marred the primary combinations, tlie evening reports said 
D'Erlon hnd also gone wronp, and it was tlierefore evident 
that by rough fighting only eould tlie main objeet be attained. 
Eoult feIt 111s error, and it: is sairl his language u Fe, 
indicated e secret anticipation of fai1ure; he \vas cnmpia-ne 
1813, 1814. yet too steadfasst t o  yietd, w d  next morning 
resumed Lis march, having renewed his orders to D'Erlon, 
w h e  operations must nov be noticed. 
Tl~at pnenil had tliwe diFisions of infantv* furnishing 
eighteen thoussnd combahnts. On the moming of the 25th 
he assembled two of tliern beliind some heiglits near tlie 
passes of Maya, h a ~ n g  causect thc naiional guarrls of Baygorpy 
to malce previous demonstrritinns towards the lateral passes of 
Arrictte, Yspegiiy. asid h r i e t t a  Tlie di9position of EIl's 
force liatl not lieen clmngetl , but Stewart, deceived by the 
movements of tlie irntional guads, ioolred towards Silveira's 
post on tlie righh ratlier than his own front, and lii4 division 
was not ivdl posted or prepared. Tlie p u n a  t o  be defended 
mas very ctwng; yet however rugged a, mountain position 
rnry be, if it ix too extensiv~ and tlie troaps are not disposed 
wit,ii judgniciit, tlic inequavtia comtituting ita defensive 
strengtli f,ivozir an asedlmt. 
Tlicrr! werc tIirce pnqses to rfefend. Aretesque on the right, 
Lcsscrrsa in tlie centre, AJnyx on tlie Feft. From these passrs 
t.wo rtinrls lctl tn Rlisanrlo i ~ i  pnrnllel directions; one tfom tlie 
cnlley tiirougli die tnivn af II~~Q, recriving in i t s  conme the 
Erazu ronrl; tlie ntlier along the Atclriol~ mountain. Pringle'~ 
lirigwle was charged to  dcfend tlis Iiretesqtio, and Carneron's 
tirigade tlie Ali~yyu, and Lecsccsa passes. The Col or neck, 
broaid un the suuiruit, war tiiree d e s  \vide, and on each flsnk 
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lofty rocka and rjdges rose ane above another; those on tlia 
rigllt blending witli the Goramendi rnountains; those on tbe 
lelit witli tlie Atclihla, near tlie summit ol which tlie eighty- 
second regiment belonging t o  the ssveiitl~ division ww 
posted, 
Carneron's brigxíle, encamped on tlia ldt, had a clear view 
of troops coming from Urdax; but at Aretersque a great round 
hill 0118 milei in front masked the muvements of an enemy 
coming from Espelette. This hill wns not occupied at niniglit, 
and in the daytiine on1y by some Portugese cavalry vitttes. 
Tlie nearest giiard was a piquet oP eigirtp men, posted un t l ~ e  
front alopo of fhe Cal and witli no iinrnetliate sirpliort; but 
four liglit companies were enmmped a mils down tlte reveme 
slope, ivliich lvns more rugged nnd diffcult tbun tliitt towards 
the enemy. Tlie rest of Pringlds briprle waa disposed ak 
varioiis distnnces frnm two to tlireo miles in tlie mar; nnd the 
s i g d  for assembling an tlie position was ta be ths fire ef 
four Portiipcsc guns frnm tho mclrn nbovo the Maya pws. 
Shuq of B ~ X  Britisli regiments, furnisliing more thnn thrw 
tliousnnd figitiiig mcn, Iidf onlg were in lino e€ battIe and 
chiefly maqsed on the Ieft of positian, wide open nnd of an 
casy mccnt from thc Aretr?srpo side: tliey lmerc iIE-posted, 
ancl their general, Stewad, demived m t o  t he  red &te of 
affairs, was nt Elisondo when thc atta& commenced 
COnIBAT OF K A f  A. 
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CaptaiU Moyle Slierer, wmmanding the piquet at the 
Aretesque pass, Wa8 told by liis predecessnr tliat at dawn a 
glimpae hd been obtained of cbvalry and infantry in move. 
nient riIong the hiils in front: some peasants also announ~erl 
tIic opproach of t l~e  French. At niae o'clock m~jor Thorne, 
a stafXicer, hwing patrolled ronnd the great hill in front of 
tlio pnss rliacovcred enougl~ ta rnnlrc him order up the light 
compnniea in support of tlie piq11Iiiet ; rtnd they Bd just fomed 
nn the neclr, witli thcir left at  tlic rack of drctesque, wheii 
D'Armnpnc'~ division coming from E~pelette mounterl the 
peat hill in front, Abb8 foliowed, znrl Mamnsin with a third 
divivision aclvmced from Ainhoa d Urdax against the %ya 
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perta, designlng a l ~ o  t o  turn it by a narrow way Iending np the 
Atchiola mountain. DYArmwnc's men pusliing formrd in 
~cvernl colnmns forced the piquet back witli great- loss upon 
the light cornpanies, who sustained hia veliernent assault with 
infinite difficulty. The alam ganB were tlien hoard from 
the Maya pasq and Pringle hastened to the front; but Iiis 
regiments moving hurriedly from different wmps were 
neceswrily brought into action one dter the other. The 
tliirty-fo&h carne up first at a ann ing  pace, by cetiipanies, 
not in mam, and breatlilesa from tlie bngtli md rugednees of 
the ascent; the tbirty-ninth and twenty-eiglith followed, yet 
not immediately nor togetlier ; and meanwhile D'Armapac, 
cloaely mpportcd by Alib6, with domineering nnmbers and 
mlour eombincd, mnugre the desporutu figkting of the piquet 
of tlie light campaniw and of the tliidy-fourth, Iiad establislied 
Lis mluinns on the broxd summit of the position. 
Carneron sent tlie fifkieth from the leEt to the wasaistance of 
tlie over-matched troop, anri that fieree and fornidalile old 
regiment charging the liad of an advancing eolumn drovs it 
clear out of the pass of hsessa in the oentre. But the 
Prench were ao mxny, that clieckeci at one point tliey assem- 
bled with Increased force at auotlier; nor could Prjngle restore 
tlie battFe witli the thirty-niiitli and twenty-eightli regimenta; 
they were cut off from &e others, and though fighting 
desperately, forced bbetck to a mcond and lower ridge crostliiig 
the main roxd to Elizundo. D'Arrnagnm follow~l theru, but 
Abbé continued to press the fiftieth tuid thirty-fourtli, whose 
nxtu i~ l  ine af rctreat saa tuwards the btcliiola road on tlie 
left, because the position trended backwmd from Aretesque 
towarda tliat point aiid beause Cameron'si brigade wm there. 
Shat officer, still holding tlie pass of Maya aith the left 
npiiip of tlie seventy-fimt and ninety-second, tlien brouglit 
tlieir right wings and ttie Portu\pese guns into action, nnd 
tliiis maintained the figlit ; btit so drearlful mas tiie slnugliter, 
enpecially of the ninety.s~cond, tliat it is mid tiie advancing 
enemy mna actudly stoppcd hy thc hmped mas9 
of d d  snd dying; itnd thenthe Teftwing oftlint Ap*en" 'le' 
noblc rcgimcnt, coming down fmm the higher ground,  mote 
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wounded friend~ and exulting foes alike, as mingled fogetl 
tliey stood or crawled before its wasting fire. 
It waa in tliia &ate of aff~ra t h t  general Stewart reacheu 
the field oC battle. Lessesaa and Aretesqae were lost, &laya 
was di11 lield by tlis left wirig of tlis seventy-first; bnt seeirtg 
Elaransin's men gatliered on one side and A bbE's on the otlier 
he abandoned it to take a position on a rocky ridge coveriny 
the lateral road over Atchiole; tlien lie called down the ciglitp 
second fmm the surnmit of tliut mountziin, and senG for tiid to 
the seventli dirision. He mas woiinded, yet fought stoutly 
for he was a gdant man; but driring tliis retrogrsrlc move- 
ment ;Maíransin sudclenly tlirust tlie Iiead of Lis divipioii across 
the front of the  Britibh line antl connected his left wrth dbbe, 
t h w i n g  as lie passsd B destructive Ere intci t l ~ e  waskd rmnant 
of tlie nhety-second, wliich even tlien gave way but sul~enIy, for 
the men fell until two-tliirds of tlie w1iole hrid gone to Clie 
ground. Still the survivors fought and tlie left wiiig of the 
eeventy-first coming from Maya also entered into actio'n, yet 
finally, one after the other, al1 tlie regiments were furced bwk, 
tba firat position wns lost and the Portuguese pns  were 
taken, 
Abbé then followett Il'Armagnac, leaving Maransin to dml 
with Stewnrt, wlio was ptished b ~ k ,  riotivitlistantling the 
&rengtli of tlis new position until six o'clocli, d e n  tlie remnnnt 
of his force was in defeult of nmmunition mmpelled to defend 
tlic liiglie~t c rqs  with stoncs: ho vas just giiiig t o  ubandon 
tlie mouutain when a br igde  rif tlio seventli clivision Ied by 
general Burnea arrived Duin SclialIiir, ttnd ckarging, drove tha 
Frencli baelc t o  tlio Cot de Muyii. Stewnrt tlius reinaincd 
Fwnch master of Atcliiulu, arid B'Erlon, prolinlily tliinii- 
nnic in i  ing grenter reinfuiccrnents hnd come up, rmalled 
I:c]:url, 
JlSS. D'Armngnac and AbbE and conecntrukd his 
niitisli forcca : hc hnd lost fifteen liundced men and si 
olricial gcncrnl, biit hnd takcn four p n s  ami kil id or 
Ueturn. 
nouiidcd fourtDen hundrcd Britisli soldiers. 
This disnstrous fight of KInyu, m cxaggcratcd by Frcnch 
mritcrs, and 110s bccn by m Englirili nutlior inia- huthey. 
rcpiliscnted ns u surprise cnuscd hy tlic nrgligcnce 
of tbe capnlry. Stcwurt was surpriscd, his troops wcre not; 
and never did solldiem fight better, seldom so wcll; tbc skrn 
mlour of the ninety-second would h a ~ e  graced Thermopylre. 
Ths Portupese mvnlry pntroles, if nny went out, whicli is 
nncertain, might have neglected theii dnty, and doubtless the 
front should h n v ~  been scoured in a more military manner j 
bnt the inf~ntry piquet~ nnd tlie light companies so happily 
ordered up Eiy Thorne were rearly; and no rnrin wondered t o  
isee tho French columns cromn tlie great hill in fibont of tlie 
pms. Stewmt, expecting no attack at Maya, h d  p n e  to 
Elieondo, leaving onlera for the ~oldiero to cook; 
from l i i ~  erronwus views therefore the GaisTortune s m a r * %  
rteprt. 
spning and from no other sourae, Ha~ ing  de- 
ceived Iiim~elf as to klie point ofatkack he dirl not take military 
precautiuns; his position was only hl f  oocupid, Iiis trmps 
were tirought into action ivilrlly, and he mused tlie loss of 
bis p n s  by a misarection as to tlie road. He waa a lirave, 
energetic, aealouli, inrlelirtignzille maIi, and of a mrtgnllnimoua 
spirit ; but lie po~sessed neitller tlic calm reflective judgment 
nor tlie iiituitive genius ivliicli hclonp to natiire'a generals. 
Tt is difficult to iinderstand why count D'Erlon, when he 
h ~ l  carried th right of the position, followed two weak res- 
ments with tmo divisions; leaving only one division to attack 
five iegiments gosted on tlie strongest gronnd and having 
hopes o l  succour from Echallar! Certainly it Abhi! had acted 
Mth Jfaransin, Stewarb, so harrlly pressed by the latter alone, 
muwt have passed the Ecllallar road in rehreat before Barnes'a 
brigade arrived. SouEt h d  dirccted D'Erlon to SoPlt's 
operate by Es left to connect the whole army on ~ e ~ p a t c l t ,  
tlie summit of tlie p e a t  ccli~in of tlie Pyrenees ; 
he shouId therefore hrtve used his wl~ola forcs to cmsli tlie 
troops on tlie htcfiioln Iiefore they could bo succoured from 
Eclialla~,r,-or, lelaving Ma~ansin there, hwe mnrclied by tlie 
hTnyn rond upon An~ciin to cut Silveira's line of retrent-lie 
cernainetl upon the Col dc llny~. for tmcnty hours aftci- tlie 
liattle! nnd Rill me~nmhila conccntratcd his wliolc forcc, now 
a~i~penterl  by Rnnd brignde, nnd would bnvt! fnllen upon 
hini from thc roclts of Ateliiolx next day, if intelligence of 
Colc's retreat had not come tltrough the Alduides. Tliis ren- 
dered the recovery of the Col de Maya useless, and Hill, ivith- 
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dmwing his t r o o p  during tha ni& y t e d  the British bri- 
gades which l i d  been engaged, together with one Portupae 
lirigade of infantry au-3 s battery on the heights in rear of 
Irneta, Hteen miles from tha scene of action; tlie other Por- 
fuguese bripck remained in front of Elimndo, and thas he 
mwred tIie r o d  of San Estmn on his left, that of Berderez 
an hi righb, and the pass of VelIate in lii retir. Sucli WM 
tlie commencement of Soult's operations ko restore the for- 
tunes of Franca. Three considerable actions fought on tEie 
samo clay had mch been favowable. At SL Sebwtian the 
allies were repulsed; at Roncevallea they abandoned the 
passes ; at Maya they were defeated; but the decisive blow 
liad not yet been s b c k .  
WeIlingkon hemd of the iight at Map on his m y  bmk 
fmm Xt. Sebostian dter the mwult, with the falsa addition 
that Dqrlon was beaten. As enrly as the 22nd Be lmew 
Soult wrts prepnring s p a t  offmsive movtiment; yet the 
immovenble attitude of the French eentre, the akilful disposi- 
tion of their rmerve. twico a etrong as he at first aupposed 
together wIth thc prcpamtions made t o  throm bridge& over the 
Bidmsoa at Ririaton, were a11 ccrtlcnlated b mlsled rind did 
mislead him Soult's complicated comblnntions to brin,PD'Er- 
Ion's divisions finalIy into line un the cresk af *he gretit chain 
were $so impenetrable; the Eoglish general could not believe 
his adversarg would thmw himseIf with only tlibty thousnnd 
men into tlie valley o£ the Ebro, unlm mre of aid from 
Suchet ; but tbat gened's movements indicated s deterha-  
tion to remnin in Gatalanin, Sonlt thought I'ampeluna, in 
extremity and knew Xebastian was not so; lveuinghn knew 
Pampeluntt was not in extremity, and previow t o  the msauIt 
thougl~t Schstian was; hence the opemtions ~hgainst his iiglit, 
t h e i ~  fdl scope not lmown, appeared a feiat, snd he judgeed 
the real effort would be t o  tlirow bridge8 wer the Bidassao 
and mise tlie siege o€ 5m Sebastiau In the ni& mrrect 
intclligence of the Maya annd RoncevalIes nffairs arrived. 
Soitlt's ~iroject wau tIien de~eloped, and Grabam was orderd 
to tnrn  tI~e siege into a blockade, to embark his p n s  and 
atores, and be ready to join Giron on a position o€ b&le 
marked out nenr tlie Bidassort, Cotton waa ordered t a  mom 
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the caralry np to Pmpeluna, O'Doonel mas to hold his Spsnish 
troops ia readiness, iind Wellington having arwnged fresh 
lines of correspondmce proceded to Estevan. 
%%le the ernbarkatien of tlie g u n ~  and storea was going 
on jt ,S essential to bold the posta at Vera and EclialIar; 
D'Erlon's object waa not then pronoun~tl; and once in possea- 
sion of t l~ose place8 he could npproacli San Sebwtian by the 
m d s  lcading over the Pena de Haya, a mcky monntain behind 
Lcsaca; or by tlie dcfiIes of Zubietta md Gogzueta leading 
ronnd that mountdn from the valley uf Lerina. Wherefore 
in passing tllrough Estevan on thc marning of the 36th,Wel. 
lington directed Pnclt to pard the brlílges over tlie Bidassoa; 
but whcn he reaclied Iructa, snw thc state of Stewart's 
divisiun and h w d  tliat Picton had rnarched from Olague, he 
disected al't the t r oop~  within his reach upon Pampelun4 indi- 
cnting the valley of h n r  as thrj general line of movcmcnt. 
Of Pictonk position and intentions notliing porii- 
ManuperIpt tive was lrnom ; hut: Wc.llington, ~upposing Ern Xotes by tha 
to havo joined Cole at Linzoain as indced hr: liad, 
~ ~ i , " ~ , +  Sud,@ tlieir combined forcea would be suíñcient 
to check Soult irntil assistance mme from the centre or from 
Pampelunn, nnd Iie so advised Hcton the evening of  the 26th. 
h conscqucnco of tliocc o r d ~ n  tlic seventh division aban- 
doned Eclinllw in the night of tmlle 26th, md the sixth clivision 
quittcd Srtn Estevan rat duylight tbe 27th. Ilill lialteri on tba 
l ie igb of I m t a  uutil the e~ening of tlie %7tb, liut marclied 
during tha night tlirougli the pnss of Vellate upon tlie tuwü 
of  Lana. Tlle light division, qiiitting Vera alsc un thc 27tli, 
retired by hsam to tlie sunirnic of tlie h n t a  Cruz mountaiti, 
overloolting tha valley of hriins; there it haitetl-tu vover t l ie 
pass of Zubieta until hngaS,a"a Spnisrds blocked tlie mads 
leading over the Pena dc Huya to protect tke emliarkation of 
the guns on tliat flank. Tliak aliject eKected, tlie clivkion was 
to tlirend the pases, reaclrZecumberri on tlw p a t  road of  Imr- 
zun, aacl so connect Graharn ~ v i t l i  tlie army r~und  P q e l u n a ;  
for Wellington deaigned, if unablc to cover that fortresq t o  
tlirow his army back upon i t s  left on a new line covering t t e  
apprmE1 es to San Eebastian. Tliese movements aprelrd fear 
snd confusion fw and wide. Al1 the narrow valleys and roads 
were crowded with bagapge, commiasarint dores, artillery and 
fugitive fmilia; and report~i of the most alnrrning nature were 
as usual rife ; emh di~qion,  ignorant of whnt bad really hap- 
pend t o  tlie other, dreaded tlint some o!? the numerow mis- 
fortunes relatcd might be true; none Irnm what to expect or 
where they were to meet tl:o enemy, and ona universal liulibub 
filled the wiid regions througli which the French army WAS 
miw worlring it4 f icry path towmds Pampeluunn. 
D'ErlonYa inactivity gnve grcat unminesa to Eoult, who 
repeated the arder to puuli forward by liis left whatever miglit 
he tlie force opposcd, and thris &mnIiite& he advanced to 
Elizondo on the 27th ; but thinlring the sixth cliviaion WRE 
su1 st %n Eñtevnn, i i g h  Iialtd.  Nmt &y, ~vhcn Hill 
retrmted, he follomed thmugh th8 pnss of lTclhtg ltnd hk 
fnrthcr progress belonp to othcr combinations. 
Pi&u having msumed commnnd in the TrsI Zubiri the 
26tl1, rctirotl: bcforc ílm thc 27th and without the hopc or 
intention of covering Pampeluna Soult followed in the 
marning, having firrrt sent sconts towards the ridgcs where 
Camphcll's troops l i d  nppenred the ercning befnre. ReilIe 
rnarclid by thc lcft back uf the Gep r i~-cr> ClnuseI by t.hc 
right bnnk, thc cavalry amd ar t i l l c~  closed thc rear, thc whole 
in compnct order : tlie nmow vallcy ww thus prged with 
trotipa, ra hasty bickm of musketry done marking tbo separa- 
tion of the hostile forces. The g~irrison of hmpelnns made 
a d l y ,  and O'Donncl in p t  ñlam spiked wme af his gung 
(Festroyed I i ia  rnltgmines, and would llave surered a rlisster 
if Carlos &España hd not fertunatdy arrived at the moment 
and checkerl tlie garrimn. G~eat now was the dxnger. Cole, 
first cmerging from tlie vibllg of Zubiri, hd passed Villalb,lba, 
three miles from Pampdun% in retreat ; Picton 
" mwas at l3u8.de, and O'Donners Spaniards were in pngc 109. 
confosion ; in fine Soult was al1 hut successful mhen 
f-icton suddenly turned on some skep ridges, whieh, undcr 
the names of Xan Miguel, Mont Esca~n and &n Christovñl, 
crossml tlic mauthg of tlie Zubiri and Lanz valIeys and 
screened Pampeluna. 
Posting liis own di~ision on tbe figlit of Huarte, he pra- 
longed Iiis line ta tlie left with Morillo'm Spnniards, called 
pon O'Dsinnel to support him, and dlrmted CoIe to occupy 
m e  heiglits betmeen Orimin and brletta. But t1int general 
unving with a snrer eye obseired a salient hill rieiir Zditalrliceb, 
oiie niile in admnce and carnmanding the rond to Biiade, 
dcmanrFcrI snnd obtnined pemi~sion to m u p y  it instcad of 
tlle lieights first rtppointad. Two Spanish regimcnts o£ tlic! 
l i l o c l í ~ l i ~ g  troop~ were still thcre, nnd tonnrds tliern Cole 
rlircctcd I i is course. Soult hnd also rnarketl tliie hiI1. A dc- 
tacliment issuing from the motitli of tlie Vol de Zubiri wna in 
ful1 cnrccr t o  scize ft, and tlic hustifc masscs mcre rapi<lly 
rtyiproncbing the aummit on eithcr side when the Spnniarh, 
seciug tlic British so close, vindicaterl their own post by a 
sutlrlen clinrge. TLis was for SouIt tlie strolce of fate. Ris 
tlwbla coluinns, just then emerging exultant from tlio nnrrow 
~ ~ J l e y ,  were sudrlenly stopped by ten tlioiisarid men d e r  
Cok, \dio crowoed t he  suminit of tlio mounhin in h i ~  front; 
and tlvo miles furtlier h k  stood Pictoii witli a greater 
niimber, fur O'Doiinel Eind now Ldcen post on 3filurlllo'~ left. 
Ta sdraiice by Villnlbz xnd Eluerte \vas iinpossihle, to stand 
stiIl mas dangmous; tIic nniiy, coiitmcted to ri span in front 
and cldt in its wliole leilgtli by tlie river Quy, was  compressed 
on cacl~ side by the mountnins, \vIvriicli in thnt part nnrrowed 
the valley to a quarter of a mile. It was a moment uf difi- 
cuIty, but %ult, iikc a p a t  and rendy ccommander, instantly 
shot the hmd of Clausel's columna to Lis riglit acrosc the 
ridgc separating the Tal de Zubiri from the Val de Lanz; 
nnd at tlie a m e  time threw ane of Reille's divi- Soiilt,i 
sions af  infnntry and a body of cavalry across the n.spnüence. 
rnonntains on liis le& beyond the Gny river, tu ""- 
fnr as thc viIlage o€ Elcano, t o  menace Picton's rigl~t at 
Xiiiirte. Bis remiuning dicisions were estprlilisiied at Zxbal- 
rlim in the Tal de Zirbiri, close under &le's riglit, and CIauseI 
scixet? Gnriroren close under tlirst pneral's left. 
T1'Iiile Soirlt \vas tlim formlng Iiis line of battle, Wcllingtoii, 
' d i o  hsd qiiit,~d Hill's quurterri in the Rastnn early on tlie 
%'ltli, mas descending tho valley of Lnnz, uunabIc 
to lenrn nnything of Picton'c movmcnts ar posi- 
"!whq 
tinn; nnd in this ~ t a t e  of uncertainty he reaclied 
Ostiz a Few miles from Sauroreri, ~vheri! he fuurid L ~ n g  t v i b  
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the liglit cnvalry mhich hnd furnished tlle podita of corre 
dence in tlie rnonntains. These leasning that Picton 
aliandoned Linzoain and was rnoving on Runrte, he Iej 
quarter-master-gencrnl mith instnictions to stop alI tlie tt 
ooming down the vallep of h n z  unti1 tlie stnte of ~ f f ü i i  
Iluarte aliould be ascertaimd. But at racing speed lie 1 
for Eauroren himself, and enterixlg that Pillnge ssw Chusei 
corning aloug tbe creat r>f tlie muuutnin, and knew tlie ~illied 
tmops iu tlie valley of h n z  were intercepted. Piilling iiy 
his Iiorse Iie mote  on the parapet of tlie hriclge of Suur 
fresli iil~trtictjuns to turn everytliing from tliat  all ley un 
rod mhich, througli Lixttseo and 3larcalaii1, led liehinrl 
hiEEs to Oricain in rear of Cole's position: lord Fit-__, 
Somerset, Qie only staff-ofticer who liad Itept np witli Iiim, 
plloped arith these ordcrs out of Sauroren by onr! road, tlie 
Frcncli light cnvnlry d m h d  in by nnother, nnd the English 
pncrnll rndc done up the mount.nin to rench liis troops. 
of Ca~npbcll'~ Portugieae hxttaliolis Rrst dcscricd Iiim 
mised a joyfiil cry; then the ghrill clnmour, canglih irp Ii? 
eext rcgimeiits, soon meIled as it run dong tlie line 
tliat stern appalling shout whicli the Eritish s01dit.r is mt 
to give upon the edge of battle, and wliich no enemy el 
heard unmoved. Suddenlp he ~to l~ped  tit a conspicuous poii 
for he desired both armies should know Iie vas there, annt 
double spy who was present pointed out SouIt, wlio wns 
aear tliat bis features coulrt be distinguislied. Attentivt 
WellinGon fixed his g e s  upon tliat forniidalifei man, and 
if spealting to liiincelf said, F d e r  2s a p m t  m m a d  
lrut ?M ia cautim, amd will delay /¿;a atta& to mcwtafn 4 
rnw qf ibetw clwer~;  tAa¿ d t  S;ve time fw tF@ &tJ¿ 
#u a&w~ a& 1 #hall beat 7~im' bnd the E'rendi gene 
mnrle no seriona attnck that dg! 
Cole's position was the foremost ridge of s mass of mor 
baina filling the spnce bctwecn thc Guy and the Lane ri~trs, 
as far baclc BR Ruarte nnd Tillalha. Highcst in tlic centre> it 
waa boldly detincd towards the cnemy; but the tmce mas 
irregular; the n'glit being throm baclr towards tlre village af 
Arletta so as to flank the mad to  Buarte; which w.rves also 
wept by some guns placed on a lower range, connecting the 
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i4g ? with Picton and Aforiilo. OverIooking Xrilid- 
dic : Guy, was the bulging hiIl vindicated by tha 
Spm"ír[ls; ~t WBFI on the rigl~t, of the fourth division and 
dintiiiet, h i t  connected with the centre of the ntnge an(l 
considembly lower. The left of the position wils 'extremely 
rugqed and steep, overlooking the Lanz river and tlie rcid to 
TTillnlbir. Roas's hripcle of the foiirtli divi~ion wftq posted 011 
tlirat &de, having in front a Portngyese bnttaIion whotie flank 
rested on a smdl chapel. Camphell mas on tlie nght of Ross. 
Anson mas on the Iiighwt groiind, prtly hehind and partly 
on the right af Campbeü. Bpg aas on a second mass of 
Iiills in reaerve, 8nd the Spnisli hill wm reinforced by a 
battnlion of the foiirth Portupese regirnent. 
T h i ~  front of brtt8tle being l m  thnn two miles wm welt fillerl. 
The Lanz and Giiy torrents washed the flanks, iind two milee 
further d o m  broke througli tlie crossing rirlges of San Miguel 
and Chriabval ta meet heliind them ~ n d  form tbe diga river; 
on the ridges tfiils cleh Picton's line was fomed, nearly 
parallcl to Colda but on s more extended front. E s  left waa 
at 'Hnwrt, his right strengtliened with a battery, stretclied to 
tlie villege of Eürnitz, covering more tlian n mile of ground on 
thrrt flank; Morillo prolonged hia lcft nlong tlic mfit of Snn 
3iipiel to VillaIlrix, and O'Donnel continiied the line to  San 
Cliristoval. C d o s  d'Fxpnña'~ division maintaincd the hlockde, 
aiid tlie British cavaly iinrler Cotton, eoming up from Tafnlla 
nnd Olite, took post, tlie heavy hripdes on some open grciiind 
hrliind Ficton, tlie humrir brignlido on 11;s right: t l i i~ second 
Iinc cntircly barred t1ie openings of the two vallcya lwding 
dovn te P~mprlirne. 
Sriiil t ' ~  position wris dso a mountain filling the aprtce between 
tlic two rivem. It W M  even more mg,d than the ~llies' 
niountain, and thcy merc only sepnrutcd by e niarrow valley. , . 
Clausci'a tlircc divisions lcanccl to tlic rigl.lit on tlic villagc of 
S~urorcn, whicli wna down in the vdley of Lanq closc under 
tlie diapel beight where the left of the fourth clivision IVW 
posterl. His left wns proIonged by ttwo of lEeille's divisiong 
~vlvlio also occupietl tlie villnge of Zabaldicn in tlie vulley of 
Zubiri under tlie riglit of tlie allies, Tlie remnininq division 
nf tliis wing alid e divisio~ of cavdry were, as bpfore statd, 
Q a 
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ins, also fe11 into the d l e y  of h n x ,  but near Oricain oilc 
ile bchind Golek lcft. 
It; was by lfarcalain Wellington expected tlie sixth nnil 
soventh di*ons, liut the rapidity rvjth wliicL Eoiilt seized 
Stlusoren caused a dclay of eigliieen houra. Por tlio sixth 
division, having reaclied O l a q e  in tl ie vaIlg of Lanz at oue 
o'cloclr on the 47th, hdted tliero until four, and thm, folluwing 
tha orders brouglit by lord Fitzroy Xomerset, marched by 
Lixmisuo to ~ a i n  tlie &Iarcalain r o d ;  but the grwt lengtll of 
tliese mouiitaiii marcliea, aad hhe heavy starrn wliicli ter~iii- 
natcd the rtction at Zabaldicra, sweeping witii equnl violence iii 
tliis direction prevented tlie fxoops from passiug Lizasso tliat 
niglit. Slie march was renewed at daylight, nnd rneaii~vl~ile 
ni11 reached the tomn o€ Lauz, where he mllied Long's cnvnlry 
rind his o ~ m  artillery mind moved likevrjse upon Lixasso. At tliat 
place he met t1ie seventh division coming fibom fian E x t m ,  
and Iinving restared Barnes's Pirigade'ta Jord Dalliousie took 
n. poitinn nn a ridgc ccorering t,he road to llnrcnlain. She 
sevcnth division being on his rigiit WRS tlien in rnilitnry com- 
municr~tion with the sixth division, niid thus Ilrelliiigton's left 
cot*ered tlie ~ e n t  road lcnding from PamgeIunn by Irurziin t,n 
Tolosc. Thcsc importnnt movemcnts, wliicli lvcro not eorii- 
pleted until the evening of tlie B t h ,  brought six tIioucnnrl 
incn into tlis allies' Iine of battle, md fifteen tlion~iiiid more 
iuto rnilitary communication with tli~ir left: yet D'Erlon re- 
irixiued libuted in his poaition of olimwation mar Eiixoiidii 
witliout a movenient ! 
Wctlington consiílering tlie nearness of 8ie sirtli rlivision, 
and tlie certainty of Hill's juiiction, irnagined Soult would 
not venture m attnck; and itruly ihat marslid, disqiiieted 
about D'Erlon of whom he only knew tliat he liad not fot- 
lowed his instructiona, riewed the strong position of his 
ndveruary with unerasy anticipatione. A p i n  witli nnsious 
eyes he took copiznnco of al1 its ruged. strength> ,li,~id 
seemed di~bious and distriistf~~l oof his fortune. He could not 
oyicrate witli tidvnntrige hy hia own left. beyond tlic Gi~p 
Aver, Iiccause tlie mountnins there icere too rougli, nnrl Wcl- 
lington hving sliorber lincs of  movement muld nicet him 
witb aii arms combin~l; the Freneit artillery slso uuaUe to 
emerge from the Val de Zubiri, would Lxve Seen exposer 
counter atta&. He orossed tEie Lanz nver and asccnde 
prolongation of t l~e allies' ridgo? wIlicli, a8 be had pos se^^^ 
of tlie br id~e of Sauroren, ~ a s  for tlia moment Lis 
p n n d .  Fmm thence he conld ses the 1eTt nnd rew of 4 
position, and down the vaIIey as fw ns Villalba; bu 
coilntry beyond t.he ridge tomrds MnrcnInin was too broken 
to disccrn tlie mnrch of the siath division. He 
"SS'- knew Iiowever frorn the dcsertcrs that Tcl-  
oivu 
:ole's 
t tlie 
lington expccted four fresh didsiona from tliat aide, that *tia to 
my, the smotid, sixth, and seventli Rritish, and Silveir!:~ 
Portupese diGaion, whicli almp mmlied witb Bill. TIiis 
I tnowl~lge  and tlie nxtiire of the ground detemined bis: 
~ttack.  The valley of Lanz, pwingwider M it desoendctl, 
offered the nenns of assailing the allies' leB in front and rear 
at onn moment; and the same coinbination wonld cut off the 
reinforcements expected from the side of Marcalain. One of 
Clausel's divisions occupid Xtiuroren, t l ~ e  other two were ozi 
m11 side of thab d l a g e ;  thrat on the right harid was ordered 
to throw hnkers on the ridge from wlience Soult was ttzkiiig 
his obsmntions, to move in one body to a convenient difi- 
tance down the valley, and then, wlieeling to its left, asssil 
the renr of tlie alEiea' Ieft flank wliile the other two divisions 
assailed Lis front. Cele" left, wIiicli did not exceed five 
tliouatind men, would thus be enveloped by sktcen thonsarirf, 
mnd Soult expeded te crusli it notwithatandig the strengtli 
of the ground. Reille's two divisione advancing on t i e  side 
cif Zalilitildica, were eacli to send a brigade against tbe Spanish 
hill now occupied by the fortietb regirnent; khc right o f  tliin 
nttnek rvns to be connected lvith the left of ClnuaeI; the 
rcmaining I-rrigndes wcre dosely to support tIie aqmiIing 
mwsce; tlie divisions beyontl the Guy werc ta keep Pieton in 
check; and SouIG, hnvjng no time t o  Iosc, ordcred his licn- 
tentints fa tlirom t,heir troops at once into netion 
Fi~pt Iinttk af Sawwe?a.-It was fought on the fotirtii 
anniversxry of tlic bnttle of  Talavera. 
About mid-dity the Frencli gnthered at the foot of t h  
position, and their skirmisliers spread aver the face of tlie 
momtain working upward like a coaffagration; but tlie 
columns of attsck were not $1 picpred mhen Clnii~ei's divi- 
don, t o o  irnpnticnt t o  nwiait thc gcncrnl dgnrtl of hattle, threw 
aut its ffanlrcrs on tlie ridge beyond thc river and pushed 
down t l ~ e  valley of Lnuz in one mnss. Witli a rapid pace it 
tiimed Cole's ieft, and ms preliaring to wheel up on Es rw, 
when s, Portugese brigads o€ 81s sixth division, suddenly 
alipeafig on tlie ridge beyond the river, drove tlie Freuch 
fl:tnltm back and iristantly descended with a ruttIing fire 
upon tLe right and rear af tlie column in tlie valley, Nearly 
at the same instant the m ~ i u  h d y  of tbe sixth division, 
einerging from Jieliind tlie saine ridge near tlie viiiage of 
Oricin, furmerl in order of httle across the front. It mas 
tlie counter-stroko of Salamanca l Tlie Frencli wliile ~itriving 
to  encompus the Ieft of the allies were tli~mselves encom- 
pnssed; for two brigndes of the fourtli division turned nnd 
smote them on their left, tlie rortugueae smote them on tlieir 
right; and whiIe tlius scatlied on Loth flanks witL fire tliej~ 
were vioIently shocked wnd puslied back with a mighty for,e 
by tlie sixth division-not in fliglit bornever, bnt fighthg 
fiercely and strewing the ground with their enemies' bodiea 
as weii 8 8  with $heir own. 
Clausel's second clivkion, seeing this dire cona iet, with a 
hurrietl mavemwt assaiIeri tbe cliopel Iieight to draw ofi the 
fire from tlie h o p s  in t h ~  ~ l l e y ,  and gallantly did the 
French soldiera throng up tl~e c q g y  ~teep;  but the general 
nnity of tlie att,lclr 1vm mined; neitllcr tlieir thirtl division 
nor Fhillc's brigdcs had yet received the signa1, and the 
attacks wliich :hRlioiild hnve been simultaneous wem made in 
siicccxsion, rirnning from rig1:lit t~ lcft as tlia neccssity o€ 
g i v i n ~  nitt h m m c  nppnrciit. It 7m.q h01ivcver it terrible hattle 
md ivell fouglit. One coIumn d a r t i n ~  out of tlie villnge of 
Sattroren, ~ilently, gstmly, without firing a diot, mrked up 
t o  tfie chape1 under n teinpest af biillcts, wliich swept away 
whole ranlcs witliwt nliuting tlie speetl ananrl ~ioivw of tlie 
mass. TLe seveatli cncadores slirunlr aliaslid and tkat part 
o£ tLe position Tvas won; but soon tliey ral1ied on Ross's 
brigade, and tlie wliole mms charging the French witb a 
loud ahont daslid tliem down the 3ii11. EeaPily stricken 
thcy were, yet unibrnayed, for reforrning helow they apio 
m n d e d  to be ap in  brolren and mst down. Bu€ the other 
coIumns of attnck were now bearing npwards throngli +.he 
m o k e  nnd flame mith which the sl&misliem hnd eevcred thc 
fme of the mmntrain, and the tenth Porbupwe r~,nirnc 
fighting on the 14ghg;ht of  Rocds brigadc $clded to  their fu 
Thns A c0111mn cromed t.he heights nnd mheeling qninst f 
exporred flank of &SS forced that pl lant  officcr alno to 
hack, and liia ground was instantly oceiipied by tliose w 
whom h~ h ~ d  been enpgeil in front, Tlie fight then ni? 
clme and desprate on the cm* of the position, charge SL, 
ceeded charge, and each side yielded nnd mllied by tnms; yet 
tliis wtountling &ort of French valour availed not. Wel- 
lington brought Byng'~ bririg~de forw~rd at ir running pace, 
and sent tlie twenty-seventli and forty-eiglith Eritish, of 
Anwn's bripde, from the Ugher ground in the centre apinst 
the  cromded masses, roiiing them b a c h r d  in disorder, and 
throwing them cine afier tlie other violently down tbe moi 
tun side; and mitL no child'u play, for the two Britrsh re 
rnents fe11 upon the enemy three sepamte times with t 
bayonet, and lost more than hlf  their own numliers. 
During ibis battle on lthe mounhin-top, the British brigades 
of the aixth division, strengthend by a httery of pns ,  
gained ground h the valIey of Lanz and arrivd on the same 
front with the left of tliu vichrious troops about the chapel. 
Wellinson, eeeing the momentary disorder of the eneniy, 
then ordererl Mnddcn's Portupese brigade, which hnd nwer 
ceoaed its fire ngaiast the right flnnlr of the Frcnch column, 
to  nssd the village of Xauroeen in the renr; but thc stnte of 
tlio &ion in othcr parts and tho cxhaustion of the troops 
soon induced him ta muntermand t.his movement. hielcn- 
while Reille's brjpdes, connecting their right with tlie left of 
LTauqel'~ third divieion, had environed the fipanish hill, 
had asoentled it uncliecked, antl at tlie moment the foiirth 
division was so hardly pressed m d e  the regiment of E1 Pravia 
give way on the lefi of the fortieth. A Portu p e s e  battalion 
rushing fomrd  covered the flank o€ tlitit invincible regment, 
which waited in stern ~iIence util tlie French set tlieir feet 
upon tlie brmd mmmit; but then when their gliktering arms 
aypeared over tlie brow of the mountain tlie cliarging cry was 
h e a 4  the cromded masa mas bmken t o  pieces, and a ktempest 
of h l l e t s  followed its Right. Four times this assault was 
renewed, md the French officers were Been to pul1 up ttieir 
tired men by tlie belts, so fierce rtnd resolute tlicy w e e  to 
win; yet it m s  tho labonr of Sysiphus, tho vehmenf shouf 
and d~ihack of the Rritilrh rioldier always premiled; and at last, 
with tliinnerl ranke, tired limbs, hewts fainting rsnd hopelm 
froin rcpentcd fnilures, thcy wera so abmhed that hhree Rritisli 
compnnies ~uficed to henr down a wl~ole bripde. Anrl whilo 
thc hatQe mas thus heing fought on tlie mountnin, tho Frcneh 
cavalry beyond the Guy river pnssed a r i ~ l e t  and with e fire 
of carbines forced the tenth huasers to yield some mcky 
grmnd on Pictan'~ right; yet the eighteenth liurrsars, havitig 
better f i r e a m  tliart tlie tenth renewsd tlie combat, killed 
two oíEcers md &ove tlie Fr~eiicli wer the rivuleh agigin. 
Xucli were; the leding events of this sanguinary struggle, 
which Wellington, fresli from the fight, witli. hornely empliasis 
wlled ' blecrlgem vmk.' TWO generals and eighken hnndred 
men h d  been killed ar wounded on the Frcnch side, followiug 
their officid neports; a number far belom the estimate made at 
the time by the allies, mhose Ioss amounted t o  tmo thousand 
six hundmd. But these diacrepancics between liostile d c u -  
lations ever oocur, and there L little wkdorn in disputing 
mliere proof is unnttrtinrtble ; but the numbm rnctudl y 
engaged were o€ Frencli twenty-five thoumnd, uf tha allies 
Gwelve thousannd; and if fhe strength of the latter's positioii 
did not save tliem from tho greater lo= their stdfast courage 
ia to be tlic more ildmired. 
On the 29th the armim rcsted in p i t i o n  without firing a 
ahot, but the wandering divisions on both sirics m r o  nom 
entering the line. 
Bill, having sent al1 his bqgnge aartillery md wounded 
rnen to Berioplano behind thc Christoml ridge, still occupied 
his strong grounrl 'tiotmeen Lizmaseo and Arestepi, oovering 
the Ihrculnin ani.1 Irurzun roa& and menacing tlmt Ieadiiig 
from Limo to  Olague ia mar of Sodt's ~ g h t  : tEs commu- 
nication d h  OÍicaiin wmas miutrained by t.he seventk clivision, 
snd tlie liglit division mas approaching his left, On ITrelling- 
tanas side tlie crisis mas over. Re had vinciicated his positiun 
6 t h  onIp Ixteen tbousand combafantei; and now including 
tlie troops of blockade he had fifty t h o u ~ n d ~  tn-enty thousanrl 
being British, in clase mili* combination: thirty tbousand 
were in hmd, and Rill was well placed for retaliing tlie offen- 
sive, Soult'a situation w i i a  proportionably diñlcult. He hd 
~ e n t  bis srtillery, part of Iiis mvnlry and bis vrounded men 
back to France immedintdy after tlie buttle; tlie tmo former 
to join Vilhtte on tha loiver Bidassors. Thns rdieved he 
awaitert D'Erlon's arrivd by the vdley of Lanz, and tliat 
gene~d readied Ostia ia few milee abov~ Saumren at mididnay 
on the 29tl1, bringing intelligence, obtained indirectly during 
his march, that Graham hod retired fram thc Bidmsoa and 
Villette hnd crossed that river. This made Soult think hiils 
opcrntiona hml discngaged St. Schnstinn, and he instmtl- 
deviaed n ncw scheme, tlangerons indeed but confomable 
the critienl ~ t n t e  of affnirs. .Tud$ng it hopelcria t o  rcnew t 
battie, he wna weme ta retire wIien he liad been reinforc 
with eiphteen thonsand fre~1i men; he m yet unnble 
remain, becmse hia supplies, derived from distant rnagzir 
by slow and s d l  aonvays, were iincqiilil t o  tlie consrimptic 
Two-thirds of the British troops the greatest 
Soalt, MSS. part o£ the Portirguese and al1 the S p a n d e  
were, he mpposed, in his front under Wellington, or on his 
right; flank under Hi11, and otlier reinforcements were pro- 
bal-ily on the marcli; wherefore he resolved to prolong his 
right with D'Erlon's corps, anrl cautiously drawing off the rest 
of his army place h i e l £  between the aliies and the Bastan, 
in military connexion with Lis reserve and closer to his frontier 
magaeinea. Thus posted md able to comline al1 bis troops 
in one operation, he expected to relieve San Xebmtinn entirely, 
md proiit from &e nenF state sf affairs. 
In tbis vim, one division of cnvalrg passed over the posi- 
tion fm tlie Val de Zubiri to tiiat of Lanz and joined 
I)"hIon, who mns ordered t o  mztr~h early on tlis 30th by 
Etulain npon Litiarisso, and to send acouti~ig parties tawards 
Letmsa and Irurmn, and on al1 the roads lending upon Pam- 
nPlan 6, peluna. Durjng the night tlie otlier division of 
p. 19%. cavalry and Ln Mrartiniere'g infnetry, both fit 
Elcano on the cxtrcme lcft of tlic French army, rctired over 
ie mountnins by Illtirdos t o  Eugui, En tlie upper part of the 
'a1 de Ziibiri, beving ortIers to cross tlie eepar~ting ridgo 
..ieibe, t o  enter tlis vnlloy of h n z  and join D'KrIon. Rrillq 
mnrcl~ing by t.Iie crest cl tlie poaition from Zabnlrlica to tlie 
vilfage rif Sñuroren, wa gradually to relieve Clniisel, who wna 
fo mksfierntile his trovps beliind Suroren tomards Ostia, tlius 
following D'Edoii and to be liimself followsd Iiy h i l l e .  
Clansel, to cover these movmnents rtnd maiiitain bis con- 
nexion with D'Edon, placed fmo regiments on t l~e  Iieiglits 
beyond the h m  river; but he was to hold oxi to neille rlitlier 
tlinn D'Erlon iintil tlie former liad completed his d~tngerouei 
flank mnch amoss Welfin4$on7s front. 
In  tlie night 80ult. beartl from deserters, t h ~ t  tliree dirisianzr 
were to malre an offensive movement towarrls Lizascn on the 
30t11, ~nrl wlien rlqlig1;lit cnme lie wne convincerl the men 
apolre trirly; because frnm R point beynnrl &iirorcn, he dis- 
cerned coftimna dcsccntling tlic ridjit: of Cliristovxl and the 
licights nbovc Oricain, otliers iii n~nrcli on ra mirlc swccp 
appamntly to trirn Claitsci's riglit. Tliese were ñlorillo'e 
Sp:ininrds, Cnmpliellk Portuguese and tlie swenth division; 
tlio fonner rqjuiiiing HilI to ivl~om tliey belonged, tlie others 
adnpting tlienisclves to a new line of lruttEe wli icl~ sliall be 
preserill y e q l  sin erl. 
At six o'cloclr in tlie morning Foy's division of hille's 
ctirps s a s  in mnrcli from Zabnldica toivarrls Ssiiroren, d e r e  
Maucune tiratl alreatlp rcl ieved Conrour ; the Iittter, Iielonging 
t o  Qaugel, ws muving up the valley ot' Lanz, and Ctausel, 
witb exccption of the two flniiking regiments befoiv mentfo.icd, 
hnd concentrnted Iiis mmainiiig divisions Iietween OIiibe and 
Ostiz. 111 this stnte of affairs IVelEington opened Iiis tnttcries 
from the chape1 heights antl sent dovn sl<irmisbcrs against 
Snurcircn. V e v  ~ o o n  tlris bicliering of rniisltet.ry spred  
tnwards the ridit, bccumiiig hrinlc lwtivcen Cole snrl Foy? 
 hile i t  ~ub~irIer1 at ~aurorcn; litit &uIt rclying on thc grcnt 
streiiqtli of liis pnsition, ortlrrcd h i l l c  tn rniiiiitnin it until 
evcning nnd m-cnt oíT at a gnllop to join D'Erlon. Pon,rs 
Ris dcsign was tt~ fnll witli siilierior num1iei.s I ~ P J I O T ~ ~  
upon tlie divisions he supl>osed t o  Iic turnitig Iiis ""- 
riglit aud crush tliem, a daring projeck and well conceived; 
bu€ he had to deal with s man whose rnpid perception and 
roi~gb Fjtrolce rendcred the p m e  danngerous. 
Cdcrt of Bma. -Sou l t  fonnd WRrlon, mho harl entered 
the Ulxema valley, rnalhg dispositiona t o  attack Hill between 
1311- md Are~~tegui; and the lattu having only ten tliousand 
fighting men, induding Long'a cavalry, occirpied a very exten- 
sive mountain ridge. Es right was strongly posted on rugged 
ground, Imt the left, prolonged towards Buenzq r a s  infiectire; 
and D'Erlon, who hrid nof less than twenty thoum~iid sabres 
and bayonets was fdlowed by La Martiniere% ditision of 
infantry nom coming from Lanz: Soult's combinrttion mas 
therefore extremdy powdd.  The Iight troops were already 
engaged mhen he arrived, and tLe same soldiers, on both sidw, 
who had so strenuously coaliated ati Maya tlis 25th were 
again epposcd in figL:tit. D'Amagnw waa to make a false 
attmk upon Bill's riglit; AiiliE, eaerging by Limsso, wns to 
turn tlie le'& and gain the suminit oT the rridgei in t h e  direction 
of Biiwm; Maranzin followed AIibEi, and tlie cal-a1 y mip- 
ported wnd connected the two a t t a d ~ ,  Tlie iaction was brifilr 
nt both points, but D'Armaggc, pu~hing his feint too fnr, 
bemme seriously e n w d  aud WUR beaten by Da Costa nnd 
As:i\vorth's Portupese, giided by a pnrt of the twenty-~iglith 
British regiment. Nor were the Frcnch &t. first more sncsess- 
fui on thc othcr flanlr, being rcpentedly repulsd; Abl)B liow- 
ever finnlly turned the poition, p i n d  tlic summit of the 
rnounhin and dendered it untenahle. Rill Iost foiir Iiirndred 
men and retired to the heigbb o€ Yguarm Iichind Ai~estcpi mrl 
R c r ~ i n ,  thus d m i n g  tomrcls Ifarcalaini with his rigiit nnd 
tlirowing hnckhis left. Tbcre, unitingeith Campbell~nd~Iorillo, 
Fie ~gztin ofered b ~ t t l e ~  but Sanlt, whose principal lms ww in 
D'Amzynac's diviaion, had gained his main ohjcct; 11e liad 
t.rirned Rill, ahtyijned ri freah line of retrent, nnd a, sliorter com- 
munication witli Villatta by the p s s  of Doña Marin; and withal, 
&e grest Irurzun rond t o  Tolom, distant only une league nnÜ 
hlt,B 
a hnlf, was in bis power. His first tliouglit wxs to 
hspatc& ~e ixe  it and march throiigh Lecurnhemi npon 
MS. Taloza, or Andoain and Ernani. There wa9 
nothing to  oppose him except tlie light. division, lvhose mor* 
ments shdl be noticed hermfter; but neitlier he nor Hil 
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knem of ils praence; and Soult thought liimself strong 
cnough to force a way to Bm 8ebastim, there to unite witli 
Villatte and the srtillery, ~ b i ~ h  wa8 now on tlle lower 
Bidmtoa. 
Tliis project m s  feasible. La Martiniere's division, coming 
from Lnnz, waa not ftrr of; Glausei's three divisiona were 
momentarily expected, nnd the rest of lleille's during tlie 
niglit. On the 3 1 st tl~erefore, at least fifty tlioumrl French 
moulcl have hroken into Guipuscoa, thnrsting asirle the lipht 
division in their march and menacing Ch.~harn in reverse 
whiIe Vilillritte attacked him iri front, Tlie countrgr &out 
Lecurnberri was liowever very strong for defence, and TVel- 
lington would have followed; yet scarcely in time; for thoiigh 
he ~ O ~ R W  tlle movement he was ignornnt of Roiilt's atrengtli; 
Sic tiioii$t D'Rrlonk force to bc otfqindly trvo tlivisionn of 
infnntry, and now only reinforced with a tliircl division; 
whcrens it was three divisiona orimnally, and wns now rcin- 
forced by a fourtli division oE infiintry und two of mmlry. 
Rut t h i ~  error did not prevent him scizing with the rapirlity 
of a g e r t t  curnrnander tha decisive paint; of operation, aiid 
giving a couuter-strolie wliich Soult, trustbg to tlie strenglh 
of  Reille's yosition, Iittle expected. 
When La Martiniere's division and tba mm1ry abnndoned 
the mountains above EEcmo, Wellington, ~eeing tliat Zabaldica 
ms also c)vmutitetl, o d e r d  Picton, reinforced 6 t h  t n o  
sqndrons of cavalry ancl a Gattery of a r t i l l e~ ,  to  enter 
tIie m1ley of Znbiri anrl turn the Prench left, d i l e  tlie 
seventh divitiion smept oaer the billa beyand the Lanz river 
upon their right. Tlie mmli  of Campbell md 3ZorilZa insuretl 
tlie cornmiiniwtion with RiF1; and that general mas t o  point 
Iiin mlumns upon Olnpe  rrnd Lanz, . threatening the French 
renr, but meeting with D'Rrlon trw forceil back to Eguaros. 
&!e was to t o ~ n i l  Fopk poaition, yet, recpecting its grcat 
strength, the nttnck waa t o  lic r p l n t c d  by tlie cffoct pmdiiccd 
on the flnnka. Byng's b n g d e  and the sixth division, tlie 
latter having a tiattery of guns and aome squadroiis {if mvalry 
attaclied, were comliinetl to assault buroren. O'Donnel's 
Bp~niards followed the aixth division; Fane'~ horsemen were 
atationed at Berioplano with an advanced post at Irurzun; 
the h e a ~  citvalry remained behind , Hmrte, and Carlos 
d'Elpaña mainhincd the IiIocknde. 
Xeccnd batth of S~]~~~men.-These movements were b g u n  
at dayligllt. Picton's dx-ance on the right mas rapid ; he 
gained tlie Ya1 de Zuliiri and threw hia sltirmishers at once on 
Pofa flank. At t l i ~  samc time general Tnglis, one of those 
veterantns who piircliase every step of promotion with thnr 
Mood, advnncing on the left with onljr five hundred men of 
tbe ~eventli clivision, brolre at one shock tlie tmo French regi- 
ments covcring CInusel's riglit, and rlrove them down into tlia 
valley of Lani+-lie lost indeed one-tliird of liis own inen, liut 
iiistautlg spreading tlie remaiiider in skirmisliing order along 
tlie descent opened R biting fire upon tlie flank of Conroux'e 
clivision, ilieii nioving itp the va1illt.y from Bituroren, and sorely 
amnzerl. and disordered by tliis sudden fa11 of Iwo regiments 
froin tlie. top of tiie mounkiri. into tlie midst of the column. 
Poy nas slill on tlie crest of tlie position between Ztibaldim 
and LSnirraren u t  tEie moment of tliitl dtttack, liut too far of f  t o  
give nid; Iiis own light troops were engaged with CoIe'g 
ñlíimidicrs, antl Ingliri h d  hocn so sndden, tliat I-icfore the 
cvil couId bc ivcll pcrccivorl it was pmst rcmcdy. MTel1in@en 
inntantly piislied tlie ~ i s t . h  clivision, nnw commnnded by Pnlcen- 
liniii, e0 trhc Icft of Sauroren ; and he also uhovcd Ryng'a 
t~riga0e heatllong down from t,he ch~pel lieiglit í lpinst tliat 
v i l l q e .  wliich waa tiefended by Mauciine. Ryn~'s mmuIt wvs 
simultnnenuslp enfarcetl from thc opposite direelion by I b a -  
den's Portiiguese; and the chape1 li~ttery sent i t s  biillets 
crnsliing throii~h tlie hniiaea, or booming up tEievalley towards 
Conmux's column, wliich IngIk, dosely supported by &e 
sevcntli division, never censed to TPX. 
The rillage antl bridge of Sa~ttiirorm tind the straft beyond 
were noic covered d t h  8 pall of smoke, the muskctr~r pealcd 
frequent anri loiid, and tlie tiirnrtlt and affrxy eclioing from 
mountnin t o  mountain fillcd dl tEie vallep. B.pg nrith l iad 
fighting cnrried Srttiroren, fonrteen Iiitndred prisoners mere 
madc, antl tlie Frcnch divisions thus velicmently assailed 
in fr~nt  rand flnnk mere entirely brokcn. h r t  rekmatad up 
the valley towa~ls Clausel d o  was now beyond Ostie; ~izrt 
fled up tlie mvuntain side to  seek a refuge with Foy, ~vho had 
rernaiiied on t l ~ e  siiinmit a Iiel~iIcss pectator of this rout; aiid 
tliuiigli Ilie rnllied tlie fugiti~ea in great nuiubers he lid soon 
to liok to liimselr; for liis skirinishers were driven up 
tlie mountain by Cule's men, and his Feft mas infcsted by 
Sicton's detaclimentri. 'I?ius pressed, he abaarloned Iiis strong . 
position and feii baclr along tlie summit of tlie ridge separat- 
i u ~  hlie two ralleya, nhere the woods enribled him to effect bis 
retreat witliout rnucli loss: yet Iie dared not desoeod into 
eitlier valley, snd tliinking himself entirely mt 08, aent advioe 
of his aitiiation t c l  &ult and retired into tlie dlduides by the 
1 ) ~ s  of Urtiaga. Meanwhile Wellington, pressing up t t e  
wlley of L n z  d r o ~ e  CIRILSC~ ns far as Ol:igue, where he wns 
joined by La Martrtiniere and took a position in the weninq 
cerering the roda  of Lms md Gzasso: tben tlie Englisl~ 
geiieral, wliose pursuit liad been dampd  by liearlng of Hill's 
action, also balted near Ostia. 
Tlie al1ies 'tost nineteen liuntlred men killed and tvounded 
or trtken in tlie fwo battles of this d q ;  of tliese nearly tivdve 
Iiundi~d were Portuguese, tlie soldiera of tliat niition liaving 
borne the bnrnt of Iiotli fiylits. On tlie Frcncli sirle tlie loss 
was enormons. Conroiix'a and 35aticiiiie'~ divisions mem 
completely diaorgtrniaed; Foy, aiigmented tu eiglit tliousnnrI 
meii by tlie fugitiva, nFns entirely separatcJ from tlie mnin 
botly; more tliañ two tlioiimirand men-liarfbecn kkilled or wounrlerl, 
mnriy were dispersed in tlie woods ~.nd rnvines, nnrl tlirre 
thouennrl priiioncrs mcrc tnl~cn. Tliia lilow, joíned to formcr 
Iosses, reclticerl 80111th f i~ l i t ing  men to tliirty-five: tlioitslintl 
of whicli tlio fiftcen thnu.~and iinder Clatiael ntid Rcille werc 
ditipiritccl by dcfcat. Hill's fowe, increwd to fifbeen tlioiisnnd 
by tlie juuction of Morillo ririrl Cnmlihsll, wns in Iiis froiit; 
thirty tliousnnrt were on I~is rcar in tlic vallcy of Lanz or un 
tlie IiiIls nt  ench cide; for Pictoii, frnding na cnemica in tltc 
Vnl dc Zubiri, lid crowncd tlie hcigl~ts in cunjunction ~vitli 
Colc. 
SYelliiigton liad ddncTied aome of ODonriel's S~i:iniards to 
Marcnlain wlien t e  lieurrl V E  HiII's d o n ,  birt lie was not yet 
aware of tlie true state of afairs on tlmt sirle, TIia operations 
7vem foiinded upon tbe notion tliat Soiilt m s  in rettent 
ta~vards tlie Rastan; and he designd to fuilow closely, push. 
ing his o m  left forwartrd to  aupport GwIiam on the Bidiissoa 
-yet, always undemting D'Krlrlen's force, he thougl~t la 
Mtartiniere liad retreated by tlie RoncevnUes rosd; and as 
Foy's coIumn wm numerous and two divisions liad been 
broken .at Sniirorcn, he judged tlie force jmmediately under 
soult t o  he w e k  and madc diq~o~it!one mordingly. The 
~ i x t h  division and tho thideentli Iight dmgoona wme to rnnrcli 
by E11pi to join Picton, who ms directed upon Linzoiiin and 
R o n e ~ v ~ l ~ e s .  Cole wm to desccnd into tlic vdlcy íif L ~ n s .  
W11, mpport~d by t11e Spanimlci at Nnrcdnin, ~ * n s  t o  press 
8oiilt dowlcry, nlmys t t r n i n q  the French righk but dircctirlg 
his own innrch upon h n x ,  from ~ h e n c e  he mns tn aend Cnmp- 
bcll to the ~tlduidea. The sevonth diviqion, ~vl~ich harl Iialted 
on tlie ridgn ktween Hi11 and Vrellin@n, mas to  suffer the 
former to cross its front and t11en mar& for the pass of Dona 
Mar i~ .  
Wellington exptfng SonIt would rejoin Chu~el and make 
for the Bastan by the pws of VelIate, intended to confine and 
presa bim closely in tliat district; biit thc French imrslial 
was in a worse position than his adversary imGnetl, being 
too far advanced towards Buenza to return to Lmz; in finc 
lie was between two hes  and Lad no retreat 6aTe by the pass 
of Doña Mari& Wíierefore calling in ClauseF, nnd giving 
D'Erlon, whose divisions were in good order md unrlisrnayerl, 
the rear-gmrii, he comrnenoed his marcli at midniglit tom& 
the pass. NisciiEef WELS pthering around him. Ord~arn bad 
twenty thousand men ready t o  move vi~ist Villatte, and 
between him and HilI was the light division under Char?es 
Alten. Tlmt general was as before said, on the Santa C m  
moiintniii tlre 27tZ1, but had niarched in tlie evening o£ tlie 
28th t~ giin Lecumherri on the p n t  Imrxun rond; yet from 
some emr or failure of orrlers, for tlie difficulty of commnni- 
&ion m s  gr~cth, he oommeiiced his descent into the valley of 
Lerins too lafe. His lmding brigrule got down with soma 
difficulty and renclid h y z a  beyond tlie great chain by the 
p m  of Ziibieta; but darlrness cnughh the ather brigde and 
tlie troops werc dispersed in that frightful wilderncss o£ woods 
nnd preeipices. Muny madc faggot torclim, md thua moving 
about. the lights served indeed t o  mist tliose who crirried 
tliem, y& misled and bewildererl others mho uaw them rtt a 
distancq-the heiglits snd the ravines were alike studded with 
these smdl fires, a d  tlie soldiers mlling to each otl~er, filled 
the mliole region with their clamour. Thns they continued to 
m e  and shout nntil morning sliowed the face of the monntain 
covered with tired and ~ceittered men and animals, who liad 
not gained half a leagua of ground beyond their ~ t a r t i n ~ - ~ l c e ;  
and it was many hours ere they could be collected to j oin the 
otlier brigde at Leym. 
&en, tlius isolated for three dey~, sent oficera in al1 diiw- 
tions t o  obtain ticlingg and in the evening renewed his marcli 
to Areysa, whew he Lalted without suffering fires ta be lighted 
lest the enemy should difieorer him; but at niglit he moved 
again and. reached Lecumberri on the 30th. At that plwe 
tlie noise of Hill'a battje at Buenzti, was lieard, and the ligllt 
rlivision agnin found itself witliin the syritem of opadons  
directed by Wcllin@on in person; if Soult hatl continited bis 
movement on Irurzun it would hnve been in grent ddrrnger; bnt 
now, he h i n g  in retraat to Dona Mnria, tFie liglit division 
waq a ncw ltnd terrible powcr pIwd in his adver~ary'a 
bn ds. 
It has been shmn how Fop was mrt off and drivcn t o  the 
Alduida, how he Frcnch artillery rtnd pnrt of tlieir cavalry 
were qnin on tlie Bidasaoa; whence Villntte hnd not moved 
thoudi he had ~lrimislied with Longn on thcr heiglits af 
Lesam Sonlt was thus iaolatctl, wiMtut othcr rcsources tlian 
hls o ~ n i  f rmness and ability. Síis retreut by Doñe iilaria wns 
howevor open as far as Snn Estevan, end from thenee hc could 
aseend the Bidsssoa to Elinondo and gain France by the Col 
(le Maya; or go down tlio river towads 1-em by Wuinbilla and 
Y~nzi ,  from wliicb roads Iod over tbo mountairis to the pasafs 
of Echallar: there w a a  also a tfiird mauntain-1vnd leatling 
dkect from Estevan to Zagaramudi and Udax, fiut tou 
rugged for wounded men and hggage, The road to ElizontIo 
was good; that down tlie Bidssaa w a s  a temible ddle,  EO 
contractd abonf the briclges of Y d  and flumtilla thlit a few 
men only could rnarcli abreast. fioult bad therefore to dread, 
that Wellington would by 'Vellate reach Eli7nntlo before him 
and block the p s a g e  there,-that Graham aeizing the rocka 
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at Ynnzi, would bar that pnsqe  and by detachrnents cut off 
the line of Echallar, Then, confined to tho namw rnountain- 
may from San Estemn to Ztigaramiirdi, he would be followed 
hard by Hill, aariailed in rear rand f l d  during the march, 
and perhaps be heded at Urdax by troopa moviag through 
Telltcte, Elizondo and the Col de M a p  
Bis iirst object being to gain Dofia Ykria, he, as before 
stated, moved in the night of the 30tl1, while Wellington, not 
knowing G11e real state of affairs, halted in the vslley of h n ü  
t o  let IIill pass his front and re-enter the Bastan, upon 
wliich valley Byng had slready moved, Wlien Soult's red 
stren@h became known, tIie seventh divisian waa sent to aid 
H111; but Wellington EolPowed Ryng by tiie pass of Tellate; 
and tliinking Alten rnight be at Zuliieta, directed him to hend 
the French if possilile bt San Estevan, at Sumbilla, st any 
point he could attain, h n g a  mas dao odercd t o  come domn 
t o  Ynnei in nid of Alten, Graliam was warned to hold l i s  
c o q s  in hmd, nnd both Picton and Pa1;cnham hnd their 
mutes changed for a timo. 
C& of Bdh M a k - A t  ten o'cloclc in the morning 
Hill overta~k Soult's rw-gunrd, bct~vccn Liznsao nnd the 
Puerto. The seventh division, coming from the hilIs a h v e  
OIape, was already fisceiiding the rnountttin on his Tight, and 
the French only gained a wood on the gummit of the p a ~  
itntler the fire of Htll's p n s :  there hawever tliey tnrned nnd 
throwing out skirmishers d e  strong bnittle, Bewart, leading 
the second division and now for the tbird time eng~ged mitlr 
VErlon$ troops, was again wounded and his first Iiripde 
wm repulsed; Pringle micceeding t o  the comiaand reneired 
tlie fight witb the second brigade and Groke the memp; tlie 
seventli division 6id tlie same on the right and some prjsoners 
were taken : but a thick fog preventd further pursuit and 
the losa of the fitncli in the action ia nnknom, probnbly l~ss 
tlian tliat of tIie allies, which wm ~ h o r t  of four hundred mea 
Tlie seventli division semalned OQ the mountain, Hill fe11 
Imck to Lizasso, and then, EoIlowing his ordera, moved by s 
short niggcd wrty between tlie liasses of  Doña Maria and 
Vellate, aver the great cliain to Alrnnndoz to join Welliugton, 
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he could not return. Then troops and hnggtage got inter- 
rningld, many men fled np the Iiill~i, nnd tlie commanding 
energy of Rouult, whoae personal cxeitions were conapicuous, could 
scwcely prevent a general dispersion; tiaggage f . 1  at every atep 
into the hands of the pursuers, the boldest were disrnayed, and 
worse would have awaited them in front, iT Wellington h d  
been on other pointa well seoonded by bis generals. 
Inatead of taking the first road Ieading from Sumbilla to 
Echallrtr, the h d  of tlie French passed onmard towards tliat 
le~ding from the bridge near Panzi; t h  valley narrowed to a 
mere cleft iii the rocks as tliep advsnced, the Edassoa was o1 
their left, tliere was a tribuhrp torrent t o  m s s ,  and the bridg 
was defended by a Spanish cacarlore battdion, detac'ned £ron 
the heiqhts of Vera liy general ilarceñas. Tlie front was tliu 
as much diaordered as tlie rear, and liad Longa or Barcefia 
reinforced tlie cacadores, tliose only of tlie Freiich wlio liein 
near SumbiIla could hice the road to Echallar would hav- 
mcaped; but the Spunisli generais kept doo f  and D'Erlon 
won th0 defile. Reille's divisions were still to pass, md whea 
they carne up a new eneniy hsd appeared. mis was t,he liglit 
division. The mler  to intercept the French hing receivd 
t he  evening of the Slst, Altcn, repmsing tbe d&les of Zuliieth 
again descended into the deep valley of Lerin~ and reactied 
Elgoriringn nbout mid-dny the 1 s t  of Aupst. He had ther 
morched twenty-four mile& waEi little more than a leape fron 
Xstevna, abont tbe m e  distunce fram Xumbilla, and tli 
Frcnch movement alung tlis Bidaesoa was discovered; bu 
ii~sterarl of marching on Surnliilla he cliimbered. up thc p a t  
mo~intain of Santa Cntz aud made for ths bridge of Ynnn. 
Very m l t y  n.as $110 weather, the monntain stecp nnd h r d  to 
overcome, mnny men fe11 md died convulsed and fmthing nt 
tlie mouth, whilo others, m h o a  spint and atrength had never 
heforrc been quelled, lenned on their mudets iand rnuttered in 
mllm tunw thnt they yielded for the first time. 
Towmds evening nfter inarcliing nineteen consecirtive hours 
and over forby miles of niountrain roads, the hml of the mlunin 
reached the edge of a precipite near the bridge of Yanxi. 
Bdow, withim pistol-shot, Reille'~ divisions were seen hurrying 
formrd along the horrid defile and a he of musketry coni- 
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mcnced, slightly from the Btitish on the bigh mclr, more vigor- 
ously from some low ground near the bridge of Pnnzi, W ~ W A  tba 
riflemen bad ensconced tbemselves in the brusliwood : bnt tlie 
scene which folIowed shall be degeribed by ~rn eye-witnesa, 
overlooked the enemy rit stone'a throm, 
and frpm t h ~  summit of a, tremendous preci- gFAh 
pice. The river sepnrated ua, but the French 
were wedged in 8 narrow road with inaccsssible roclcs on 
one side anrl the river on tise other. Confusion impsible 
to describe followed, the mounded were thown down in 
the rush and trampled upon, the cavdry drew their swortls 
aiid endeavourd to climge ap tbe pass a£ Echallar, but 
tlie infantry b a t  them baclr, and several, hhorses and d l ,  were 
precipitatea into the river ; some firerl vertidly 8t us wlde 
tlie woundetl called out for quarker, md otliers pointed to tliem, 
mipported m they were on Iirancliee af trees, on rvliich were 
siispendecl great coafs' clotted with gore and bload-~tained 
shects t,aken from different hnlriitations to aid tlie aufferers.' 
On tbcst: misemble supl~licnnta brn~e men could not fire; 
and ao piteous ww the spectncle tliat it wns nith averterl aim 
the Britisli soldier shot nt the sound men; although the lo t te~  
mpidly plied tlieir muskete in pmsing, and Fiome in t h e i ~  
setentn liardiiiood wen dashed across tlie bridge oof Yanzi t o  
niake ri cotmter-att.ackl It w w  .s ~soldier-like ht a win 
ehr t ,  the niglit found the Briti~h in posseasiun cif tlie bridge; 
and tliough the great body of the Frencli escaped by tlie ruar1 
to Echallar, their bggage was al1 cut uff with manp prisonem 
by tlie troops hangiilg on the rmr in pursuit from h n  
Estevan. 
H e a ~  wns the Frendi loss; that of fthe aIlies mas about a 
Iiiindred men, of wEiicZi sixty-fi~e were British, principnlly o! 
tlie foiirth divishn. WelIinptan mas justly discontented with 
tlie result, Neitlicr L o n ~  nor Alten liad fulfilled rtheir mission. 
Tlie f o ~ m e r  excu~ed liimñelF as heing too feerile t e  oppose tlie 
rnnw Soult led down tlic vnllry; yet the rocks mere so preci- 
pitoira the Frcnch colild not hnve r~nclied him; thc rcsistnnce 
of tJlii Sprinish m~ndores mas LonpY's eontlemnrttioa. Fittnity 
s c r m ~ l  to  prevnil in mnny qrinrtcrs. If Barceñus had sent 3iin 
wholc Srigade instcnd of a wenk bnttaiion, the smrtll torrent 
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muld i io t  h a n  been forccd by DTrlon if Longa had been n 
the bridge of Yanai the Frencli must llave! snrrendered, for tli 
~xrpentlicular rocks ori tliejr rigIlt forbade e r a  nn escape b 
disperjionj if Alten, instead of  rnarcliing d o ~ m  the vnIIq ( 
h r i u s  as far as Elgoriaga, Iiad crosried tbe Santa Cruz moiii: 
taiu by the road used tlie iiigI:~it of the ZBth, be would hav 
been mucli earlier at tlie briilge of Yanzi; and then belike 
Longa and Etirceños would also have come down. al ten'^ 
instructions prescibed 8umbilIa and Xwn Estevan as the fmt 
piuta to llead. tlie Frencli ; judging them too strong at Surr 
EiilIa he marched upon Ymi ;  and if lie lmd passd the bridg 
there and seized the road to Echallar witb one brigrtde, mhil 
tlre other plied tlie flnnlr witli R r e  from the left of the Bidar 
pon, hc moiild hove stmck a grcnt blow: it was for tEiat hi 
soldiem huxl made mcli a prodigious exertioa 
During thc night Soult rtmllied hía diriisions abont Echallx 
and on tlie rnorning of the 9nd occupied the Pwto' of  that 
name. Ris left IWS on the roclrs of Zagarxmurdi ; his right 
on tlie rock o€ Ivantelly, communicatin,rr with the left of 1'11- 
latte, who was in pmition on the ridges betweeu h u l t  an' 
the head of the great RXliune mountain. Clausel's three div 
sioiis, now reduoed to six tionsand men, tooli post on a &ron 
hill between the 'Puerta' and town of Echallar. This positio 
ww mornentarily adopted t o  save time, t o  examine the county 
and t o  make Wellington discover bis views, h t  the Iattc 
would not suffer the affront. He hd mt ricton and Paker 
Lam t o  reoccupy the piisses of Ibneevalles anil the Alduidea, 
-Kill h d  reaclied tlie Col de Maya,-l3pg was at Urda%- 
the fourth, aeventh, and iight divisione remained in band, and 
witb these he resolved to fa11 upon Claueel, whoae position was 
dangerouslp aidvanced, 
Crmbdal~ ofEc7bGallw a& IztankZly,-Ttie liglit division held 
tlie road mnning from the bridge of Yanzi to Echallar until 
rclioved by the fourtli division, ~ n d  then marched by Lesacs 
t o  Santa Bnrbara, tlius t.urniiig Clnusel's right, The fourth 
rli&ion marched from Yenzi upon Echallhr to attack hia frunt; 
t2ie amcnth moved from '3umbilla against his left; but Biirnes's 
bripde, oont rq  t o  Wellington'~ intention, arrived nnsup 
ported beforc the fotirkh and light divisions wem either seen 
or fclt, and without imiting the arrival of more troops 
nssailed Clausel's strong positIon. The fire becnme vehement, 
yet neither the steepnws of the mouatain nor the over~liuñlow- 
ing muititude of the enemy, clastered sbove in aupporh of 
tlieir glrirrnishers, could arrest tlie assailants; and then wa3 
seen tlie astonisliig spectade of fiheen huudred men driving 
by slieer valour and force o€ ams six thousand pod troops 
Erom a po~ition, so rugged that tliere would have been Iittle to 
tomt of if th  numliers had been reversed and the defence 
made p o d .  The fourth division &ved indeed towards the 
end of the action, and the French, wlio had fulfilled tlieir 
mission as a reai.-guard, mere worn mith fatigue nnd iI1-pro- 
vided with ainmunition, having exhausted al1 their reserve 
stores dnring the retrent: but their inferiority here belonas to 
tlie liigliest part. of mr. Tlie Britidi soldiers, their natural 
fiercencss stimulated by tlie remarkahle personal daring of 
thcir gcnernl, Barn~s, wcrc excited by R R U C C ~ B ;  thc FPC~CII 
mere those who hnd fnilcd in nttilck tlie 28th, liad bcen utterly 
defested tlie 30tl1, and liad suffcred so severely the doy before 
about Sumbilla. Sucll tlien i~ the prepondcrance uf moral 
power. %he men who hnd assnileci tlie terrible rocks above 
Sauroren with rt frim aiid eiiergy tliat al1 $Le vdoirr of 
tlis liardiest Britiali veterans scarcely suffieed t o  rcpel, were 
rrow, only five days afterwrds, unable to suatsiu the shock of 
onefourtli of tlieir own numbers. And at tliis vei-y time, 
eighty Dritish soldiers, the comradtis and equala o€ those who 
acliieved tliis wonderful exploit, being surpriserl while plunder- 
ing, surrendered to some Frencli peasants wlio, as Wdlington 
tmly observed, ' t i ~ y  w d  uder ollier cirmmtancea Imw e& 
y ~ ! '  JTIlat gros"gnomnce oF liumlm nature then do those 
declaimers display, mho nsscr t  tliat the cmploying of brnte 
force is tlic liighest qualification of a genemi I 
Clausel thus dispossessed, fe11 back fighting to a strong 
riclge beyond tlie pws of Echlialllir, lirtnng Iiis rigli: covered 
by the Ivantdly niountnin wLicL ww strangly occupied. 
Meanwliile t h ~  liglit division, emerging by Lesaca frorii the 
nmow valley of tlie Xirlassoa, asccnded tlie Lroad lieights of 
Santa Barliara nnd saitcd until tlie operations of the fourth 
and aeventh divisions were far enougli advand to render it 
ddsable to attack the Ivantelly. Lifting its paiked liead out 
of the Santa Baibara heights, it seprtriited them from tlie 
ridges where Clausel was retmting, and the evening cam- 
on, a tbick mist cappd tha croming roclrs, ñrhicli containei 
a strong French regiment; tbe British ~oldiers, still wearjei 
wlth their long and &blo marcli thc previous dny, hnd bccii 
for two without sustenance, md were lcming, wcalr md 
fninting, on their a m a  when the advancing iire of ames's 
action nbone Echallar indicated the necessiiy of dislod,ninp 
the enemy from Ivantelly. Andrew 13nrnard insitnntly lei- 
five companies of his riflemen t o  thc nttnek, nnd four com 
panies of the forty-third followd in suppod. The miqt 
cloud had descended, and tbe riflemen were soon lost t o  view 
but the sliarp clang of t h e i ~  weapons, heard in distinct ~epl:  
t o  the more mnoroua rolling rnutrketry of the French, tal! 
w h t  work was going on. For some time the echoes ren 
dered it doubtful how the adion mnt, but the following cam 
panies of the fo~ty-tliird codd fina no trace of an enem: 
san  tbe killed and wounded: Barnnrd had fongl~t Iiis wa; 
unsided and without a check to the auinmit. Hi -iZark- 
dothed, m d h y  ~eterans raised their vichrious sliout from 
the highest peak, just as tbe eoming night showed t1ie long 
ridgw of tba rnountains bepond, spttrkling witli tlio lasb 
muaket-flashes kom Qausel'a troops then retiring in disorde 
from Echallar, 
Thiu &y's fighting m t  the Rritish four hundred men, ani 
Wellington nwrrowly escaped tlie euemy's hends, HG hari 
mded with him towarcls EcllalIxr lidf a company of the 
forty-khird as an escort, md piaeeri a serjeant nmed Blood, 
with a p d y  to wutch in front d i l e  he extimined his rncps, 
Tho French being close at hmd scnt a dctnchmmt to mt tlie 
party off; and such waa the nature o€ the ponnd thnt thcir 
troops, nishing on a t  speed, would jnfallibly have f~lIcn upon 
Wellington, if R ! d ,  a ynung intclli~cnt man, sccing th 
dmger, had not wrth mrprising activity, lefiping irtther t h ~ i  
ninning down ths precipitous rock~, given bim notice: yet ths 
Fiench amived in time to send m volley of shot after him a 
he giIloped away. 
Soult now made D'Erlon occapy the hüla about Ainhoa 
CIausel those in advance of %me, and he sent ReilIe with 
two divisions to R t  Jean de Luz, beliind Vitlattda reserve. 
Foy, whe liad after his retreat mhIy uncovered St. Jean Red 
de Port by descending upon Cambo, mas ordered to retiirn and 
aupei i t  iiis troops with al1 thist he could oollect of aational 
p a d s  and det&cl~ments. 
Wellington had ou t.he 1st directed Grnham to ?nave up 
wiih pontoons md cross the Bidassoa, but now abmdoned 
thia design; the tmo amien tlierefore rested qniet in their 
respective positions, after nine rlays oh continua1 movernent 
during which fliey had fonght ten serioiis rtctiom. Of the 
allieq inclnding the Xpanin~lrc, seven tliou~nncl thrce hiindrctl 
oíñcerw nnd snlcliers IinJ heen killed wonndcd or tnlrcn, nnd 
mriny wcro dispcrscd from fntignc or to plundcr. On thc 
Frencli side the losa wns terrible, nnd tlieir clisorcler rendercd 
thc oficial returns inaccurate. Wellington at first crillciI 
it twclve thousand, liut he~ring tlint the Prcnch oficers 
adrnithcl more he raised liia mtiinute to fifteen tliouwt~id. 
Tlie engineer, Belnzau, ir1 Iiis Sourilals of Sieges, coinpiled from 
official documenta by orcler of tbe Prencli governinent, seta 
down above tltirteeii tliousnnd. Xoult in Iiis despatches at the 
time, stnkd fifteen liuatlrcd aa the lo= rit Maya, four liundrerl 
at Roncew~lcs, t ~ v o  hiindred on the 27tl1, nnd eigllteeii Iiun- 
drerl on tlie 28tl1, after wliicli ha spepiks no more of lnsses by 
battle. Thhere remains tliereforc 'co be adrlecl the killed and 
wounded nt the combats of Einrrodn on the 16th, the doiiblc 
httles of Xaurorcn nntl Ruenza on the 30tIi, tlie eomh~ta of 
tlle 31&, and those of tlie 1 s t  and 2nd of Au9st ;  finnlly, 
four thotrsmd unwoandecl prisoners. Let thia aufice. It is 
not necdful ta sound tlia stream of hlood in al1 its homid 
deptlis. 
19 The allies' line of defence was weak. Was it therefore 
injudicioitsly adopted 1 Beaten ñt Yitoria the Frcnch mere dis- 
organized, tind retreated mitliout iirtillery or bagpge on 
ecmntric lines; F- lo Guipttsco~, Clnii~el by Zarqozn, 
Rcille by iyn E~svnn ,  J o ~ ~ p h  hp Pampeliinn, There wns no 
reserve to rally upon, tho people flcd from tlie froiitier. 
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Biiyonne and St, Jmn Piecl de Fort, if not defencelegs, were 
oertainl y in a very neglected state, and the English geiieral 
might have underhken m y  opemtion, assumed any position, 
offensive or defeasive, which ~eemed good tu him. R?iy then 
did he not eshblish the AnglwPortuguese beyond the monn- 
tnins, leaving th Cripnninda to blockade the fortrwses behind 
liirnl The a m e r  to this question ia~olvea the difference 
between the practico and the thcorp o£ WQT. 
' 2% a 0 1 d k s ~  ilas&ad of p p a h q  food m d  resting t ? m  
sdws a j e  € 7 ~  8a.ttk dhpersed im tiJbs night to  
Wcl''ngtm's $u&; m d  m e  m fati& t@ when the ~l~lyn Deapatchcics. 
camg m tb n& &y d J ~ y  w m  inenpable of 
mdhq, and 7wd w w  stragqlma tham tlae beaten enmy 
E i g 7 t ~  d ~ y 9  afier ths victory teaBlve lhmand &e hundre 
m, chh$y R&&, w 8  &&, m s b  of dhem mmudinq i 
tlk? mntdns. '  
Such mere the reasons assigned by the Eoglish genemi fur 
his slack pursuit after Ghe brittle of Vitoria; yet he ha! com- 
rnmded that army for six yeam! Was he then deficient in 
tlie first qua1ification of a general, the art o£ disciplining and 
inspking t.mops; or was tlie English rnilitilry system defe* 
tivel It is eertain ha alwap exacted the confiilence of Iiis 
soldiers as a Ieader; it is not so certnin he gained their 
affections. The Iiarbarity of the EngIish military corle excite 
public horror, the inequality of promotion cre~ted publi 
disconknt ; yet tlie general complaind he hatl no dequat 
poiwr to reward or punish; and he condeinned alike t h  
system and the aoldierri it produced. Tlie lntter wwe dda, 
cable fw mytlazng 6ut JFgJ&rq, a& tA8 o+a as culpcsble a 
tlte m Y h e  vehemence of these censures is inconsisten. 
witli Lis celebrated observation, subsequsntly m d e ,  namely, 
'that he thought he could go anyn;bere and do ~nything 
with the army tliat fouglit on the Pyreneea; and akthough it 
cannot be denied that his oomplaintii were generally too well 
founded, there were thousands of true and noble soldiera, and 
eealous wuithy &cm, who served their country heuestly 
anrl meritecl no reproaclies. It is enough tliat they Lave 
been since neglected, exachly ly proprtioa to tbeir want of 
that corrupt mistocrahic iufluenca which produced tha evil~ 
oompldned o£ 
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2'. mhen the miñconduct of the troops had t11us weakened 
the effect of vjctory, the qiiestion of folIowirtg Joseph FLC once 
into Fmnce axsumed a new acpect. Wellington's aptem of 
mrfnre hrsd never v~rFed after tlie Iiattle o€ Talavera. &je& 
ing dangcrous cntcrpriae, it rested an profountl calculrttion 
bnth aq t o  time nnd rosources for nccomplishing the grrtdu~l 
libcrntioa of Spdn by tlie Anglu-Fortugueae nrmy. Net that 
he hcEd it impossiblc t o  nttniii that oliject mddenly-and his 
batittlw in Xrdin, tlie pmsagc oaf the Uouru, the dvunce to 
Tnlaverrq, prove tliat by nntirro he was inclined ta dtaring 
operatiom.-but such eforts, ho~vover glorious, codd not be 
adopted by s cummanrider wlio feared even $he lms of a 
brigade lect tlie pveriitncnt he served sliould pub an earl to 
tlic wrtr. Neill~er was it auitalilc to tlie stabe ef Iii rela- 
tions with the Portuguese aud Syaniartisj itlieir igaorance 
jealousy and pawionnte pride, fierce in proportion to their 
weakness and improvidence, wmeuld kave enhanced wery 
danger. 
3". No man coiilrl liave nnticipxtctl the extraodinary e m r s  
of tlie French in 1813. ITelliiigton did not expect to crom 
t!ie Ebro bcfore tlie enJ of the campaitipi, rind Lis battering- 
trxin waa preparerl for tlie siege of Eurgos not for thtat of 
Raynnne. A stidden invasion o€ Frrince, her milita9 m- 
putntion considered, w s  tlierefore beyond the pnle of his 
metliodir.cd sygtcni of wnifi~m, wllich m foundcd upon 
politicnl os wclt kq milihry considcrationg; and of thc most 
canlplicated nntiire, sccing thnt lie had at al1 times to  den1 
with thc pcrsod and fuctioue intercsts and pnssiona, ns wcll 
as the pent stnte intercats of three natiions, two of wliicli 
abhorrctl ench otkcr. At this moment ala0 tlio uncerhin 
date of nffairs in Germany strougly influcnced his views. An 
armistic~ nliicli rnigfit end in e separate peace excfuding 
Eiidand would liave liroiig1;lit Napoleon3s wl~ale force to the 
Sretiees,  alid Telliilgton lield tIie milita7 md political pro- 
ceetling of tlie coalesced poaem cheap. s 1 d woutdi m v e  as 
cqnwrd's p a r d  in velianw apoa swli a qstm,' mas the 
sigmificant plirase be employeil to express 11h contempt. 
These oonsiderations j&ified hirt caution as t o  invading 
Prauce; bu$ there mere locul military reaaons equnlly cogent. 
Lo. He oould not dispense with a securc horbour, bemse  the 
fortrmses still in possession of the French, nnmely, Santona, 
Pnncorbo, Pnmpeluna, and St. hbastian, interruptcd hls 
oommunimtions with tlie interior of Spain. 2 9  Ile hnd to 
guard apinst the union of Suclict md C?auscl on his right 
flank-heme hiq efforts t o  cut off tbe Inshamed general- 
hence slse the blockade of Pampeluna in preferenca to siege, 
ruid the Eaunching of Mintb mil the banda on the side of Zara- 
goza. * 
4'. After Vitoria the natare of the c~mpaign dependt 
u p n  Sucliet's operations, wliicb were rendered more impo 
k n t  by Murr~ty's miscontluct. TIie allied force on the eastei 
coast was badly orpnized; it did not admce from V~lenc,, 
as we h v e  seen until tlie 16th and then onIy pmtially and 
by the coast; whereari Suchet bad nssembled more tlian twenty 
tlousand excellent troops on t be  Ebro ag earIy as tlie 12th of 
July. He might haw saved the mtle of Ztiragoza with its 
great stores, and then rallying Paria' division, be muld have 
menaced VCTellingtoda AanIc mith twenty-five thou~and men 
exdusive of Qausel's foroe, and, if that general joined him, 
with forty thousand. On the ZGtli, tlie day lord Willinm 
Benitinck gnitted Valencia, Xuchet might have marclied from 
Zairagos un Tudela or hnguessa; anrl Soult's preparatioiis, 
originally made to nttack on the 2 3 d  inatead of tlie 2Stl1, 
would have naturally been Iiastened. Hritv diificult it ivould 
tlien have been for the allies t~ rnsintttin tliemselves beyond 
the Ebro is evidcnt.; much more so to hotd a forwmd posi- 
tion in Fr'r~nce, That Wellington feared an operation of tl~is 
nature is shown by his inatnictioas fe l o r d  Wiiliam Bcnt,hclt 
and to Mina; and by hia keepiiig Picton nnd Colc behind tF- 
niointains solely to mtch CInusel unti1 be rcgained Frmc 
whcn CCe was permitted to join B p g  anrl Morillo. 
follows that the operahions aftrr the hfitkle of Vitoris me 
well considered md conmmnt to tlie general system: tlieir 
excelIence would bave been proved if Sucliet liad seieecl tlis 
advantolges withii Iiis rmch. 
bO, A general's capacity is ~ornrtimes more taxed te pro( 
from a victory than to  gain one. Wellington, master o£ E 
Bpain, Catalonia excepted, desired t o  establisli hiniself soliiil 
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in tmhe Fpnccs,  leat 4 separnte pewe in Germany ahould 
ennlile Napoleon to  tirn liia ii-lioPe foice a,&at the allies. 
In this espectdtion, witlr nstonisliing exertion of body and 
mint$ he had in three dnys acliieved a rigorous examination 
of tlie wliole masa of tlie Western Pyrenees, md concluded, if 
Rrnpeluna tbnd San Xebastian fell, tliat tt ddefensive position, 
t;troiig ae tliat of Portugal, much stronger tlran couId be 
fuund her id  the Ebro, miglit be estabhhed, But to invst  
tliose places and k n t a i n  so dificult a cevering line waa a 
grenter task than to win tlie battle of Vitoria. However, the 
early fnll of San Sebastian be expcted, because tlie errors of 
execution in tliat siege could not be foreseen; and be counted 
also on the diaorgani;r.ed state o€ the Fwnch army, on JosepYs 
ivant of militay capltcity, and the moral ascendancy which 
liis own troops had acquirett. He could noti anticipate tlie 
eñpeditious journep, the sudden nrrivnl o€ So&, w h m  rapid 
re-organimtion o€ the Frcnch arm y ancl vigorous opr~tions,  
contmsted mith Joseph's abantlonrircnt o€ Spain, illustratx?d 
thc old Grcek aaying, tlint s licrd of dcer lod by a iion aro 
more dnngeroua than a herd of l ion~ led hy a dew. 
69 Soult ws littlr! Fieholdcn to fortune at thc comtnencx- 
mcnt of his movcmcnte. Her fimt contradiction wns the b d  
weather, which brealring up thc roada dclapd the concentm- 
tion of his army at 8t. Jean Pied de Yort for tmo daya; and 
the eFect whicli hmyr rain md b r d  marches have ulion tha 
vigour and confidence of ~oldlere n-lio are going t o  nttack is 
me11 knom. If he ha$ comluenced tlis S316 ingtead o£ tlie 
25ki1, the surprise would have been more complete, hiri rirrny 
more brisk; and aa no cowrilit  liattalioiia would llave arrived 
to delay &de, that general woulrl have been more ready in 
his attack; antl miglit possibly have escapeti tlie fog wliich ou 
the SGth stoppcd his niarcli ralong tlie superior crcst of tlie 
mauntain to~varde TTellitte. On tlie othci hand the alliea 
would lime besn spnred the uiisucecesful assault on San 
Sebastian, and the Col de Maya miglit have been better fur. 
nislied witli tmops. Howzver hult's combinations were so 
well hiit, that more thiin cine error in execution, more than 
one accident of fortiine, were necessary to baffie him. Had 
D'Erloa fullowed his instructiona even on the 26t11, RiU 
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wouId ha% been ahouldered off the valley of Lrinz, and thei-e 
mould hnve been twenty tliousand additionrtl French troops iu 
the combats of the 27th and 28th Such failues hoivewr 
general1 y attend extensively combined movements, and dt is 
not certain thxt D'Erlon could hnve won the Cal de Mnya 
if al1 Stervwt's forces had been poeted here. B would 
perliaps have been more stiictly w i t l i i  the rules of art, if 
D'Erlun liad been directad to larave one of his three divisions 
t o  menace the Cd de &hya wliiIe he rnanched with the otl~er 
two by í3t. Etienne de Bay-gorry np tlie Alduides. Tliia 
movement, covered by tlie nationd guarda who occupied h e  
moiintain of Lw Buurna, could not bave lieen shpped by 
Campbell'~ Portupese Ilrigade; and would Iinve dislodged 
Hill from tEie astan d i l e  it gecured a junction with Xoi 
cin tlie crest of t he magistraI chain. 
7'. The intrepid constnnq ef Byng nnd Ross on thi 
severnl positions thc 25th, thc ~ b l c  and clcan retreat mnde 
Cole M far as the heights of Linzonin, gave fuIl effcct to t 
French emrs ; and would probaiilp Iia~e hafled Soult atj 
early period if Picton hnrl com-preheiided tbe importnnce 
his position. WelIington wid the concentration of the arr 
would Iiwe been effected on tlie 27th if that oficer and Cc 
hnd not ageed in tfiinking it jmpos~ible to make a ata 
behind Linzoain; and surely the necesaity of retreating on 
tliat d q  may be questionecl. For if Cole sith teii thousand 
men mmint-riinerl the position in front of Altobigcar, niañetn, 
and Atalosti, Picton miglit bave maintained the more con- 
tracted one beliind Linamin and Erro with fmentp tliousíinrl. 
And tliat nurnber he could liave asseinliled, because Campbcll 
rexclicd Eugui long before the eveiiing nf the 26th; sud Wel- 
lingtan liar1 directeii O'Donnel to lceep three tlrousand G 
liundred oT the Iilockading: troops iu readiriess to nct in atlvau 
of whicli Picton could riot have been ignumnt. It \vas i 
possible to  turn liim by tlie vulley o l  U ~ E ,  that lizie behg too 
mggcd foi  the mmch of nn n m y  anti not leading directIy upun 
Pampcl!liine. The only ronda inta tlie Iral [le Zuliiri were by 
Erro nnd Iinaonin, lying close togetlicr nnd botli lcdingupnn 
tlic vilIage of Ziitiiri over tlie r i d p  i ~ h i c h  Pidan occupicd, 
me strength of the position was evident from So~iit's decliu- 

at once by the two mlleys of Zubiri and Lrsns, after heing 
reinforced &tli twenty tlioustnd men, would h w e  given pe~t  
importante t o  his repulse on the 28th; Iiis reputrttion M a 
general mpable o l  re~toring tlie French affnirs worild have 
mnishcd; ~ n d  mischief mnst have a m e d ,  even tliough he 
sliould have effected his retreat safely, which, regad being had 
to tlie narrowness of tke valleys the position of Hill and 
7t'elliiigton'a boldness, was not cerhin. To abandon the Tal 
de Zuliiri and secure that of h m ;  to obtain another md 
sliorter Iine of retreat by tthe Doñu Haria pass; to crush Hill 
witli superior numbers, gain the Inirzun xoad, and suocoui 
iSan Beliaatiaii; br f~iling DP tliat, to semre tlie anion of the 
~vlirile army and give to Lis retreat the appenrance of an able 
orensive inovement-te comliine al1 tliese chiinces by one 
opri-ation immediately sfker a r;erere check waa Soult's plan: 
it \vas not impraeticnlile m d  waa aurely tlie mnception of a 
great comander. 
To succed Iiowevcr it waa asential eitlier to boat Hill off- 
bnnd and thus draw Wellin$on to that side by tlie way of 
hlardain, or so Recure tlie French Ieft that no effortv against 
it shonld prov~iI to tlie dctrimont of tho offensive movement 
on tFie right: neither WAF~ effocted. An orerwhelming force 
drove Hill jndced from thc rond of Imrírun but dirl not crush 
km, hecause hc fought so atrongly and rctircd 114th mch good 
d e r .  Mcanwhile tlie French left was complctcl y Iicaten and 
tlie advnntage gained en tlie rig1:lit w ~ s  more thm nullifid. 
SonIt tmrrted t o  the remrtrkalile rlefen~ire citrength o£ the 
p u n d  occiipied by his left, trnrl hwl ienson to do so, for it 
was nerirl y imprcgnnblo, but Wellfngton turned it on both 
flniilra rtt the ssme time. Yet neitlier Picton's dmnce into 
the Val de Zabiri on Poy'a left, nor CoCole'~ fcont attack on tbat 
general, nor Eyiig'a assault upon the village of Saworen, 
woixlcl llave serioiil;lg damagecl the French mithout ths midden 
and complete sncceas of Inglis Lieyonil the Lanz. The other 
attaclcs would indeed have forced the Trench t o  retire some 
what hiistily up the valley of the Lmz, yet they could have 
held together in mass secure OF tlieir junction with Xonlt. 
But when tlie ridpes running between them and the right 
wing of the JFrench army were carried by Inglis, and the 
whole of the seventh dihion was throwe upon their flank and 
rear the front attack became decisive. Tbe key af the defence 
wax on the ridge beyond the Lmz, and intitead of h a  regiments 
ClavseI should have p I a d  two diviaions tliere. 
9O.  Wellington'ri quiclc perceptien and vigorone dmke on 
tlie 30th wero to bc cxpected from mch a comummate m- 
mmder, yet he W ~ E I  not rnwte: of a11 tb benringa of the 
Prcncb operctions; be knew neither the extent of HilI's 
danger nor h u l t ' ~  difficnlties; otliermise it is probable he 
would have pub stronger clo!umna in motioe, and at  an earlier 
liour, tawards the pasa of D>h Maria on the morning of the 
Jlst. Hill did not commence kis march thnt day until eight 
o'cloclr, and it hm been sliown, that with the heIp of tlie 
seventh division he wasi toti me& t o  Lurh the heavy retreating 
maga. Tha fliuIts and accidents whict bafned 'CVellington'g 
a h r  operationa have been sufñciently touched upon in the 
narrative; but he hdkd in the midst of his victririous career 
when SouIt's army was broken and flying, when Suchet had 
retired into Catatonia and alll ttliinge eieeemed favourable for 
the invnsion of France. His motives for fliis were st.mng. 
He knew the armistice in Gemany liad been renewed with a 
view te peace, and he bad thercforo mson  fo cxpeet Soult 
wouid be reinforced. A forward position in nancc  wouid 
have lent bis riglit t o  the enemy, who, pivoterl upon St. Jena 
Pied de Port, coold operate agninst bis fl anlc. His arrange- 
menta for intercourse with his dEp6ts and h o q i b l ~  ivould 
have been more diificult annd complicated; and as the enemy 
possessed al1 the Frelich and Spanisli fortresses comrnending 
tlie great roads, bia need to gaiii one at least befoore the fine 
season closed was absolute, if he would not resigri his com- 
annications wltli tlie interior o€ Spain. Long marches and 
frequeut combnb had htigued his tmops, destroyed tfieirsloes, 
anrl used up tbeir muslset atnmunition; the loss of men liad 
baen great, especirt1ly of British in the second division, where 
their proportioa to foreign troops ww bewme too small; t he  
dificulty of re-equipping fhe froops muld bave increased on 
entering an enemy'~ state, becrinse the Enkish system did noE 
malre umr ~upport wnr, nnd 16s commnicxtions would have 
Eiccn Ienshened Finnllp Fm-nce was tu be invadecl-Fmce 
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and Le Marhiere were searcely f u better plighk, and tbe lmsee 
of the other divisions were p t .  Foy'ii eight thousand luen 
were cnt of from the main body; and the Nivelle, the sourcea 
of which wers Ui the afliesa power, m behind the Frencli. 
With their Ieft ppreased from the pana of May~, their front 
agsded by the main body, they muId hardly ham kept 
togetlier, shce more t h n  twenty-one thensand men, excluaive , 
of Foy's troops, wore then absent from thoir c d o m .  A8 late 
as the 12th of August, Soult told the mlnister of war, that he 
wm indeed preparing to  asad his enemy wiu bnt had not 
tlie means of r e s k t i i  8 oounte~-attack, dthough 
be held a dierent lnnguaga to his -y and t o  lt 
the people of the country. 
Had G s a r  Zidted bemwe hts sol&m were fwtigued, Phar- 
mIia would hme heen but s common battla 
CHAPTER 1. 
AFTER the combats of Echallar and Ivantelfy, gonlt adopted 
a perman~nt poaition. His left under D'Erlon, was on the 
hilIe of A i o a  s i th  an advrtnced guard overhanging Udax 
and Zagaramurdi; Lis centre un& Clau~el, wm in advmw 
of #me guarding the iasuea fiom Vera und EchaEIar, ~ n d  
hnIdiiig the peater Rliune monntaia ; the right 
, 
under Reille, liiled tlie loaer Bidnssoe t o  tlie mn- 
~ ~ - 1 9 9 .  lijs th id  division beinp undw Foy at St. Jan  
Fid de Port. Villatte's reserve wm behind the Nivelle n w  
Sems ; one en~alry division waa qnartcrcd for the a t o  af 
fornge bctmcen the N i ~ e  nnd Nivella rivem, the other as fiir 
brick as Dax. 
Wellington occupied his oId poa!tiona from the pasa of 
h n c e v n l l ~  ta the month of the Bidassoa, biit the disposition 
of liis troops was difcrent. Hill reinforced by Morillo held 
the Roncevdlcs and Alduides, havjng Reld-works at tha 
former. Tlie t.Iiird and sixth divisions guarded the Butan 
and Col de Maya; the seventh division reinforced with O'Don- 
nel's Spaniards omipied Ecl~dl ar tind Zagamimurdi The iight 
division held the Santa Barbar11 helghts, with piqnets in the 
town of Vera; the Ieft wsted on the Bidassoa, tlie right an the 
Ivwntelly mck, mund which a bridIe commnnication with 
Echallar was made by fhe soldiem. Longa wm Zieyond the 
Ridassoa on the left of the Iight divbion; tlie fourth divhion 
was liehind &m, nem Lesaca, The fourth Spanisb army 
ander Freyre prolonged the line from Longa to tlte m; it 
crossd the roya1 causemy, occupisd Inin and Fontsrsbia md 
gnmled the Saizquibel nountaia The first division w a ~  
hhind Freyre; tlie fifth divisi~n rwmed tb aiege of San 
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&bstiran, and the blockade of Pampeluna wm given to Carloe 
&España 
Therce diipositiona, made iirith Encreased means, were more 
powerfut ior dehnce tliiin the former. A strong co ip  unrler 
one general was entrenclied a t  Ronce~aUes; and in tlie Bmtm, 
two British divisions, admouislied by Stemart's error, wcre 
more than suíñcient to defend t l~e  Col de Mayb The lbhallar 
mountains were, with tlie aid af Q'Donuel'a Spnniards, equally 
setare; and the reservea posted nmr Iam supported the lcft, 
now the most importtmt part of t l ~ e  line. Tlie custles of 
Za-xa aand Daroca hrtd fiillcn, and tlie Empecinado, directed 
upon Alcnnitx, maintained tlie oommnnication between t11e 
&talan bnrrny anind Mina; the latter and Duran were near 
Jnm, from wlienca they coulrl retreat by Sanpessa on Pampe- 
luna. General Paria bcing thns menaced, rctimd aftcr a sicir- 
mish into Fmncc, leaving clght huiidrcd mcn in Jnm. Lord 
William Beiitinck wos then before Tnrqonn The allies mere 
thus in direct military communicntion from tlie Ifediterrmean 
to tlis Bay o€ Biscay, wliile tbe French could only communicate 
circuitously tlirougli Fmnce. 
Soult dicl not fear a front attack, but the aiigmentation of 
force at Eoncevallerr and Maya. waa disquietiiig, as menming 
fo turn Iiim by the course of the Nive. I'aris nFas tlierefore 
placed at Oleroii to support Foy; the fortresses of St. Jenu 
Picd de Port md Navnreins wero armecl ras s pivot of opera- 
dona on tliat side; Bayonue ser+-ed a lilre purpose oe the other 
flnnk; nnd e fortified liiro from tl ie mouth of t11o Bidosso% up 
ta the roclcg af hfondamin and tlie Nive mns cornmcnced 
Rnt Wellington, liaving littlc to fear from a renewed athclr on 
the sida of Pampclurq was wholly bcnt an the siege of &. 
Sebastim. Nor waa tliut a trifiing op~ratbn, for he m 
tliwarted in a rnanner ta  prove that tlie EngIisli miniders were 
no lietter tlian the Spanish ancl Portuguese autlorities. Lord 
Me3pilFe wrta at tbe head of the Admiralty ; unrler Iiim tlis 
navy of Enpland first met with disostw in Gattle; and hia 
negligente in giving rnaritime aid t o  the operations in flpain 
went nigh te  fasten a like minfortuw on tke armp. Tlii~, 
combinetl with the cabinet sclieme of ~ending Wellinghn ta 
Germanr, nhows RBt time had bught the EngIish &tem 
notliing as t o  the Feninsula war; or that clntcd d t h  the m y  
of aevercigne against Nfipoleon they were now arelesa of n 
canse so rnixed up with democracy. That lord McIviIIe, a 
man of ordinwy capacity, shauld bam been mffered to retard 
and pndanger the fina! sumeas of a g e n e l ,  whose sure judg 
ment anrl extraordinaxy merit were authenticated by exploita 
n n p I l e l e d  in Englkh warfare, would h incredible if Wel- 
Iington's correspondeme, and that of Mr. Stuart, did not 
estalifish tlie following facts. 
19 Deriertion from the enemg m hpped, chidy becaase 
the Admiml@ refused to let t.he ship of war carry desertas o t  
prisoners to England; they mere t h n ~  heapped up at Lisbon 
and mdtreated by tlre Portnguese governrnenq which checked 
al1 dasire in the French troops t o  come over. 
2". When tlie disputes with America cammenced, Mr. 
Stnart'~ eirorts to obtain flour for the army wem vexatiously 
tliw~1ted by the Admiralty; wliich permitted, if it did not 
enconmge, the Englislr eliipa of war to capture Amencan ve+ 
seh trading mder the sewet licences. 
3'. The rehsal of the Bdmimlb to establish certain cruiscrs 
rilong the coast caused. the loss of many atore4hips and mer- 
chmtmen, to the great dctrimcnt o€ thc ormy bcforo it quiktcd 
Portugal. Fiftm were tkcn off Oporto, and one cloae to tlie 
bar of G b o n  in iMay. And a h d s ,  the 
Appendk lb Mediterranean pclret hring despakhes from 
lord William Rentinck was mphired, which led to lamentable 
conseqnencea; for tha p~pipers were not in cipher, and contained 
detaild accoants of ploh against the French in Italy k t h  thc 
nmcs of the principal persons engaged. 
4'. A lilre neglect of the coast of Spain caused ships con- 
taining money filoes and other indispensable s t o ~  to remain 
in port, or risk being taken on tha pasmge by cruisers issning 
from Santon% Baymne, and Dordeaux. And 
.Weu'm* whte the communications of the aIliw were tlm WGS. 
intercepted, the French coasting vesseIs supplied 
their m y  and fortresses wjthont difimilty. 
54 Afterthe battle of Tito& Wellington was forced ta use 
French smmnnition, thongh €00 ama11 for the Englisli muskethi, 
because the ordn~noo storwhip whicli he had odered fmrn 
Ancom, 1813.1 ROOK XXII.-CITAP. 1. , 263 
Lisbon to Fhntander cou1d not mi1 for m t  of convoy. When 
the troops were in the l'yrenees, a reinforcement of five thou- 
sand rnen was ltept at Gibralbr and Lisbon waiting for ships 
o€ war; and the trnnsporfs employed to conver tliem were thus 
ii-ithdrrtwn from the service of carrping homa woundd men, 
at a time wlien the SpamisIi autliorities at Bilbao refoaed, eveu 
for pyment, to conwile pulilic buildinp for hospitnls. 
6". Then snow was falling on tlie Pyrenem tlic ~oldiem 
were without proper dotliing, becntise tlie siiips contrtining tlieir 
great-mah, tliniigl~ rcrarly to sail in Aupist, Tverc dctninctl at 
Op0rt0 until Nnvcmher waitiiig fnr convoy. mhcn the vic- 
torics of Jnly mere to be turncd t o  profit crc tlic fi t t in~ scason 
for thc sicgc of 8m Bcbnstinn sl~ould pass nmay, tlic attaclr of 
tliat fortress -,as rcturdcd sixteen duys, I-iecnusc a Ivattcriiig- 
trniii rtnd atninuuition, demanded severa1 inonths before by 
WclliogLan, liad not  yet nrrived from Englnnd. 
7". Uuriiig tlie s i c p  the sea coiiiniuuim~tiiii~ y? t I i  Rayonne 
was fi-ee. 'Aiyt l~i i ig  in t11e sli:ip of a irxval forcc,' snid 
Wellington, ' woiild drive nway sir George ColEier's sqularfrun.' 
The prrisvn receiverl reinfor.cements, artillery, amiiiunition, 
and nli necessary stores for its rlefence, sending nivay t t e  sick 
and wounded men iu ernlity vessels. Tlie Spanisli general 
blockadinp Santona cornplninerl rtt tlic senia time tliiit tlic 
cx~rtions of Iiig troops wcrc iisclcsu, L~cca~~sc tli  Frendl siic- 
coiirctl thc pl~co  by  en wlien t l q  lilcnscd; nnrl iifter tlio 
hittt,lc of Titorin not lcss tlim fivc vrsscl~ lndcn with ~torcs 
nlid provicions, ilnd onc. trnnsport l i~ving Eritisli solrliers nnil 
clothing tia lionrd, wcm tnltcii liy wuiscrs issixiiig out of tlint 
port. Tlic grcnt odwntngc of nttaclriiig Siin Sebnstinn Iiy 
 vat ter ns wdl ns by 11anll wns foregune for wnnt  of rinva1 nieans; 
uníi from the cnnie cause Britisli soldieru ivere withdrriwn froiii 
tlrei? oivn service to unloail store-slripa; tliegun-iiuats employrri 
iu tlie S?ocknde were SpanisEi vesseis nitinned by S~ianish aol- 
dicrs withdrnwn from the army, and thc store-tiuuts were navi- 
pted by Spnnish women ! 
89 The costing trade betmeen Eoidcaux and Bnyonne 
Iieing quite free, the French, whose m i l i t t i ~  mems of trtins- 
~ u m t  had heeu so crippleri by their losses at Vitaria thnt they 
could scarcely haye colIectcJ m a ~ z i u c s  with lanbcarringe 
nnly, receirwd their suppIies by water, and were thus saved 
tronlile and expense and the unpopiilarity attending fürced 
requisitions. 
Between April and Aqust, more than twenty applimtions 
una remonstrances were addressed by WelIington t o  the 
government upon these poiiits, without producing the aliglitest 
attention. Mr. Croker, unrler-semetary of the Adiniraltg, of 
whose conduct lie partieularly complahed, was perrnitted to 
write an offrnsive oficial Ietter to him, whiIe his demands 
and the dangem to be appreliended from neglecting them 
were disregariied; and t o  use bis own words, 'mme Gmd 
B~da iw  h.& b m  a mva i  pmm a B&b amy hósd m w  
bBfwe h hft in ;m& a d t w h  d a s t  importani 
5aOm?nh1 
Nor is it eapy to determino whethcr negligcnce nnd inmpb 
city, nr n grovelling iiiscnsibility t o  nntional honour prevniled 
most in the csbinct, when we find tliis renowned general oom- 
plaining, that the government, ignorant even fe ridicule of 
rn.ilitiiry operatiuns, ~iemed to know notliing o€ the nature of 
tlie dement with which England was surrounded; and lord 
Nelville insensil>le to tlre glarious toils of the Feninsiila, 
teIling him that bis army mas tbe last thing t o  be attendd tol 
REN?4WED SiEOR OF m. SEBASI'IAK 
[Sw Plnn, page 181.] 
Villafte'a demonstration againet Lonp on the 28th o€ July 
had caused the shipe laden with +he battering-train t o  put to 
sea, but on the 5th of August the gnns were re-landed rnd 
the works apinst the fortress rerrumed. On the 8tl1, a nution 
having spread B a t  tlie enemy was mining under the eask 
redoabt, the engineers seiaed the occasion to exercise their 
jnesperienced miners by ~inking a shaft and driving a grrltery ; 
the men soon q u i r c d  expertness, but tlie water rosc in the 
slraft a t  tweIve feet, and tlie wurlt m disc~ntinued when the 
gallery had attained eighty feet. Tbe old trenches mere 
repaired, the heights of San Bartolomeo were strengthened, 
~ n d  tlie convent of Antigua, buiIt on a rock to the left of those 
hciglitti, waa fortifisd and armed wjth two guna t o  scour the 
o p a  beach aad sweep the bay. The niego however ImguhhBd 
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In the nighi of the 25th tbe batteries were al1 armed on 
both sides of the Drurnm, arta on tlie 26th fifty-seven pieces, 
opening with a general mlvo, mntinued to play with astounding 
nuiae and rapidihy untii evening. Tlie firing from the Chofre 
IiiIls destroyad the rev&tem~nt of the deini-bastion of St. John, 
ancl nctarly rnined the towers at the old brench, together with 
tlie wall oonuiecting them; but aii the isthmus, the htteries 
although they injured the horn-work mado littlo impression on 
the mnin front, fmrn wbich thcq- were too far distnnt. 
Wellington, present nt this attnck and disconknted with thc 
operation, thcn o d e c d  a b a t t e ~ f o r  six p n s  tobe constructed 
amongst some mined houseti on the rig11t of t l i e  pnralle1, three 
bundrd yarda from the main front. Two sliaf'cs were also 
~unk GtJI g. view t o  drivc plleries for its protection npinst 
tlle enemy'~ mines; bnt the mndy soii made this work 
slow. 
EarIy on the 27th the boats of the squadmn, under Iieutenant 
Arhthnot of tlic Sumeillante, earrying a liuntlied soldiera of 
the ninth regirnent nnder caphin Carneron, attaclred tfie island 
of Snnta Clnra Tbe troops landed with some dificulty under 
R heaqp fire, bnt a lod-ment wns made with tlio 101s of only 
tmenty-cight men nnd officcrs, of which dghtecn werc seamen. 
In  the night the French aallied agninst tbe new bnttery on 
the isthmua; but BB C O I O ~ C I  Carneron of the ninhh wgiment 
met tliem on thci very edge of tha trenches witli the btiyonet 
the attempt fniled, yet if delqed the arming of ttie bat tq .  
At dnybreak the renewed fire of the be8i~gern wm extremek 
h e q J  and the shrapnel sheIls mrere aiipposed to be very 
destmctive; neverthelem the p~xctice witli that missile was 
vey uncertain, tlic bultcta frequently ffew amongst t h e  gritlds 
in tbe paralle1 mrl cine stnick the fieId-offioer. I n  tbe course 
of the day another saUy was commenced, but tlie enemy being 
fired upon did not persist, The trenches mere now furnished 
with bnnq~ettes and pampets ns fnst as the qnantity of gabions 
and fascines wonld prmit; yet the work was sloa; because tlie 
Wpish authorities of Guipuscoa, likB tliose in every otlier 
part o£ Spain, neglected to provide a r t a  to conveythe niaterials 
hom tlie woo&, and tLis l i d  labour wis perforrned by Portu- 
p e s e  soldiers: tliese things however should have been pre- 
pared duriiig the bloclíade. 

playing hotly at the time, they reacbed the foot of the breach 
unperceived, and tlien mounted in extended order shwting 
and firiiig; the French were too steady to be imposed upon, 
their muskety Iaid the pady Eom, and their commiander 
returned narly ta the treuches. 
Oa tlie 30th tlie sea 3ank being opened h m  the half- 
U i o n  of iSt. J o h  t o  the moet dishnt of tlie old breaclieg 
five hundred feet, tlle Cliofibe batteries were turned agains t 
the castle and the otlier defenws of the Monte Orgullo. TIie 
battery on the istlimus, in wnjunction with th~i fire from 
the Clioba, dso demoIished the fsice of tlie Bt. Suhn7s bastion 
and the end of the high curtiiin above it; thus tbe wlioIe oi 
that quarter was in mine. The San Barhlomeo batteries 
then brolre the demi-bastion of the horn-worlc, find Welling- 
ton after exnmining the dcfences decided te malee a ldg- 
ment and ordered an assnult for the acxt day at eleven 
o'clock, when the ebb o€ tide would leave spnce between the 
horn-worlt and the water. T h e  gallerie~ in front of the 
advanced battery on the isthmw were now pnshed t o  the sea 
wdE; and three minea were formed with the double v i w  of 
opening a w a ~  for the troops t o  reach the strand, and render- 
ing useless any subtemnean worke the enemy might have 
made in that pnrt. At two o'clock in the morning of She 
3Zst they were spruiig and opened tliree wide passrsg~; 
tliese were immediately connected, and a traverse of gabioas, 
six feet high, waa m n  across the mouth of tbe main trench 
on the left, to @creen the opening from the grapc-slrot of 
the &le. Everytliing WR8 now rmdy for the asrraul4 but 
before desmibing that teriible event it will be fitting t o  ahow 
the exact state o f  the hesieged in defence. 
UraZiam bad been before tlie place for Hty-two dnp, dmbg 
thirty of w1iich the attack was suspended. Al1 tliia time tha 
prrison had Iiiboured incessantly ; and tlioug?~ ktlio hesiegcrs' 
fire a p p r e d  to Lave mined the defences of the enormons 
brea& in tlia sea flank it was not so. A perpendicular fall 
behind of more thun tñreaty fe& barred progrws; and 
beyond, amonpt  tl~e mins oP the burned houses, wac a strong 
munter-wall fifteen Twt high, looplioled for musketry and 
pm2leI 'upit11 &e breaches, which were also cut ofl fmm the 
nound pnrt of the m p n r t  by trnverses nt the extremities. 
' I I e  only ra l ly  practicnble road into the t o w  waa by the 
narrow end of  the high curtain above &e I ~ l f  tiastiun of 
$t. John. Ahout the middle of tho great brea& stood tlw 
tower of Los Hornos, still capable of some defence, and 
beneath it a mine charged with twelve bnnrired weight of 
powder. The streets wme al1 trcnched and furnislied witb 
travetses to dispute the pssage and c m r  a retreat to t l~e  
Monte O@o; to reech the main breach it ms necewry 
dso to form a Iodgment in tlie liorn-work, or p w ,  as in the 
former assault, unrier a hnking fire of mnslrety for two 
huudred yards : and the firat step mas dose nnder tlie sea wall 
at the snlient angle of tbe corered way, wliere two mines 
charged WMI eight iinndred pounds of powder msre prepared. 
Besides tliese retrenclimente and mines, the Fmnch had 
~ t i l l  eome artillery in reserve. One eixteen-pounder mounkd 
at 8t. EIme ff ruilted the left of the hreacliea on the river fncc; 
a twclve nnd an eigl;libpomder, prcserved in tlio macmah of 
tlie Cnvnlier, wcre rmdy to flank the lnnd fnce of the balf- 
bastien of St. Jolin; many guno from tlie Monte Be,ma& 
Orp114 especialIy those of tlia Mirador, colild 
pIay upon the coltimnn, aand tliere sas a four-poander 
Mden  on tlie horn-worlc to be brought into action wlien tlie 
assault mmmenced. Naither the resvIution oE the governor 
nor the courage of fhe garrison nas abated, but tlie over- 
whefming Tire of the Iast fcw dnys Iind rednced tha nnmbcr 
of fighting men; and Rey mlio had only tmo hiindred anci 
fif@ men in reserve, dern~ncled of Soult whether liia brava 
gnénson shouId be exposcd to another assauIt. 'Tbo army 
would endeavour to suceour Km' WBS tha ieply, md he 
abided Lis f&. 
PiTnpoleon'a ordinance, mhich forbade fhc mrrcnder of s 
fortress witliout Iiaving stood nt leaat onc nssrtuit, has bccn 
hrongl:lp censurcd by Englirih writcr~ upon slcndcr groundn 
Tbe obstinate dcfenccs made by French govcrnom in the 
Yeninrmla mere tlis results; md ir, eondemn an enernyb sp te rn  
from wliich we h ~ e  ourselves suffered will scarcely bring it 
inta disrepute. The argninent mns tLat tlie besiegers work- 
ing by the rnles of art must make way into the place and to 
r i~k  an assault for the mke of mi?ihry ghry or to a u p e n t  
+he losa of tlie enemy> is t o  aaerifice brave men uselessly; 
capjtul~tion allvays fdowed a certain advanoe of the tiesjegers 
in Lovis tlie Fourtesnth's time; and to suppose Napolean'~ 
upatart genemls possmsed superior courage and sense ol mili- 
tary honour to the Iiigh-minded nobilitp of tliat age waa 
quite indmissitile, IG Las been rather whimsically dried aisq 
that ohcdience to the  amperor'a odera might ~ u i t  a predes- 
tinnrian Turk hut could not be tolerated by n reflecting Chris- 
tian. From tliis it woiild seem, that certain nice distinctions ns 
to cxtent m(1 manner reconcile human ~igughter witli Chriris. 
tinnity; nnd hhe tme stnndnrd of military honour was fixd 
by tlio intriguing depravd and insolent Louis the Four- 
teenth. I t  m. howcvcr be supposed, that as h'apoleon'a 
generalri far inrrpaascd the cringing conriier commandera of 
Lonis in rnilibl daring they possased p t e r  rnilitay 
virtuc. Morcorer rnaralinl ViIlara hcld, thnt a governor 
shonld never sirrrcnder, and when his worka were niinerl 
slionlil break througli tha besicgcra. Lord Clive also recorn- 
mend~d tlmt nn ordinanee similar te Napoleonb should be 
a.pplied +a Rritisli fortrcsses in India Finnlly N~poleon'~ 
ordinance was rnereiy a revival of one ifisued by Louis 
himself ! 
But tlio whole ~ ~ g n m e n t  ~ e s t s  on fialse graiinds, To inflict 
loss on fin ennn y js the essence of war ; and aa the brnvest 
rnen will a l w a ~ s  be fmmost  in m assault the Ims thus occa- 
aioneii may be of the utmod imporhnce. To wsist when 
notliing can be pinetE or anvcd is an act of barharm coumge 
~vliich rerison qurna at;  bxt Wapleon only demanded a 
rwistance wliich t;hou!d mnlre it dangerons for the  beaiegers 
to Iiasten a sic@ beyond the niles of a+-he wouId not have 
a ñwk governor yieId to a simulatinn of forre,-he deaired 
that militay honoiir should red  tipon t11e eourage anJ 
re..seurces of rnen ratliez than i ipn $he strmgth of wdIs: in 
fine he made n practica1 application of the proverb tliat neces- 
~ i t y  is tlx motlier of invention. Gwted that e siega con- 
ducted with s~fficient means must reduce the fortress attacked; 
still a governor may divlay liia resources of mind. Vauban 
admits of orie asxtdt. aria ~everal retrenclimentri afeer a Idg- 
menr i~i m d c  on tlie body of tho pllacc. Napolcon only 
imiifed thnt ovcry effort which ooumge nnd genius could 
dictnta ~110uItl be exhausted heforo a surrennder, and tliose 
efforts can nemr be defined or bounded liefore-hnd, Tarifa 
M a hsppy example. 
To be consistent, anp attack whi& deviates from the rulw 
of art muat also be denounwd ap barbarous; yet how seIdom 
has a general al1 tlie neoesmry means ~t liig disposd. In 
S p i n  not one siege coiJJ be conducted by the British army 
according to the niles. And tliere is a manifest wenkness jn 
pmising the Spaish defeence of Zaragoza, and condeinning 
Napoleon, bemuse he demanded from repIar troops a dwo- 
zion similar t o  thnt displrryed by peasants ancl artisms. What 
governor ivas ever in m more desperate situation than Biaanet 
\vas at Bergen-op-Zoorn? Geneml Gmham, with a hmardihood 
and daring which wouId done place Iiim amongst tlie forc- 
most rnen of enteqrise wlGch Erirope crin boast of, tlirew 
more tlinn two tlionsnnd men apon the rnrnws of thnt 
almast impvable fortrcss. Tho yonng eoldiers of the gar- 
rison, mrpriacd in tlie night, were dispersed, wero fiying, the 
Britirh hd possession of fhe wnlle for several hourvl yet 
some cool and b m ~ c  oficera rnllied their men, charged up 
tlie m r m  rnmps anci drove tlie assaiImts over tlie pampetti 
into tlie ditcli; they who couId not at first defend tlieir 
works were tlien able to retake thsin; and so complctely suc- 
cessfd and illustrntive of the pririciple was this counter- 
attack, that the number of prisoners cqualled that of tlie 
garriaon. There are no rules ta limit energ and geniua, and 
no man knew Eietter tlim Napoleon hoa to cdl tliose qualitieq 
fortli : he possessed tliem kirnself in tke ntmost perfection and 
creiited them in otheta 
CHAPTER IT. 
To asssult the breachea wlthout having destreyed the enemy's 
defences or establialied a lodpent on the liorn-vork waa, 
notwithstanding the increasd fire and greater facilities of tlie 
besiegers, obviously n repetition o£ error. And the m e  
prierals who had before made their disapprovd of such opera 
tions public, now more freely dealf out censares, not ill- 
founrld, but very indi~creet, since there is much danger when 
doi~hts come down from the commanders to tha soldiers. 
WelIington tllouglit tlia fifth didsion had been thua di 
coumged. Ea TVW inceneed and demanded fiky ~ o l u n k r a  
from mch of tber fiftecn regiments composing tlie first, fourth, 
and light divisions, m who M sJmo othw t ~ 0 9 ~ 8  hm to 
mmd a 6mch. Sucli was the phrase empIoyed, sind Eeven 
'hundred and fift,y p h n t  soldien instantly mnrched to Sen 
Sebnstian in nasmcr t o  the appeal, Colonel Cooke and major 
Robertson led tEio guards mbnd Qrrmans of the first divixion; 
rnnjor Roae cornmanded the men of tlie fouiih division; coIonel 
Eunt, r dnring officer who liad already won hifi promotion at 
fo~mer asaaults, a t  the head of tlie fierce rugged vetema 
oF tho light division: yet there were pod  oEcars. snd bmve 
soldien in the fifth divjsioa 
Tt being at drst snpposed tbat WelIington designed only 
simpIclod,ment on the grmt brench, thevolunteers and one bri- 
gade of the fifth division ody were ordered to be mdy;  bnt in a 
council held at night, major Smith mainttiined that the orden 
wcre mi9~nd~r6t00d, MI no lodgmcnt aonld be fomed udtss 
the high mmirtain mas gained. Gencml Osvanld being ealled ta 
the conneil mas of the sama opinion;-whereupan tlie rcmaindcr 
the Fifth di~ision was brought t o  the trenches; and general 
.arlfortl haxiving offerad the servicea of bis Portiiflese bripde, 
1s told be migl~t ford the Urume~  snd assail the fiirthest 
e ~ c h  if he judge)etl it ~lvisp,b1e. u t h  had now resumed 
mmand of tlie fifth division, and directed the attack from 
tiie is thms; but lie was extremely offended 6 t h  the volun- 
teers and mould not suffer them t o  Iead the assanlt ; some he 
rrprearl along the trenclies t o  keep down tbe fire of the born- 
worlt, the remainder were held in reseme w i i  Aays Britísh 
and Sprye's Portiiguese hripdea of tbe fifth division; to 
Rohinaon's brigade tlie assault was confided. lt me f o m d  
in two columng, one t o  attack the old breach between the 
toweir, the other to storrn tlie bnstion of St. Jol~n and the end 
o€ the higl~ curtnin. Tlie small breach on fhe extreme right 
rvns lcft for Rmdford'~ Portripmc, who were on tho Cliofre 
liilla; some large borita filIetl witli troops werc diwctcd t o  mnke 
n demonstrntion npinst tlie aea-line of the Monte Orgullo, 
itnri Gralirim overlouked the wbole operations from the riglit 
linnlr of the rivw. 
Heavily the mornlng of tlie 31et 'broke, a thiclr fog bid 
every ob j~c t  and tlie Liesiegers' batterias wuld not open until 
eiglit. e'clock; from tlint hour Iiowever a comtaut shower of 
rtiissiles wm puured upon tlie besieged vntil eleven, when 
Elobinsa*iys bripde quitted tlie trenclies, and passing through 
tlie openiugs in tlie sea-wall was launched agaiust tlie 
Lirencli~~. Wliile tlie 11cd of tliis column was still gat l~er i~g 
o11 the atrnnd, tbirty ynds from the salient angle of the liorn- 
work, twdve men under a. sergmnt, whose heroic death haa 
not aufficed to preserve Iiii name, m i n g  violently for\~~anl 
leaped upon tlie covered wtty with intent to mit tlie sausage o f  
tLe enerny's miues. SIie French startled by this surlden 
tissaiilt fired the truiii preniaturely; but tlioiigh the sergeant arid 
liis fulloaers s e m  al1 dev l ruyd  and the liigli sea-wvall tlirown 
ivith a dreadfal crnsh upon the l i a d  of the dvancing coliimn, 
DO% more than forty men wert? crushed by the ruins, and tIie 
msh of tlie troops was scarcely checked. The forlorn hope 
had before passed beyond the pIay of the mine, and nom 
speeded along tlie strand amidst a ahower o f  p p e  and shells, 
tlie leatier, Eieutenant Mwguire of the f d  regiment, con- 
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was in proportion; for the t r ~ v m e  on the hnk w w  defended 
137 French gmnatliers wlio wouId not yield; the twa piecee on 
tlie C a d i e r  itsell swept tLe front of tlie opening, and the 
fonr-pounder mhnd mnsldry from the horn-work swept the 
river fwe. Rome sappem and a working party attached t~ 
the assaulting columna ende~voud  to form a Iudpent; but 
no artificial materials liad been provided, and most of the 
labonrers were kiiled hfore tliey could raise the loose rocky 
fragmenta into a cover. During t t i s  time the Dritish wnn- 
ter-fire of artillery kilEed mnp;  and the reserve brigades o£ 
the fifth division were puslied on by degrees to  feed tlie attack, 
until the left wing of the dnth regiment only remained in 
the trenches. The voIunteem also, who had been with diñi- 
mlty rectntined in f le  trencles, c d i n g  out to know why 
Ghey 3iad been bronght time i f  they wcre not to Iead the 
assault,' thesc men, wvhose presence liad given auch offence ~LI 
hit11 thet he mould lime kept them altogether from the 
msault, being now let loose went like a wIiirlwind to the 
brenchee and the cmmdcd mases swarmed np tlie face of tke 
ruinu; but on reaching the crest line, they m e  down again 
like a falling ~ a l l :  crowd afher crowd were Eem to mount, fo 
totBr, to sink; tho Frcnch fire was unabated, the. smoke 
floated s w ~ y  and the crmt of the breach bore no living u n !  
Gralium, danding on the nearcst of the Chofre batkrics, 
behold thia frightful dcstmction with n sbrn resolution to win 
at any mst; and he wm a man to llave put b e l f  at the 
head oE the last compmy and dio sword in hand npon the 
hreach rather tIian sustnin a second CEeEeat; yet neither his 
confidente nor hia resourccs wen: yet exhnusted, He direcbd 
an rittempt to be made on the horn-work, md turned al1 tbe 
Chofrc batteries and one on the isthmus, tlirst is to say tha 
coilcentrated fire of fifty heavy pieces npon tha high curhin. 
Tha shot ranged over tlie heads of the troops, now ptliered 
at tlia foot ~f the breiicli; and the stream of missiIes thiis 
poured along tlie upper surfsce broke down the haverses and 
in ita fearfd coune, shattering al1 tbinge, atrswed the mm- 
part with the mngled limhs of the defenders. 
by When this fl:ght of buUds first awept over the mlonsl HOBG 
heads of the soldiers a coy Rmse hom some in- 
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ex y erienced people, ' to retire becanse tlle batteries mere firing 
on tlie stormers;' but the veterans of t l ~ e  liglit division under 
Hunt were not; men t o  be 80 disturlied; irnd in the very lleut 
and ftwy of tlie cannonade they etiected a solid lodgment iu 
some mins of llouses actually within the rampart on tlie rigLt 
o£ the great breacli- 
For h l f  an lioiir this liorrid tempest m o t e  upon tlie worka 
and tlie tiousea behind; and wlien it tba rima11 clatter 
uf the French muskets showed tliat the fight wiis renewed, 
At. tEiis time 81130 the tliirteentli Portnguese negiment, led by 
major Snutlpss and fdluwed by s dehcliment of the twenty- 
fourth undcr colonel Mricbean, entered thei river fmm tlie 
Chofres. Tlie ford wm deep, the water rose above the waist, 
md when tlie soldicrs reactied the middle of tlie strtream, whic.1 
sas two Iiundrd ymds wide, a heavy gun struck the head o 
the cclumn witli a ahower of p p e ;  tlie hawc was fearfu 
pel tlie sunivors closed and moved on. A second discbargt 
Sm tlie mme piece toro tlie ranlis from front to rear; stil 
Be regimelit moved on; and smidst a confused 6re of mus 
btry l'roni the mrnpttrh ~ n d  of artillery from St. Elmo, frtirr 
tlie mile and fmm tho IIirdor, hnded on the l& bank ani 
nralied sigainst t11e third. breach. Nacbean's men Erillowiii; 
with eqnd bra~erp reinforced the great breach eighty yard: 
to tlie lcft o€ tlie other, although the line of ruins seemed to 
extend tlio who!e way. 
Then tlie fighting became fierce and ohstinnte again at al1 
the breaches; but th0 Fnench musketry atill rolled with dwdIy 
effect, the bmpe of ~lain increnaed, nnd once more the gre~t 
mnss of stormera sunk to &e foot of the ruins unable to 
win-thc living shcltered themselves ari they could, and the 
dend and wonndd lay so thickly thot h a d y  couIcl it be 
jiiddgct: whether tlie hurt or nnhurt were t k ~  most numerous. 
It was now evirlent the assratilt must feil unlea some ncci- 
dent intervcncd; for tho tide was rising, t,he mscmm nIl 
engaged, ~ n d  no greatcr effort muld be cxpcctod from mcn 
v;hoso courage had been alrerady pwhed to the verge of niarl- 
ness. In this crisis fortnne interfcrcd A niimber of pomllcr 
barreis, live ghells, and combustible materiiile, which Qie 
Fmch hrtd aceumulakd behind the tmversea for their defence, 
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cau~ht fire. Xoon B, bright conuuming d m e  m p p e d  the 
wliole of tlie higli : l ih in ,  a succession of loud ex~ilosiom 
were liead, liundreds of tlie Frencli grenailiers were destroyd, 
tlie ivst wew tlirown into eonrusitin; and d i l e  the ramparts 
were still euveloped with auffocating ddies of smoke tlie 
Britisli boldiers broke in at tlie firat traveae. The defenders, 
Iiewildered by this terrible disaster, yidded Tor a mament, yet 
soon r~llied and a close desperate atmggIe took place dong 
thc sulnmit of t l ~ e  Iiigll ccurttiin; but the fury of the stormers, 
wliose numbers increased every moment, could not be stemmed. 
Tbe Frencb colours on the Clrvalier were torn away by Iieute 
nnnt Getliin of tke eleventh regiment; the horn-work, he 
land front belom the curtain, the lmpholed wall behind the 
great breach, were al1 abandoned ; the light division soldiera 
ii-Iio liad nlre~dy eshblishod tliem.jeivm in the ruina ori the 
Frencli Eeft, pnetrated t o  tlic st,reets; and the Portupese rrt 
tlie smnll breach, mixed 6 t h  Britisli who liad wandererl t o  
t!int p i n t  seeking for R n  entrance, bumt in on tllleir side. 
Fivc Iioiire the dreridfiil hrtt,tle had Irasted at the ~valls, and 
now the stream of war went pouring into the town. She 
uiidnunted governor hitill disputed the vict.org Eor a shart 
time with tlrc aid of liis bnrricndcs; but severa1 liundreds of 
liis mcn mcrc cut off md tnkcn in the horn-work, nnd evcn 
tn effect a retreat beliind Qie line of defences wiucti sepamtd 
tlic toan from the Bfonto Orgullo was dificalt: homever a 
cron-d of his troopa, Bying from the Eiorn-work aIong the 
Iixrbour fli~nlr of tlio town, hoka  thmugh .li body oi' tlie 
Uritisli mho liad renched t he  vicinity of the fortiíied con~ent 
of Lmta Téresa Thiu post wm tlie only one rehined by ttlie 
French in tLo toivn, and it wnt; tliought that Monte Orgullo 
miglit have Leen carried, if a pnet.rrl to direct the troops bd 
been at hand; 6ut whetliei from wounh or accident no oflicer 
of tliat mnk enkeretl tlie place until Iong after the brea& 
I i d  iieen won; tlra I~attalion cLiefs were thus embamsed for 
~vant of ordcrs, and a tliunder-storm, comiug d o m  froin the 
mountains \vi'Lh anbounded fury inirnediately after the place 
a a s  mrried, addd to tlie confiision oE the figlit. 
This storm ~eemed to be a si@ from hell for the perpe- 
tration of d l m y  whicb wodd Lave aslmmed tLc most ferocictu 
barbanana of antiquity. At Rodriga intoxication and plunder 
had been the principal object; at Bitrlajos lust and murder 
were joined to rapine and drunkenne~is; but st &n Sebmtiau, 
the direst the most revoiting crnelty was added to the c a b  
l ope  of crim~s,-one atrocity of wliicb a girl of aevcnteen 
was the victlm, shggers the mind by its enornious, incredible, 
indesmibable barburity. The resolution of the troops to  throw 
oR di~ciplme m= quickly made manifest. A British atar- 
oficer wus pumued with a volley of smll  a m  and escaped 
with dificulty from men who miabook him for tho provoat- 
inarshd of the fifth division; a Portuguese adjutant wlio 
eiirleavoud to prevent some wicl~ednees wae put to death in 
tlie market-place, uot with sudden viulence frorn a single 
rtiffim, but deliberiitely by a number o$ English soldiera; and 
tliough many offiom exerted tliemselves to preserve order snd 
riiany men were well conducted, the rnpine and violence com- 
inencerl by Villains spmii;  the cnmpfollowers soon crowdetl 
into tho plrtcc, nnd thc disorder continued until the flamca, 
folIowinp; the etcpe oT tlie plunderer, put an end to  his fcrocity 
by deatraying thc ~vliole town. Tliree gencrnls, Leitli, Oswald, 
and hliiason, htwE been hurt in t11e trenches; sir Richarrl 
Fletcher, chief cngineer, a brnve rnan'lvho liad long ecrved his 
muntry honoumlily, m killed; cotonel Rurgope, seoond 
eiiginecr, m wounded, md the cnrnage at the brmhes \vna 
apl>nlling. The voliinte~rs, although h u g h t  llnte into tlie 
actioa hnd nearly 11alf their n d c r  stmck down; most of tlio 
regiments of the fifth cfivision suffered in the Hame proportion, 
aiid thc wllole loas aince tho rcnewd of thc sicgc, excccdcd two 
tliousand five bundred men and officers. 
Whcn tho town waa talcen h e  stecp and rugged Nonte 
Orgiillo with itg citndd remained t o  be a s s d e d  It prescnted 
four bttci;cs connccted with masonry in firat line; and fmm 
tfic extremitie~, rampa protected by rednns 14 tu tho h n t a  
TEresn, convent, wliich offered a crtlient point of dcfenca On 
ttic side facing Santa Clara, and beliind the Orgullo wcre some 
batkics; and if al1 tliese worka had been of gcwd con- 
struction mnrl qa rded  by frcah troop~, the second siege wo~ild 
have been dificult. But tlie force of the garrison was shnhtererl 
by the recent assault. most of the enginects hrid been killetl, 
th pvernor and many others wounded, five hundrd men 
were sick oe hurt, the soldiers fit for duty did not exceed 
thirteen hundred, and thep had four hundred prisoners t o  
g u a d  The castIe was ~irnall, the bomb-pmofs smmly snfficed 
to protect tho ammnnition and provisions, and only ten giins 
rernained in a condieron for aervlce, three of which were on the 
sea line. There was ve y little water, aad the troops had t o 
lie out on the naked rock exposed t o  fire or only covered by 
tlie mperities of ground: &y and hia bmve prrison were 
however still resolnte to fight, and thep remived niglitly by 
see smdl mpplies of nmmunition. 
Wcllington ~rrivcd thc dny itfter tlie assxntt. Regular 
approaelics could not Iie cnrried up the stacp naked rock, be 
doubted the power af vertical fire, and ordered bntteries te hc 
formed on tho mptured worlrs of  tho town, intending to  brcnch 
the cnemy'a remaining lines of defenco and tlien ~itorm tlie 
Ogul lo ,  hfeanmhile seeing tlie Santa TQresa would enable tIte 
Prench t o  sdly by the rampart rtn tlie lelt of tlie tlllies, Le 
composed his first Iine witli a feiv troops strongly bsrr idd ,  
and pIncsd o, supporting Iiody iin the marlsebplace ivith strong 
reserves on the liigh curtain and flank mmpark, I3ut froin 
the conven6 wl~icli was actually in the town, tlie ene.ny killed 
ntniny of thebesiegers; and ~vlien afber sererd days it was 
assriulted, tliey set the Iomer parts on tire and retired by a coin- 
municntion m d e  from the soof to a ramp oa tlie liill hehind. 
All tIiis time the flames were licking up tlie Iiouses, and tho 
Orgullo mas ovenvlielmed .wvitIi a vertical fire of shella 
On the 3rd of September the govmnor m aummoned, 
but bis resolution was nwt t o  be ~ihalcen, and the vertical fire 
was therefore continued dg and night, The BritisIi prisoneix . 
miffered as me11 as the enemy; for tlie officer ctim- Jmee, 
manding in tlic m~tle,irritated by tthe miserp of the 
garri~on, cruelly reftised to let tlie unfortunate captives maka 
trenches to mvcr themselves; tlie French dso kllas, 
complnin thnt their wounded and sick men, lying 
in an empty magazine with a, blacl~ flag ffying, and having 
the English prisoners in their red uniforma plsacd around ta  
strengtlien the claim of humnnity, were fired upon, 
GURS for the new batteriea were now bmught from the 
Chofres ~cross the Urna; at first by nighh, but the difficul9 
of wtn~ggling with the water in darkness, induced tlie transport 
by day and d h h i n  retich I f the French baWwies, whiQ how- 
ever ilid not fire. The ffaming houses impeded Ue morks, 
l id  the mina furnhhed cover for marksmen t o  gall the h e & ,  
and the guns oa Santa Clara were ~ u p e n k d  and worked by 
seamen. With the besieged ammnnition mas scarce, the 
horrible vertical &e suuued their energy, tand the besiegem 
Ixboured íreely until Be 8th; then fifty-bine hewy piews 
opened at once from the itiland, the isthmug the horn-work 
and the Chofres, md in two h o w  the Eraclor and Qeen'a 
battery were broken, the French fire eztinpished, the hill 
torn and furrowed in a friglitfui mmner; the bread-ovena 
wem datroyed, a magazine exploded, and tha &le, s m d  and 
crowded with men, ms overlaid with the descending shellii. 
TGen tlie goyernor, proudly hending t o  fntc, ~ m n d e r e d .  On 
tha 9th thEs b m e  man and hia heroic gisrrison, rednced t o  
onc-tliird of their original nnrnber and leaving five hundred 
wonndcd behind them in the hospital, rnarchcd out with the 
honoum of WW. The 6panieh flag wris hoistecl undcr a aalute 
af twenty-one guns, and the siege terminated after sixty-thiee 
dnpa iipen frenches; preciaely when thc tempestirous saqon, 
then beginning t o  vex the cowtI woeld have rendered a con- 
tinunnca of the sea bloclrade irnpossibla 
lo. %n Seb~tian, a tbird-rate fortre~ls md in hd condi- 
tion when fimt invested, resisted a besieging army possessing 
an enormone battering-trah for sixty-three dap. TI& k~ to 
be attributed partly to the errors of the besiegers, prindpallg 
rli 
ta ohtructions extxaneom +,o the militarp operntions; and 
conspicuoue among the last wns the misconduct of the Admi- 
ralty md general negligenca of the govemment. Slie latter 
rctmdcd the g i e p  for ~ixteen day4 the formcr enabled t . h ~  
g~mison to i n c r e ~ e  ita mmeans ns the siege proceeded. The 
Spanish failures carne next, tha authoritics would not aupply 
carts and boata, and even refused the use of their public 
buiIdin~ for hospitsala ! Thus between the seti and t l i c  ~Lorg 

aasanlt, and Ghe jurliciou~ umge of bia artillery during t 
action, were no mean heIps to  the victory ; it n.as on su 
occasiona that his prompt genius shone; yet it was nothii 
wonderful that beavy gans at short.distances, the mn 
perfectly Lnown, should strike with &ainty along ri line 
ramparG more than twenty-seven feet aiiove the Lea& o£ t 
troopa Bucli practice mas to be expected, and Gnliani s 
genius wm more evinced by €he pminptnw~i of ttL thouglit 
and the trust he put in the vdow of hk soldiem It was 
more remarkable thnt the stormars did not relinquish their 
attack when thw expo~ed to their o m  p n s ;  for it is a mis- 
taka to say no mischief ocmrred; e serjeant of the ninth 
segiment wm killed closo to his commanding oEeer, nnd 
other cma1t . i~  AISO liad plnce. 
4'. It j a  supposed the cxplosion on tlio rnmpah M 
caused by the cannonade from the Clhofres; yei 
o001 obsemr, mhose account 1 have adopt Cooka 
because he was a spectator undiaturbed, affin 
that the cannonade ceased before Snodgrasa forded the rirl 
and the great explosion did not h~ppen until lialf-an-ho-- 
after that event. That intrepid exploit of the Portupt 
was thought one of the principal m i s s  of success; and 
entrance w s  cerkiinly made a t  the emall breach by sewi 
soldiem, British and Portupese, manp of the former b a ~  
wandered fmm the great breach md got mixed with the latts 
before the explosion happened on the higb curtain. Whetb 
those men would have beea followed by greater numbem 
doubtft& bu2 the lodgment m d e  by tbe light diviai 
volunteers withi the g r e ~ t  breach m5 solid and could ha 
been maiiintained. The Frencli cal1 the Porf 
Bellas. 
mese athck a feint. Gnibam certainly ddi n 
found much upon iG. Ha pv0  Bmdford the option  tí^ atta 
or rsmain tranquil; and XcBean acturalIy received ctiuntt 
ordera when Lis oolumn was ~ l d y  in the river, buk he 8- 
then too far ml~anced. 
59 When tlie destrnction of &m Sebadian became lrnown, , 
it m nsed by the anti-Briti~h pparty ah Ciidie t o  excite the 
people affainst Englnnd. Tilo political chicf of Guipnac 
publicly c l i n ~ e d  Grnhnm with hnving 's&d a& h u d  1 
ion 
!ha 
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eocle&stical bodiw, the consduls, and principal persons of S 
Sehstian, who solemnly affirmed the tnith of each case; a 
if Xpanisli testimony here is not t o  be heeded, four-fiftbs of t,., 
exeesses attributed to the French armieg must be effmed as 
resting on a like tliough a weaker foundation. Tliat the town was 
fircd Iieliind tlie brwhes during tha operations, and that it 
spred in tlie tumult following tlie wassault is unduulitd; yet 
it is not improbable tbah plunderers iiicreaaed it; aiid cer- 
tainly tlte 'peat destmction did not hfd1 until long after tlie 
place was in possession of tho allies. I huve been aswred liv 
a surgeon, tliut Iie ldged tha tliid day after the assniilt d 
bouse well furnislied, and in a street flien untouclied by fi 
ar plunderers, but house and street were aftwwards plunder 
and bumed. Ttie inhabitants couTd only have f i r d  upon t 
nllics tho first dny, nnd it might wclI hava bccn in se 
defcnce for they wcto bmbnrously treated. The abhomc 
case of tlie ymng girl was notcirious, so wcre mnny otlic-- 
Aroiind tlic piquct fires, where fioldierc, as every experienc 
oíñcer ltnows, speak withoiit reaewe of their past deeda n 
feeliiga, 1 Iave heard tlie abominable actians rnentionecl ' 
the mi~nidpality~ relsted witli little varicttion long before tha t  
narrative was pub~ished told howmr 6 t h  sorrow for tke 
suftercrzJ and indignatian against tlie perpetrators; for these 
last were nat so numeroue as mi@ be supposed from the 
extent of the calamities t h g  infticted. 
Lt i, a common but abd!ow and miechievow notion, that a 
villain makes never the worse soldier for an assault, because 
tlie appetite for plunder supplies tbe place of honour; as If 
tIie compatihility of vice and bravery rendered the union of 
virtue nnd cournge unnecessasy in warlike matkw. In al1 the 
bost mhich ktoimed &ri Sebstian there was not a man, being 
sane, rvoi~ld for plunder only have encountered tlie &nger of 
tliat assault ; yet under the spell of discipline al1 ruslied eagerly 
t o  meet it. Discipline bowever Fias i t6  root in patriutism, or 
how coa3d amed men he wntrolled at alF? It would be wise 
and nat diñrcult t o  graft moderation and liumanity upon such 
a noble stock Tlie modern aoldier is not necemarily tlie atem 
bloody-hnnrled mman the ancient soldier vas, tl~ere is ns much 
difference between them ae between tlie aportsrnan and the 
butcher; the ancient warrior, figl~ting +th the slrord and 
reaping liis harvest of death mlicn tlia enemy wns iii fligllt 
bemime Iiabituated to  the act of slayiag. The mdern soldier 
seldom uses his Iiayonet, sees not Iris peculiar victim fall, anrl 
exults not over mnngIed I i m b  as prooh of personal promess. 
l 
Hence, preserving his original feelings, his nzttnral abhorrence 
o€ murdcr, lie difiera nat fmm otliei men nnless ofim erlgaged 
in the assault of h w n g ,  where rapacity lunt and inebriety, 
uncheckd by the restrainta of  discipline, are excited by temp- 
tation. It is said no d d i w  can be restrained after sttormicg 
a t o m ,  and a British soldier lenst of all becanse he is brutisli 
~ n d  insensible to honour! Shame on sucb dumnies! Wiiat 
rnukes the British solclier fight as no otlier soldier erer fights? 
His pay l Roldim of al1 nations receive pq. At tlie period 
o€ thia assanlt, a iwjennt a f  the twenty-eighth 
regirnent, mmed Xnll, liad been sent witli a party $':;fg 
fo the coaat fmm Rotoncemlles, t a  mtrlze purcliases 
for bis ofñccw. Rc pIaced the money he was entrtisted with, 
two tIiousand dollm, in t l~e hands of a commissary, aad h v i n g  
sccured a reccipt persutided Uis pnrty t o  join in thc siarrn: he 
survived, reclnimed the money, rnacle his purchases and 
retuned to his regirnent. Aud these are the men, these the 
spirits, who are cnlIed too brntidi ta  work iipon except by 
fcar! it is precisely fenr t o  wliich they are most insensible. 
Undoubtedly if aoldierri hear icnd read that it is irnpossible 
to rertrain fheir violencc they wiIl not be restrabed. Xut let 
the pliinílcr of s t o m  a b r  an asmuit be exyirtwlp m ~ d e  mi- 
mind by the nrticles af mar, witli a due punisliment attricherl ; 
le$ it be constantly impressed upon t h ~  troops that aucli CQU- 
(liict is a6 miich oppo~crl to rnilitnry lianour and dirrcipIine ns 
it i g  to momlity; lct a select botly of men receiving higber 
pay farm a pnrt of tlic nrmy ~ n t l  be ch~rged t o  fol3oiv storm- 
ing oolumns, with pomer to inflict instantnneouri p~inisliment~ 
denth if it be nccessary. FinnEly, as rewnrd for urtmrdinnry 
vnlour should keep pace with chastisement for crimes com- 
~nitted under such temptation, it would be fitting tliat mmong, 
apportioned to tlie dunger nnd importante of the service, 
, 
sliuuld be insured to  the succeasful tioops md always paid 
without delay. Tliis iiiight ba tuken as rmom from memies, 
bat if tho inhnbitanb are friends, or toa ~ O O T ,  governmei 
riho~ld furnish the amaiint. With mtch regulations the s t ~ m  
ing of t o m a  wonld not pmduoe more militay diaordem tb 
thi? gaining of bmttles in the field. 
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'ECLLE San Seba~tian was being stormed SouIt fought a 
h t t l e  witli tlie covering Eurce; not willingly nor with much 
hope of success; but Iie uras averse to let tbe place fa11 without 
antnather effoit and tliouglit a tiold demeanour would best 
Iiide liis renl weakness. &idea by the progress of the aiege, 
Iiich he lrnew tiirougit Lis sea communication, lie awaited 
e lnst moment of action, gtriing meanwhile to improve his 
sources and te revive tho confideiice of the army md of  
e people. Of hia dispersed soldiers eight thousand had 
joined their regments by tlie 12th of Aupst, md be was 
.omised n reinforcement of GLirty thonsmd conscripts; these 
st were lio~vever yet to be enrolled; and neither the pro- 
ass of t11e siege nor the general pauic along the fronti~r, 
Iiicli recurred wjth increasd viderice ~ b r  the late battles, 
~ u l d  sufFer liim to remain inactive. He h e w  his enemy's 
perior strengtli of ponition, nnmher, and military m&- 
:lice; but Iiis former eflorts had intermpted the attack of 
m Sebsstian, and ananother offensive mowment would neoes- 
rily protluce a like effect; wheicfore he hoped by repeatlng 
e disturbance, as long EW tbe inbltercmrse by sea enabled him 
reinforoe and suyiply tlie gxrrigon, to render the siege a 
~ ~ m t i n g  opration. To renelv tlie movewnt; against Pam- 
pelma wae. most advantagoous ; but it required fifty thousand 
iiifnntry Ltr attzck, tmenty thousand for obsemation on*tlie 
lower Bltlussoa, tind he had not such numbers. Suhsisknco 
-so ww uuncertnin, because tlie loes of nll the m i l i t q  m- 
1g.ges at Vitoria nnas stiIl íelt; und the resourceei aE the 
'ui~trj- wom relitctantIy yielded by tho Prancli peuple. To 
,t on the sido of St. Jean Pied de Port was therefore i m p m  
:able, To attack tlie dlies' centre, at Vera, EcMlar, and 
LE Bastan, ww unpromising, seeing tht  two mountain- 
cliairis mere to be forced before tlie rnovemeot could aerjonsl: 
a&ct Wellingtoa: moreover, kl~e ways King impmcticablo fo 
wrtillery, success would lead t o  no decisive result. 
To athclr tlie left rif the aIlies 11;v the great road of Imi 
remained. Agninst that quuarter lie eonld bñng more tlirai 
forty thausnad iiifaritry, 1)ut the positions were of pcriloii 
strength. Tlm upper Bidassoa was in Wellingtiiiis pewei 
Lecausa the liglit division, occupyinp; Yera and tlie. heiglits o 
hiita Enrbarm m tlic iíght bank, covercd aII tlic bridgae 
The lower Bihsson, flowing from Vera with a bend t o  tli 
lcft: ~cpmated dia  hostil^ nrmies on an extent of nine mila 
biit from thr! broken bridgo of Behobia in front of Inin, ti 
tlie sea, the river, brod and tidnl, orered no apparent facilit 
for a passage; ancl between the forda of Biriatii and tliose of 
Tcra j  three miles, there was only &e one pwsage of Andar- 
lnssa, two milea below Vera : along this spam also, steep c r q g  
mountab ridges without roads, lining the river, forharl m, 
grcat operations. nitl~ the points of attack were restrictcl 
tc Ver% and the Eo& between Firiatu and tlie brciken bridg 
of Behobi~ 
To raim Ihe aiege of &n Sebastian iE wae oniy neoegsarlp 
to force a way to Oyarzua, a mal1 town seven or eiglit 
miles beyond the Bidassoa, from thence tlie assailanb could 
mwcli xt ouce upon Passages and upon the Urumea. Tlls 
roya1 rond led rlirectly to  Oyarzun dong tlie Iiroaci wlle: 
se~)aratiiig the Pesa de Haya Gom the Jliizquiliel mountein 
Tlie latter wae on the sea-coast, but tlie P&R. de Etrtya, com 
monly c d l d  the four-crownd rnuunt~in, fillcd witli its depen- 
dent ridges dl tlio Fpwe between Vera, Leskca, Irun, and 
Oyarzun. Xtei staring head bound ivith a rocky dindem wns 
impnssnhlc; but from the bridges of Vera and Lesaca, soveral 
roads, one of them not absolutely impracticable for p n s ,  
pmscd over ita enomiins flnnlrs to Imn at one sido, to Oyarziiii 
o11 tlle other, falling intn the roya1 r o d  at both places. SouItY8 
first dcsip  ~ n s  to unitc Clnuscl'e nnd D%rlon78 troopg drivc 
tlic ligl~t divisi011 from Bnnta Barbmn, tinri then, using t,he 
bridgcs of Lceaca nnd Vera, forcc a pnssnge over thc Pcña de 
Rnya un the lsft of its summit, and push tlie hmds of columns 
t o ~ v ~ ~ r d s  Oyarzun and the upper Ururnetb: Reiile and ITilliitte, 
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passiq tlie Bidnasoa at Ririatu, were ineanwliile to fight their 
way to  Oyarzun by tIie royd road. Re forefiaw Soult, 
that Wellington might during this time collect bis 
right wiag and seek to envelope the French army, or mar& 
npon Rayoane: biit he tliouglit driring memres were necpa- 
snry, and t11e propess of the bmiegeiri at San Seh t i an  eooa 
dmve him into action. 
On '!ie 29th Foy, mmchin~  by the rond of Lohou~son, 
crosscd tlio Nive nt Gnmbo and rcaclied Espelettc; Eüiving 
h e h d  him six hundred nien and tlie nntionnl fivnrds wlm . 
were v e v  numerous, witIi orders to wutch tLa ronde and 
valleys leading upon St. Jean Pied de Port. If pressed by supe- 
rior forces, tliis coms of obsemation m s  to fa11 back upon tliab 
fortress, md it was supporterl with a bririgde of ligtit cavnlry 
stritioned a$ Xt. Palais. I n  tlie niglit two rif D'Erlunys divi- 
aions were secretly drawn from ~inhos,  shndtFoy cont.inued bis 
march thro~igli Espelette, by tlie bi-idges of Arnotz aiid Serres 
to Snn Sean de Luz, from mlieuce the reserve moved forwanl. 
Thns in tlie morning of the 30th two ~trong French columna 
of attack mere assembled on the lower Bidassoa. One unrler 
Cla~~aeT, being twenty thoumiid men mitli twenty pieces of rartil- 
lerf? WFGR ocincentriited in tlie woods behinrl tlie co1nri1i8e~6 
and hyonette moiintains aliore Vew. The otlier iinder 
Fkille, furniirhed, including T'ill~tittr's ragerve, only eighteen 
thowrand men; but Foy'a division 114th Rome liglit cn'dry 
wcm in rmr ready to augment tliia coIumn tci tm2nty-five 
tliousnnd : and thcrewere thih,y-aix picqes of nrtiIl~ry tliíii fwo 
roya1 r o d .  
Lteille's troups were secretd, partly bel~ind tlie Croix dcfi 
Eouquets moirntitin, partly beliind tliut of Luuis XIV. md thc 
Joiver ridgea of tlie Uundnle, near Binatu. D'Erlon, Ii~ving 
Coiiroux'ci and AIiliEys Jivisious and twcnty picces of a~tillery, 
held tlie canips iu advance of Barre nud Ainlioa If tlie a l l i ~  
in liis front marclietl ta reinforce tlieir own left un tlie crowncd 
mounhin, be m-aa t o  vex and retard their movementli, wvoiding 
a serious engagement and feeling to Lis riglit t'or Clauscl'a 
coliimn-that is to s q ,  Abb6.s division, moviiig from +kinlloa, 
was to menace Zqaramurdi aud the Puerto de Echallar, while 
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Conrwxvs division, then in front of &me, w&ri to menace tht 
light division, sieize the roek of IvantelIy if it waa abandoned 
and join Clausel if occasion offered. But if the aIlia asemblec 
a hrge force to operate offensively by the Nive and Nivelle 
~ivers, D'ErIon, without losing Lis oonneñion vith the main 
army, waa to concentmte on hhe alopes deseending from tlie 
Rliune mountain t u 4 8  San PB. If tlie attack an tlie lamer 
Bidassoa succeedsd he m= Go join Clitusel by Tem, or by 
the lreighh of Ecbdw and t l~e  bridge uf Lesaca 13'Erlon 
wau also h hnve been Btrengthened with the Iieavy cavnlry ; liut 
fomge mnld only be obtaiiied for the nrtillery homcs, the liglit 
horsemen, si1 choscn troops of dra-pons, gnd two or three 
hiindred gene-d'arrneth, which mere $1 aswmbled on tlie ropd 
r d  Gehind Rcille. 
Sonlt designed to attack 3 dsybreak the 30th, but hia pre- 
parat.ions being ineom plete he deferred it nntil the 31 st, and 
took rigorous precaations te prevent inklligence pming orer 
t o  the allies' camps. Nevertheless Wellington's emissaries 
dvised liim of tlie movements in the night of t;lie 29tli; the 
augmentation of troops in front of Imn wras observed in the 
rnoming of the 30th; and in the evening tlie bridge equipage 
and the artillery wese deíicried on the roya1 road beyond tlie 
Bidassoa. Thus warned he prepared fos battle with Iittle 
anxieb. For the brigade of Englieh foot-guards, left at 
Oporto when tlie campaign commenced, was now come up; 
most of ttlic muraudera and meu wounded at Vitoria l i d  
rejoined, and three regiments just arrived from England 
formed a new bri@e iinder lord dylmer; making the total 
augrnentntion of British troops in thia quarter Iittle F~ss than 
five thousrand mcn. Hia extreme Ieft was on the Jaieqoiliel. 
Tliis narrow mountain, seventeen 1imclred feet liigh, runs 
along thc coast, abutting ah one end upon tbe Pussuges bnr- 
bour, snd ot thc other upon the naviglthle moiith oE the 
Ridrisaoa Offcring no rnnrlr for tlttnck it was only gmardctl 
by a S l i ~ ~ i ~ h  dettttichmcnt; but at its foot the smtlll f o ~  of 
Rgueras, commnnding the entranoe of the rivcr, was p r -  
riaoned by seamen from tlie naval squadron. Fucriterabia, a 
walled t o m  nt the rnountfiitin foot, wns also occupicd, and t,hc 
low ground betwcen it and Imn waa defenaed by a chain 
of eighk l a g e  field redoulits; t1ius the Jaizquibel was con- 
nected with tlie Iieights covering the ropl  mad to O~nrzun. 
On the nght of Irun: between 131riritu and tlie bridge of 
Behobia, there was a sudclen bend in $he river, the concave 
towards the Frecch, and tlieir positions cummanintled the pmwge 
of tlie frirds bc1ow; but opposerl t o  thern m 9  $he rxceediiig!y 
stiff n d ~ e ~  calleJ.  SR^ bIr,rilini, teminating cne of the p e e t  
ffanks of  t,lic Pena de Rnya. The water flowed round tlie Feft 
of tliis ridgc, confining tlie road, Imitrliiig from tlie 1iritI.ge .pf 
Belioljia tri Irun, for one mile to thc nnyrow ñpnce b~twccn  i ! ~  
charinel nnd the foot of tlia hcight. Irun itaclc strongly 
o m p i d  nnd defcntletl Iiy a fteld-mork! Iiloclred thip may; arid 
it followed tllat the Frericli, aAer fúlrcing tlie pessnge of tlre 
river, must of neceasity win San Marcial EieE0roi.s tlieir army 
could use tlie great r o d .  
Gix thousancl ISpaniar~ls under Freyre were estalilished on 
the crest of San Marcial, ~vliicli wm citreiigtlieno<I by dibntis 
rind teniporriry fielcl works. Behind Imii tlie fimt Britisli 
division under Bownrc! was postecl, and lord Aylrncr's Iirigrtrle 
wm puslid snmewl~d in advance to mpport tiie left of tiie 
Spaniardq. The rigl~t oof lliircinl, falling back from tlie 
river, m s ,  altliough distinct ns n pocitioti, mnnected with tfie 
Pena de Haya ~ n d  in Roine desee  e x p o r ~ t  to  fin eiiemy 
pasang thti rivcr above Birintu; ~vkerefore, Langrt's Sptini~rrls 
wcre d r a m  from tliostr slopcs of f,hp Pcna dc Haya wliicli 
descended towfi~rls Vem, to Fe p&d on those ¿lescen!ntling 
hwards Ririatn:-in tliat situation he protwted the rig1it of 
Sari  Marcid. 
Eighbeen thovsand fiqhti~g mcn were tbua dircctly opposeti 
to the progreas of the cnemy. Tlie fourtli division, quarterctl 
near Lesaca, was stilt disposnl~lc, nnd ti Port:iguese briprlo 
was detnclied from it, t t  mplnm Longrt on the Iiei~1it.s oppo~ite 
Vcra; and to  cuver tlre rtinds lcarliii~ from the bridge nnd fords 
af tliat place aves ttie fianks oF tlie Pena de Haya. The 
Britisli brig~rle were stationed up tlie mountnin, clcise unrler 
the foundry o€ San Antonio, wliem tliey commanderl tiie jitter- 
section oE the roa& coming fmm Bera and X~saca, and foineil 
a reFcrve t o  the Portuguece Iirigde, to h n p ,  anrl to Freyre, 
tj-ing the wliole togetlier. TErc I'ortitguese lirigades w r e  Iiow- 
u e 
ewr somemhak exposed, and toa weak t o  paml t11e enormons 
slopes on which they were placed; wherefore Tnglis's bngaíle 
of the ~ieven.th division a m e  from Ecliallar to reinforce it: 
even thsn, the flanks of the Pena de Haya being 80 rougli and 
vast, the troi>pa eeemed sprbkled here and tliere with l i t t l~  
coIierence. Wellington, ibware that his posjtions were too 
extensive, had commenccd tbe eonstruction of redoubts on 
, commnndingpoints of the mwntrsin; and hnd tmced oiit s 
fortified cnmp on mmo hcights immediatcly in front of 
Oynrmn, which connccted fl ie EaTA,yn, with the Jai~quihel, bat 
thew works were unfinirihed. 
During the night of tJie 30th, Soult ~ m i ~ h e d  with artillery 
al1 the points commancling the fords of Biriatii, the dwcent to 
the bridge and the banks hlow, called the Bas de Bebobii 
This wa9 t o  cover the passage of the ford4 and formation 
huit. of the bridges, and to stop pn-boats coming u?; in which viem also he spread Casa Palacio's bripde 
of Joseph'~ Spanish pa r& along the river t o  Andaya, fronting 
Fuentembis 
Reille m s  directed t o  stom San Marcial, and l e a n  s shong 
reserve tliere iu watch for tmops coming from Vera or 
descending fhe Pena de Haya; with the rest of liis force he 
was t o  drive the alliea from ridge ko ridge, unti1 lie pined 
tliat fiank of the g e a t  mountain wliich descenda upon Oyarzun. 
Tlie roya1 r o d  beinp tlius opwed, Fufa division and the 
avalry and itrtiIlery were to cross by liridges to bs laid during 
the attack on Bzn Marcid; and it wils SoulR iiitention to 
~eki in  tliis liist-named ridge and forbify it as a bridge-liead witli 
a vim t o  subsequent operations. 
To aid Reille nnd provide for the concentration of the whole 
amy at Oyarznn, Clttusel was directd to make z simultaneona 
attack fmm Vera; not as at first designed liy driviug the 
alIiea from Santa Barhra and seiaing tlie liridges; tu t  leaving 
one di-iision and hia gons above Vera to  keep tlie light divisiun 
in check, t o  cross the river kiy two fords below and assail that 
dape of the Pena do Hayti where the Portuguese brigade snd 
Inglis were posted. Then forcing his imy upwztrdri to the 
fnrgc of Stbn Antonio, he could aid ReiIle directly by falling 
on tlie rear of San BIarcinl, or meet him at Oymzun by 
turning the rocky surninit of tho Pena de R n p  
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Gmnht of San 11fwciaE.-At daylight on the lst, ReilEe, 
uiidcr protoction of thc Freach giln9, fordcd tho Bidnssoa, 
abovo Biriatu, with tm70 divisiom and two pieces of actiiisry. 
110 quickly seized a detaclied rirlge uf inferior lieight just 
under 8an Marcial, anri Iwviiig une brigade tliere su a 
reserve, detaclied anotlier t o  attack the Blitmi~h lefi by a 
slape wLich descended in that qunrkr to the river Lrt 
RItartiniere's division assailed tlieir right at the same time, but 
- 
tFie rnountain mns covered witIi brusliwood and 
remarliably steep; the French troops presewed nci Scmlt, HSS. 
order, tlie mpports wnd skirmishm p t  mked in confiision, 
nnd when two-tliirds of tlie lieight were gnined tlie Spanimds 
cli~rged in columna nnd drove tliem heacllong down. 3lean- 
wliile two iridges ~ c r c  t,hmmn 11elo-w tlio fordq and tha liwd 
of 'STillnttc's rcscrve passed ~ n d  rencmcd tlic figiit morc vigor- 
ously; ont! Iirigndc &en renclied the chtapcl of Xao l~urcinl,  
and tlie lea u£ tlie Spanish lino twis shaken; but tlie eighty- 
fifth regirnent dmnceJ from lord Aylm~.r's brigetIa t c  support 
it, and mt tliat momrnk W~llifigton rodo up witli l~is  hñ.  SIie 
Spniards carcd wry little fos tlieir own ollicers but mitli that 
noble ilistiiict wliich never fihiuaiidons tlie your ~ieople of aiiy 
country, ac?cno~vledgeierl roa1 greatnese withoiit refercnce to 
nation, rtt liis order, with lond shoilts they dashed tlieir arIver- 
slvricg down, and ivith so much riolence tl ist  many were 
driven into the river, wl~ere some of tlie pontoon boats coming 
te their sucoour were overloded and sunk. It was several 
hours before the confused rnasses could be rallied, or the 
kidges, wliicli kxrl bcen liroken iip t o  let the tionts aare tlie 
clroming men, lic repnised. Whrn this mas effectetl, Soult, 
wFio overlooked tlie action from tlic siimmit of the mountaiin 
Louis XW., sent the remaindcr of ViZlntte's reseme oveib tlie 
river, and caIlEng up Foy pr~pared ib more formidnblc attack; 
rind he expectcd geater succcsu, becnuse t h o  opcratian on f he 
side of Vera, of wliich it i.q time to treat, was noiv making 
consklemble progress up tlie Pea% de Haya un ttie allies 
rjght. 
C d a t  qf Vera.-Chusel h d  descended tlic Boyonette nnd 
Cummissari mountitins mder cover of a thiclc fog, bat nt 
seven o'clock tlie weatlier deared, and tliree Iieavy colunim 
were seen by the troops on Santa Barbaru makiug for h e  
fords beIom Tem, in the direction of tvo bamlets d e d  the 
iclalinas and the Bario de Lesaca A fourth division remaind 
witli tlie gnns on the mounhin ulopcs, and tlie artillmy openerl 
now anrI tlien i i p n  tlie little town of Vera; from which the 
piquets of the light rlivision wcre recalled, with exception o€ 
one post in rt fortified housa commanding the bridge. At 
eight o'clock the enemy's wIumna bepn to pass the fordg 
covered by the fire of thcir rdi l l f iy;  yct thc first shella 
thrown fell into the rnidst o€ thcir own ranks, u 1  tlie Eritish 
troops on Santa Bnrbnrn checrcrl tho French hnttery with a 
deri~ive shout. Thelr mnrcli m s  howevw m e ,  and a h t -  
tnlion of light troops withoiit lrnapwke quiekly 
Sonlt, MSS. commenml battle with the Portugueqe brigade, 
mri by their extreme activity rind rapid fire foroed the Iatitter 
by to retire up the s l o p  oi the moiintnin. Inglis 
gcncrd reinforced the line of skirmishers and the whole 
Ingli~,  
IrSS.  of his brigada was soon af temrds  engnged; but 
Clausel rnenaced his lefh flnnk from tlie lmer 
ford, and értill foreed a ñray npwards without s checlr, nntii 
tlie whoIe mass distnppeared fighting amidst the asperitiee of the 
Pena, de 1s H a p  Ing1,lis lost two hnndred and aerenty men 
and twenty-two oficem, md finally haIted on 8 ridge wm- 
manding t h o  inkrsectien of the rands Ieading from T r m  and 
Lesaca to Xrun md Oyarmin. This wns somewliat beIow tEie 
fonndry of Antonio, wvllere tlie fourkh division, Iia~tn, R now 
recorerd its Portugu~e bripde, was, iiil conjurictioii with 
- Longds 'Xpanhda, BO placd as to  si~pport and proted 
equaIly tlie Ieft o!¿ IngIifi aad tlie riglit of Freyse on San 
Marcial. 
From tbe greut height md ssperity of tbe mountain the 
fight occupiod many hours, nnd it wna pnst two o'clock mo the 
hend of Cleuscl's colurnn~ maclied thiu point, Tlie French 
tmops left in front of Snnh Rnrbnrn madc no rnovcrncnt ; and 
1i8 Rellington had before dircctetl the light divjsion te nid 
Inglis, a wing of the forty-tliirrl and tl~rec companies o€ tho 
riffemen from Kempt't's brignde, with three wcrik Spnnish 
battaliona dram from O'Donnel's ~ndalusiran~ zt E~hallar~ 
crotised the Bidassos by the Lema bridge. They were to 
occupy some lower dopes on the riglit of Inglis, and eovef 
anotbor línot of minor mmmunicatious coining from Lesaca 
snd Yern; tlie remainder of Heuipt's bripde accupied Lesaca 
itself; and thus the connexion betweea h u t a  Barbara and the 
positions of the fourth division ou the Teua de la Haya wlts 
coinpleted. 
Claucel seeing tl~ese movements, and thinking the allies at 
Eclir.11~ and Santa Barbara wcre only awaiting 
mR,Isei,s 
tlie prnper mornent to tzke liim in flank ancl rear itelm& 
if he cngnged furtlier up the mountain, ctbated ""- 
Iiis bnttle and sent notice h Soiilt. Tliis opinion m well 
fui~nrlerl; MeTlingtoii ww nut a gen~rd to let lialf liia amy 
Ix pnixlyscd hy D'Erlon's divisions. On thc 30tIi, mhcn ho 
ohaemcd XouIt'a first prepnratio~is in front of San Marcial, he 
liad orclcrcd attacks to be macla iipon D'Erlon from thc Piiorto 
of Ecliallar, Zrq~mmurdi aand Rl~tya; Hill wm dse to ahow 
tlie Iiextls of columiin to~vaids 8t. Jean Pied de líort, Aud 
on tlie 3Iot wlien tlie furce and direction of Clausel's colurnag 
were known, he diected Giron to sus& the lig-ht division on 
Santa Barbars, md lord Dnlliousie t o  bring tbe remhtder of 
tlie m ~ e n t b  division by Lesacn to nid Tnglis. 
Following tliese ortlers Giiron, wtio commanded the 
Spaninsds, O'DonneE being sick, slightly akirmislied on tlie 
30th mith Conrouds advunced posta in front of  %m, and 
on the 31st at dnpbreak tlie whole of thc FrencEi i i i  ww 
assailed. Tbat is to say, Qiron figain fouglit with Conroax, 
feebly as beforc; but tmo Portupese l~rigndes ~f the sixth 
anrl seventh clivisions, directed by lora Dalhorisie and general 
Colville, drove tFie Frencli from their cainp beliind U r b x  and 
bliiirned it, Abb6 who commanded tliere, being thus pressed, 
collected hii wl~ole force in front of Ainhoa on an eutrenched 
position, and mpulscd the allics &tli some loss. Tl in~  five 
mmlmta were fougIit in one day nt tlifcrcnt points of the 
gcnernl lino; nnd D'Erlon, rvho lind Iost thrcc or four bun- 
dred men, seeing n fresh column coming from Maya as if to 
turn his left, judged tliat tt great moveinent a<qinst Bnyonne 
m s  in progresa and sent notice to Soult. He {vas midalíen. 
ltreIlington only sought by these demonstrations to diturb 
tlie plan of attack. Giron and the seventh division, followjng 
tiie second orderri, then niarched towards Zesaca; but as tha 
fighting at Urda1 lasted until dd-day, lord Dalhmsie'a 
rnovement m= no* mmpleted that evening 
D'Erlon'e desptch reached Souit at the time Clausel's 
report &d. Al1 l i s  arrangements for a final atta& on 
San Marcid were then comp!eted ; bnt thesc reports and the 
ominoua cannonede at San Sebastian, plainly heairl dunng 
the morning, iinduced him to zbandon this object and hoId his 
afmy rertdy for a general battla on khe Nivelle I n  tliis mew 
he rient Poy, wlio had not yet crossed tlie Didassoz, to 
Serres b~hind the Pvivelle as a supprt to DZrlon, and eix 
troops of clragoooo iisarched to b u  P6 liiglier op tlint river. 
Clausel was diiected to repasa the Bidassoa in tlie night, 
to leave Mamnsiii upon tlie Bayunette nsountaiin aud the Col 
de Vera, and w c h  ivith bis otlier tliree fivisiuns tu join Foy 
on the lieights of Serres. 
But Reille'~ troopa wero di11 beyond the Bidassoa md the 
btt.!e went on shitrply ; for the Spaniurch continually detaclied 
men Com tbe ridge, enhvouring to  drive the French from 
th8 lower positions into the river, until about four o'cloclr; 
then their hrdilioad ubating they desired t u  be relicvcd; but 
Wellingkon, seehg thc Frcnch nttaclía mero ~xliaustcd, thonghkit 
sgoori opportunity to fix the Spnnisli military spirit, and refuused 
to relicvo or to aid thcm. It wotild not bc just to  m m r e  
their ~alonr by this fact. Thc Englisli gencral blushed ivhile 
he d l e d  iipon them fo figlit, for they hxil becii previoi~dy 
famished by their vile gove~nrnent, and there were no hoqpi- 
tala t o  receive tliern d e n  sounded. The battle wm h o ~ .  
ever arrcsted by n tcmpcst wlvliicti commenced xbout tliree 
o'clock, and q q e d  for scveml hours 6 t h  wonderful violente. 
Ruge bninches wcre torn from t l ~ o  trces and wbirled tlirough 
tlie air like feathera by tlie liowling winds, and tiie tliinned 
streams, ~welling into tomen&, claulierl dawn tlie mwntainri 
roUing innumerable stones dong mith a friglitful clatter. This 
was the sbrm wbieh £el1 at San Sebnstian, rtnd nmidst its 
turrnoil and iinder cover of nig11t thc Frcnch rccrossed the 
Bidasso& 
Clausel'a retreat waa more unhappy. Having rcccived the 
d e r  retire early in tlie evening whcn tlie stom had 
already put an end to dl figliting, he repassetl the fords beforo 
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dark with two brigacles, orrrlering general Vandermaesen to 
follow with tlie remainder of Lis divisiuns. It wuuld appear 
tliat he expected no difimlty, aince he di4 not take posses- 
sion of  the bridge o€ Vera, nor of ttie fortified 
BwlkMS8. house covering it, and nccupied Iiimself mith sug- 
gesting new projcctcta displeusing t o  So& Mean~hile Vander- 
maesen's division was endangei-ed; many of his soldiers 
nttempbing t o  mss were drownd by tlie rising waters; and 
fineIly, undle to &ect a pasnage at the forclls, lie marched up 
the stream te seixe the bridge o f  Vem. Ais advanced guara 
surprised a corporal's piqutt and rushd iiver, but it was 
driven bnck by tr rifle company posted in the fortified house. 
Tliis hxppened at tliree a'clock in the morning, aud the rifle- 
men defended tlie pnsage until cltaylight, when a semnd 
compny and some cara.atlores carne t o  their aid. The Freiich 
reserve left nt Vcra, secing hom rntittcrs atood, then openetl a 
fire of p n s  ~griinst t.he fortified house from a high rock jnst 
nhovc tlie town; and their rikii-mishew qiproncli~l $t. on tlic 
ridit bank, wliile Vanrleimn~.sen plied liis mttaketr-y from tho 
lcft bank. The two rifle c%ptains find mmy mer. kll uilíler 
tiiis crosa fire, and the pnssnEe mm forc.cd, br~t  T~ildermiaeaen, 
urging tlio at;tuck iii pcrgon, wnu killd and more tlinu two 
hundred OE bis solrliers wcre huilirt. 
Soult, ha~ing Iieard from Cotint D ' E ~ O ~  thn,t, offensire 
movements un the side of hlaya 11nd cnticly ccntrcd at tivcfva 
o'clock on the 32st., now contcrnpkterl anotlier nttack on San 
Marchl; Iiut in the mursc of tlie day Rey's report uf tho 
assnnlt readi~d him, nnd he 1ienrd thnt Riil mas in mnvcrnctit 
on the side of St. Jenn Pied de Port. fht; Sebastiiin m.w logt, 
a fresli attempt t o  cnrry off the masted garrison from tLe 
castlc would cost $ve or ~ i x  thau~untl gmd ~olrlicr~, und tlie 
sxfcty of tlls whulo nrm? would be andangcrcd by ppusliing 
FieadIoiig rimoupt tFie terrible uspe~itiea af the cwiwried 
mount,ain. Wellinghn muEd t h o w  Liti right wing and centre, 
amountiiig t o  thirty-five tliuusanll nien, upon tlic Freiich iefi; 
during tlie action; and lic would he nearer to 8ayonne t h n  
tlie Frencli right wlien once the buttle wns engngecI Iieynnd 
the Iower Bidausoa. Tlie receiit actions llnd cost tliree tiinu- 
sanil siu h u n h d  men; Tranderniuesen liad been killerl, 

be felt at Bayonne. In tliis vierv, D'Erlon would have conie 
in tIie night of the 30th toVera, wliicli, witlinut ~veakening 
t l ~ e  reserve opposed to the iiilit division, wouId have airgmeiitd 
Clausel by ten tliorisand men; and on tlie most imporknt 
point, becanse 8an Marcid oñered no front for the &ion of 
grent numbers. 
Tlic secret of mountain warfare ia, by mrpriae or the power 
of ovemhelrning nnmbera to seize ~iucli commanrling points 
as sliall force an enemy eitlier to abandon his strong position 
or become the assaiIant to recover the points tlius lost. 
Nom the difficulty of defending the crowned mountain was 
c~nced by the rapid manner in which Clausel at onec gained 
tbe ridges as fm ss tlie foundry of San Antonio; with ten 
tlrousand additionat men hs might lime p i n e d  a mmmanding 
position on the reQr and left flank of San Narcial, and forced 
tlie allies to abandon it. Tliat WeElington tliought himsdf 
weak on the Haya mountain is proved by his calling np the 
seventh division from EchnIlm, and by Lis orders to the light 
divisioti. Sault's object wna to raise tlie siege, but his plan 
involved the risk of having thirty-five t h s a n d  alliea iriter- 
posed bctween liirn ant1 Bnyonne; a more decisive opmtion 
tlian the raising of tlio siege; wherefore the enterprise may be 
pronounced injiidicious. He admitkd indeed Po,,lt3 Cot. 
that excikd to the rnterprise, parrly by insinaa- rexpwidewe. 
kions, mfietlier from tlie rniiiister of war or liis own n''Sm 
lieutennnts does not appear, pertlp by a generous repnpnce  
t o  abandon the Grave garrison, he wna too ~irecipitatc, rtcting 
contrargr to his judpent;  but he was prot;ibly temptecl by 
tlic hope of olitmning at Ienst the ca&p of San hfarcial as a 
bridge-head, and thus eecuring a favoumlile point Sor after 
combinatitiuns. 
Iirellington having resoIved not tu invade France at this 
time, IRIS unpreprired for m great an operation as tlirowing his 
rigl~t aiid centre upon ,T;oult'a left; arid it is obvious also that 
on the 30th he expacted only a partial akkack at San J h c i d ,  
Tlie ordcr he first @ve to assail D Edon's position, and tlie 
eounter-oder for tlie seventli division to come to Lesaca, 
prove tliis; because tlie latter wm issued ufter Clausei'~ 
numbers nnd the directian o£ his nttaclr were wscertaind. 
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Two Portupese bripdes aent againBt D'Erlon rendered null 
^ Roult's cornliinotions, and his extreme seneitiveness to their 
attacks marlra tlia vice of hi own. Here it m y  he obaerved 
thmt the movement of tlie forty-third the rifle companies and 
Bpaniads, to secure tho Ligbt flank of h g h ,  was ill-arranged. 
Despatched by dierent  roairls, without kilowing precisely ttie 
point they were to concentrate at, each fe11 in ivith tlie enea; 
at diff'erent places; tlie S p a n i d s  got under f i e  and alteret 
their route; tha forty-thid, stumbling on n French divisioi 
had to fdl back half a mile; it was only thus feeling thu 
enemy at different points tliat tlie dmtined position mas at 
last found, nud a asaster wus ~mrcely prevented by the fury 
of the tmpest. Tlioee Jetachments were kowaver finally welI 
piaoed to have ~tmck a btow tlie next rnorning, Iiec~we they 
ivere anly lialf an houfs march from tlie 11igh ground behind 
Vmdcrmncsen mhen ha forocd the bridge at  ver^ ; the firing 
would have semed us a pidc ,  ond the rcst of ICcmpt's brigndc 
muld also have moved upon the s m e  point frbm Sesaca; but 
it is fifficuit t o  &e auch occasions in mountain warfare where 
so little can be pcen of tlie genera2 S ~ R ~ C  o i  aKnirs. 
A more obvious dvantage was neglected by general Ekerrett. 
A single comyiany of rifles defended the bridge m hour; and 
fonr brigades o€ the enerny, crosaing in a tudtuous  manner, 
could not hwe cleared tlie narraw passage &ter it \vas won in 
a moment ; Wellioghon's despatch erroneously ciescribea the 
Frencli as passing under the Ere of great p& of LSkemtt's 
lirigade, wwhereas &at oficer remained inerb on the lower 
slopeg of Santa Barliara, half a mile diahnt., and allowed tb 
enemy to escape. A lxrge mass of Freneli troops were indecd 
on the comter-dopes of t11e Bapnette mountain, beyond 
Vera; but the seventh division, then close to %nta Barbar&, 
would have prevented any scrious disaster if tlie blow liad 
FiiIed. A great opportunit~. w a ~  certuinly loa1 
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ROKLT W ~ E I  RO fearfiil of an nttack alonq tlic* 'rTi~c, that hiei 
unilasy movemcnt~ mnile the allies thinlr lir: wan ngnin pro- 
paring for offcnsivc olierutiona: tliis donhle misundcrshntling 
did not howcrcr 1wt long, nnd cach amy  rcsumed its formcr 
positinn. The ME of Sim Sebwtian had given Welliilgton a 
nelv port nnd point of support, liad increased tIie value cf 
~ ' ~ E S ~ R  as a dEpGt, aiid Jet loose mnny troopa for field opera- 
tions; tha armistice in Germnny was at an entl, Austria liad 
joined tlie dlieu, md it seemed tliererure certain tliiit lie 
~voulri irnmediately invnrle France. Tlie EugIisli caliinet liad 
promised tlie conti~entül sovereigna that it diould be so when 
tlie French were expelled iiom Slmiii, mcaiiiiig Navarre and 
Guipuscoa; and tLe nervsliayier editora >vere, m u~ual ,  ar~tively 
deceiviviiig tlie people of u11 cauntries Iiy tlieir dictritorial 
nlisurd projccts and ascumptions. Tlio Bourlion partisana 
were secretly enrleavoiiririg to form a cunspiracy iiii tlic soutli; 
snd tlie dulre of Berri desired €o joi~i  tlie Eritisli army, 
pretending tliat twenty tliousund Frencliineii, armed and 
orgnniaed, awuited l i i a  amivui. was exultutioo niid extrn- 
vagance. Wellington liowever, ~ c l 1  unrlerstaiiding tlis iuflutrd 
uature of sucli liupcs tlnd promises, while adectilig to rehuke 
tlie alisurtlity uf the neivspapcrs, totik tlie opporbuiiity tu 
checlr sirnilar fully in Iiigbe~ places, by alservi~ig, th& ay le 
Id done all that was qwcted Iw ~ J t d d  Jmv~ beea 1flb9 that 
* o d  i r b  ths mon.' 
With rr?spact i o  thi! dulro of Rerri ih was for the soverei,p 
lie said to decide wlietlier t1ie restoiñticiri ol tlie Piuurbons 
sTioulrl furm piwt of tbeir policy, but as yet no fixetl Iirie uf 
conduct oii Uiat or any otlier puliiicaI points was declared. 
It mas for tlieir iriterest to get xid of Kapuleon, und tliere 
codd be no questiou af tlre advantage or propriety of 
mepting the aid of a Bourboa gmty without plerlgiiig them- 
selves to rlethrone the etnperor. Tlie Bourbone miglit indeed 
decline, in default of snch a pledg~, t o  involva tlieir partiuans 
in rebeilion; and he advisd tliem to  do so, because Napo- 
leon's power rcsted, internally upon tlie most exteiisive antl 
expensive ~ p t e m  af corniptinn ever estalilislial in any 
oountry; externally upon hia military Iorce which was si~p- 
poded almost exclu~iv~ly b  foreign contribut?on& Once con- 
fined tcF tlie liniits of Frmce he wonFd be nnable t o  h a r  the 
douhle expense of his government and army; the reduction 
of either ivould be fabl to him, and tlie objiject of the Bour- 
bons t h u ~  obtaind without risk But, ifthey did not concur 
in tliis reasoning, the dlies in the north of Europe must 
declare tliy wouId dcthrone NapoIeon liefure tlie duke of 
Beai should be ellowed to join the amy;  and the Bribisli 
government mwt make up its mind upon the question. 
Viis reusoning put an end t o  the projeet, becuuse neither 
the English cabinet nor the allied souereigns were redy ta  
adopt a decisive open line of policy. The ministers exulting 
at the progress of nristocratic domimtion, had no thought 
save that of mast in~  England's sulistnnce bp extrnvapnt siili- 
sidies and ñupplies; these were taken witbout gmtitude by 
tlic contincntnl powers, mho hcld thcrnselvas no-vnys bound 
thereby to uphold the mmmon cause, whIch each secrdly 
designed to  make available for peculiar interwts : moreover 
they still trembled before their former oonqneror, snd nono 
wouId pled* themseIvw t o  rr decided policy. Wellington 
done moved with a firm composure, tha remilt of profountl 
and well-understood cahculations; yet bis mind, naturally so 
dispnssionate, mas atrangeely clouded at khis time by per~onai 
hatred of  h'aipoleon, 
W h r e  i~ the proof, or even probability, of that great mnn's 
system of government beirig internnily dependent upon '.th 
m t  mtasivei mmptiora seier satablkhd i m  ung cmratry.' 
The annual axpenditure of F m c e  was scarcely lidf tliat oi 
E~gland; nnd Napoleon rejected pnbllic loans, which aro tiie 
life-biood of state wrrulition. He left no debt. Under bim 
no man rlirvoured ths public subshnce in irileness nierely 
h w e  he ivm of a privilegsd class; tlie state servants ivcre 
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largely pnid, hf they were m d e  to labonr effectually for tlie 
strtte. Tliey did not eltt their liread rand sleep, His sgstem 
of public accounts, remarkabla for its uxwEctuess, sisnplicity aiid 
comprelie~isiveness, ww vitdly e p p m ~ l  to public fraud and 
therer0i.e extreinely uiifavourñlile te corniption. NapuIeon's 
power w s  supporterl in Frnnce by that deep sense of his 
goodnesa as a sovereign, md tliat admiratíun for his genius 
whicb pervaded the yonrer d niiddre classw uf tlie people; 
by t h  love tlicy boro him, and stilI Iiertr for h i ~  memory, 
Lecause he ~Iierisliecl tlie principlcs ol a just equality. TTfy 
loved him a180 for hia inoessant iictivity in tlie pufilic serrice, 
Le frserlom from private vices; aiid lxctiuea lik pubhe works, 
wonriruus for tiieir number their utility and p n d e u r ,  never 
stootl still: under Ilim tlie poor u n  never wanted work. 
To Frltnce he gave nollle institutions, a compnrritively juñt 
code of laws, snd gloy iinmatclied mnce tlie d a y ~  oi' tlic 
Eomans. IIia C&t.rq more extensire and perfect than tlic 
DooinsJay IEooIc,,tlitlt monument of the misdom and grat- 
ness of onr Norman Conqueror, was alone sufficient to endenr 
hirn to tlie n~tion. FhpiJly advancing under liis vigorous 
~uperintendenm, it registered and t.anglit every man the true 
value and mture of his property, anrl al1 its liabilities publi: 
or private. It was degigned and ably adal~ted to fiu aiid 
secure titles to property, to prevent frauds, ta a h t e  litigation, 
to eipportion the iveight of taxes equrilIy and jnstly, to repress 
tlie insolente of tlie tsx-gatberer ñithont injury t o  tlic 
revenme, snd to Becure the sacred freedom of the paor man's 
liome. The French C h t r e ,  aEtbough not origiwal, wciulc!, 
from ik comprehensiveness, liam been, when coinpletad, tlie 
peatest  E ~ o n  ever conferred upon a civilked natiau by a 
atntesn1m. 
To =y that the emperor was supprted by bis soEiIiers, i s  
to say that lie'mas siiplmrted by tlie people; liecxuse tha law 
of conscrjption, that migbty staE on wIiich France leanetl 
wlien dl Eiirope attempted b puah her dolvn,-tlie conac~.ip. 
tion, withaut wbich slie couZd never have ~ustniiied tlie 
dreaJfuI war of aiitagouist prineiples enbiled upon her liy 
the revolution,-that energetic larv, ivhich he did not esta- 
blbli, bnt which Le freed from abuse and rendercd gt.iit, 
nationnl, and endiiralde, by causina it bo striie eqii~llg on al1 
cln~ises,-the conscription d e  thc soldicm t11c rcnl iepreecn- 
btives of the people. The troo~s  idolixed Napoleon, wc-11 
tlicy rnight; and to ea7 their attrtchment commmced only 
when tliey became soldicm, is to &cImon.ledgc tlint his cxccl- 
lcnt qrialities antl g-ratnws of mind turned hat.red in to  devo- 
tion the moment lie m8 ~ppmached. But fipolean never 
wna Iiated by tlie peaplc nf Trance; he was tbeir own creation 
and they loved him so as never monarch m s  loved before. 
His march from Cannee to Paris, aumundod by bundreda of 
tlionsanda of poor men, who were not soldicr~~ wtn nevcr be 
cffaccd or evcn disfipred. For nix meelrs, at nny moment, a 
sinde nssihssin might by a single diot hme racqniled fhe repu- 
htion oT a tyrannicids; and obtained vast rcwards beside# 
ftmm the trembling monarchs and aristocmts of tlie earth, wlio 
ecrnpled not to imtignte men to the ahnrneful deed. Many 
tl~ere were base enough to undertake, none so harJy as to 
execute the crime; and Napoleon, guardd by the pcopIe of 
Fmee, pa~sed unbmetl $0 rt thmne from whence It required 
a million of foreip bnyonets to drive liim apin. From the 
throne they drovc him, not from the thoughts and hearts of 
men. Hc hos bean redIed once allve, once dend ! 
Wcllingkon, h d n g  ahaken off the weight of t11e continental 
policy, proceedcd to coneidcr the question of invading Fmce 
simply as n rnilihry operation, wbich migbt condum to, or 
militate against tbe security of the Peninsula while Napolenn'~ 
pomer was wenlrened Iiy tIie war in Germany. And ~uch wai.as 
his inflexible proliity of diarackr, tkat no secret arnliitiow 
prornptings) no facility of pining persona1 reputation, diverted 
liim from t1iis object ; he wodd not elvade, when he might 
have done ~o by assenting to tIie miiiister's projecta for Gw- 
many and Thly, tlie enormous embarrassments and mortifics- 
tiuns still attending bis work, tliough to  tlie suríace-cieeing 
puLlic there appared none. Austria's smssion to tlie coali- 
tion fvoured thc invasion of France, yet he relied little on the 
military ski11 of the banded sover~ips, and a, defeat might at 
any moment dissolve tlieir alliance, Napoleon could then 
reinfme Soult wnd drive the alliea hack upon Spain, w b e ~  
the Prench still possessed the fortresses of Santona, Parnpb 
luna, Jsca, Venasque, Monzon, Fraga, , M d a ,  Mequinema, 
Figueras, Gemna, Hostalrich, Barcelona, Tortoza, Morella, 
Peniscola, Saguntum md Denira. In tliis +ew lord William 
Bentinck, misled by False information, hrad oornmitted a amious 
error in sending Del Parque to Tudeh; because the Ordal dis- 
mter and mbseqnent retreat; sliowed Sucliet woa ptrong 
enough to drivc baclr the Anglo-Sicilianans t o  tlle Xucar. The 
affairs of Catalonias were indeed very unpromising, and it was 
not even certain that tha 'Rritish could iemain tliere. h r d  
Ilrilliam, assured of Murat'~ defcction, wns ragain intent npon. 
inwding Italg; and the ministers mnst hava lwned t o  tliat 
projed; far Wellington now seriousIy demanded that they 
should say whethcr the Anglo-Sicilinns wwe ho go or atay in 
Spain. 
Lord Williarn Bentinclc had quittad tho army, making the 
eevcnth change of commandem in fiftecn montlis, whkh donc 
aocounted for arr ineffickncy so notoriona that the Spaniah 
genemls ridiculed j ts ill succcss knd spoke vnuntingly of thm- 
sdvea. Strenuoudy did Wellingtcn urge the appointrncnt of 
Borne cornmander who wouId devote hirnself to his bu sin es^, 
obserPing thnt at no pcriod of tha war oould he have quitted 
his amy, evcn for a fem dnys, without danger to its intereds. 
But thc English rniniskrs' iporancc of evciythiiig relating to 
war m profound, and ak this time he m 8  himmlf being 
Btript of gcne~ah. Gmhnm, Picton, Leith, lord Dalhonaic, H. 
Clinton and Skenett had gono or were p i n g  tu Enghnd on 
wcount of siclrncsq wounds or private business; Ucresford 
after menaced the cxistence o€ the Portugnese army; Ciistdlns 
and Gron had been removed by tbc Spnnish rcpncy from 
thcir commands, O'Donnel, m able oficer but of impmctic- 
nble temper, licing denicd *.he chicf comrnnnd of Eliok, 
Copons' and Dcl Parque's troaps, also quitted the 
m y  undcr ;irctest thnt his a1d wounds had 
~ ~ ~ S ' ~  
broken out, and Giron Lecame his succemor. 
But thou~h Catnlonia mas thue ncplccted by the mini- 
WeIIinfiton thoiiglit it now the most irnportant and invithg 
theatre o€ viir. TIie country immediabely beyond tlie Bidassoa. 
whicli he was mlled upon t o  enter, wus &e&; it would be 
diEcult for him to fwd his army there in winter; and tIie 
twenty-five thoumd hnlf-sterved Spiíinninrds under bim wouId 
certainly p h d e r  for subsiatence and incense the peopIe of 
Eiance. SouIt'a position wae strong his troops still nnrnerous, 
and hia entrenched mmp furnisbed n, semire retreat. h y o n ~ e  
snd St. Jean Picd de Port were so placed, thnt no serious 
invasion could be msde until oiie or both were talren or 
blockaded; which in the tempestuous seapon aad whdo tl ic 
drlmirnlty refuaed to furnigh sufficient mval means was  scaroely 
posaible; even to get nt those hrtresses would be a work of 
tirnc, dificult q a i n s t  Soult done, impmctimhlc if Surhct 
carne t o  his anpport. T u m r d ~  Catak~nia thcmf~m Wcllingtoii 
desired to tiim when the fronticr of thc westcrn Ppenecs 
should b sccurcd by thc fa11 af Fnmpeluna; nnd ho ~vould 
have talten the commnnd therc in pcrson if Napoleon's suceead- 
ing misforkuncs in Gemnnin~ had not rendercrl it jinpomible to 
reinforce the French nrmies of  Zjpnin. Mcnnwhile, yielding 
~ornetl>ing to the allied uovereign~, he thought it nnt amiss to 
BPUF pllhlic fccling by taking n menncing position witliin the 
French territov. Tliia rnm liowever no slight military eón- 
assion ta politicnl congiderations. 
Soult' pmition w a ~  t8he hse of S triangle, Bayonne being 
the apex, and tlie great mad fi-om Irnn and Bt. Jeiin Pid dc 
Port the sirles. A nigged maqs o€ monntains intervened 
lietween tlie Ieft and centre ; but nedy al1 tlie vnlleys and 
comrnuni~tions, coming from 8pein beyond thc Nive, united 
nt St. Jcnn Pid dc Port, and M-crc cmbraeed by an entrcnchd 
mmp which Foy occnpied in fmnt of thnt fartress. Re could 
tlicreforc without nid from Paria, ~ 1 1 o  m s  & Ol~ron, hrinfi 
fiftcen tl~orisniid men, inclnding nationrtl guartls, into nction, 
tand serionfi clispositions wcre ncwssxry to dislod~c liim; thwi: 
coulrl not Iic made semetly, ancl %ult wou1rl linve t ime to aid 
him nnd dcliver tsattle on &osen pound. Foy tIius beld 
tiie right baiik of the Nive, nnd corild, by tlie grent ronrl lea& 
iirg t c  J~J-o i inc  ar by sliarter com+iiiiieations tlirotigli GiAmny, 
rencli the bridge of Cambq and gain Espclette behind the 
camps of Ainlios From tbenee, passing the NirelIe by the 
bridges of Bmotz and frenes, he could wach Et. Jean de Lu;u9, 
and it waa by this rouk he moved to t t e  atitick o£ Xan Xarcial. 
The dIies indeed, marcliing from the Aldnides and the Bastan, 
oould by SS lC\lartin d'Arosa and Uie Garospii mountnin also 
r w h  Bidmy, bctwcm Foy's and D'Erlon's positions; buk the 
rods  were dificult, tlie ~rench frequentiy koured them, $he 
liriiigc of Gnmbo mna sacurcd by worlcs and Foy could not be 
eusiiy crit o' 
WErlon Iind p n  advanced camp at Urrlnx, and on tbe 
Mondmin and Choulicrn morintnins; his main position mas 
a brond ridgc Iieliind Ainhori, tlie rigljt mvering pl,, 8 9, 
tho liridgc af Amota. Bcyond tlint bridgo ClnuscIB PP. H7* 
poaition extcnded along ii muge of strong hih, trending 
t o w n d ~  Ascain and ser re^ ; ianrl nri the MivelIe swcpt w i t l ~  ti 
curvo qiiitc ronnd his rmr, Iiis riglit fiank rested on tlint 
river nlso. TBe rcdoubts of San &&e and tho camy of Barre, 
Einrring tlie ronds Iending from Yerrs and tlie Puerto de 
Echallar, wcn: in ndvancc o£ his Icft; thc pcatm Rhnn~ ,  
whose liiirr! roclry herid lifLed two t,hhousnnd eigGt liundrcd fcct 
above tlie Rcn Eevel overtopped al1 the ncighbouring mountnins, 
formcd, in conjunction mtli its depcndcnts tlio Commissnri 
nnd Bayonette, a mnsk for Lis rjglit. Frnm the Rnyoncttc 
tlie linc ntn nlong the lIandale or Snlcopin mountnin; but 
frem tlicncc to t h  sm thc ridgcs sutldenlp ubntcd, nnd thcre 
wcrc tmo lines of defcnec; tlie first anlong tIre Bidasson, tlie 
sccond, eommcndngr ncnr St. dcnn dc Lnn, strctc11ccti from tha 
licights af eorrlcgain tarrards bsmin, hnving tlic camps of 
Urognc and tlie Sans Culottes in ndvance. Iteillc pguarded 
these Iineg and tlio ~econd waa connectad witli Clnuael Eiy 
Villatte who nrm postcd at Axcnin. Thia ~yatcm o€ dcfcncc 
mas tied to  that of 8t. Jcnn Picd de Port by tlie double br i t lp  
head ~t Cambq wliieh seeured tlie jiinction of Foy witli tlie 
mt of the army. 
DiligentIy tlie French worked on their e~t~renchrncnfs, yet 
they mrre but lrttle advanced when tlie emtle o£ Ban Scbmtian 
surrendered, and Wellingiton yielding to the political pressure 
t h c ~  maturerl a plan for placing himself within tlie Preneh 
temtorg. I t  wis one to prove the idle facility rvith wliieh 
the ministers nrged meariurm the nattire of which they did not 
undmtsnd; for it involvetI as dangeroris ~ n d  nrlng an eiiter- 
pise acr any nnd&alreri by 3iim during the wbols mr. Tliiei 
x 2 
wag to selze the great Ithune mountain md its dependenti 
and at the s w e  time force &e passage of the iower Bidamo 
and estabiish hia lefb TPing in France. Tlie Rbune, Cornmissa 
and Bayonette mountains, forming a saiient rnenacing point of 
greut sltitude and strength towards the French centre, would 
thus be broaglit within hia o m  syshrn, and his commnnica 
tions would be sliortened by gaining the road along the river 
fiom Irun to Vera. The port of Fuenterabia aIse wonld ftill, 
and though bd in winter be of gome dvantage to  a generd 
whose aupplles carne fram the oman; who had to encountei 
tlie perveae opposition of the Xpanish authoritieri; nnd whose 
nearest port, Pnssngerr, wna reetricted in jts anc1iom~:e-groand, 
hard to make from the a#, and dnngerous when full of 
vessele. 
Be hd dwiped thisi olicrntiori for tha middlc of Scptcmber, 
imrnedintely n f t e ~  the mqtle of Ennn 8eh:Rsstinn fe11 nnd hefore 
tlic Frcnch works ncquircd strength; but some error retarcied 
tlic arrival of Iiia pontoons, the weather bccme bnd, ~ n d  tlie 
attack, which depended npon the state of t,he tides and fodq, 
was of necessity dcfcrred nntil the 7th of Octoiicr. Mmn- 
while, to misled h d t ,  nscerhin Foy's trne position, and 
strengthen liis o m  right, lie hrought np part of De1 Parcpe's 
f o m  t o  Pampelum, and sent the Andaliisians t o  Echallar. 
Mina's troops, also gatlrerd about Roneevalles. aud Wellington 
went tliere in person the 1st oF October. As he 
Ocwber. passell the Alríuides, he mwed Campbeii to sur- 
p&c some iaolated poats on the mck oF Airola, carried off 
two thoiiaand French ~heep from the valleya of 
m'* R~pgrorrg~ nnd cut oR ta French seouting dctach- NSS. 
ment. This disquieted Boult. He expected an 
attndt yet could not foresee where. Deceived by W s e  informa- 
tion that Cola had rcinforcorl Rill, he thonght the movementa 
of Mina and the Andnlnsians were to mask an operation 
by the Val de Baygorry ; the arrival of light 
c a v a l ~  in the Rastan, Welli@on'~ presence nt 
Roncevalles, and the surprise at Airoleb seemed to crinfirm 
this; but the pontoons collected at Oyarmn indicated otlier 
objects, wd Borne desertera told him the allies aimed at 
tlie geat Rhune monetain Bornever, a French commisaary, 
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hken trt fft Sebastian and exchnnged after remaining at  
haacít twclve d q s ,  assured liim notliing at tlie Britisli l i d -  
q~tarterai nilicnted a serious attack, dthougli tlie oficem fipke 
of one, and tliere were movementa of troop; this wcighed 
much witli fionlt, bem~ise tlic dom mmcli of  jlie priutoons 
snd &he wct wmthcr hnving dclayed tlie atttwk, thc rcporta of 
elie spies and tlie dwertcra secmcd fnlñe. 
Tt WPTRS algo hcyond cnlctilution that Wellington should, 
against hia military Jtirigmcnt, pusli hia lcft ivinn into Frnncs 
rnercly to meet tlie wisliea o€ ttie nllicrl sovcreigna in Gcrmnny; 
nnd nfi tlic moqt obvioua line for pcrmnncnt invnsirin v t t s  by 
IiIs right nnd ccntrc, tlicre was no npparent muge for defcrring 
l i i ~  oprntions. Tlic trnc rmmn of tlie procrastinntion, namely, 
the oF the tide8 and fuds on tlic Iomcr Bidasson, wm 
ncccsmriIy liidden; and Boult finnlly j r idg~l  tlint UTcllin,@on 
only dcs iped to secure Iiis blockadc of PninpcIunn from inter- 
rnption, by inenncing the Fsencli anrl impcding tlicir cntrench- 
ments: nevertlielese, ns nll tlic dcscrtcrs nntl ñpics cnmc. mth 
the snme hry ,  1ie rccommended incrwsed vigilnnco dong the 
whule l i u ~ .  On tlie 6th he reviewed D'ErLon'r. divisions at 
Ainlion, iitid rernained thnt niglit at  Espelette, doulrting 1T any 
nttaclr mas intended and no wny s~iñpccting t,hhat it ~voulrl Iie 
sgninfit bis rigbt, For Wellington conld not diminisli b i ~  
fvrce nt RuncevaIles and tlio Aldiiidcs, lcst  Foy and Pmiiis, 
and tlie liglit eavalry unrler Fierre Soult, slioulrl unite at St- 
Jean IPied de port to ruise thc IiIoclwtdr: of ArnlicIunu; the 
tioops at 3 I n p  mwaeed tlie line Zietween tbe  Nive and the 
TiVclle; nnd it w-u thcreforc onIy witli liis Ieft wing and Ieft 
centre, nnrl agrtinst thc Frcncli right tliat, ho cedd nct, md 
thnt secmcd too dnn~croiis. 
Flarly in Octolier twelvo huntlred Rritish aoldicr~ a&md 
fmm Eng-lo nd ; niica mm tlieii jn tlie Ahescoa, on tlie riglit 
of ofill, d i o  va;  tlius ennhlcd to relieve Camphcll't: Portii~rcse 
in the hlrliiitle?; and tlie Enttcr rnnrcliing to  I l n p  rcplaccd 
tht! third division, wliich, sliifting to  its Icft, oceirpisrl the 
heighh &ore 7,Rgrtrarnnr~li t o  cnnblc tlie seventli rlivision to  
relieve Giron'a Autldusisns in tlio Pucrte dc Edinllnr. Thwe 
dispositions were mnde for the nttack of tlie grwt Rliune and 
its dependents, wliich waa arrangcd ia the following manner. 
Giron, moving fmm the Ivantelly, was to astssail a 10% ridp 
or saddle, uniting tlio Coinmissnri and the p a t  Xhune; one 
battalion, steaiing up tlie sIopes and liolloms on his right hnk,  
was t o  seize the rocky head of the lrtst-named mountain, to 
mns,Ii.P87+ place dehcliments there t o  watch tlia rwds leading 
rouiid it from Snrre and Ascain, md thereto 
Mer of 
nrouomeats, descend upon tlie saddle aud raenaee tbe rear of 
~~9.5. tlie enemg rit i l ~ e  Puerto de Vera Tbe principal 
attack was to be mnde in two columns; Tmt to prottect the 
riglit and rear against a counter dtock from Barre, Giron was 
to leave a bngde in the nannow pasa leading to  Barre from 
Vera, between tlie Ivantelly and the Rliune. 
On tlze Ieft of Giron tlie ligl~t division was to assail the 
Bayonette mountain md the Puerto de Vera, connecting its 
riglit wiili Giran's left by skirniisliers. 
Longa, wha hsd resumed Ls old positions above tlie Salina6 
de Le~ac& rrTas to move in two columnz acroF;s tli8 Biclassoa; 
ong p~ssi ing.  by the Eord of Salinas, was lo aid the left iving 
oE tlie liglit divkion in itfi attacIr on tlie Btiyonett~; tlie other, 
pwieg Iiy tlie bridge of Vern, was to move up tlie n v b e  
seyw~ting the dopes of tlie Bayoilette from tlio P ~ e r t o  de 
Vera, antl tlius connect tlie ahtade of the liglit division, 
Durirtg tliese operations Longa was to send soinc men over 
khe rivcr a t  bndnrlasa, and seize a telegrnph whicb tlio French 
used ta  communicate between t l i e  left und centre of their 
Irna 
Behind the light division, Cole m8 ta hold Santa  Barbara, 
pnsliing forwnrd detachments to  semre tlis comm anding pointci 
gained hy the fighting troop. Tlie sixtli divi~ion w~ tu 
make rs demonstration on tlie riglit, by Urtlax and Zwr& 
rnurcii, apins t  D'Erlonb s(?dvanced posta. TLw, withont 
weakening Iiis line between hnccvaIles and Ecliallar, Wel- 
lington piit nearIy tlventy thousand men in motion qainst 
the Rliune mountain and its dependents; and he had still 
tweuu-four thoustand di8posable to forcc the passage of the 
lower IBidassoa. 
From Andarlasa Eo Biriah, three miles, there were neither 
mads nor f o d s  nor bridges; the Frencli, trusting to tbia 
difficulty of apgrvach and t o  tbeir entrenclunents on the 
OCT. isla] BOOR XXIL-CPIAP. 4. 811 
craggy slopm of the Mandale, bd nollected their troops 
principally where the Bildox or green mounhiin and the 
entrenchect camp of Biriata ~verIooI~erl the forde. dgainst 
tllose poink WelIington directed Preyre's Spniards. They 
were to  descsnd from San Xarcial, cross the upper foda of 
Ciriatu, ilssail the Bildox and hfandale rnountains, and turn 
tlie left of tlist part of the Prench line wiich pagfied behind 
tlie town of Andaya. 
Gtween Biriutn 2nd tlie am the advanced peints of defence 
w r e  tlie mounhin of Lmh XIK,  the ridge called the Gafi 
Repdlicaim, and tlie t o n  of Andaya Behind tliese the 
CdvaGe cl' Uropne, the Croix des Bougwts, and the camp of 
the Saw CiXorl~, served as rallying posts. Against them 
were ~ e t  lie fimt and fifth divisioas, and tlie unrtttaclied 
brigades of Wilnon and lord Aylmer, in al1 fifteen tliouriand 
men. 
Tlie Spanish fishermen had aecretly discovered thrce f d s  
practicable at Iow water, between tlic bridge of Dclioliia and 
tlie sea, und Wellington decidcd to pass liia columns tlere; nsing 
$lie old fords J o v c  bridge and tliese new ones below bridge, 
dtliough the tides rose aisteen feet, leaving at ebb hmvy 
santla iiot less thnn Iidf a mile broad; and tliough liis bank 
was overlooked from the Frencli liills which werc alse strong 
for defence. But relyng on liisi previouv rneasures heaffrontcd 
alE these rllingcrs. It appeared so unlikely tinat a genera.[ 
Iiaving a betrcr iiie of oper>itions on bis right sliould attempt 
ta  pass the Eidassoa, at i t s  mouth, that i3oult w a s  cornpletely 
deceiverl; l i i  lieuteiianh on tl~nt side were also negligent. Of 
Lteille's tmo Jivisions one under Doyer waa at tlie camp of 
Urope, and aa the morning of tl ie 7th was as usual labour- 
ing at the morks; Kllatte w a s  at hcain and Serrcs; Mau- 
cune's 'sdivision five thoussnd strong waa iudeed in line, but 
unexpectant of an nttnclr; nnd tlioitgli the vorlcs on tbe 
hlnntLdc were finished and those at Biriatu in a forrvard 
state, from the latter to the sea the entrenchments wem 
sesrcely cornmenced. 
P m q  of the Bkh~oa.-TLe niglit set in heavily. A 
sullen thuader.storm, gathering abot~t tlie cragg crown of 
the Feria de Huya, carne sloivly down its flatiks, and t o d  
morning; rolling over the Bidasaoa, fe11 in ih peatest violence 
upon the French positiona. During this turmoil, WeIIington, 
whose pontoons and artillcry were close up to Irun, dis- 
posed a number of guns and howitzers along the crest of San 
M k a l ,  and his columns athined their  respective stations 
rilong tlie Lanks of tlie rive~. Freyre's Spiyaniards, a brigade of 
t l i e  p a r &  and Wilson's Porti~gxese, stretcliing from the 
Biriatu fords t o  tLat near tlie brolren bridge oof Dcliolii~ were 
eusooncd belzind t11e detaclied ridge which tlie Prench liad 
Erst seized in the atta& nf tJ1w 331st. A second brigde of 
guarde and tlie Germans of tlie first divisiun were conceded 
near Irun, at a ford below tlie bridge of Reliiibia c d l d  tlie 
great Jonco. The Brítisli b ~ i g d e s  of the fiftb division were 
directed to cover themselves bcliind a large river embanbrnent 
opposite P.ndaya, - Sl>il,rye's Portuguese antl lord Aylmer's 
brigade were posted in tl?e ditcli oE PuenterabL 
Al! ths tents were left stunding in the camps of tlle allillies, 
snd the enernp coitld perceiira no chtlnge un the moraing of 
the 7th; but et seven o'cloclg the fifth divisipn and lod 
Aylmer's brigatle, emerging from &eir concealment, took the 
snnd~ in two eolumns; that on the left pointed apiinst the 
French cnmp o f  the San8 Culoltes, that on the right apinst 
the ridge uof Andaya, No shot w ~ s  Rred until tliey hd 
pwsed the k r d a  iif tlie low-water ccliacnel, when a rocket was 
sent up froin tlie steepIe rif Fiienterahia as & dpal, Tlien 
tha artillcry opened from Snn Mnrciol, the troops neor Irun, 
covered by tlie fire of a bnttery, mede for the Junco ford, and 
the pnssrtgo above the bridge also cammenceti. Fmm the 
crest of h n  AIarcial seven eulnmus could now ha seen at once, 
moving on u lino o£ five miles; tliose tihora bridge plunging 
st once into the fiery contest, those bclow appeuring in the 
ditanm lilce hug8 ssullen snakcs winding over tlie hexvy 
sands. The Germanr, missing the Jonco ford, got into dwp 
water, yet quiclrly recopered thc true linc; und tlie 1-rmd+ 
conpletely surpiised, permittad even tlie brigades of  the fifth 
division to gnin the right bank and form tlieir lines Iiefore a 
hostile musket. flaslisd. 
Boult lieard the mnnonade of San Ninrcial at Espdette; 
~ n d  at tlie same time tke sixtb division, advmcing beyond 
Urdax and Znpramurcli, made a fnlse attnck on D'Erlon'm 
positions. A hrtugriese brigade under colonel DougTag, 
beinp p ~ h e d  too far, were repulsed wjth the Tosa of one hun- 
drcd md fifty mcn; the FrencFi mamhnl, having thus de 
kcted the tme nrttufe of tliis attack, then hurried to  his right, 
hut his mmps on the Ridnssoa wcre lost before he arrived. 
For wlien t h e  Rsiti~h artillcry firRt opened, hfniiciinc'fi troops 
hnd assemliled nt their different posts of defence, rand tlio 
Frcnch q n r ,  cat~~,bIished principally near thc mountxin of 
Louis XIV. and tlie C ~ f f %  hpublicain, commenced firing 
The nlarm sprcatl and B O ~ F  mnrchcd from Uropa to mp- 
port Mm~ciine without mihing for thc Junction aE the workinp 
parties; biit his bripdcs moved scpwxtcly ns they could 
~ l I e t ,  and bcforc thc firat mmo into a,ction, Spryc'a Portu- 
*ese, forming tlie extreme left of tlie nllim, wrvns rnenncing 
thc Gms Culottcs; thither thercfore one of Boyer's reglmenta 
wus ordrrcd, wliile thc othcrs ndvnnced by the royril road 
towards the Croix des Bouqueta Biit Anrlap, girnrded only 
by n ppiqnct, wns nbandoned, antl Reille tl~inldng the camp of 
tho Sana Culottrs wonld be lmt heforo Eoycr'a mcn could 
reach it, swt a Iinttxlion there from tlio centre; tliia iveolrcn- 
ing his force at tlie cliief point of attnck becnuso the Eritish 
brigadw of tlre fifth division were now arlvnncing from 
Andaya, and beriring under a wliarp fire of artillcry and mw- 
ketry torva& the Croix des Bonquets. 
By this time t l i ~  columna of tbe first division Iind parised 
the river, one ebove bridge preceded by ll'i'iison's Portuguese; 
one below prcccded by Hallcct'~ German liglit troops; mho, 
aided by the fire of tlie p n s  on San Mareinl, drwo Gnck the 
enemy's ~ l v a n c e d  posts, won tlic CaK6 Xtepublicoin, tlio 
rnountaiin of Lriuis XIV. and arave tlre Prcnch from thoso 
heighta to the Croix dea Bouquet~. Tliis wns the key af tlie 
poñition, and townrds it guns and troops wcrc now hrastening 
from every sidc; the Germnna who liad lost meuy men in 
the previous rtttitcks were braught to a check, for the Iieights 
were strong nnd Uoyer's learling battalions close at hand; but 
at this moment Carneron arrived witli tlie nintli regiment, 
and passing tlirougli the German slcimisliers rushed witli 
g~eat vehemente t u  t h e  summik. of the fimt height. The 
French f n f a n q  opened ranh to Iet the p s  retire, and then 
retreated themselvesi at fuIl apeed t o  a second ridge somewhat 
Iower but wliere tliey coulrl onlp be appkoached on a n m a  
front, Carneron as quickly tlirew his men into a single 
calumn sand liore against tliis new positim, wl~ich cuming 
Inmrds enribred tlie French t o  pour a coneentmtc?d fire npon 
l i s  regiment; nor did ltis vioIeat course seem to dismay them 
until he -*as within ten yards, wlien appdlcd by the furious 
ehout aud cliarge of the ninth they gave way and the ridges 
of the Croix des Bouquets 11-ere won as far as the royal road. 
The Dritisli regiment lost many m m  and oficers, and during 
the fight the French artillery znd ~cattittered t r o o p  coming 
from different puints md rallfing on Boper's liattalions, 
pt l~ered  on the ridgea to the French lcft of tlie road. 
Above Biriatu and the Bildox tlie entrcnched camp hm 
been defended with anceess in front ; but Feyre turned it witl 
his rigbt wing, which being opposed only by a singIc battalio~ 
snon won tlie Mandale mountain, and tlie French feii back 
from tha t  quai-ter to the Calvaire ZGrogne and Jollimont, 
Reille, beüten nt the Croix des Buiiquets, and having his 
flanks turnd by the Mrtntlale and al¿mg tlie sea-coest, re- 
treated in disorder along tlie royal caweway and the old mad 
of Baponne. He  pwsed througb ttbe village of Urogne and 
the Britisli skirmisliera entered It in pursuit, but they wera 
beatcn out by Boyer's second bngnde; ernd nom Soult arriving 
with part o£ ViUatte's reserve anll mnny giins, restored oder, 
mcl revived the coursige of tlie troops just as the retreat was 
dcgeneratiiig into a fiiglit, 
Reille lost eiglit p n s  muid four Iiundred men, the alliea aix 
hundred, hnlf Lieing Spankrds; so aliglit and easy had the 
sl~ill of the general rcndcred this stupentlous operation. But 
if Boult, penetrating Wellingten's design, had opposed al1 his 
troops, amounting with what Tillatte could spare to aixteen 
tliousnnd instead of the five tliousnnd actunlly engaged, the 
p-ge couId scarcely have been forced ; and rt check ~ d d  
have been batainount to a terrible defent, because in twn 
liours the returning tide wouId h a ~ e  come wiGh a d l o w i n g  
flood upon the renr. 
EguaIly uiiprepared werc the Frcnch on the side of Vera, 
aItliough tlie stniggie tliere proved more fierce and constant. 
Girrin liad descended from the Invantelly rocka, and Alten 
froin the r i d p  of ZSt. hrbara at claybrealr; tlie Erst to the 
11as~ Ieading from Vera to Sane, the last to the town of Vera, 
wlrere he mas joiiied by lidf o f  Longa's force. Tlie forty- 
third Britisli, t h e  seventemtli Portupese, and the first and 
tiiird Iiattalions of riflemcn drcw up in column on an apen 
sprice te tlie right af Tem; the fifty-aecontl, two battalions of 
capdores and a batblion oP Dritich riff~men under colonei 
Colborne, a-ere clicposed on the left o£ Vem. Half of Loriga's 
rlivision was bctrveea tliese columns, the other half, mssing 
tlie f o d  of Sdinas, drew np on col borne'^ left; the namw 
vale of Vera was thus filled with troops rcady to ascend tlie 
rnountains; and CoZe, displqing his force to dvantage on the 
lieiglits ol Xzntx Barbar* preseuted a furmidahle reserve. 
Tnupinys division pitrded tlie enorinous Freuch positiona 
Ris right was oii tlie Betyonette, from wlience e siiigle slopp 
descended to a small plain about bvo prtrts down the moun- 
tiiin; from tliis platform tliree tonguea shot iuto the valley 
lielow, each dcfended by an d ~ z n c e d  limt; the phtform 
itself was securcd by a atar redoubt, bcliind wliidi, Iixlf way 
up the slope, tliere waa a aecond rctrenchment with alibatis. 
Anotlicr larga redoubt anrt an unfinislied breaskwork on tlis 
crest of tlie Bnyonette completed the aystem. 
The Commicsari, wliicli is a continiiation of the Dayonetto 
towards the great Rliiine, wns covered by tt profonnd gulf, 
tltíclrly wooded and defeutled witli akirinishcrs; between this 
pulf and anotiier of the same nature the main rolirl, learling 
from Tera over tlie Puerto, pierced the centre of the French 
position. I l~rgpl  and asccnrling with sliort abnipt turns, 
tliis road mas blockecl xt every untovered polnt with abbatis 
snd small wtrenchments; ench obstade ivm commanded at 
l id€  muskct shot by ama11 detnchrnents placed oii dl tlie 
piojecting parta overlooking tlie asccnt ; and a regimenb 
entrenched above in the Puerto, connected the troop~ on the 
crest of the .Bayonetk anrl Commissaxi with those on the 
snddle ridgc n$.ainst nhich Giron's attaclr mas directed. 
Between Alten's xiglit anrl Giron's Icft m s  aa isolated 
idge mlled by the soldiera the Liowi's btac2, tlie summit of 
wliich, half a mile Iong and rounderl at each end, waa occnpied 
by four French compwniea. n i s  huge mvaiicr, thown m it 
were into tlie gdf to  cover the Puerto and srtddle ridgee 
although oF mean height in comprison af the towering range-es 
beliind, was yet so great thilt tlie Eew warning sliota fired 
fmn the sunimit by tlie enemy, mclied the allies at ik base 
with tliat slom sinping sounrl ~vliicli rnarks tbe dgiiig force of 
a mu~lret-liall. It wm esstntial to trike the Boar's bnck 
liefure the geiieml ~ttack camrnenced, and f ive companies of 
Britisk riflernen, supported I)y the sevcnteenth Portupese 
regiment, were orderd to nssail it nt tlie Vera end, \\.hile one 
of Giran's battalions, preceded Iiy a Jetttclied company of tlie 
forty-tliid, atbcked it on I l ie otlier. 
Bt four o'clock in tlie rnorning Clanse1 received intelligence 
Ciri,ile,,s tliat tlre Bayrinette was to be asvaulkd tliat day or 
iieiiurt, the n e x t a t  scven o'clock he hwrd from Conroux, 
38 SS. 
wlio corrimanded u t  Sane, tEiat Giron's cmps were 
abandonad, hut tlie tcnts of the seventh divisiou wexe still stand- 
ing-at tlie same time musketry ww Lead oit tlie side of 
Urrlm, a canriouarle on tlre side of Iriin, and Triupin reported 
thttt the m1e íif Vera was filled sith troops, To tliis Just qutirter 
Clnusel liumied. The Spanixrds had Jrcady driven Conroux's 
outpests from tlie gorge; leading to Sarre, md nd ddetachment 
was creepiiig up towards tlie unparded Iietid of the great 
Rl~uns; lie immediiitely ordared four r e ~ m e n t s  of Conroux's 
division to  occupy tlie suniinit, tbe front, snd the flanks of 
that mountain; snd lro formed a reGerve of t ~ ~ o  other re& 
~tients: witli tliwe troope Le des;ped t o  secure the mountiiin 
and surpurt Taupin, but ere they could reach tlieir desthtion 
tlrat general's fate was decidetl. 
Xecond Combat at Vera.--[Plrin 8.1-A t seven o'clock a f ~ w  
cnnnon+liot from some mountain-pus of ~vliicli each side bad 
a battcrg; rvcre fol lowd by tliu S~i~nisl i  musketry on the rigbt, 
and tlie ~iext  rnorner~t tlie Uuur '~  baclí was sirnultuueously 
assailerl nt both ends. On tlie Vera side tlle ~iflernen ascended 
So s smalI pine-wood two-tlijrds of tlie ivay up and thore 
restcd; but soon resuming tlicir movcment, with n scornfd 
gallantry they smcpt the Freneh off t l ~ e  top, disduinina t o  use 
their riflcs licyoiirl 8 fciv shota ílown thc rcversc sidc, h ~ h o w  
thcy wcre masters of tlie ridge. This wns tlie dgnnl for tlis 
general atta&. The Portupcse followcd tlie victoririns sharp- 
shmters,-tiie forty-third, preceded by their o m  skirmishets 
and the remainder of the nfl emen af the right ning, plunged 
into the rngged pass,-Longa's troope entcred +e gloomy 
wooded ravine on the left. Colborne's brigade, moGng by 
narrow paths rrnd tlirowing out skirmishera, nsgailed the Bqo-  
nette; tlie fifty-second took ilie middle tongue, the cacadores 
and riflemen the two outermost, and a11 bore mith a concentric 
movement w imt  the 6t3x rcdoubt on the plrttfom aliove. 
Longays second brigade ~hould have slritted the left of this 
attmk, but k n o ~ h ~ g  litfle of such warfare quietly folloivd 
the riflemen. 
h o n  the open ~Iopea were covered with men and wit11 fira, 
a niinglcd sound of sliouGs and musketry filled tlie deep hol- 
l o w  between, ~tnd the mliite smoke carne cuding up above tLe 
dark forest trses in thcir gloomy recesses. Tlic Prench ~crtt- 
tered on khe mountain side seemed weak, and Kempt's bngade 
easilp forced al1 tbe retrenchments on the main pws; bis 
akirmisliers theii spretid mider, and formcd small detachments 
of support as the deptli of tlie ravine Iegsened and the slopes 
melted into the liiglier ridges. Ealf way np an open space 
g w e  a dcar view over the Rayonette rand al1 eyes wem turacd 
tliat way. Longa9s rigl~t hrigade, figlzting in tlie p l f  between, 
memed labouring and mes-matched ; but bqond, on tlie open 
apme in front of the star fa* Colhome'a capflorcs and ritle- 
men were coining out in mal1 bodies from a forest below 
the edge of tlie platform. Their fire mas ~harp, their pce 
rapid, ancI they closd unpon thc redoulit in mass as if resolved 
to storm it. SLe fifty-second were not then in sight, and the 
Frcnck seeing onlp dark clotliing thougit al1 were Portu- 
p e s e  and rtislied in dose order out of the entrenchment; 
they were numerous and very midden, tbe rifle is unequd t o  
the musket and betyonet, and this rough cliarge aent thr? scat- 
tered acsaiImtfi back over tlie rocky edge o£ the clescent 
Wth slirill cries tho Prench followecl, h t  just khen tlie fifty- 
second appeamd, partly in line partly in colirmn, and raising 
their ehout rushed forlvad. Thc red uniform azid full career 
of thia regiment starfled tlie adventurous Prench; t.hq 
ptoppd short, waveretl, turned and fled to their entrenchment; 
tbe fifby-second entered tho works with them, the riflemen 
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mntrc h i n g  thus ~ompletely beaten ffcd down tha rnauntain 
tomards Olette pursucd by a part of thc rtllies, but they 
rallicd on '~'i'ilatte, who wns in order of battle between 
Uropo and Asain. TI10 Riayonette iknnd Commiaari, witu 
die Puerto de Vera, were moii in thís manner nfter five h ~ u r ~ '  
incessant fighting sbnd toiling up tIieir q g y  sides; nererthe- 
I C R ~  t l t~ hattle was still rnuiuhined by tLe French on tLe 
Rhuna. 
Giron, after clriving Conronx's adwlnced post out of tEie 
g o p  lssding from Yera to Starre, had pupuahed a battalioil 
towards tlie hend of tlic g~c3.t Rliunc, rtnd pInced n rcserve 
in tlie gorge to covcr liis rear from aay tuunter-attnck. Eut 
when tlie trking af thc Bonr's buck frccd liis lcft wing lio 
fought liis ~vay up nbreast mitli tlie British lline until near tlis 
srtddlc-riilgc, a littlc to  tho ri$t of tlio Pucrto. Therc lie 
was nrrested by ri strofig Iinc oT abbntis and the henvy firc of 
tivo French regimcnts. The Spuniards stopped, and though 
thc advcnturer Doivnie, now a Spmish gencral, encouraged 
them and they kcpt tlisir ranlís they scemcd irrcsulut~ and 
did not admnce; but it Iinppened thnt nn oliicer af tlie forty- 
tliid regimeiit uimied Uaveloclc, attnched ta Alten's stuff, liad 
bcen sent ko asccrhin Giron's ~irogres~i, ind his ficry tempcr 
ciiuld not broolr tlie clicclr. Stblí1iig off his hat he mllcJ. 
upoe tlie 8pnniards tn follow him, and putting apum t~ lils 
Izome at ono boand clmred tlie ablibatis md went licndlong 
amongst tlie enerny. Theu tlie solrliei.;, eliouting for '&¿ 
chico blanco,' t h  fair boy,' 80 they ucullcd Em, for lie wns 
verp young and had liglit lmir, with onc sliock brolce tlrougli 
the Fremli; nud this nt tIie vcry motnent wlleu tlirir centre 
fiying undcr the fire of Kcrnl~t's 8lfirinishe~~ from tlio 
Puerto dc Vcm. 
The dcfcatcd troops rctircd by thcir Icft dong  thc snrlrlle- 
ridge to  tlie flonlrs of tlie Ehune. Clnuscl h d  tlius eiglit 
segiments conccntr~ted ou tliis grent inoiiiitniii. Two occti- 
pied t,hc crcst nntl tlie rock cnllcd tha Hcrniitagc; four were 
an the flnnltq ilescending townrds Ascnin on une bantl, sud 
Sarre on the otlicr; t he  remaining tmo occupied s lomcr 
atid pamllel crcst beliind caIlcd the smdl XtEiune. GirorTa 
right wing first dislotlgd a sml1 Fiody froia a iietachcd pile 
oE abont mnskebshot bebw *he mmmit, and then 
rmailed the bald ataring rocks of the Hermitage itself; ende* 
vouring at the aame time to turn it by the riglih) but the 
attempt was quite defeated; the Hemitage was impregnable; 
tlie Frerich rotled down stonea 1~rge. enougli tu sweep awby a 
whole celumn at once, and the Bpnnierds rasorted to e dishnt 
rnuskctry mliich Iaatcd until night. Tnupin hnd two generat 
and four hundred men kilied and wounded, and five iiundred 
prisoners. Tho Iosa of the nIIics m 9  nenrIy a tliausund, of 
which five liimdred mere Xpaniards, and tlie nucsess ñ a a  not 
complete; for mhiZe $!no Prcncli lrept possession a€ the summit 
o€ the Rhune the ralliwhew pofiitiun wria insccure. The front 
nnd dglit fl~anFr of that rnountain were impregnrtble; but 
Wellington abserving that the left flank d~cending towards 
Barre wnri less inaccesible, concentrated tha Spaniards on 
thaE side tlie 8th; desipiog a combined attack apinst tLe 
mountain itself and against the camp of ESnrre. The rocka 
atuilrXiDg the lomr slopes were assailed by the Spmiads, and - 
dehchments of the seventh division descended from the 
Puerto de Echallar npon tha fort of San Barbo, and other 
outworks oovering the Prench camp of Xnrre. 
Tho Amhlusiana then won the mcks and an entrenched 
hcight c o m w d i n g  the camg; for Cland, nlmned at gome 
demonstrntion~ nom made by the'sixth didsion towurda the 
bridgc of hmotz, thought he ~houId h cut off from his 
great camp, and suddenIy abandoned not only the slope of tlie 
Rhnnc, but al1 bis ndvanced worlra in the bnain bclow) includ- 
mg the fort of San Bnrbe. His h n p s  were t h u ~  concen- 
iírated on tkc hcigtt behind Xarre, stilI holding with their 
rigiit the amnlicr Rhunc, but the consequences of liia error 
wcre soon mado appnrent. Wellington estnblishcd a strong 
lwdy of Spnniarrls close to  the Hcrmikage; and fhe French 
regimcnts tlicrc, seeing tbo lowcr slopcs anrl flan Barbo 
given up, imngined they &leo w o ~ ~ l d  be cut off nnd without 
orders nliandoned thcir imprcsablc rocks in the night, retiring 
t o  the smaller Rhune. Next rnorning some of tlie aeventlii 
divjaion rnslilg puslied into the vilIuge of S m ,  but were 
quicldy ~ q u l s e d  and would have Iost tho camp and worlts 
hken the day before, if the Spnitards had not mcwuied them. 
In tlta three days' fighting, fourtecn hundretl &nch and 
sixteen hundrcd of the nllies, onc hdf bcing Spaniruds, wero 
killed or wounderl, but mnny of the latter ir-ere not brought 
in unti1 ths third day; antl s e v e d  perkhed misembly wbere 
they feF1, it iieing impossible to discover them iu those vast 
solitucles: some mcn a130 wcrc lost from want of discipline; 
for haring descended into tho Frcneh villtigcs thcy got drunlr 
and WQIY! tnken next dny by tiie enemy. . Nor was the 
numbcr smnll of thom who plundercd in definnce of Wel- 
lington'e procfrim~tion Ho arrestcd nnd sent t o  Englnnd 
severa1 officeni, and rcnemed hia prodnmation, ~nping, if he 
2nd fivo timea ns mnny men he could not ~en tn rc  to invade 
Frmcc unless marauding wnc prevcntcd; md it is rcmarkalile 
tlint tlie Frcncll troops, on tlia snme day, ackd townrtls their 
lown countryrnen in the same rnanner. But Sonlt also checlred 
the mishief with in vigorous liand, caming a mptain of some 
reputation to be shot na an cxemple, f o ~  liaving suffered his 
men t o  plundex a Louee in S m e  diiring tlie actioa. 
Tliese oprations Iiad beea emiiiently successful, and the 
bravery of troops ~vho nssailed wrT car~ied sucli stupendous 
positiom rnnst be ndrnired. To ihem the uníinislied atate of 
the French worke was not visibIe. Dity after dw, for more 
than it rnonth, entrenchment Iiad risen wer entrencliment, 
covering the vast slopes of mountnins wliich were warcely 
accessible from their natural steepness and asperity. Tliis 
they could see, yet c a i ~ d  iieitlier for the gmming strength of 
the works, tlie heiglit of elie mountáins, nor the 'lireadtli of 
the river with its heav sands artd its miglity rusbing tide; 
al1 were despised; and while kliey assailed mith confideut 
valour, the French fought in ddence af their dizzy steeps 
with leas fiercenw than, when ~triving agninst insurmonnt- 
able obstaeles, they attempled to storm the 10% rocks of 
Sauroren. Continual &fea$ h d  baered tlieir spirit, bnt the 
fecblcness of the defence on tliis occasion may be trnced to 
mother m s e .  It was a general's not a soldicr's liattFe. WeI- 
lington had with overmastering comliiwtionri ovenvlielmed 
each point of attack. Taupin's and 11auctme's dlvisions: each 
Iess than five thousand fitrong, wwe rel~~rately assailed t1ie 
first Iq eighteen the second by fifteen thousand men; and a t  
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fieither point were Wile and Clausel able t o  bring fheic 
reserves i d o  action before tlie positions mere ~von. 
hit complained tM he had repeatedly toId Lia Iientenants 
soult, MSS. "U attack was to be expected, and recommended 
extreme vi$ance; yet they were quite unpre- 
pmed, dthougli tliey hwrd the noise of the giins anil pon- 
tmna about lrun on tlis night o t  the 5th and apin on the 
niglit of the 6th. The passage of the river, he siaid, had 
cornmenoed at seven o'clock, Iong after dayliglit; the dies' 
miissw were then olearly seen forming ou tbe banks, and 
tliere waH time for Boyer to arrive before ths Croix des 
Bouquete wris lost. Thus the battle wus fouglit in di8oder 
with lesa thm five thousand men, instad of witli ten thousand 
in good oder  md supported by a part of Vilatte'~ reserve. 
To tlii8 negligsnce the genemls aho dded great despondency. 
They liad so little oonfidenw in tlte strengtli of their poait,ions, 
tlittt iP the allies eisd puslied vigorously forwnrd before the 
mar~hal's amvxl fmm Espelottg they would Iiave entered St. 
Jean de Luz, tumed the riglit of the second position, and 
forced the French mny back upon the Nive tind Adour. TIiis 
was t r u ~ ,  liut the strolre diti not Selong b Welli@li~'s 
~yatem, He couId not go beyonti tlia Adour, lie doulitad 
whether he couId cven maintain h L  wmy during tlie winter 
in tlie position he had already g-ainedj annd he was awrse to 
the experiment while Pampeluna held out and tlie war in 
Qerrn&y bore an uadecided qmt. 
CFIAPTER V, 
SOWLT tvas appreheashe for some ílnys tliat Wellingtrm mitld 
push his operations furtlier; but ñ-lien he knew 
Ponlt. BISS. from Foy, aud by the numbers rissembled on liis 
right, thcre vas no design to atta& bis le& he resnmed Iiis 
labourg on the worlrs ocivering St. Jean de Luz. IIe also kept 
a vigilant wstcL from hia centre, holding his troops in reatli- 
ness to concentrate towards &m; nnd n-hen he saw tlie 
heary -sea in his front disperse by degrees into different 
camp, he directed Clausel to mover the San l3~rbe. This 
wrirk, constructed on a cornparati~elp lom rjdge, barred issue 
from the gorge leading from Tcra to &m; nnd it defended 
the narrow p u n d  bctwveen the Rhi~nes anrl the Nivelle river. 
Al~andoned on the 8th withoiit remon by the Frerencli, since jt 
did not niltumlly belong t o  tlie position of tIie nlliea, it w:ls 
now oocupied by a Spaiiidi p i q u ~ t  of forty men; some hat fs  
lions werc oncnmped in a smrtll mood cIosc beliind, and many 
officers md men slcpt in tlie fort. On tlic niglit of the 12t11, 
thrce of Conrei~x'~ bbnttdions rraehed the plntforrn on wlrich 
tlie fort stond without licing pcrccived nntl escdaded ; the 
troopa hehincl it went off in eonfusion rit tlie first alarm, and 
two Iirindred soldiers with fifteen ofñcers wero m d e  prisonem 
Tlie Sp~niawls marle a Avigorous effart to recover tlie f c ~ r t  at 
daylight, were repnlsed, nnd repented thc atkmpt nitli five 
bmttnlions; Clau~rI tlien hro~~gdit up tmo p n s  aild a rihnqi 
slrirmish took plnm in tlie wmd for sever~l Iloum, tlie French 
endenvoiiring to regnin tlie 1vFiole of t,heir old entrcnchments, 
the Spaniardri to recover tlic fort. Ncither succccdcrl, and 
h n  b b c ,  too nmr tlie cnemy's position t o  be mfcly hdrt, 
WELS resigned mjth n loss of two lmnrlred men Fiy tlic fiencli 
and five hundred by the Spniards. Soon nftcr thin isolntcrI 
action, a Frcncli s!ooli fi'cifitcd with storcs for &tibna 
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attempted h m n  from St. Jean de Luz, rtnd being chased by 
thrw English brjgs and eut off from the opcn sea, 11cr crem, 
aftei cxchrtnging n few dishnt shots with onc of the briga, set 
her o n  Firo and escnl>ed in their boats to the Adoar. 
R e d - q ~ i d e r x  wcre now fixcd in Perra, and the allied amp 
wari organi~ed in three ,mnd divisions. The right haPing 
Mina and BloriIlo attachcd to it m commmded by Rill, sntl 
extended from Roncedlcs to the Bastan, The centrc, occu- 
pying Maya, the F~haIlnr, Rhuns and Rqonetta moantning 
mas given to Eeresford. Thc Icft cxtending from tlie Mandale 
rnoiintain ta the sea waa under sir John Rope. This oRwr 
nucceetled Graliilm, who had retnrned t o  England Cornmand- 
ing in chicf at CoruEa after sir John ñToorc's dmth, he was 
siiperior in tank to  Innl Wellingtnn dnring tl~e eaxly p ~ r t  of 
the Peninsul~ war; buk mhen tlic latter obtained the baton of 
field-mnrslid ~t Vitoria, Rope, with s patriotim and modesb 
worthg of the pupil of hbercromliie the friend o£ Moore, 
offered to serve as second in command; and Wellinghn joy- 
fully accepted bim, sayng he waa the cdEest o$Ceer i~ the 
mrmy.' 
On the right and centre the positions were ogensive, brit 
the left was still defensive~ and the Bidassoa, impnssrtble a t  
high water below the bridge, was dose behind. The r i d p  
were however strong, and powerful batterim established on 
thc right bank; fidd-works were constmcted; and thoiigh the 
Torrls below Behobia mere: dangerous for retreat even xt low 
water those abore were semire, and there was a pontoon- 
bridge. The front nin along the heights of Cmix des Dou- 
quets, facing 'Crogne antl the crtmp c ~ f  the has Cdoetes; the 
reseme was entrencbed above Alidaya; the right re&d on ths 
Nandsle, and from ihat mountain and the &lyonette the alliea 
could flank an rrittaclíing armg. Xoult howwer looked only 
to defenee. IZc had not more than aeventy-nine tliousand 
oId soldiers under arms including officem and artillerpea. 
IIis ganisons absorbed thirteen thousand, Ieaving sixty-iix 
tlionsand in the field; wbereas tlie allies, wunting ,%a's and 
Del Parque's troops, now at Tudela, Fainpeluna and the Vd 
de Irati, exceded une hundred thousand; swenty- 
Appendix s, 
g2, 7'd, three thousand, induding oAcers wergemts and 
artilleqmen, hing BTltbk and Portuguesa 
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Frwcli marslial tliought there were more; for exaggeruterl 
mj~orts made Del P q u e  twenty tliousrintl atrong, urid gave 
'IITellingtori one Iiundred and forty tliousnnd camliatants. But 
it n a s  not so, Bnd as good coi~scripts were joining the FreiicFi 
army rapfdly, aud the nationrtl giinrds of tlie Pyrenees ivere 
niruy, it iw iu tlie number af s o l d i e ~  ratlier thau of meii 
t l ~ e  Eirglisli pilwal liad the advantage. 
Soult's policy lvas to maintain a strict defensive, unrler 
cover of ~~,I.vliicli the spjrit of tlie troops niiglit be revived, tlie 
country in rmr orgauized, and the coiiscripts liardened t c ~  war. 
Tlie-loss of the lower Bidasson had an injurious effect upon 
the spirit of tl~e frontier deprartme~ts, and gave encournge- 
m n t  to tlie mcret partisans u1 the Bourhons, but in a rnilitary 
vicw it was n reiicf. For the grertt rlevdopment of tha mouii- 
taiiis bordering the Bidassoa 11ad rendered their defeiice diffi- 
ciilt, tlie line coulrl alnpnys be pieierced, ancE the army sud(lcn1y 
driven Geyond the Adour. Tlie position w s  iiow more con- 
centrated. Tlie right, nndcr IlcilFc, m s  on tivo lirles. One 
across tlie roya1 road on tlie fortificd heigl~ts of Urope and 
the mmp of the snns CuloEtes; tha otlier iin tlie pihns 8-D. 
entrenclierl camps of Bourtlcgnin and Belehcna, PP. 2s7*3CS. 
coveBng St. Jeltn dc Luz aiid barring tlie gorgcs o€ Olliette 
and Jallimont. The centre uncIer Clnusel, wns on tlie rhlgcs 
between Aamin nnd Amotz, holdiiig tlie amaller Rhune in 
advnnce ; one divicion \vas liolvever rctaind in tlic cnmp of 
b e a  on tlie right of the Nivelle, overlianging Ascain; to 
rcplace it, oni? of D'Erlonh divisitma wm on tlic Eeft of 
tliat river, reinforcing Clnusel's Ieft ahove Sarre. Villatte's 
rcscrve wes &out St, J a n  de Lnq having the l t d i ~ n  Iiri,de 
in the camp of Semes. D'Rrlon's rcmaining divisiona con- 
tinued in tlicir old position, the ng1it connectd witli Ciniisdf 
linc by tlie bridge of dmotz; tlie left hcId tlie Choupera iiiitl 
Bfondai*in mountains Iiordering on tlie Nive. 
Behind Glausel nnd D'Erlon Soult h d  comrncnccd n secon& 
cliain of cntrcnclied mmps, prolongccI from tlie mrnp of Scrrcs 
up the right bllnlr of t11e Xivelle tn San PB; tlience by Siirnide 
ta the double bridge-liead af Cambo oa the Nive; and beyond 
tlint river to tlie Ursouia mountain, wvering tlie grext wad 
From byonne to St. Jean Pied de Port. He d l e d  Pariti from 
Oleron to the defence o£ the latter fortress and ita entrenehed 
carnp; and drew Foy d m  the Nive t o  BidarmyJ half-way 
beheen St. Jean Pied de Port md Camba. Foy thus: watched 
t l~e  issues from the Val de Duygorry, and could ocmpy th 
Ursouia mountain on the right of tbe Nivel or, movjng by 
Cnmbo, reinforce the position on the left a£ t h t  river, 
To coniplete tliese immense entreuchments, and between fhe 
Nive and tlie sea, they were double, on an opening of sixteen 
mil-, t1ie whole a m y  laboared incessantly; md al1 the 
resources of the wuntry in material8 or worlrmen were called 
out by reqnisition. Thia defensive warfnre was kowever 
justly regarded by Soult as unsuitable to the general &ate of 
affairii; tIie offensive was most ooasonant to the character 
of the French saldiera, and also t o  the exigencies of the 
time. Experience lid indeed shown the impregnable nature 
of the allies' position, aad lie TVZM too weak singly b cliange 
tlie tlieatre of operations; but when he considered how strong 
thc arniiee appropriahed ta the Spanish contest were, he 
thought France wwuld be ill-served if hw g~nerds  ccould not 
resume the offensive succesdully. Sucliet Liad proved Lis 
pwer at Ordiil. Lord William's auocewor, af inferior rank 
and power, Iitiving an army unpGd and feeriing on salt meat 
from the ships, and Spmiah collwes nnwilling to act 
cordially or upon za fixed plan, was in no conclition to menace 
tlxe French seriously. And tbat be wm permitted to pam19se 
fiftg or sixty tbansand excellent French troops possessing al1 
the strong place5 of the country, waa one of tlie most sinpiar 
errora of the war. 
Exclusive of national gurtrds and detachments of the line, 
dieposed ntoag the fmntier to g u d  Pmce agninst mnrondii 
excursions, therc wctc avnilnblc ono huntlrcd ond 
tpe",g.$v wventy thownnd men. md ewenteen thousand 
horsw, One hundrd and thhty-cight thowand 
were preaent undw rirmq and thirty thovsand wnscripts mere 
in niwch to join them; thcy held 1111 the fortresses of Vdencia 
and Catalonin, and most of those in Amgon, Navarre and 
Gnipnacoa; and they could al[ unite behind the Pyrenees for a 
combined effort. Wcllington could not, bcluding the h g l +  
Sicilians and the Spmiards on tlie eastern coast, brhg into 
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line one hundred and fiftythousand men j he had severd siega 
on his bmds; and to  unite his forees at my point required 
slalful dispositions to wver flank marches. Suchet hdtliirty 
thowand disposable men and could make them forty thownd 
by relinquishing some unimporht posts; and as his artillerg 
nieans mere immense, md astributea in $1 hia strong plam, 
he mnld furnish hirnself from almost any point. Ninety 
tliousantl old soldiers and two hundred guns might thercfore 
have been nnited oa Welfington's fiank; thirty thousand con- 
scripts and the frontier nationa! guarde mould have remabed. 
Thcse based on the fortresses and camps of Bayonne and of St. 
d a n  Pied dc Port, and on the cítqtlcs of Jaca and Navarens, 
would cover the northern pan% while $he numeroua fortresscs 
of Cntalonin could protect France on the 8011th. 
To make tliis g e n t  power bear in a right direction was 
SOult's ohject, but Iie coirld never pemunde Suchet to ariopt 
Iiis projecta; anrI thst marslid's resistance would appear to 
Eiave qvung from personrnl dislilr e contr~ted durinf: Eoul tk 
sojourn near VaIencia in 1812. Xt hw been shom how lightly 
he ahnndoncd Aragun nfter quitting Valencia; hc did not 
indeed then Irnom t h t  Soult commandcrl and was prcpahg 
liis great effort to relieve Pampcluna; birt he ltncw IJIausd 
nnd Paris wero on fhe aide of Jncb and tlint to nionm Wcl- 
linghn's flank would palliate the dcfcat nt 17itoriu. ht Znm 
goza he h d  e lnrgo gmison and an immense nrtillery d6pGt; 
from thence he could by Jacn hnve communicnted quickly and 
surely rvitli Eonlt; md tlius acting in concert they would have 
mccoured hmpeluns. 
8oult had not time to communicata with Suchek He 
quitted Dresden thc 4th of July, racched Bayonne the 12th, 
and on the 20th he mas in march towmds St. Jeau Pied de 
Port; and it wus during this rnpid journey Sucbet abandoned 
Valencia. Soult therefure lrnew nothing of ~ucliet'a plnns, of 
hig forces, af his momments, of his actual positions. How- 
ever, between tlie 6th ond 16th of Aupst, immediately after 
$110 retmat hom Saurorsn, he uged 8uchet to march upon Za- , 
mgoza, open a mmmunictbtion by Jaca, ami thw aid the effort 
to relieve San Sebmtinn. As an. intlucement he stated, tbat his 
recent opwatioria h d  caused troops actudy in march under 
RilI towads Catalonia t o  be recalled; thig was an error; 
bis emissltries were dweived by the mwemenh, and corrnter- 
tnovements in pursuit of Clausel after the battle of Vitoriii, 
and by tlie change in Wellington'a plans w to the aiege of 
Pampeluna. No troopa were sent towards Wñlonia; but it iis 
remarhalile tliat Picton, HiII, Qraham and O'Donnel were a11 
mentioncd in tliis correspoudence between Bonlt and Sachet 
as being actualEy in Catalonia, or on tbe march; the three 
first ha~ing been really seunded as di taking *he comrnand in 
tliat quarter, nnd the Iast h a ~ i n g  demanded it himself. 
Xuchef trerrted the proposal as ~1iimericral. Bis moveable 
troops did not he said exceed eleven thousnnd, aiid a march 
upon Zaragoza with so femmen would be to rcuew tlie disaster 
of Baylen; iinless he oould fly inta France by Venasque where 
he h d  a prrison. This extntordinn~ i e i v  of atTa.irs be sup- 
~ o r t e d  by statements still more extraordinq! ' RZZ I d  
jo id lord WaZ*n, Bentimk with twenty four t7untsmd men.' 
- La B k a l  had &ved &thj.em t J m ~ d ' - ~  I T I m  w e  
m e  than teao ?~m&d t7wwand o n  tls loww Ebro.'- 
I'h Spanish Cmmciior, wm gemral a d  rtrwag-12, organkd.' 
-< ,Te Iad a a c m e d  tlae g h m  of Tmagm and deshoy& 
#M m h , m d  IM maat mvictud Rw&rm anzd fim witfIdrcbw 
to t719 .enFin?/ of Geroim umd r m i w  m tJ~e def&tw P 
Tliia letter wns writtcn the 23rd of Aug~st. Lord WilIiam 
ha4 then retreated from tlie G a p  to tlie mountains above Ilofi- 
piklet ; the imperial muster-ralfs prove that the two aimies 
of CataIonia and Aragon, liotli under Suchet'e 
f S ~ ~ - X ~ I ,  cornrnsnd, exceedcd aixtp-fi~e thousand men, fifty- 
six tlionsand lieing present under arms , tliirty 
thousand were uni td  iin tlie field mlicn he receivd Soult's 
letter; tliere WRR notliing to  prevent hirn marcliing by Tole- 
toza exoept Iord William's amy, wl~icli had just ackuoii-ledgetl 
by a retreat it4 inability tu  cope ~vhh im ; hhere vas notliiiig 
at all to prevent him marching by brida, O'DonneI hd 
throm up l i s  command from bad liealtli, lea~ing liia trciopa 
under Giron on the EclialEar mountains; Bill wris at Ronce 
valles, ~ n d  not. a mae h d  mored from Wdlington's mny. 
ELo nnd Roche were near Volencia in a stltrving condition; 
tiie Angi+Ecilianhns, only fourteen thousand strorig includinl: 
Whittingham'~ dividon, were on the bsmn rnountains above 
RoiipitRlet, whye no Spanish army could remain; Del Pwq~m 
ttnd h ~ f i c l d  liad gone over the Ebro, Copona htid taken 
refuge in the mountains o€ Cevera. In  fine not tmo hundred 
thoiisand, but leas thanthirty-five thousand men, htrlf-organized, 
ill-fed and acattered from Vich t a  Tinaroa were oppoaed to 
Suchet ; ancl fheir generals had d i r e n t  views md different 
Eies of operations-the -4nglo-Sicilians couI(1 not abandon the 
coast, Copons coiild nut abandon tlie mounttiins. Del P q u e  
soon aftcmards mmched to Navarre> rind t~ use Wellington's 
phmse there was nothirig to prevent Sucliet ' tudE:ing M 
IPe'IIiam Bmtinck 6ack even 80 t ! ~  Xq.war.' Tl~e nattture of the 
inaurrection wliich Sucliet pretended to dread shall be shown 
when tlie political conrlition of Spnin is tmated of. . 
Suchet's errom rcipccting t bc  nlliw wcrc msily dctecter1 by 
So~iFt. T h o ~ e  toueliing tlie FrencIi in Catalonia he couId not 
wspect, nnd wquiasc~l  in tlie olijections to Iiis fint plan; Iiut 
fehile of rcqourcc lic immediatcly propoacd anothcr, xliin tn 
tliat wliicli Iic hnd urgcrl Josepli t o  ndopt in 1812, afttfter tho 
hnttle of Xdamnncn; namely, to chrtm,ge the t l ~ ~ m  of war. 
Tlie fortre~~cs in s p i n  would, he s d ,  incvitrrhly fa11 bcfnrc 
tFic nllics in succcssion if tho Prcnch nrmics rcmaincd on thc 
defensive, rtnd thc only mode of rcndcring offensive opemtions 
mcce~sful w n ~  f i gcneml concent.mtion oF menns nnd unity nf 
&ion. Thc Icvy of conscripts uiider nn imperial dccrcc isauetl 
in Aup~i t ,  would furnish, In conjiinction mtii tlie dc$ts of 
the interior, R rcinforcerncnt of forty thousand mcn; ten 
thoiisand would form a sufficient corps of observation nhout 
Gerona; and he hopcd thnt by encrificing eome posts Siichet 
could bring tmcnty thonsantl infantry to the field. ñ e  c.ould 
1iave producd forty thousnnd; hiut Soult, mislcd 3iy Iiis 
emoneous sti~terncnts, nssumed only twenty thousaiid ; nnd he 
calt~ilnt~ctí bnt lie cotild b s e l f  bring thirty-fi~e or forty 
tlioitsanci p o d  infrtnt'y nncl al1 his envatry, te  n givm pnint of 
junction for tlie tuyo bodies between Tnrbes and Pau. F i h e n  
thousand of tlie remsining conscripts were dso t o  jio tliere; and 
thus seventy or scventy-tive tliuusa~d infnntry al1 the cavdry 
of botli arrniea and one hundred p n g  would be audilenly 
assetribled to thead the narrow pass of Jacn and desoeiid 
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npon Ampn. Once in thnt kingdom they wuld ettwlc the 
alIied troops in Navnrre if the latter were diveraed; nnd if 
they were unit.4 retira npon Zaingoza, there t6 fixrasolid base 
and debe r  a genera1 bnttle upon the ncw lint? of gmntions. 
Milennwhilo the fiftecn thousnnd un~ppropriatcd conriciipta 
mjght rein force twenty or twenty-five thousand old soldicm lefb 
t o  covcr Rrnyanne. 
An amy so veat ancl atmngly mnstitnted appeaTing in 
A q o n  would, Soult nrgued, neccsaarrily mise the Irrlockrndm 
of Pampeluna, Jaca, FmpI aiid Monzon, md it was probnble 
Tortom m d  even h p n t u m  wonM be relie~ccl; the p t  
ditFculhy waa t o  pss tlie gg~iins by Jaca; yet he wasi resolved to 
w, cven though he should eonvcy them upon trucka to be 
made in Paris and sent Lp post to Fan. Be anticipntd no 
serious inconvcnience from the nnion of the troops in h n c e ,  
since Sucliet hsd alrearly dcclared his iotention of retirjng 
toñrada hrona; and on the Bayonne side the army t o  be left 
t.here muld dispute the entrenched line betwcen Cambo and 
M. Jean de Luz. I f  driven from thence it could tnke a 
hnking position behind the Nive ; the nght resting upon the 
entrenched camp of Bayome; the Ieft upon the works at 
Cambo and holding communication by the fortified mountain 
o£ Uno& witth Xt. Jean Pied de Port, There could be little 
fear for thisi seconda y furm when the p t  army was once in 
Aragon; but what he dreadd was delhy, because a falE of 
snow, alwap to be expected afkr the middle of October, wonld 
entirely dose the pass of Jaw. 
This proposition, h t t e n  the 2nd of September imme- 
&&ly after the battle of San Marcial$ rertclied Suchet the Ilth, 
and was peremptorily rejected. If he withdrew from Catalonia, 
dismragement, he mi4  would spreacl, dwertion would com- 
menee and France be immedistely invaded by lord William 
Beni.inck at tlie Z i e d  of fifty tliouasnd men. Tlie p of 
Jaca wtis impracticable md the power of man cmld not opm 
it for &qes under e year'a IriIioiour. His wish m t o  act on 
the defensive, but iT an offen~ive movement naa abaolutely 
neccssary he of f td  a, oountcr yrojjcct; that ia, hha wonld b 
d e  the English in his fmnt re-ernbark &t Tnmgona, or he 
would chive t h m  over the Ebro and then mar& with one 
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hiindrd guns ~ n d  thirty tlionsand men by Leida to the 
Gallego river ncar Zaragoza: Soitit'a m y ,  coming by Jacn 
without p n R ,  might thcre meet him and the united forces 
could thcn do wllat mas fitting. But to efect tl~ia he reqtiired 
a reinforceinant of mnscripts, and to Iiave P~iris's didaion and 
khe nrtillcrpen and drnft horsea of 8oult.'s army sent to 
Gntalonin; hc dernnndert nlso thnt two thousund bulloclcs Tor 
t l ic sulisistcnce of l i s  troopa should be provided to m ~ ~ t  him 
on the Gi~lZego. Tlren toucliii~g upon the dificnlties a£ tlie 
mnd from SnnF~cicssi tu Parnpeliina, Iic dcdarcrl, t l i n t  a f t a  
forcing Wrllington mross tho Ebro, hs wodd rcturii to 
Catnlonin to revictutil Es fortresses nnd prevcnt nn invksion 
of Fmnco. TIii~i plan ho judged f ~ r  less clanpous tlinn 
Seult's; yek he cnlrargcd upon ih d%cultias and its dangen if 
the combincd mov~ments were not c m t l y  executed. In fina, 
lie continued, <The Frencli arinies are enhngled timongst 
rockci, and the emlmor &ould direct n third army upoa Spnin 
to act betiveen tlie Q~enees nnd tl:e Ebro iu tlie centre, while 
t l~e  arrny of Bpnin sixty tliousand atrung and that of Awon 
tliirtgr thousand strong operabe on tiie ilaiiks. Thus .fI~er@t+ 
t h  of l ? ~ e  ~ ~ 1 i s J ~  army, 100 easily acqwired EUF Salmnca 
m d  Pdoria, Tw abatd? 
Thia illibenl remark comliined witli the defects of bis prn- 
ject, prove Lhat tthe duke of Albufera fni. Iiclow tlic duku 
of Dalmatia's standard, both in inagnanimity and capncit.y: 
tbe one giving bis adversary just praiuc, tlioiiglit tlie force 
alrcady mpplied by the emperor sufticimt to dispute for vic- 
h o y ;  tha other, with an unseemly boast, daired overwli~lm- 
ing numbers. ISmlt's letter reached Buchet. t1:e driy before the 
wmbat of Oríld, and in piiiriuznce of liis ~ w n  p l u  the lutter 
sliould have ¿iri\-een lord WiIliam over the Ebro; as be couid 
well have done, becanse the Catalm troops liad then sepa~atd 
from tlie Angla-Sicihns. Tn liis fomer Ietters lie liad esti- 
rnated Iik enemica at $10 Ziundred tiiousmrl fighting men and 
hig own divposnble force at eleven tlicusand, gincg tliat as a 
reason wliy he could uot march to Arngon. Now, f q e t  M 
of liis previoru objections and estiniates, ho admiited t h t  he 
had tliirty thousand clisposable troops, and proposerl the v q  
movement which he h d  rejected as matlness mhen suggcsted 
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by 8oult. And tbe futility of his argumenb, relative to  Ghe 
general discoaragement the desertion rind the temptation to 
an inwsion of France if he adopted Sowlt's plan, is itp'parent 
for these things could only happen on the supposition that he 
waa retreating from weakness; a notion wllich would, if enter- 
tained, hme effectually mvered the real design unta the great 
mo-vement in advance should change tlie public opinion. 
Soult's plan mas surer, bctter imagine4 grander tlian lis; 
it ww l e s  danprwa in the event of failure and more con- 
forrnable t e  mili* principlea. Bucliet's project involved 
doulile lines of olieration withont trny aure communications, 
and consequentlp witiout any certainty of just co-opemtion ; 
bis point of junction was witlJn th'e enemy's pomer, and the 
principal mmy was to be deprived of its a r t i l l e ~ +  failure 
rvould Iiave leit no resource. But in SoulR project fhe amise 
were to he nnited xt a p in t  beyond the eilemy's r e d ,  and to 
operate ahereards in masa with al1 arins complete, wliich 
wxs oonfornial;ile to tlie lirinciplca of war. S~ichet averred the 
iinpracticaliility of moving tlle guns by Jnm, yet Sonlt'~ 
couilter-opinion clnims more respect ; Clausel nnil Puris, wlio 
had lntely passed with troope through that defile were in Iiis 
campj ho hd made verg exact inquiries of tlie country peo~ila, 
liar1 causd fhe civil migineers of rands md bridgcs on tlio 
frontiers to exnminc the routc, nnd fiom tlicir r e p o h  judgod 
the dificulty to be surmountnble. 
Feitlier thc inconsistency nor the exaggemtions of Suchet's 
statements eacriped Soult's ohserv~tion; liiit anxioua to  efFcch 
somcthing while Pampeluna still held out nnri fhe semen per- 
mitted operationa in tha moiintains, Iie frankly wccpted the 
otherk modi fimtion ; end adoptited e v g  ~tipitlation sme tlirit 
of sending the artillerymen and horses of Iiis ~ r m y  to Catalonia, 
wIiicli he c o n s i d a d  danprous. T h e  preparations for this 
great movement were therefore immediately mmmenoed, and 
Buchet on his part seemed equally camest dthough Iie m- 
glnined of increasing. dimrlt,ies; prctending Longa and 360- 
rillo h d  arrived in Catalonia, and tliat Graham was also in 
marcb to that quarter. He nlso deplored the loss of Fm* 
from whence the Empecinado had just driven liis prrison, rrs 
if it were irreparable; but thwgli it commancled a bridge over 
the Cinca, n, rivcr dangerous from ih sudden and p a t  floods, 
he stiEI posscssed tho bridge of Moazon. 
During th ia  ccorrespondence Napolecri remrtined silent ; yet 
at n lakr periotl he expressed cliscoritent at suchet's inrtctivity; 
ami indirectly approved of SoilIt's plam by recommending a 
movemmt towads Znrugoza, whicli Sucllet hoivever did not 
execute. It woulri appem tl~at liaving given al1 tlis reiiiforce- 
ments he muld sptire, ancl full powerv t o  both rnarpbtils to  act 
as ttey judgetl f i t t ing he wouId not, at ti distarice and whilo 
eng-aged in such vast openitions as those ho w3s carrying on 
at Uresden, decide 80 imporhnt a question. Slie viprous 
execntion easential to sucwas was not to be expected if citler 
mssslial actea nuder constraiiit anrl against Lii  own opinion: 
Soult liad adopted Suchet's modirimtion, and it would have 
been univise to substitute a iiew plan, which :hvouId liavu pro- 
bwli2y disl~leased both commm~lera. Nennidile MTeIlington 
passed the Bidassoa, and Sucliet's project wvm annulled by 
the npproach cif winter nnd thc furtlier aperatiorts of tlie 
d i e s .  
3f the plan of unitinf: the tmo m i e s  in Arrtgon liad been 
happily acliieved it mould oerhinly h a ~ e  formd TVdlin, -ton to 
repass the Ebro, w fight n great battle wit1,li an army less 
strongly constituted tlian the Prench army. II Le chose the 
latter victorj. would have profited him little, because Iiis 
enemy, hrong in c ~ a L r j ,  conld have easily retired on the 
fortresses of Catalonia U he received a check he must have 
gone over thc Ebro, perhaps Lwk to Portugal, and the Frcnch 
would bwe recavered Aragon, Kavarre and Talmcin. Xt is 
not probable howwer, tbat such a p a t  operation could have 
been condncted without beiag diacovered intime by TVellingteii. 
It has been a l d y  sliown, that besides the odinary spies and 
mdes of gaining lntelligence he had secret emissaries amo@ 
Joseph's courtiers, and even amonpt Frencli officers of rnnk ; 
and Soult vainly endeiivoured to 5urprke I ~ i m  the 31st of 
Aupst when the. combinrttiuns were only two days ald. 
Sucliet's retrent fkom Cntalonia and junction witli Sonlt in 
Frfince, \den Napolcon mm pressed in &rinruiy* togetlier 
with the knom diffimilty of pwing guns by Jnca wouid 
indeed bave made it appear a, mevement of retreat and iear ; 
nevertheless the ecret  must hvtl been k n m  to  more tlisn 
one, md tlip. Euglish general hrid agenta who were little 
suspected. Boult liewever wdd stiil h v e  reiumed to hia old 
pit ions,  anJ, reinforced by Suchet'~ troop, repea.M his 
former attack by tlie Rontxrltllee. lt migigrit he liiti secret 
design werai to  iavolve that maraha1 ,l iiis operations, and tliat 
Iie mas nrlt very eager h d o p t  bis motIifid plan, wliich $he 
rspproach of the bad Boaaon and the menacing position of 
Wellington rendered eacli d q  les promishg. But ih own 
project, liardy i;r.d dangerous for t t e  dliq praved WeIlington's 
prufound aequtiintance wEth liis art; for he lid entered Franoa 
only tu ~ i l a a ~ e  the 'ailied sovereips, and alw~lys wakhd 
closely for Sucl~b;  averring that tho truc miliby Eine of 
opemtiona wiis t o w d  A r w n  and Catdonia. Being now 
lioawer in Franoe, and tile war in Germany having taken a 
fn~ourable turn, lie resolved to continue operations on the 
a t t d  front, awaiting only the 
Thii mmt mas prodnced by a long bloclíade, less fertile of 
incirlent than the siege of San Sebastitin, yet very honourable 
tu tlie firmness of tlie governor, Cassaa The town, contain- 
ing fifteen t h o u s d  inliabitants, stood on a bold tahle-hnd 
where a nnmber of vallegs opened; and where the great rmds 
coming from St. Jcan Pied de Part, 8 ~ n  p a s a ,  Tudela, &tellq 
Vitoria and Imrmn w r e  concentrated. Tlie northep and 
ensterii fronts mere covered by tlie Arp,  the defeacm being 
only siniplr walls edging tlie pqendiciifar rocky bmk of the 
river; tlie otlier fronts were replarlj fortified with ditchm 
mvered wvy &nri Iinlf-tnoons. Two unfinislled outworks onlg 
WPPF: c ~ r ~ ~ t l ' ~ c f ; e d  on the aouB front; biit tlie citruld ori. tlie 
math-mest vna ii F ~ I I I R P  pentsgori with bomb-proofs and 
rr~agmin~rl, vaulktl btlmactc~ for a t3oumnd men and a com- 
plete sp~tem of rriiiies. 
Pam1ieliina Iiad been pnrtially blockaded by Mina for eigh- 
teen rnmtlis ~revious to  the hnttIe of Vitorin, and wlvliea 
Joscpli flerl tlierr: it w a ~  bd ly  prchviaioned, The strqglem 
of lii army increasd the g~~rrison to morc than three tliou* 
srind five hundred men. Many inhalitanb went ofF cluring 
thc short interna1 between the king's arrival and departiira, 
and Casan, finding his troops foo few for action too many 
for Ghe food, fihandoned the nnfinished outworkq demolirrhed 
evcrything interfcring with his def~ncc oiitsirle, and ccm- 
menced otIier morks inside. Moreovcr, foreseeing tlie French 
army mi@ possilily niake a mrlden march wiihout ptm'i to 
sumur t l ~ e  garrimn, he prgiared a field-tmin of forty pieces 
t o  meet the oceacion. When tlie blockade mns eshlilished 
his chief object waa t o  ebtain provisoos, and the 38th and 
30th hf June he fougbt acbioas: to cover hls foragers; the 1st 
of July he burned tlie mhurb of Bhdalina, beyond the r i ~ e r  
&a, ancl forced many inbsbitanLq to quit tlie place before 
the bloclradera' worka werc completed. Slíirmishes fhen , 
occurred alrnost daily, tlic French always seeking to gatirer 
grain ancl vegetablw whjch mere ripe and abundant beyond 
the d I s ;  tlie d i e s  seeking t o  fire the standing corn witlin 
mnge of the fortress. 
On the 14th O'DwneI unrtertook the blockade, nnd fhe 
next day tlie garrison mde a succpssful forage sontli ef tlie 
tom; tliey r e p t e d  it on tlie e&. beyond the Arga tlle 19111, 
with a s l i q  enpgement of c a v a l ~ ,  ditring which the in- 
fmtry carried away a peat deal of corn. Tlie 2Ftli the sound 
of Soult's artillery reached the place, and &s;iu, juclging lie 
wm coming to sumour Parnpeluna, m d e  a sally i n  tlio nidi€ 
by tlie Roncwdles road; he  vas drivpu back, liut the nnext 
morning carne out again with dwen liundred men and two 
p n s ,  overthrew tlis Spttoisli o u t p d s ,  snd ad vancarl toivnnls 
Villalba at the moment when Picton ww fulling baclr mith the 
tliird md fourtli divisions. Then O'I)onnel, as befor~ relntd, 
etwnated some of tlie ontrencbrnentq destroyed nmmunition, 
spiketl p n a ,  and h t  for tlie tirnely arrivcl rif Cnrlos d"Espaiía 
and Pictoa's stantl plt, HII&C would have nbnndoned tlie 
blocl~?Je al togetlicr. 
When tlie Iinttle on tlle rnountnins com~nenccd, tlie smokr: 
rose over tbe intervenii~g height~ of E s ~ ~ r a  and Snn Nigucl, 
t h ~  F~ench CI~YB~I-y ppeared on the slopea aborr! El Cano, 
and tlie u l l i ~ 9 q g : n g i t  ivm sm filing along tiic r o d  of 
Irureuii. Cassan thouglit deliverrancc sure, aud liaving rmld 
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much corn during UDonnel's pmic awaited the result. 
khulk'fl ~ ~ Y O U L C  fires conld be aten during tho ni@, and in 
the rnorning a fresh anlly pmcured more corn witli little loss 
of men. Some doserter3 from the foreign Britisli corp also 
went ever with intelligence exrtggerated snd coloured after 
the manner of such men, and the fiench re-entered the place 
elated witb hope. In tlie evening the sound of coníiict 
ceased, ohnd the aiIence o€ the next day told liow tlie battle 
liad p n e ;  but a m a n  made rtnothw sdy and qain obtained 
provisions from tlie ~outh side. 
On tlze 30th tlre battle rmmmenced, and the retreating 
fire of tlie Prench made sick the spirit of the garrison: never- 
tlieless their indefatiphle pvernor led anotlier sally on the 
south side, mhmee they mcarried off graln and some ammuni- 
tion which h d  been left in one of the abandoned outworka. 
Next day Carlos cl'Espxiia carne to resume the blockde 
with seven thous~nd men antl maintaind it until the middle 
Pepternbm. of September, &en t.he p~ince o€ Anglom's divi- 
sioa of Del Parqada army reIieved the Andalu- 
sian portion of the troops, mho rejoined tlieir awn m r p  
near Echrillisr. The allies" works of contrav~llation were then 
aupented; and when Paris retired into France from Jam, 
part o€ Mina'a troopa occupied the valleys leading from the 
side of Ehnguessa to Pampeluna, and mada entrenchments fo 
bw the escape of the gnrrison that wwtly. 
Su October Cassan pnt his fightting men upon mtions of 
hoiwe-flesh, four oiinces to w h  with Borne rice, and lie tnrned 
more familics out of the town; hut this time they wese fid 
upon by thcir countrymen anrl forced ta reenter. 
On ~ l i e  9th of September baron M~ucirne, who had eon- 
di~cted most of +he sallieri cIuring the Iilocknde, attacked ltnd 
carricd some fortified houw on the east side of tlie place. HG 
was wsaileri by tlie Bpanish cavalry, bnt he bent them and 
piirsuetl tlia fugitive~ close to Villaha; whereupon Carlos 
d'Eapnfia dva.nced with a p t e r  body, and the French wem 
driven in with the losa of cigfity men; yet tbe Spaniards Iost a 
far greaíer nnmber, D'Eqaiia himself w ~ s  wounded, ancl the 
g h o n  obtained some com which was  tlieir principal object. 
For the ao1dim were now feeding on mh and other dhgusting 
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anhals, manj seeking for roots beyond the wdls were poi- 
soned by eating Iiernlock in their hunger, and a number 
deserted Xn tliia atate &san, deaigning fo break out, made 
an experimental sdly to try tlie strengtli o€ the lines, but afkr 
, some fighting was drimn back with a loss of seventy men snd 
lis hopc of escape vanished. Yet lio stiIl spoke of attempting 
it, md the public rnltnner itt wliich lie increased the mines 
under the citade1 induced Wellington t o  reinforce the 
33locIrarIe and bring his cavalry intu the vicinity. 
Smwy affected the garrison. One thouwnd men mere 
sick, eight hundred hrtd bcen wounded, the deaths by battle 
md disease exceeded four hundred, one huntlred and twenty 
Lad deserkd, and %assan, moved by the misery around hini, 
propofied to. mirrender if dlowed t e  retire ivith six pieces of 
caxinon. Being denid, he offered to yield on conditiou of not 
~ r v i n g  for a year and a day, which was also denied; then he 
broke the negotiation, giving out tIiat lis would blow up 
the works of the fortreer~ and burst though tlie blockde. Tu 
deter liim a menltcing letter was thruwri to liis outposta, arid 
I\'ellhgton, dcnounciug his desigi as contra~ to  tlie lswa of war, 
directed Carlos d'Espiía to put him, liis oficers, non-commiw 
sioned officei~ and a tenth of tlie rioldiem to derith when the 
place ahould bo tolren, X nnny damrage wcro done to the works. 
Cwrrnn'a ohject being merely to obtain Iietter terms this 
order remnincd dormnnt, una hnppily so, for tlie exccution 
would never hnve borne tlie test of public opinion. To destroy 
the works of Pampelunn, and break through the blockading 
force, aa Brennier did rtt Almeida, would have been FI very 
noble exploit ; and n useftil oiie, jf Soult's plnn of clianging the 
thcritre of war by descending into dmgon h d  been followed. 
There could ttierefore be notliiug contrary to the Iaws of wwar 
jn a resolute &ion of tliat nntiire. On tl~e otlier liaud, if tl ie 
governor, hrtving no clian ct: wliatever of  success, made a Eiope- 
less attempt tEie prctence for d e f  rcyiiig ra great fertrcsa 
Zielonging ta tbe Spjysniardq tlius rlepriving tte allies of $he 
fniits of their long blockde aiid glorious battles, tlic con- 
querors migh  have justly exercised that esevere Iiut untloulited. 
right of mr,  iefusing qiinrter to itn enemy. But Wellington's 
letter to Es+ involved anotlier queaiti~n, namely the pub 
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ting of prisonem ta death. For the soldiers could not bu 
docimatctl until captured, and thcir ci.ime would have been 
only ohedicncc to ordera in a mntter o€ which tlicy dared not 
md*; t l ~ i ~  wonld h nvc becn quitc eontrnry to the n s a p  of 
civilizcd nntions; hcncc, the threat must bc wnsidcrcd tns A 
device to mvc tlin worka of Pampeluna osd woid tbe odluin 
uf rcfiising qunrtcr. 
A fcrv (Iibys longer the governor and gnrrison endnred their 
digtrcas nnd tlien cnpitulcted, liuving defended tliemselres 
more tlirin four rnontlis with p a t  constancy. The oficem 
and soldiers Iiecnme prisuners of war; tlte first to lcep their 
arma nnd tiiiggage the secanul tlieir lrnapsncks, exyiressly on 
tlie ground t11:~t liey had treuted tlie inliabitnnts well during 
tlie investment. This camplimant waa lionour11il.s to botli 
sides; biit tliere TJS anothcr nrticlc, cnforccd by Esparia 
witliaut lieing acceptcd by tlie gamison, for which it i a  difficult 
t o  wriign aay motive savc tI~e vindictive ferocity of tlic 
8pnnidi clinradcr: no pcrson of eitlicr ~ c x  mns permitted to 
follow tlic Frcncli troopa, niid womcn'a rrffcetions i\.cre thw 
b~rbnrously brought under the action of tlic sword 
There wns no stronghold now rctnined Ay tlic Frcnch in 
the nortli o€ Spnin exccpt Bnntonh Tlic Mockade theie hd 
hcen tedious, and Wdlington, ivhose m commiinimtions rrera 
intcrruptcd by $he p r h t c e a  from thence, fomcd a smdl 
Britislili corps unrl~r lord ilglmcr ko ntbck Larcdo which, 
m the oppoaitc point of Santona Iiarbour commandod tho 
mcliorngc. ~Zccidentnl circunist~nces prcventcd this cntcr- 
prise und Santona. remnincd in tlie encmy's poescssion; bu& 
witl! tliie exception, the centcst in the nortliern pnrts of Spuin 
wlls terminated. It is now fitting to show with what great 
political Inliour Wcliington lind broright it h tlus stste; nnd 
wliat contemptible rtctions and sentimcntu, wht.  a, fnithless 
sllinncc, what vilc govcrumcuta his dazding glpry hid from 
the siglil of the  world 
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Political B~btg of Poriugd, - In that  country nrttionai 
jdousy, long comyrcsscd by fear, liad expanded with vio- 
lence m &iiger receded, and Englt~~id's ii~fllience decline4 
in an iinverse proportion to her sucoess in removing tlie 
peril of iuvrtuion. Wlien Wellington crussed the Ebro tlie 
vile Suwa ,&ction becarne elntc; and tliose members of 
governnient wlio Iizd nupported tIio Britisb policy while 
it suhined tliem ngxiii~t court intriguea, now sought p p u -  
larity by aan opposita course. Nug~era vexntiously resisted 
or suspended cornrnerciuI and financia1 operations,-princjpai 
Seum wrauglcd fiercelp and insolsntly nt the council-board- 
the gatriarcli fomentd ill witl at LisZion nnd in 
the nohhern provinccs-Furjns, rsmbitious t o  com- 
mand thc nmionnl troops, becnrne tlie organ of 
discontcnt upon Dailitnry mntterc. The return of thc princn 
regcrtt, tlie trcnty of coinmcrcc, the Oporto cnmpiany, tlic 
privilcg~ of tlie Britisli fiictory mcrchunh, thc modc of 
py i i ig  t t i c  mhsiílp, nnd the milit,iiry transpart; tlie canven- 
tion ~ t h  Spain relxtivc to thc saliply of tlic Yortugucsc troopa 
in thnt ccoi~ntry; t l~c  rcmiiting, tlic orgnnixntioir, tlic mmmiintl 
of tlic nntionnl srmp snd thc honotirs drir to it; dl fi~rnishctl 
poiinds for factieus prnceee'linqs, cnnrlurted witli thitt ignolib 
aulitlety wliicFi invarinhly clinracterixed Peninsular politica. 
TIic cspcnditurc of tlic Eritfsli nrmy liad been immense, the 
tradc and commcrcc dcliciidcnt oii it, now reinoved to the 
Spnnich. port3, cnurmow : Pii~%iigd liar1 lived upon Englnnd. 
Hcr interna1 tnxca mrdcgsly or littrirti>llly eiiforcerl, mcre 
vcxatioiw to thc pcoplc witliout licing lirofihthlc ta thc gnvcrn- 
ment. h'inc-tcnt-hs of tlie reveniie ~ccrued from d u t h  on 
British tmrla Tlie sutlden ckqwtir~n of rnnrkcts aiid nf 
criipFoynieíit, tlic ubsciice of scri{ly inonej; tlie loss of profit, 
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pnblic and priPate, occamoned by the departure of Ghe army, 
whi'te tbe contributiona and other exactions remained the same, 
plled al1 clases* and the aafion was quite ready to sbake off 
the burthen oC gmtitude. 
Emiasaries promulgated tala, some h e  some fahe, of the 
dimrders perpetrrtted by the rnil ita~ detaehments on the fines 
of communicsfion, dcling that Wellington gztve secnet orders 
for tliia t o  satisfy Iiis percanal hatred of Portugal ! Disconrses 
md mritings against the British inflnence nbounded in Lisbon 
md Rio Janeiro, and were re-eclioed or surpaased by the 
London newspupem, whoss shtcmenh, ovcrflowing of fdaa 
hoorl, could he t m r d  to the Portupese em1)nssy in thrrt 
apihl .  It was asserted that Englnnd, deqigning t o  ret~in 
her power in hrtugd, opposed the return of tlie prinm-regent; 
tbnt thc war iteclf heing removcd was bcconie mholly a 
Spnisli  musc; and it wa.s not for Portugal to levy troop~ nnd 
cxhau~t her msources, t o  help a n~ t ion  whose aggressions slre 
must bc mlZd npon aooner or later to rcsist. Mi. Etuart'a 
diplomatic intercou~sc, nlmp difficult, hemme one of con- 
finual remanstrance and diqmte; liis comphints mro  met 
with insolente or wbterfuge; ariri illepl violence agdnst the 
persons nnd propertg of Rritish subjectsi was pushed se far, 
thnt Mr. Slonne, an English entlerntln npon whom no ms- 
picion rested, ww cnsk into prisoa for three months becanse 
lie had come t o  Lisbon without a pascport. The rights of tlic 
English fiictory werti invaiied, anrl the Oporto compmy, 
est~bIisIied as its rival in violation of treaty, m openly 
cheri~lied, Irresponsible and rr ipmious this pernicicus 
company robkd everyliody, snd the prince-regent, pro- 
mising to reform or htally abolisli it, o d e r d  a prepmitory 
investigation; but ia Ilr. Sbuarl's words, the regenby actrd 
no leas wifairIy by t.Iieir sovereign tlian unjustl by their 
alry. 
E~pecial privilcp claimed by the factory merclisnts were 
nnotlier cause of disquiet. Tbey pretended to excrnption fiom 
cerhin ttaxes and from Iiillets; and tliat a fixed numhr of 
tIieiF clerka, domesties and catGle aliould be exonerated of 
militaiy service. Tliese pretensions were disputed. The one 
touclimg servants rtnd cattle, doubtful ak best, liad been possly 
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abused, and that relnting to billets unfounded. be txxes 
were justly reaisterl, and the merchants ofemd a voluntarg 
contribution to  the same amount. Tlie government d e l y  
refu~ed thi offer, neized their property, imprisoned their per- 
BOnS, impressed their cnttle to transport supplics tliat never 
reached the troop, and made soldiera of their derks sud 
servantrr without any intention of reinforcing tlie anny: Mi. 
Etuart then dediicted from tlie subsidy tlie amount of the pro- 
perty thw forcibly taken and repaid the miflerers. The 
regency also commenced a dispute upon the fourth article of 
the treaty of commerce ; and the prime, tliough he openly 
ordered it to be executed, secretly permitted count lunclid, 
Iiis prime ministm, to remaia in Lonclon as ambassttdor until 
the disputes arising upon tliis treaty wem arranged: ivherefore 
Funclid, who Iiked the Englisli wpital, hok are tu iriter- 
pose many obstacles to n, fi~ial decision, advising delny under 
pretence o£ rendeiing ultimate concession of vdue in oClier 
negotintions. 
When +he bnttle of Tyitoria becnme known, the regency 
proposcd tu cntreilt tho return of the prinec from the Brneils, 
lioping thcrehy to excite tlie oppsition of Mr. St~inrt; but 
when he, contrriry t o  their expectntions, approverl of the pro- 
posal they deferretl the execution. The Rritish ctabinet, wliich 
Imd 10ng neglected 'Iliellington's snggestiorw on tliig liead, then 
pressed the matter at Rio Janciro, and FiincliaI, xt 6rst aversc, 
nom nrged it wrtrrnly, fmring if tlie prince remained nt the 
Braails he must go them However few of tlie Portupese 
nobles desired the return of the roya1 family, md when tlie 
tliing wrtsi proposed to the regent he discovered no inclination 
for the vgtage. But the most important subject of discord 
was the army. The absence of the sorereigu and tlie intrigues 
at Eo Janeiro virtunlly rendered,tlie government at btskton an 
oliprchy without a leder, in aklier words, a go~ernment 
fonned for mischief; and it hns been mfficiently sliown, tliat 
Wellington's eucrgy and ability, Gded by Bir. Stuart'p sagacie 
and finnness and the iiiiluciioe of EngIand's power and richeq 
were scarcely able to dry up tlie evils flowing from this fuul 
source. At tlie end of 1812 tTie native milihry force wus ior 
wmt .of sustentance on the point uf clissolving. 
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The strenuons interference of tlie EngIish genenil and envoy, 
seconded by the grerit exertions oT the Eritisli officers in the 
Postiigiiese service, rcstored indeed the efieiency oF tbe m y ,  
and jn the campaign of 1813 the spirit of the troops mas m- 
pnrising; even tlic militia-men, dcprivarl of  their coloum snd 
drnfted into tlie line to puninh tlieir biid condtict ~t G~iinnFa 
undcr Tmnt, nolily rt-pinsd tlicir stnndnrds on thc Pyrcnees. 
Rut thiq rittite of nfti~irs, ncting upon t;he natiimlly sangiiine 
tcmperament and vnnity of tlie Porf,upcsc, ercnted a very 
exaggcrate(1 notion o£ tlicir rnilitnv prowr~s nnd impnrtnnoc?, 
nnd witEia1 a morbid scnsitivcncsa to praise ar 
"'. S'nBltp neglect. Picton Iind tlirown some slur upon the MSS. 
conduct of n, regiment at Vitnrita, and Beredord 
complained thai justito liad not been done t o  tlicir merilrits. 
The eulogium~i pasad in tlie English parliament and in the 
deqmtclies upon the conduct of the Britis11 snd  Spanish 
trooph but not extended to the Porhrpese, galled tlie whole 
nrhion; and tila remwlra and omissions af the London news- 
papers were os wormwood. 
limnmhile t I ~ e  rcgency, imder pratext of a di~pnte with 
Spaia relativo to  a breach o€ t l ~ e  milítary mnventiw of ~upgly, 
neglectcd tlie subsistente of the army nltogother ; and so rnany 
obstncles to recruiting were raised, that the dBpbt6, wliich 
ougl~t o have fuinishcd twelvo thousand men t o  replace the 
Iosses tiustiiined in tbe  campaign, onIy contaiiid four tlionssnd 
~vitl~out tlie rnenns o£ tnliing the field. This seriaue matter 
tlrew Ueresford to  Lisbon in October to propo~e a new regu- 
Iation, wliicli afiaulI disregard tlie exemption~i claírned by the 
nobles t.he clergy and tlie English mercliants for their ser- 
vmts and foUumm. On h i ~  firrivaT Forjw mgd tlle public 
dismntent as to  the position of the Portrignesc troopri. 
They ?vere, he said, gel~erally inconpornted with the Bri tish 
divisions, comnianded by British of&ccrs, bad no distinct 
recop i s~ l  existente ; h i r  services mcre unn~t~icd nnd tlie 
glory of the country suffcred-tlie world nt Inrge knew not 
liow mnny men Fortirgnl furnishcd for the mar. It wns 
knom then: wero Yortugueac eoldicm aa it WM known there 
wera BrunswicIrers and Baneverjnns, hut ns a nntionnl army 
nothing wna known of thcm; their exertions, their conrqo, 
only went to swell thc gcncral triumph of Englmd, whils tlie 
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Spaninrds, infcrior in niimbcrs nnd fm inferior in al1 military 
qiinlitierr, werc Anttcred, praiscrl, t1innkP.d in tlie public dec- 
pntclics, in tlic Eiiglish ncwspnpcm, nnd in the discourscs aiid 
votes of the Brit,isli pnrlinment. Re proposetl tIierefore to 
hnvc tlie Partugiicsc formed into a disbinct army ncting uiider 
'I\'ellington. 
l t  was objcctd fhtat thrr brigndcs incorpomtcd with th.he 
Brieish divisiona were fed by tlic Rritiuh commissnrint, tlie cofit 
being detliictetl fsom the subairly, anrl t.11~ loss of tfiat nrlviiu- 
tage the Portugiieqe could not suqtain. Forja9 rrjoined, tliat 
tlicy could feed their o m  trot~ps clieaper if the  sulisirfy wr~s 
pnid in money, but Reresford referred liim to  t11e scnnty means 
of transport ; so scauty that tlie few stores tliey mere then bound 
to furnish for the unattached bririgailcs depending upon the 
Portupese commissiiriat were not forwartled. Forjas then 
proposerl to mitldraw grarluallp thr! best brig~ides Srom t,he 
English divisions, to iiieorporab tliem u<th tlie unattnched 
bri,des and so f o m  aa auxiliary corps; tlie same olijcction 
of transport applied hewecer to tliia matter and it drogped 
for the moment. The repency thsn agreed to reduce the legal 
age of men liable to tLe conscril>tion for the srmy ; but tlie 
islaads, mliieli, ouglif to liave gii~en tliree hnndred men jearly, 
were exempt hom their cuntroI ; itud tlie goveraors, sulipoi.ted 
by tha prince-regeiit, refusd to  permit levies wid grankrl 
a~yIums to tliose m110 wislied t~ avoid tlie Ievy in Portujnl. 
In the islancle also? tlie persons so unjustly and cruelly 
imprisoned in lSlO \vere atill kept in durance, altliough the 
rcgeucy, yielding to thc perseveriiig remonstrmces of Stuart 
and Welliugton, hnd mlcnsrrl ttioac xt Lisbon. 
Soon dter thls 13eresfarrl dcsircd to ~ I Y  tte England, and the 
occnsion was scizcrl by Forjas to rcnew liis pmposition for a 
scpmta arrny, wl~ich he deaigned to  cornrna~ul liimself. 
Silvcira'~ claim to Qint honoiir ivw liomever sulqmrtcd by the 
Bouzas, to  mhoric fiiction he hclonged ; nncl the only mdter in 
wliich nll agrewl m s  the displlay of ill-will towvards Englsnd. 
WeITington became .indignant. Tlie English newspapers, he 
said, did much miscliief by their assertions, but he never 
mupaeted tliey coiild by their omissions dienate tlie Portu- 
p e s e  nation and pvernment. The latter comp1ainecl that 
tlieir troopa wers not praised in parliament, nothing couId be 
more diir~rent from a debate within the liouse tlian the repre. 
sentation of it in tlra newsppers j-tle lratter aeldom stated nn 
event or transaction as it really occurreci, unlesa when tlig 
abaolutely copied 1v11at was written for them ; md even than 
tlieir observiitions brmched out so far from the text t h t  they 
appmred alisulukly inmpab1e of understanding much les8 of 
stating tlie trutli upon any subject. Tlie Portuguese people 
sliould tlierefore be cautious af taking Englisli newspapers tts 
a, tes t  of the estimation in wliich tlie Portugese amy m 
1ieId ia Eiigland, wliere its cliamter tood high md waa risixig 
daily. ' Mr, Forjas is,' eaid Wellington, ' tlie ab1,lest man of 
business I have met 6 t h  in the feninsuila, i h  Is to be hoped 
11e will not on such grounds llave the folIy to alter a successful 
iililihrp system. X understand s o m e t h g  of the organimtian 
an<l feeding o£ troops, antl 1 assure Lim that, separiited from 
tlie British, the Portuguese army could not koep tlie field in ri 
good state altliough their government were to incur ten times 
thc expense under the actual aystem; and if they are not in a 
fitting state for the field they cae gnin no honour, they must 
suEer dishonour l Tbe vexatioua disputes with Spain are 
increasing drrily, and if the omissioiis or assertions of nemc 
papersi are t o  be t l ~ e  canses of disagreement with tlie Portupese 
I d l  tpi t  tlw Pminmhfor eaerS 
This remonstmnce lieing r e d  to the regency, Forjas replied 
dEciaIly* 
' The Portupese pvernment demanded notliing nnmason- 
ablc. The liappy mmpaign of 1813 was not to make it 
Leedless of sacrifices lieyond its mane. It liad a right t o  
expwt geater exertions f m  rSpnin, which was more lnterested 
tlian Portugal in the whial operations sinm the safety o€ the 
latkr was obtainetl. PortugaI only wanted a solid peace, she 
did not expect increase of ter rito^ ; nor my advantage ~xve 
tlie consideration and influence which the ~ervices and gallantry 
of her troops would $ve her amongst European nations, and 
whicli, unliappily, she would proliably require in her f u t m  
inhrcourse witli Spain. The English prime-regent, lis 
mlnistem and Iiia general5 had rendered full justice to hrr 
rnilitary services in tbe official reports, bnt that rEid not s&cu 
t o  Sive them we@t ia Eufope. OfXicid reporta did iiot 
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remove this inoonvenimcs. It wwas only Ghe public expressions 
of the English prime and h i ~  ministers that muld do justice. 
The Portuguese rtrmy wes commanded by marslial Beresfod, 
mrquis of Campo Nayor. It ought alivqg t o  be so considered 
axld thanked accodingly for its exploits, with as much form 
and ~olemnity by the Englisli parliament and general as was 
used towrirds the Spanish amy-the more 90, tliat the Fortu- 
piese hd ciamificd tlieir nationd pride to the common good, 
wherm tlie Spanish pride had retarded the success of the 
cause ond the liberty of Earope. It was nccewary also ta  form 
good nati~e  general^ t o  he of use &€ter the war ; bzit putting 
that question asidc, it m only demxnded ta have the divisions 
aeparated by degreea and @ven t o  Portuguiiese officers : never- 
theles such grave objections being advmced they were willing 
ha =id t o  drop the matter Jtogcther.' 
The diacontent hawever remained, for the argument liad 
weight, and if my native oEcerñ' repufation had beea sufficient 
to make the proceeding plausible, the British oEcera muld 
have Leen driven fiom the Portupese service, the m i e s  
sepmated, rtnd both ruinei!. As it waa, the regency termina@ 
tlie diswsion fmm inahility to succeed, Erom fear not from 
rewon, The persona who pretended tm the commmd weter 
Forjas md Silveira. The English o f i m ,  wlio were well- 
iiked by the troops, would not hnve aewed under the former 
and Wellington olijectmi atronply to the latter; having by 
experience discovered thah he was an inmpable oficer, seeking 
a base and pemicious popularity by encouqin,n the viewa uf 
tlie soldiem, Beresford then relinqulshed hia intention of 
going to EngInnd, and the jnstim of the compIaint selative to 
tlie reputration of tha Portupese nmy being obviow, the 
general ortlers became more marked in ftivour of the troops. 
Yet the most effectual chck to tlie project wihs Mi. Stuiirt's 
intimation, thlit EngItuid, bound by no conditions as to tlis 
subsidy, bd a right to wibhdraw it tiltogetlier. 
To h v e  this suhidy in npecie and supply their own tmopa 
was lang ths c ry  of the regenoy, but íinally they gave the 
matter u p  Forjas kncw well tLe dministrntion of Yortugd 
waa incapuble of  supporting an m y  five hundred miles fmui 
its own cuuntry; tlie real ohject ww is thshuko off the Britirili 

The bishop of Braganza, preached doctrinea offensive to tl~e 
patriarcli and the government; he was confined, but soon 
released and an eccleaiasticnl sentenoe pronounced apinst 
him, which onlp increassd hk follo~vm and extended thr: 
iduence of his doctrines. 
Anotlm cause of uneasiness, a-t a later period, was the 
return of 33allesteros from his exile at Cwta, He had been 
pennitted fowards the end of 1813, ancl, as WeIlington 
tliought with no good intent, to m i d e  at atregennl; the 
Portupese regency, fearing he mould gather discontented 
persons round him there set ~gcn t s  to watch bis proceedings; 
rana under pretence of putling clown robbem, establisled a 
%e of ac-alry and called out. tlie militiiL-tZ1us malring it 
manifest that but a little waa ivaiiting €o lridle a mr between 
tbe twa oountries, 
Political sf& of S&-Wellingtun's victoriis liad put an 
end t o  Joseph's intercourso with the French party ih Sprain, 
yet those peopIq not losiug hope, formed a strong anti- 
English @y, mtcliing to pmfik of tho disputca bctwcen tlie 
two fwtions at Cnrlii, Tvhich were now mncoruug. Tlic ser- 
viles, bigotcd in religion nnd politicsi, hnrl tlie wl~olc hody of 
the clergy on their &le; tliey were most niimeroiis in tlia 
Cortes, and their viewrt generally nccordetl iwitli tlic fcclings of 
the people Ibeyond tlie Isla de Leon, tlieir doctrinefi being com- 
prised in two sentenoes-An a b s o h  kkq-An intolm~nt 
c í~ud.  me liberala, supporteil anrl instipted by al1 wrdent 
innovators and the commercid h d y  and populace of Cadiz, 
had also partisans bepnd tlie Ida;  nrnd tukiiig as p i d e s  tlie 
revaIutionary w i t i q s  of the FrencL pliilosopliem, were lim- 
te&g onwarcls ta a dernocracp without r e g a d  to aucient 
wagw and witliout practica1 ability t o  carry tlieir tliemim into 
execution. There wriri also a fourth fi~ction iil tlre Cortes, 
h e r i c a n  deputies, alio secretly lalscmrerl for the independeiice 
af th8 colonies; they somctiines joiued the liberrrls, sorne- 
timea the serviles# and ohen produced anomttlous resulta, 
' because they were numerous enough to  turn tlie scalo in fuvvur 
of tlie sicla wliicli tliey esporised. Jealowy of EngTand waa 
howe~er wmmon t o  au, and 'hy¿&mw' m 8  use4 as a 
term of conteiiipt. Even when Wellington waa cominencing 
tlie campaign .nf 1813, the Cortes was with diffidiy, m1 
by threi~ts mtfrer thun reason, pevented from passing : 
h w  forbidding foreip t roop~ ta mter a Spanish rortress 
ALicanb, Tarifa, C a d i  itseIf liud been preser~ed,-Rodrip, 
h d a j 0 ~  liad been retaken liy BritiBh valour, - English 
monsy had restored their biaken ivalls, repleniah~d their 
mapxines-English and Portiwese blood still amoked from 
tlieir rainpnrh-buk the mcn fram whom veins tlmt blood 
flowed wera to be denied entmnce at @es they wuld not 
npproacli witliout trenrling on tlie bones of  slauglitered com- 
rndes-comrades wlio 1iQd sacrificed their iives to procure for 
thiti aordid ungrateful ttssembly tlie power to offer tlie insult. 
To subdue tlie hishops md clerg~r, who in Wlicia openly 
opposcd thc abolition of tlie inqtiisition, mas of promincnt 
interest with rt ~ection of thk libcrds cnlled the Jacobins. 
They generally ruled t11e Cortes, hecause t11e Americanos 
Imeed towartla their doctrina, and the Anti-Engli~h or 
French p r ty ,  dcsiring diwenuion, supported tlle m o ~ t  violent 
p~ililic men. A fieroe and obatinnte fRction tliey were, and 
tliey cnmpellerl the diurclimen to submit for the time; yet not 
ziiitil the clisp~ite hecarne so rierious thxt Wellingt~n expected 
a c i d  wrrr on Piis communication~ an(1 tliwght the clergy and 
the peasnntry woiild talce part mitli tlie Frencli. This notion, 
wliicli @TW his meastire for the patriotism of both parties, 
provetl unfounded, Iiis extreme discontent with the liberal 
doctrina ~nmmvhat warped his judgment; tlie people %-me 
lcss nttached t o  t,he clinrch tlim he irnesned, the clerg~ of 
Gpillicia finding no eofid siipp~rt submitted ko the Cortes and 
the rsreliliishop of üanb'ago flcd t o  Portugd. 
Deep unmitiptcd I i a t d  of democrq m! indeed the 
moving qni~ig  of the English Torie~bf icy.  Nnpoloon was 
warred agaTnst, not as thcy pretended becaiiae lie mag a 
tyrant and usurper, for he WRR neither ; not beeta~iae his inva- 
  ion o€ Spain ves unjust, but becauso he wae tlie enemy of 
aristocr~tic privileges. The wel €are and jnrlependence oT 
khe Pminmla wcrc morda of no meaning in their stabpapers 
and speeches; and tlieir anger and mortifieztion were ex- 
treme wEien they found their 811CcC88 apitinst tlie emperor f o s t e ~  
ing fhat demomcy tliey sought to aest~oy. 'I'hey were only 
prevenkd by the superior prudence and ziagacTty ef their 
general from interfering with tlie infernal govemment af 
Spiptnin in so arrogant and injudicjous ti manner, that m open 
nipt.ure, mherein the Spanirtrrls would have liad the appear- 
ance of justiee, mwt Itaw ensned. Wellingtan atifled thia 
foT1y, he waiked to give the bleiv with effect, anrl was  quite 
willing to dm1 it himself; and tlie conduct of the Corbes and 
executive pvemrnent rwns 80 i n j u i 0 ~ 8  to Epain, and to his 
mifitary opemtions, so unjnat and u n p t ~ f u l  to him per- 
sonally* thnt the warrnwt frienda of freedom cannot bleime his 
enrnity. Rather shouId his rnoderation he admired, d e n  we 
find his aristocratic habred of the Spnish constitution exacer- 
bated by a &ate kf affairs tha~ described by Vegas, a, consider- 
able member of the Cortes. 
Spenlring of the f ~am~a&s '  or French partyI more 
numerolis tlmn \vas m p p o d  and acti~e to inmase 
orI,@nal 
their nurnbers, he saya, 'The thing which tliey k t t ~ ,  
most enforeed and wliich made most progress ivw 
the diminntion of the English influence. Amongst the Eier- 
d w  they gahd  pniselytes, by objecting the English religiori 
and constittition mhich reatRcted the power of tlie sovereign. 
With the libemls, they said the sarne constitution grt-i-e the 
~overeign too much power; and the Spanish constitation 
havinp brought the kiig*s anthority nnder tliat oof the Cortes 
wss an object of  jealonsy to the Engllsh eabinet and arista- 
cracv; who, fearing the exarnpIe woulrl encolirage the reformem 
of England, were resolved tlie Spanish constitution should 
not stand. To the Americana they observed, that Wellingtcin 
oiposed them because he did not help tliem, and permitted 
expeditions to be sent from Spain; but t o  the Europeaas wbo 
wished t o  retain the colonies and exclude foteign trde, they 
represenhd tlie KngIi~ish as fomenters and mstainers of tIie 
colonial rebellion, becanse they did not join Spain to put it 
down. To tlie honcst patriots of al1 parties they said, that 
every conceeaion to tlie Engli~h genera1 was an offence eigrtinst 
the dignity and independence of the nation. If Iie was 
active in the field, he m intent t o  subji~gate Xpab mtlier 
than ddmt tke enemy;-if he waa careful in prepatatioii, 
hia delap was t o  enable the French to conquer;-if he m w  
viproas in u$ng the go-rernment to uaeful m e m m ,  his 
design was te inpose Iiis own lawsi; if he neglected the 
Spanisk nrmies he desired they shoiild be beaten;-if he 
meJ.rl]etI with tliern u~efully, it iw to gain tlie soldiera, turn 
tlie arniy apiiist the countiy and thus render Spain depended 
ou Engla~id. And time pwfidioua insinuationa flattered tlie 
natiuriül pride, as proving the Ep~niniards eould do ererything 
fur tliemselves witliout tlie uid o€ foreipers. Notbing could 
stop tlie spread of such doctririss Iiut new victorics, which 
would briug tlie simple honestp and grittitude of tlie yeople at  
l m p  into aciivity. Tiiose vidories carne and did indeed 
stifle t l ~ e  Preneh p r t y  in Spain, but many of their views were 
too wdl fountled to ba stifled witli their prty. 
It was liaped tlie democratic violence of ths Cortea wonlil 
decline undcr tlie conlrul oT tlio cardinal Bourbon; bnt that 
prince, wlio was not of true roya1 Eilood in tbe estiwtjon of 
tlie Bpaiiiar<Is, bccai~se liis fatlier had married w i t h t  tha 
coiiseiit of  tlic B i q ,  was from %e, infirmity, and iporanoe, a 
uullity. Tlie new regency Iiecame tlierefore more the slaves 
o€ tEic Cortcs tlian thcir prcdeccssers; nnd tlie Cadie newspaper 
editora, peeminent  in fn1sehootl nnd wic1:crlncss eren amongkh 
their unprinciplcd Europenn lirothcrhood, bccarno tho cham- 
pions af the Jacohins nnd dircctcd tlie city pnplace a4 thep 
pIea4ecl. Antl alwnya tlie ~crviles yicldcd undcr the drerid of 
ljcmonal violcnce; tlicir o m  crimes ?id hecome their pnish- 
rncnt. Tlicy h d  taught Ghc pcopla at tho commcnccmcnt of 
thc contcrit tlint rnunlcr wns pntriotism; nnd now their  ~pirit 
~unlr  and qtiniled, bccsuso nt cvcry stcp, t e  iisc the tcrriblp 
significn~it cxpresgion of Welli~gton, ' Yl~e g7t~st of S&m m 
~trr,liny them in  t h  fm.' 
Jn wrpport of their criide cons~ttrtion which tliey considcred 
as pcrfcct ns an emanntion from tlic Dcity, tlic Jnmbina sought 
lo. To nbolidi thc inqirisitinn, to nrrcñt nnd piinisli the Gnf- 
lician bisliops, nud to wnr witli thc clcrgy. 2'. To put asidc tlic 
c l ~ i m  of Ctlrlottm to f,he rrjicncy. 3'. To appoint cnptain-geiie- 
rnls nnd otlier oficcrs to suit tlicjr fnctious pilrposew. 4". To 
abtnin moiicy for tlieir neccci~itics, mitliont incltiding tlierein 
t.11~ nourisliniieiit of tJic nrrnim bO. Ta control tlie eloctfone 
for a siew Cuitcs, and procure an usecmbly of tlieir own way 
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of thinkig, or prevont its asmmblixig rit the legal periad in 
OctoZier. In  the matt,er of ths bisliops they nearly caused s 
war with Portugal and a civil war with Gallicia. Carlotta'a 
uffuir wns less serious; but her pretensioxig wisely opposed by 
t l ~ o  Britisli autliorities wKle tlie arrny was cooped up in 
Portnpl, wcrc, altliough slie was ri declnred enemy to the 
English alliunce, now mtlier favoured by sir Henry Welle~ley 
as a modc of chccIring thc spirit nf dcmocracgf. 'CVellington 
beld aloof, observing, tliat if apliointed accorclinp to tlie condi- 
tution sl~e woull not b~ less a slwe to tlie Cortea thm her 
predecessorñ, snd Engtnnd mouEd have tlie discredit of giving 
power to tlic ' worst woman in existente." 
To remoGe tlie seat of govemmerit from the influence of the 
C d k  popiil~co waa one mode of abatinq tlie power of the 
iemocrntic party; nnd tlie yelIom fe~er ,  coming immetliately 
a h r  tlie closing of tlic general Corte8 in Eclitember, seemerl 
fo furnish an opliortunity fos the Englisli mbsssndor t o  effect 
ib removril ; for t l ie  regency, drending the epidernic, resolved 
te lwoceed to Madrid; tdling sir Henry Jí'ellcsley, who joyfully 
hastened t o  offer pecuniary aid, tliat to avoid tlie sickness w a a  
their solc motive. Eaving semlly formed this rcsolution ab 
niglit tliey designed to tegin tlie journey next day; but a 
dbtudiance arase in the city; t l i ~  regcnts then eonvoked ths 
extrnordinriry Curtes, tlie miriititcrs were called beEore it, and 
hending in fcar declared witli s~~?arirlaluus disreprd of tmth 
tLere mas no intention to  qnit the IsIa ~vitliont cunsulting tLe 
Cortes, Certain depzitica wero tlicreupen appointd to inquirei 
Lf tLere was any fcvcr, ond u fcm cases being discoveretI, ths 
dcputntion, npparcntly to  shidd tEie regenh, rrccommended 
thcy slioultl rcrnovc t o  hrt Bc. Jinry. 
This (lid not sntisfy tlic aqscmbly. The govcrnrn~nt wns 
commnnrld to  remain nt Cndili, until the ncw gcncrnl Co:ortce 
shodd be infitalled, and a comrnittcc was appointctl to probe 
tho whole ntI'air; or ratIicr to  pocify tlie popiilnce; who werc 
so offcnderl vitli dic report o f  tlic fimt drlititntinn, t h n t  
Auvstin Argucllcg on prcscnting it, mas hisacd from tho 
gnllcries altliotigh tlic n ~ o s t  popular rncmbcr of thc Cortcs. 
Thc morc modcrntc lilicrals tlius diwovcred tIint tlicy were 
e.qually Mth tlic scmilca thliri ~Iiives uf the ncwsp;liupcr writcrs. 
Nevertteless the inherent excelleece of f rdom,  thouph he1 
presented in such fantastic and ignoble sliapes, waa involur 
tarily d t t e d  by Wellington whcn he declarcd, that whcm( 
the Cortes and govcrnment should fix themselves the p m s  
wodd follow t a  control, and the people of Seville, Granda, 
or Madrid would become as bsd a3 tlie people of Cadiz. 
Tho composition of the new Codea waa an object of Bope 
and fear to al1 faction~; and the result being uncertain, the 
existhg nascmblg h k  such rneasures to prolong iB o w n  
power, i t  was thonght tmo Cortes would be estubliched, one 
at Cndb thc othcr at Sevillo, each striving for mnstery In tha 
nation. However the nem borly after many delnys wns in&sIEerl 
at Cadia in November, md the Jawbins, atrong in the vioIence 
of the populacg still swagred the assembly snd kept tlie seat 
o€ government at C~adiz mtil the rnpid fiprcd of the %ver 
brought a strongg fear into sction. Then the resolution to 
repk to Madrid was adopte4 and the sessions in the Isla 
elosed oa the 29th of Movember. Y& not without troubles. 
For the general belief 'tieirig that no person could take tL 
sickneas kwice, and almost every resideilt h d y  had dreatly 
d e r e d  Erom former visitatioris, the rnerclianta with infmous 
uupirlity dedared khere was no fever, induceil the authorities 
flagitioualy t o  issue clean bilis of hedth t u  ships, and andea- 
vourcd by intimidation to keep the regancy and Curtea in the 
city. An exact and cogious account of tliese Fwtions ind 
dkputea, and of tlie permunent influence which tliese dis- 
cussions of the princip1eir of govemment tliis constnnt collision 
of opposite docttrines liad upon the diaracter of kiie pople, 
would, if sagaciously traccd, form a leswn of tlie higliest 
interest for nations. But to treat tlie suhject largely would 
be to write a political history of tlie Spaiikli rsvolution, and 
it M only tlie effect npon tlie miiitary operations wliich pw- 
perly appertains to a Iliatory of tlio nrar. T k t  eEect was one 
of unmitigaied evil,-but tliis did not necessurily spring from 
tlie demucratic system, mnce precisely the mine miscliiefs were 
to be tracsd in Portugal, where arbitiliry power, cded  le& 
timate goverment, was prevalent. In  botll cases the people 
and the soldiers suffered for the crimea of factious politi- 
ciw. 
Tt hw been sbown that one Spsnish regency contracted an 
engngement with Wellington on the fnith of wEch he b k  the 
command of their.miea in 1813, B m p n l o u ~ l ~  adhered to 
by himj it was syatemntically violated by the new rengwc~r 
and rniriiater of war, almoat os soon as it was conclnded. Hia 
recommcndaiiom for p ~ m 0 t i 0 n  after yitoria wcm disrcgarderi, 
odem were sent dire& to the suEomlinnte pnerels, and 
changm mere mnde in the commands and in the drstinations 
of thc iroops without his mncurrenee, and mithout pmsing 
throiigh him ns generalissirno. hcccly had he craaaed t31e 
Ebro when Castaños, captain-gcne~al of Gallici~, Estrendura 
and castille, was di~g~atef~lry removed from bia governinenl 
uncier pretmce of m l h g  him to assist in the council of &te : 
his nephew, Gliron, waa at the silme time deprived of the Gal- 
lician amg; althowgh both he md Casta5os had been com- 
' rnended for their oondnct by Wellington. Freyre, appointed 
coiptain-general of Cñstille and Estremadura, succeeded Gimn, 
and the infamous Lacy replaced Castaños in Gallicia; choaen, 
it wag believd, as a iittei te work out the measum of the 
Jacobins rtgainst the c l e r o  in h t  kingdom: nor wm their 
svcity rat fault, for Castanos would, according to Wellingkon, 
ha>-e turned liis arms migabst the Cortes if an opportnnity had 
offered. He and others were now menaced with death, and 
the C o r h  conkmplated otn attack upon the titbes, upon the 
feudal and royd tentlig and upon tlis d a t e s  of tlie p d e e s ;  
al1 excgt  the last very 6ttíng t o  do if times and cirmimstances 
h d  been fa?-ourable; but when the nation genedly maa averse, 
and there waa an invada in the oountry te whom the discoti- 
tented could turn, the attempt was insme. The cIergy were 
at open mrfare with the gavernment, many genemls wew 
dissatisfied, and menaced the ~uiuperior civiI authorities; the 
soldiem were hoirving, the people, tired nf their m i m i e s ,  
only desfred to get rid of the invadem, and avoid the bnr- 
tIien of suppIying the troops of either side. The English 
cabinct, aftcr havíng gorg:d Spain with goId and flattcry 
was totdly withont influence. A terrible convulsion wns at 
hand if the French could have maintained tlie war with 
any vigour in Spnin itself; tind the faIlowing pnssagas from 
Wellinghn'a letters t o  the mini~tera, pmve, that even Iie 
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contempl~ted a forcible change in t,he govemment and mn- 
stitution. 
' Xf the mob of Cadie begin ta remove I i d a  from shoulders 
tlie newspapers have tliratened CaWios, and the ~ssembly 
sehe upon landed propertJr to mpply their necessitieq, I am 
afl-a%l we mnet do sometliing more tlian diswuntenance tliem. 
It ia quite impossible such a ~ystcm can last, and whst 
1 regret is tIiat 1 arn the pemon that maintiains it. Xf I was 
out af the m y  there are plenty of general8 who would over- 
turn it: Ballesteros pmitively intended it, eind X am much 
mistaken if O'Donnel and even C~astaGos, ~ n t l  prohably others, 
are not equally d y .  If the king should mtiirn he nlso mil1 
overturn tlie wholc fabric if he has any spirit.ldI wish yon 
would let me know whetlier if 1 shonId fintl a, fnir opporhini~g 
of striking d the democracy the governrnent wouli npprove 
oF my doing it.' And in xnothcr lekter he t l~us serioudg 
t w t e d  tho questian of withdrawing fmm the contest alto- 
getlier. ' !he government are tlie Best judges of whether 
tliey can or ought t o  mithdra~v, but Spain cxnnot be a iiseful 
ally, or 3 al1 in alliance \Pith Englancl if tbe republiclin 
syst~m is not put doun.' Meanwhile he dvised the English 
government ~ n d  bis brotlier to hke  no prart eithm for or 
against the princess aF Bmzil, and te di~countentmce the 
democrntical prindples and measvres of the Cortes; if their 
opinion mas aslícd reprtling the formation of a. nem resncg, 
t o  reoornrnend an alteration of that pnrt of the const,itution 
~vliicli lor1,ned al1 pomer with the Corhs, and to give in ~tead, 
Rome authority tq thc cxecuti~c governmcnt, ~~vl~ether  in the 
I I R ~ ~ R  of king or rcgcnt, T3 fiIl the lntter o%ce one of 
mynl 'tiloatl, uniting thu atrongest clnim of Iiirtl~ ivit,h the 
Iiest cap~i ty ,  shoul(1 he thoughk be ~elected; bnt if rapxcitg 
ivns ~~rantnting in thc roya1 raw, then t o  choose $he Spaniawl 
i ~ l i o  wlb~ m o ~ t  dercerving in the public estimation! Thiiri 
neoessity teaclics privilcge to bcnd bcforc mcrit, 
Spain lid at this priod bitt one bundred and ~ixty  thou- 
firuirE men in arras) frfty tl~ousnnil onlg hing ~~\.ñil:tlde in tlie 
bid; arid those only bemuse they were liad, clotlied and 
srrncd, and Irept togetiier by tlia Englisb general. He h d  
proposed an mapigernent for the civil and political govern- 
ment of the provirices rescued from the Frencb, witIi a vim 
tii tlie mpply of the amres, biit Es plan was rejected ; rtnd his 
rcpetsted repremntatiins of the rnisery the m y  and the 
pcople endnred were unbeeded. Certain districts wefi  allottml 
ior the support of each rirmy ; yet, with a jealous fear of mili- 
tnry domination, the governmcnt rehsed tlie mptain-geneds 
tl ie necegsary pawers t o  d r w  fortli the resoiircm o f  the 
ciiiiiitry, nnd thus refideret? the system a niillity. h h  
Firanch of administration was coníluctcd by cliiefs jndepwdent 
i11 tlieir attributes pet tuo rectricted in authority, generdly at 
variance with one nnother, and al1 o f  tliern neglectful of their 
iliity. The evil effect was t!ins deacribed by W&ngton aa 
early as Aiigust. 
"ore than half of Spipxin liae been cleared of tlie enemy 
above a year, and the wliole ef Spaia, excepting Catalonia and 
a small part of Arqon, sincc the months of 31ay itnd June 
hst. The most abundani hmes t  has been reaped 
Idter to in al1 parts of tIi0 couiitry; rnillions o l  money th, spinisli 
~ p e n t  hy t h  contending armies are ciiculatiiig O!!$: 
everjwhere, and yet your armim liowever weak 
in numbem are litsralIy st.nwing. Ths allid Britigh antl 
Portugvese a r m i e ~  under my cornmand have been suliJsted, 
particularly latterly, rtimost evclusiveIy upon tho magnzinea 
importRd 1)y sea; and 1 m concerncd t o  inform your exct?l- 
lcncy, that besidcs moncy for thc pay of nll thc nrrnicg, which 
liae been given hom the niilitnry chest of tlie Rritish nriny 
aiid hm becn rcceived from no othcr qunrtcr; tha Rritish 
mnpzines have supplied qnmtitias of provisia~is t o  nl1 tbc 
Spmisli armica in ordcr to enable thcm to remdn in thc field 
at ail. And notmit.hstanding this rissiiis&nce 1 have h d  tbc 
mortificstion oF seeing the Spnnish troops on the outposts, 
obliged to p1iindc.r thc ntit and spple-trees for subsistente, fin(! 
t o  know that t.he Spaniniah troops employd in thc bloclrntle uf 
Pampclnna rtnd Santon&, were starving upon linlf xn alloivxnce 
of bread, whik the enemy whom they were blocknding wsp 
at the same time receiving their full dowance. Tlie systern 
then i s  iasufficient to procure snpplies for the amy, aand at 
the =me time I assure your excellency, it is the most opp-res- 
sive and injurious to the country that could be devised It 
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m n o t  be pretended the conntry does not prdncs mesasi 
* 
of maintaining the men necessay for its defence; those meantns 
are uadoubtedly supembuedfint ; and the enemy has proved 
that ami= can be maintained in 8pain at the expense of  the 
Spanish nation, infinitely lnrger than are necessarg for its 
defence.' Tliese evih he attribukd to the inmpacity of the 
public m t s ,  and to their overwhelming numbers, that eer- 
tain sign of an tmprosperous state-to the disgnioeful negli- 
gente and disre,md of pnlilic duties-md to tliere being no 
power in the counf for enforcing the law : tLe collection of 
the revenue cost in several b r a n c k  aeventy and eighty per 
cent. No Spanisli officers arpable of commanding a large 
body of troops or keeping it iu an efficient state  Lad appeared, 
no efficient statr, no system oi military administration had been 
formed, and ne ahame for thme deficiencies, no exertions ta 
amend were Pisible. 
From this picture tmo conmisions are to be d m ,  19 That 
the pmpince~, tlius described as snperabounding In resources, 
hving been for several yearR ciccupied by tlie French m i e s ,  
tlie wadare of the latter couM not hava h e n  so devashtkig 
and Iiarliarous as it waa represented. 23 That Spah  G e i  
now as belpless as rrhe had been at  tlie beginnmg and al1 
throttgli the war, wm quite anquai t o  her own delivemnce 
either by arma or policy-that it wrne English valonr, English 
ateel, directed by the pnins of ali EngEsh general, whidi 
rising mperior to al1 obstade% whetlier presented by his 
own or the Peninsular governmenta or by tlie perversity rif 
iiational cliaracter, w o r ~ e d  out her independence. 80 utterly 
ineficient were the Spaniarsrds, that WeUingtun declared at t h i ~  
period thirty thousand of' tlieir troops codd not be tru~ted to 
act separately-tliey were only usefu1 wben mixed in the lhe 
witli larger numbers of ather nation~! And yet al1 men in 
authority, to tlie Iemest alcalde, were as premmptuousi aa 
arrogsnt and aa perrerBe as mera Rendercd callou~ to publio 
niieery by the desperate state of dairs, they were recklw of 
conseqnences, and nerer suffered prudential considerations or 
nationd hono~r to  checlr tlie exmtion of any project, 
Rclicnted failiire hnd rendered the gencrals insensible te mis- 
furtunr ; and, without my remarknble pcrsonal daring, they 
~513,] BOOK XX11.-CRAP. 6. 357 
were dwsye nrgent for battle as if that were a common matter 
instead of being the grelrt event of wm. The government 
apnts were wrrupt, and the govement itgelf tyrannical, 
friithless, mean and equivocdiag to the lowest degree. Ia 
1812 a CSpaniard of known m d  active patriotism t h a  com- 
menced an elaborate plan of defeace for the provinces. 'Cata- 
lonitt abhors France as Iier oppressor, but a3ie abliorai still 
more the despotism wliicli hae been carried on in dl the 
lirrinclies of her sduiinistration since tlie begioning of the war.' 
Evewhing was rotten except the h e d s  of the poorer people. 
Even at Cudis Spanisli mitere compred. the state to s vessel 
in a hurricane without mptain, pilot, coinpw, chnrt, stails or 
niddcr, and atlvised the crcw t o  cry to hcaven a4 their sole 
resoiirce. Rut tliey only lilwphemed, 
Wlen Wcllington, indignant at the systematic breach of his 
enWement, remonstrated, he wns answered that the actual 
regency did not hold itself bound by tlie contra& of the 
forrncr government ; no consideration for troth, for they hatl 
themselves also accepted the ctintract, nor of bcnest policy, 
nor the ueages of c2vilized sbtes w i ~ h  respect fo national faith, 
had any influence on theit aonduct. Enraged at this scm- 
dnlous subterfnge, he was get conscious bow essential it was he 
ahould retain his command; and seeinp wll Spanish g e n d s  
more or less engaged in politiml intrigues, nwe capable of 
cwperating with liim,-censcioua aiso that pubIic opinion in 
Spin would, better than menacw from the Bglish gmern- 
meut, enable him to obtain a counterpoise to the democratic 
party,-he tendered indeed hia mignation ií the government 
eripgement was not fultilled, but at the same time endeavoured 
with mild ~qyWm0IIt m11 repioof t o  induoe raason. Ee told 
them bowever tliere were limita to his forbeamnce under 
injury, snd he h d  been already most unworthiiy treated even 
as a gentleman by tlie Spanish govcrnment. 
Frum tlie wodd these quarrele were covercd by an appear- 
ame of the utmost respect and honour. He waa made a 
p n d m  of thhe firct olass, and ths estate of Soto de Roma in 
Grenadib, of which tbe mucli-maligned miserable &doy had 
been deqmilcd, was settled npon him. He tlccepted tlia gift, 
Iiut, as he liad Liefore done with hi Portupese and Spanhh 
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pay, transfemd the proceeds to the pubIic treasuq during 
tlie war. The rcgents however, under pressure of the Jacobins 
aii<? apparently bearing some personal enmity, thougb one of 
tliem, Ciscar, had been ~st rumenta l  In pracuring him tbe 
command of the Spanish army, were now intent to drive him 
from it ; and the excesses committ ed at %n Sebastiari servcd 
their factioua writem as e topic for exciting the paople not 
only to demand his resignation, 5ut to commence ti mrfare of 
assassination against the Dritish soldiers. Clombining extreme 
follp mith wiclredness, they pretended amongst other absur- 
dities that the nobility had offered, if he would cllange his 
rrligion, ta make him king of Bpain; this tale was qer2y 
atlopted by the Euglish nmspapers, and tliree Epanish gran- 
{lees thought it necessary to decIare that they were not 
aniong the nohIm wlio made the popositian. His resigna- 
tioii >vas accegted in the latter errd of September, and he Jield 
tlie command ody anta the assembling of the new Cortes ; 
liut tlie attmpt to render him odious failed even at Cadiz, 
awing cliefly t o  the personal ascendancy wliich al1 great 
ntiiids SO surely attain over the masseB in troubled t i m a  
Doth tlie people and the soldiers respected hirn more tlmn 
they did their own governmcnt ; and tlie Epanish officers l i d  
generally yieIded as ready obcdience to his wislies before Le 
wtis appainted generalisairno, as they did to his eders when 
holding that high offim, It was this ascendancy which 
enilliled him t o  maintain tlie war with such kroublesome 
allies; and yct so littlc Tvere tlie Englisli ministers capable of 
sppreciating its importmce, tliat after the battle of Vitoria. 
tliey proposed as before notieed to remave Km froin Spain to 
Germanlg: his m w e r  wari short md modes$ but hll of 
wisdom. Many might be found ta wnduct mntters os; well 
as 1 mn both here snrI in Oermany; but nobody would erijoy 
the same advantages here and 1 sbould be no bctter t h n  
snotIier in Germany.' 
This egregions folly m s  thus checkd, and in December 
tlie nem Cortes decided tlmt he ehould retnin the command of 
tlie &es, and the regency be baund to fulfiI its predecessor'a 
engagements. Ne~ertlieless, so deeply had he been offeaded 
1 > ~  tlie libela relativo to  San fkbastian, tLat a private letter 
to his brother terminsted thns :-' it m% T.& Zfw w8 
g w m m t  $0 d d m i m  wJ& t h j  m*lZ cEo wpm a wnw'dwa- 
t b n  of aa: tPw ci~cwm~amms c$ c q  M v;fl eul~a t o  &u% 
X would nd k q  t ? ~  mwp im flplch fw one bw.' And to 
many other penons at different times he expreased hii fears 
and oonviction tliat the cause was lost itnd that be should fui1 
at last. It wm under these and other enormoufi ilifficulties 
he carried on bia military operations; it was with an wemy 
at his brick mmo t o  bbe dreaded than tlie foe in 1ii front that 
he inmded the sonth of Francs. Aed this is the answer to 
thom Frmch writers who have described him being at tb 
i d  of more than two bundrod tliousaad well-furnisbd 
soldien, snpported by a well-omnized insumxtion of the 
E-pnnish people, nnembarrassed in bu rnovcmenta, and luxu- 
riausly rioting in al1 the resourca of the Iieninada and of 
EngltinrL 
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WHILE Pmnpdnna heId out Sonlt laboured t o  complete hin 
1vorI;s of defence with a view to enter dragon, prctending to 
liold thia dcsign 80 late isa hrovcmber; but he must havc 
secretly rmiounced it before thrnt period, bemw the mows of 
nn arIy and sevm winter had rendcretl cvcn the pasaca of the 
lower Pyrenee~i impractimble ia October. His political diffi- 
cnlties wera not I c ~ a  than Wel1ingt;ton's. Al1 his cfforts t o  
drhw forth tho resourm of France were meb witli apnthy or 
secret hostility, and thero waa no rneney in tlie militnry cliest 
to answer the common daily expenaes. The ld ing  mcr- 
chants of Bayonne v~luntarily providcd for the m o ~  prmsing 
neceaaitica of the troops; but their rneana were limited, nnd he 
winly urged the mercbanta of Rordeaiix and Toulou~e to 
follow the patriotic exaniplc, It requircd al1 his firmness of 
c h a r h r  to aupport thc crisis; and if the Englih nanaval forw 
h d  intercepted the coasting-aesselci between Bordeanx and 
Bayonn~, hc must have retircd bcyoiid tbo Adour. As it ivas, 
t l ~ e  grcatest part of tlie field-artillery and aIi the cavalv were 
scnt su fm to the rear for forage that they conld not bo 
counted a pat. o£ the fightiting troops; and the i n f ane ,  
in addition to thcir immensc labours, were forccd to carry 
tlieir own prodsions from the nnvjgable pointa of tlie rivers to 
tlie top of the mounbina. 
Soult was strongly affected. Teil t h  m p m 3 '  he wmte 
ta t.he minister af war, ' tdJ fih wl~en ym mde ~ G U T  wt 
vqort  lhat m t ? ~  wmjd.? of ~~ thk is 1Jw a i t m t h n  of 
t 1 ~  m g  &ti& to d f d  d~ ~ o u t h  Z ~ ~ O Z - ~ W M  jpm inw 
&m; ten him a h  thd t& wdm~dof d ~ ~ d i d h w  d
ob& 1 mei &?A 9ha.Q mt mmik m a ~  fd in my &y? 
On both sides tlie troops auEered, but thet privations uf the 
alliea mere perlierps greater; frir being oa higher mountains, 
niore extended, more dependent upon the aea, their didistress 
was in proportion to theis di&tanoa from tlie coast. A shorter 
lime had been gained for the supply of tha centre, and a bridge, 
Lid down at Andarlnsa gave acce~ls to the roots of the 
Bayonette mountain; yet the troopa were fed with difidty,  
rrnd so scantily, thnt Wellington reduted the usual stoppagc of 
py, md invoked the amy by its militay honour to sustain 
~ t b  firmness tlie unavoidahle presanre. Tha effect was 
skilring. Nurmum, loud in tlie mmpa before, were hnslied 
inshntly, although tbe aoldiers knew tllat siome commissmiw, 
leaguing wleh the speculabrs upon the coast, tiecretly loaded 
the provisiw mules with condimenta and other lrixuries to 
~ei l  on the mountdm at enormous profif;. Desertion waa 
Iiowever p t ,  more tlaa, tweive hnndred men went over to the 
enemp in less thm four m o n t h ;  and they were al1 Germans, 
Englislimen, or Spmiards ; for the Portnguese mho abandoned 
their colours invarialilg went hack to tlieir own country. 
This difñmilty of feeding the bnglo-Portupese, tbe extreme 
distress of tlie Spaniads, and the cerhinty tkat tliey woidd 
plunder in France and so raise the people in ama, together with 
the nneagy state of the political &ira in tlia lleninsula, rendered 
Wellington werse to offensive operations whiEe Napoleon 
mintained thc Elbe. It was irnpossible to make a formidable 
and sustailietl invasion of F m c a  with the Angl~Portugucse 
alonej and be had neitlier money nor means of transport 
to feed the Spauixrds, even ff poiicy warranfed sucli a me* 
me;  ths  nature of the oountry dso  forbad a decisive victory j 
and itn ndvance would be atteuded with tlie risk of retumiug 
to Spain aguin during tlie rvinter when a retrext would ba 
dangerous and dislirinuuring. On the  20th ef OctoEier Low- 
ev.r, letkr from tlie governor of Pumpeluna wsc intercepted, 
and Ford Rtxruy Sumerset, obswing the coiripliment lit tlie 
bcgiiining wm in numerals, ingenionsly foliowed tlie cue and 
mxJe out the wliolele. It announced thtit tlie place could not 
kold out mtire tlian a week ; and as intelligence of NiipoleonH 
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dka&tea in Glermany became knom at the sama time, Wel- 
linghon waa induced to yidd once more to the mishes of tlie 
allied sovereipa and the Englisb ministws, who were earnest 
that he should invxtle France. 
His intent vas to attack Xoult's entrenched camp on tlie 
2 9th, thiiing Pampeluna wouId MI before that period ; It did 
not, and in tlie p s e s  above hncevaUes tlie troops m r e  knee- 
deep in snow. His lireprations liowever contintied and strict 
prtlcautions mem talren to bafFIs the enemy'~ smisssriea; yet 
hui t .was informeii by deserters of tlie original design and 
tlie cause of t l i ~  deltiy ! He likewise Fonnd on a sergeant-major 
af artillery, bken the 29th, lettera and orders indicating an 
attack by the bridge oP Ainotz, Iietween D%rlanl~ right and 
Clnusel's ldt; Prencli peasmts a l ~ o  who liad pmsed the out- 
poatri said tliey had been quationed about i l lat  bridp und the 
roads lending to it. SouIt therefore augmcnted his ñrorka 
tbcrc, and hnving thus as ho judgcd provided for i ta  mfctj, 
snd being in no p8in for ]lis eght, nor for Clniisel's position 
which ms covcrcd by the smallcr Rhune, turncd bis attontion 
townrds Foy. 
That gencrnl wari aC Bidamy hnlf way bctwecn St. Jean 
Pied de Port and Carnbo, having t o  w a h  ccrtain muda, 
leading to the Nive fram thc liigli vallcys wliich gavo Soult 
uneasiness for liis left. Tliinlring nriw the principal ottnck 
would be Ict the Amotz bridge, and not hg tlicso r d s  OF 
St. Jean Pica da Port as he hnd fiist ~upprised nnd ss Welling- 
ton lind indced once rlmigned, tlie Frcncli mardial resolvcd to 
rtRe Fay's force offcndvcly. In t h i ~  viem Iie iiiotructed him, 
if St. Jmii Pied de Port 6hould be only sliglitly nttttckerl, 
to rliriw nll tlie troops hc coiild apnrs from ih defenee to 
R i d u m w ;  and when ffie Jliea nssniled Amote, t o  seiae tbe 
Gorospil mountain and fa11 upon their rigl~t as thep degcended 
from tlie Col de Maya. But if he wm himself assailed, be 
was to m11 ia hia detachsd troops from 8t. Jcan, repass the 
Kive by tlie bridge of Bidarray, make the best defence possible 
behind tliat river, and opea a communication with Pierre 
Xoult and Trielhmd, whose divkiona of cavalry were at St. 
PaIais nnd Ortliec, 
On the 6tL, Foy, thinking the Qomspil dificult to p s ,  


proposed to seize the Col de Yspepi from the side of 
St. Jean Pied de Port, and so desoend jnto the Bastan. Soult 
p ~ferred Bidarray as a safer poinf and more united with t11e 
m a b  b ~ l y  of the a m y ;  liut he g m  Poy a discretionary 
p w e r  to  march along tlie left of the Nive upon Itzatzu and 
Espelette, if he judged ' it fitting to reinforce D'Erlon*s left 
rather than to attaeli tlie enemy. And having thus mmged 
i& defence, he directed the pxefect of the lower I'yrenees 
to post tlie organized national p r d s  at Ghe issues of al1 the 
viilleys a b u t  St. Jeriii Pied de Port, but tc keep the mas8 
of the people quid until the allies, penetmting into tlie 
country, slioda at orrce pravoke and offer facilities for m 
irregular warfare. On the 9th. being still aneasg aliout t l~e 
San Martin d'Arosa and Gurospil roads, he bought up his 
brotlier's mvalry from M. P d ~ s  t o the heights above bh, 
md next day the 10%-expected gtorm burst, 
Allured by aome fine weather on the 6th and 7th, Weliington 
had moved Ilill. from tlie hncevallee to the Bastan wikh a 
Piew to  attack Soult, leaving Mins on the position of Alto- 
bisar and in the Aiduides, 0rders.for the battle, which was 
to commence tha 8th, were issued, but Freyre then de- 
cImcl, tliat he wanted subistenm, and must witbdraw a part 
of I ia  troops. This was a scbeme to obtain provisions from 
íihe English mqnzines, and successful, becausa 611e attack 
muld not be m d e  without his aid Forty tlionsand mtions 
of fl our, witIi a formal intimntion that if he did not co-operimte 
tlie whole army mvst retire again into Spain, contsnted 
Freyre for tlie moment; but the oxtravngant abuses of tlie 
Gpanish commiss~rint were plainly exposed when the chief of 
tlie statf declared that the flonr would only suffjce for two d g s ,  
although there were lesa than ten thousnnd saldiers in tlio 
field. Spain therefore demrended tiuo rutions for emry figliting 
man, and yet Iier troups were atarving 1 Whsn this d i f i ~ ~ ~ l t y  
ww aurmouated heavy rain cxused tIie attack te be 
deferred, but on the 10th ninety tbousand com- 
bakmt~ of al1 ams, se~enty-four thousand being & ~ ~ ~ l . 2 h .  
Aiiglo-Portupese, descended to the I-iatble; and 
witli them ninety-five pieces of artillery, al1 of ivLich werewith 
inconeeivable vigour brouglit iuto action : in tlüs host however 
neitber the cavalry, fmr thoussnd five hundred stmng, nor the 
Spaniards blockading Pampeluna are reckoned, To meet this 
pomer the French had been increaaed by conscripts, yet many 
of those had deserted, and the fighting men did not exceed 
seventy-nine thousand, including garrisons. S i  thonsand 
A-& 8. were c a d r y  ; and F ~ s  operdons were extra- 
VL neoua t a  the Ene of defence, scarcely sixty thou- 
smd infantry and artillery were oppoced t o  the $ l i s  - 
Wellington seeing tlie rjght of Soulth line m l d  nat well be 
forced, clesigned to Iiold it in check while he forced the centre 
and left, md pushed down the hrivelle to San PE. In thia 
view, tlie sccond and sixth British divisions, Bamilton's Portu- 
pese,  Bforillo's 8paniaids, four of Xna'~ battalions, and 
Grant's bripde of light cavalry, in al1 twenty-six thousand 
men, with nine pfi, were coltected under Eill in the Bastan 
to atta& DErlon. The position of RoncwaII~~ was occupied 
by the remaindw of Mina'a troop~, aupported by the bluclt- 
Weillngton ar ading force under Carlos dX~epaíis Ttie third, 
O W C P O ~  fourth and seventh divisiom and Giron's Anda- 
1u~ims, tbe whale under Berdurd, were disposed M%. 
&out Zagaramurdi, the Puerto de Ectiallar, and the 
Joww parts of those sloj~ea oF tlie peater Rhuna which descend 
upon Sarre. On the ieft of this body the light division and 
Longa's Spaniards, both nnder Charles Alten, wcre dispoeed 
rin thse  alopa of the greater Rhune wvhich led down t o w a d  
Ascain. Victor al ten'^ light cava17 with tliree bathries 
were placed on the road tr~ Sarre, and six mountnin g u n ~  
follawed Giron and fiarlea Alten. Thus thirty-six tho&and 
fighting men with twenb-four guns were con&ttnted in this 
Freyre'a Gallicians, nine thousand with iiix guna, were w 
al ten'^ Ecft, nt thc fort of blvaw and tewards Jollimont : 
being held 'there with d e s i p  to &ll upon any troops wliich 
migl~t come from Serrea by the bridge of Ascain, to support 
Claued. The first and fifth divisiong Wilaonk, Bdford's, 
and lord Aylmcr's brigaiics of infiintry, Vandelenr's light 
dmgoons and the lea* &rmm m~&,  in al1 ninetetin 
tl~oitfinnd men with fifty-four pnB, tinder Hope, opposed 
Sotilt'~ right wing; and the naval squahn hovered on their 
flank to aid the land operntiona. 
OQ the French aide mch lientenant-general hd e specid 
psition to defend. D'Erlon's fircit line r e d  itu left un the 
fortificd rocks of Mondnrin, which could not ba turned; 
from thenco it run along the Choupera md Atchuleguy 
mountainq by the forge of Urdsx, ta t hc  Wivelle. Illiis iaango, 
ntrongly entrencid, wu occiipied by aae of Abbg'g and one of 
D'Amwac'& brigades, F~pelette being behind the former 
and A i n h o ~  behinrl the Iatter. Vieir second line composed of 
tlie remaining btigdes, was on e broad ridge severai mileri 
behind Ainhoa, and its le& did not extend beyond the centre 
of the fmst 1,ine; the right, touchíng tlie bridge of Brn0t.q 
stretched witL a mde flank, because fhe Kvelle there gave 
more space : tbree grat redonbts were oonstmctd on th i~  Tidge 
aud a fourth had heen commenced close to the bridge, 
On the right of this fiemnd line beyond the Amotz bridge, 
Clausel's position extended to kscain, along a range of feiglits 
fortified with redoubts, frenches, and rtbbatis; and as the 
NiveNe after p s i n g  Amotz swept in a curve eompletely round 
thin range to Ascain. both flanks r d  aiike upon that river; 
having oommunication by *he bridge8 at those placa on t h s  
right and left, and a retreat by the bridge8 of San P6 and 
.Hamstagui in tlie mar, Two of Clausei's divisions, rein- 
forcd by one of D'Erlon'e under Maransin, were here poskd, 
In front of the left were the redoubts of  St, Barbe etnd 
arenada, mcering the camp of be; in front of the nght 
was the smaller Rhune, forti6d and accupied by a bripde 
of hfaransin's divi~ion; and a new redolibt witb abhtis wus 
aIso commenoed to cover the appxoaches t o  the bridge of 
Bmotz, 
On the riglit of thia linq beyond the bridge of h i n ,  
Dmicau's division, dso of Claustil'm corps, and San Pol's Italin 
brigade drawn from Villotte'~ reserve, Lela tlie entrenclied 
camp of Serres snd connected Clausel witli Villatte, the Iatter 
being on a ridge crocsing the gorges ef Olette and Jollimont. 
Tlie French right u~ider RRille, atrongly fortified on tlie lower 
pourid anrl partially covered by inundations, was nearly 
impregnable. 
Sonlt's weakest point m the opening b e t m n  the Rhune 
mountains md tlie Nivelle. (Xmdually narrowing as it 
apprmched the bridge of Amotz, thii spacewas the most npea 
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the least fortified; and tbe Nivelle, fordaHe above that bridge, 
could not liamper Qs dlies' movements. A powcr=Ful force 
racting in that directjon canld psss by D'ErlonYs first line, 
break in upon the right of bis second line and upon Clausel's 
teft, and o u t h k  both-and in that view JVellington dwigued 
hte battle. 
Hill, leaT.ing Jfinebs troops on &e Uorospil rnountain facing 
the roclrs of Mondafin, moved in tlie nipht by tlte different 
p s e s  of tlie Cal ¿le Maya; desiping tIizt Morillo sliould 
menace the French on the Choupera and Atchulepy moun- 
tain~ wlde  the semnd dividon athcked b h o a  and LTrda3c 
The sixtli divi~ion and Hamiltan's Portupese were t o  ~ s a u l t  
tlie works covering the bridge of Amotz, eitlier on the right 
o t  left bank of ihe river according to circumshncq and t l~na 
twenty-six tboirsand men mere combinerl agoinsh D B l o n ' ~  
position from that aide. Qn tEieir leR Bereaford'~ corps waa 
wembled. Ths t h i d  divi~ion untler Colville, descending 
tiom Zagarmurdi, wm to  move qainst the unfinishetl 
redoubts md entrenchments covering tlie bridge af Aniotz on 
tlie left bmk of the Nivelle; thus turning VErlon's riglit 
t~hcn it ww attwked in i'ront hy AilL On tho Ieft of tlie 
t.llird divitiion, tlie eeventh, descending from the Echoliar 
pws wns to s t o m  ihe G r d  rcdeubt, tlnd by tha d l w  of 
hrre to rtssnil Chusei's main position abreast aitli the riteaek 
of the tliird divisioa. On thc left  of tha scventli, the fourth 
rlivision, asssnibIing on tlie lnwer ulopea of tlie grenter RIiune, 
was to  deseerid upon the Eran Biirbg and then moviiig ttiroug-h 
[Sptirc also to asmil Clausel abre& mith tlie scvent1i diviGan. 
On tlre Ieft of  tlie fuurth division, Giroii's Andulugians, 
pthcred Iiigher up on tlie flanlc of tlie gent BIiune, rere tb 
move nlireiaa ivitli the others leaving Sane on tlieir righit; 
nnd tliey were ta  d r k e  the enemy from the lolvcr slopca of 
tlrc rininl!cr Rliuno nnd in canccrt with tkic rest rittaclr CEnuscI. 
Xn tllis wny Hill's and Eerecfortl's ( t~ rps ,  forming a mRss of 
forty tliousrind infiintrp, wcre to be titrust on both sidcs of 
tlie bridge of Amotz Iietmen Clnusel nnd D'Erlon. 
Chnrlw AItcn asid Loriga, linving togcthcr eight thousrintl 
men, were likewise to  attack Clanael on the lcft of  Giron, 
whilc Frepe approached the bridge of Ascain. Bnt A l t a  
~ i i l d  not assail C;lausel's riglit without eitorming the aniaiier 
Eliune; and tliat mouiitnin outivorlr, a hog'a-back ridge Gsing 
iil~niptlg out of tnbldand and pm~llel with the greater 
Rliuiie, was iiiaccessilile along its front, ~vhich wa4 pmcipitoua 
ririd from fifty t u  two hiindred feet liigh j however, on the 
Freilcli leR tI~e i.ocks gradually decreased, descending by a 
lorig sliipe to tEie vdley of  Sarre, and about two-thids of tlie 
wxy down tlie tliirty-fuurtli Frenclk regirnent was plmed, with 
sn adviinced post on soma isoIated c r a g  sitnnted in tlie 
Iiollow Xietween tlie twe Rliunes. On tlie French right tlie 
hog's-back aunk indecd by degroes into €he plain or plntform 
but m there covered by n mwsh scarcely pnssalle; hence the 
nthcking troaps had fir~t to  rno-i-a up apins t  tlie perpen- 
riiculnr rocks iu front, and then file to their left under fire, 
'tretween the rnzirsl~ and tlie loirer crags, until tliey gnined nn 
ncccqsible p i n t ,  from mhence t o  fight t h c i ~  m y  along the 
narrow ridge of tlio hog's-liack,-thc bri~tlcs of which mera 
huge perpcndiciilnr crnp connectcd with wnlls of lonse stones, 
rio a4 t o  form smdl fortrr or castles ~ommnnicating with 
ench other by nnrrow footwny, and r r j i n ~  one nbom nnother 
iintil tFie ciilminnnt point WM attaincd. TRo tablbland 
beymd this ridge mns extensive, termindng in n vcry decp 
m-ine on e t q  sidc MTO R nl~rrow ~pwc  on tlie Fmnch 
right of the mmh, wliere e loose ~tone wdi was conhitmetcd, 
ninning perpendicularly from behind tlie ho$e-bnck and 
ending in a star fort o~erhannging tlio edgc of the ~nvine. 
Tliis rlimpart and hrt and the liog'a-heck itself were defended 
by Barhot's brigade. The line o€ retreat waa towarda a low 
namw iieck of land, hidging the deep rwine and linking tlie 
Rliune to Clsiiselk mmzia position, At thts n e d ~  8 r-erve ww 
plmed, pzrtly to sustainthe thirty-fourth Prench rcgimsnt on 
tlie slope of tlie mountain, partly to  protect the neck itself 
on the side of Sxrre. 
ATten collected hia Groop~ ~ . t  midnight on that sIope 
of the: greater Rliune which descended towards Ascqin. Tlie 
iiiain hody of ihe light divisinn, ttirning tlie m a ~ h  1Fg tlie 
left, mas to a3sail the stone wall and overlnp the stnr fort by 
the ravine lieyond; h n g q  rct.retcliing &ill farther on the Icti, 
was to turn the smaller Rhuna altogether; md the forty- 
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third regiment, supported by the seventeenth Portnpeee, wiia 
to aasail the hog'bi-Back. One battalion o€ riffemen anlr 
the rnountain-guns were left on tha  summit of the greater 
Rhune, with orden to assail the crriggy pogt belnw aud con- 
neet Mten'a attack with that of Oiron ; and al1 tLese trogs  
gained tbeir ststions so secretlp the enemy bad no mspicion 
of their presente, though the eolumns mere lying witliin haFf 
musket-shot of the works for sepeml houm. Towads morn- 
ing, five or s k  guns fired in a burried manner from tbe low 
g r m d  near the sea broke the salness; but on the Rhnne 
a11 waa quiet and tha British troops awaitd the rising of the 
mn, when three y n s  fid from the Atchubii mountain were 
to giw the signd of attack. 
B A m  OF TITE IPIVELrn 
[ ~ n n  9, page 8Ga.J 
Day broke wlth great splendonr, ami as tbe h t  rg of 
liglit plapd on the sammit of the lo* Atchubia the sipel 
guns were fired in rapid wocesgio~ Then the British leaped 
up, md thp Wnch ,  beholding with astonishent their colurnas 
rushing forwmd from the fIank of tbe great Rliune, nin 
tci the defences with much tumult. Viey opened a fm 
piecm which wcre nnawcred from the top of the p t e r  
Rhune by tlie mountain artillery, and st the a m e  moment 
two companics of the fa%-third were detached to cross the 
marsh if psiblo  nnd kecp down tlie fire from the lower prt 
of tlie liog'zbrtclr ; the remainder of the regimcnt, partly in 
line partlp in a column of rcscwa advanced against the high 
rocks. From these mngs the Prertch ~ h o t  fnst, but the quick 
cvcn movemciit of the Biitiah linc dweived their aim, md 
the soldierg, rnnning forward very swiftly thongh the ground 
wns rough, turned mddenly hetwwn the rocks and tho marsh, 
and were immedintcly joined by the tmo compnnim which 
had passed tliat ohstacle notwithatanding its dqth. Then nll 
togethcr jumpcd into tlic Iower works; but the men, cxhauatd 
by their exertiong for tliey had pasad over half a mile of 
verg diffimIt p u n d  with R wonderful apsed, remaind for e 
few minutes inaetive within half pistol-shot of the first gtone 
&le, h m  whence eame a sharp md biting mwketry. 

with a shont dowm the deep cteft in the rack, others turned it 
by the nnrrow paths on each tlanlr, ancl the enenip abandoned 
tlie loose walls at the moment they wwe being scaled; tliua 
in henty ininutea eight hundrd old aoldiers were Iiastled out 
of thia labyrintk-yet noh so easily but tlie victors lust eleven 
officers a d  sixty-seven mea 
Al1 tlie mouuhin wrra now clearetl of tlie French, for tlie 
riflemen dro~ipd perpeadiciilarly from the water Rliune upon 
tlie post of c r q s  iu tlie LolIow aud scixed it witli m a l 1  lors; 
but tliey wem ill-seccnrled by Gir~ix'a hndtilusians, mJ LarJIy 
linndleil hy tlie iliity-fourth Freucl~ regirriunt, wliicli obsti- 
nateIy clung to tlie slopq and covered tlie tligEit of tlie con- 
fused críiwd rusliing rliiwri tlie nioi i i i t~n Iriehiliirid tliem towar~Is 
the coniiecting neck cif lrtnd: at t h t  poiiit also, al1 raiiied 
iind ~ecmetl iricliried tci rencw tlie iictioa, yet arter Borne ha i -  
tntion contimed tlielr retreat. Tiiis fnvouriible moment for a 
dmirrivc ~trcrke liad been luolretl for by t1ie commnnder of tlie 
forty-tliird, but thc nf5cc.r t?ntniskd with tlie rrscrvc com- 
pmies of the rcgimcnt hatl thrown them nc~ l l c s~ ly  into tlio 
fight, th11ll~ rendering it irnpo~sible to collcct n horlg strong 
enough :hto assail sucll n hmvy rnariR Thc cantcut at tlic stono 
w l l  nntl ~tnr-fort, shortencd by thc mliid aiscccaa on thc hofa 
bnck, hncl not been pcry sevm; ICernlit liowever, nl~; iys  
conacpicrious far his vnlour, wns scvcrely wountlrd; nevertl~c- 
lcss Iio did not qiiit thc ficld, aiid soon rc-formcd his brigdo 
on tlie platatform he hnd thiis RO gnlliintly Ton, The fifhy- 
scmnrl, hxving turned tlic positian by tlie ravinc, mns now 
npproncfiiiig tlitr ~nemy's line nf retrent; but hltcii, following 
Iiin inwtructions, hnltcd flie division pi~i+tly in thc ravine itsclf 
to tlie leFt of tbe necl;, pnrtly on tlic tal>Ic-lrbnd. nnring tlie 
action Lioi~~m g ~ t  near Ascain in conncsion with Freym, aiid 
in that state, the encmy now and tlien mnnonnding, AItcn 
awaited tlic progreas of the army on his rig1;lit; for tlio 
colriniiis there bar1 a long way to marcli nnd it wns essential 
to regulate the moverncnts. 
Tlic signal-gnu from the Atchirbia which sent tlie ligllt 
divbion agninst the Rhune, had dso p t  the fourtli and scventh 
divisions in rnovemeiit ag~inst the reduubts of San Barh. 
and Urendq a ~ d  eightecn guas were instautly plwd in bat- 
NOV. 1813.1 noox XXITI.-CR~P. 1. 371 
tery against the fomer. TTLile they poured tIieir stream uf 
sliot the troops advanced witk scwling-laddma, itnd the skir- 
mi~isters of tlie fuudli divicion soon got into the rew of t1ie 
work; wlrei.eupon tlie French leaped out iind fie& and Boas's 
bat t~ry  of horse artiIlery, galloping to a risiiig g~uund in rear 
of the GrenarSa fort, drove tliern from tliere also: then tlie 
divisions carried the village oE Siirre and t'ue position beyond 
it, and rrdvnnced to tlie attack of GlauseYs main positiou 
It %+M ~ O W  eiglit o'clock and horn the srnuller Rliurie R 
splcndid apectacle uf war opencd upon tlie view. On tlie left 
tl ie sliips of war ~Iowly miliag to and fro were cxclianging 
sliots Rith tho fort of Soco~i; and Hope, menncing all the 
French lines in the low ground, sent thc sound of a Iiiintlrcd 
picccs of nrtillery bcllowing up thc roclrs, to be an~wcrcd by 
nmrly api manp from tlic tops o€ tlic niountnins. Ort tlie 
riglit, tlie surninit of tlie grent Atcliul~ia wos jiist lig1:lited by 
thc rising sun, and fifty tlioiismd men, rnaliiiig down j t s  
enormous sIope~ with ringing ~liolzt~, ~lecmed t o  dime. tlie 
red ing  shdriivs into t1ic cEe~p valley. The plnins of  Franca 
ao long orerlooked from flie towering c r q  of tlie Pmyrenees 
were to be tlie priec of battlc, antI tlic; Iinlf-fainiolied soldirrs 
in their fury broke tl~lirotigli the iron barricr ercctcd by Soult 
as ir' it were but rt screen of recds. 
A apace of seven or eigl~t miles conhincd the principal 
action; biit the sltirtms of bnttle ~pread wide and in no point 
h ~ d  tlie combinntions failed. Rill, ~fter I long nnd diffrmilt 
nigl~t rnarcli, had neme4 tbe memy a littlc befon: seveii 
a'clock. Sciiding Morilla md Mina agninst the Monrl¿lmUi 
and Atcliuleg~~y mclís, Iie witli tlie second division bruslierl 
a m q  the Frencli brigade from Urrlax and Aiahioa. Tlien tlic 
sixtli division md Bnmiltoii's Partuguese passed the Nivelle 
lower down nnd by tlic ríglit bnnk tlircutenetl tlic; bridge of 
Arnotz ; tliua tlie filianiiirtls 1isId 12111i6 i n  play on tlie rocks, 
wl i i l~  tliree Anglo-I'orttigiiese divisiuii s a Jvnnced ngiiist 
D'Erlon's sacond position. Tlie ground J V ~ Y  I~owever su riigged 
tliey coiild nok close iicforc clcven o'clocl< on the rctloiilits, 
cw1i o€ n-Fiich contained five Iiunrlretl mcn. Tliey n.eYe ~ilaced 
dong tlie crest aF R ri11gc ttl~icl~iy clntlic~l ~vitli I)uslic~, covered 
by a tlccp rl~viiie, ;tiid vcry diflii:i~It tci uttnck; I~iit Clinton 
I 3 ~ 2  

Ciausel however stiIl atood firm with Tanpin's md 
Maransin'g divlsions; anrl the latter, now complete by tlie 
retuni of Bwbot's brigade from tlie smaller Rliune, occnpied 
the redonbt of Louis XIT., and liaving eight tield-pieces 
atkmpted to coper the flight of Conroux'e troops. 33s guna 
were swn pilenced by &se's borne artillery, the only batteq 
wliich liad mulnouuted the difficulties of the grouiid ufter 
pa~ging Sam. The infantry were then ansailed, in front 
by tlie fourth and seventh divisions, in flank by tlie third 
Jivision; the redoubt w a  atormed, the garrison bayonetted, 
Conroux's men continued t o  fly, Martinsin)s aher ti ritifí 
combat were ~ a s t  headlong i u h  the ravines beliind tlieir posí- 
tion and he wes taken, yet dtenvards escalied ia tIie miifu- 
sion. G i n  then carne up on tlic: left of the fourth division, 
somewbat late, rtnd after httvi~g iihnrloned tlia riflemen on 
tho Iower slopes of ofe smaller Bhurte., 
On tho French side 'i'aupiii'e troops and a Inrgc botly of 
conscrip@ foming GlwaeSs right wing, still rernnined to 
fight. Their Ecft restcd on a Itdrgc work d l e d  tlin siea1 
redoubt, which had no artillery but ovkrhoked the whale 
poaition ; the right ww covered by two redoubts overiiaiiging 
a ravine whicli seprtrated tliem from the camp of Serres, anJ 
some workrr in the ravi~e ittself pmtected tlic communication 
by the bridge of Ascain. Behind the signal redoiilit, on a 
r i d p  crossing the rond to San P6, by wlircli bfriransin and 
Conronx'~ divjsions were now flying in rlisorder, them WM 
another work called the redoubt of Rmmtaguia; and Clausel 
tlrinkjng he might ski11 dispute the victory if his reseme 
rlivision eould come to liis aid from the camp of Xerres, drew 
the thirtyfirst regirnent from Taupin and posted ic in front 
of this redoubt. His design was to rally Maransiii'ii and 
Conroux% t t q s  there and so form rt new iiiie, tlie left Dn 
the Hmasta,& the riglit on tlie signal redoubt, into which 
1st he threw six hnndred of tbe eigbty-eightli regiment. In 
this position, ha* s xetreat by the bridge uf Ascain, he 
thouglit to renew the battle; but hia plan fded at the moment 
o£ wnception, because Taupin could not stand Sefore the 
light division which aas noiv eyain in full. actiou. 
About Uii-pmt nine, Blten, seeing tlie ivhole of tbe 
columns on Iiis rigl~t as far aai tlie eye could reach ~ v e U  
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cngapd with the encmy, hed crossed the low neclc of Tand in 
liia front. Thc fifty-ñccond regimcnt fimt passed witli a very 
nnrraw front anrler II deqtructive caiinonade and fire of 
musketry from entrenchn~ents on t l ie opposite mountain; a 
mad, coming from Ascnin by tlie ravine, wound up the liusi- 
tion, and as ttlie Hty-second pnslied tlieir nttack along it the 
enemy aliaudoned his entrenchments on erich side and forsook 
even liis croming ~vorlts above, Tliis formidnble regirnent 
was followed by tlis otlier tioops. Taupin, though llis divi- 
sion wa9 wcak and now diminislred by tlie ~bsence of the 
thirty-first regimeut, awaited t l ~e  attaclc, being. supported by 
tlie conscripts draivn up in Iiia rear j but at that time 
Longri, liaviiig turned tlie smnller Rliun~, appromlied Asmin 
in corijunction sith Freyre's troops, and tbeir 
Cliiusel, MS8. 
skirrniiiliera operied a di~ttint musketry wi~ist  
tlic works covering tliut bridge; pmie seixed tlie Frendl, tlio 
Taupinb scventieth regiment nb~~udoncd the two rciloul~ts 
Repvrt, nbcivc, and tho consciilih wcre witlidrawn. Cliiusd 
YSS. c~r¿iere(l Tniiliili to retuke tlio forts, but this 
only d d c d  t o  tho disordet;-thc scventieth regiment (lis- 
bnntlcd cntircly antl wcre nnt tc-nsscmbled iintil next dny, 
Tlicrc ~rnnincd only fnur rcgimcnts unbrolrcn, tlic eightp 
cig1:lith mliich wos in t,he sipnl redoulit, two under Tnupin 
in rcnr of thc works on tlic riglit, nnd tlic thirty-first mliich 
covercrl the flaro~tíq~iin, om tlie only Iino of rctrcnt. 
Clnnscl, nnxioufi to bring off tlic rcgimont froroin tlic signal 
rdorilit, ortllrrcd Tuupin to clinrge on ono ~idr,  intcntling to 
do the sama himsclf on tlie otlier nt  tlio Iicntl of tlie kl~irty- 
fiirit; but tho lntter wns vigoroualy uttaclícd by tlie Portugucse 
of tho sevcnth divisioq wIiiIa the foiirth [IiPiuion rapidjy 
intcqoserl bctwocn it nntl tFic ~ i ~ i i i l  rcdoubt, wliicli w m  
morcovcr turned on itrr ridit nt rnu&ct-sliot by tlic forty- 
thiril nnd Rnrnnrtl'n ri flcmcii. Wl~crcfon? S~upin, instcd nf 
cliarging wns liiinsclf clingcd iii frotit by tthc i-iílcinen, niid 
bcing menr~ccd nt tlic sruiic time in liruilc by tlie foiiihtIi 
rlivision retre;~tctl, closcly puwuctl by Xiir~nrd until t l i u t  
fntrepid officcr fe11 <rlan~eroiislg ,wouiided. Dniing tliis 
atrug~le tfie seventli division lirakc tlie tliirtj-"first? an(1 tlie rtiut 
WM complete: tlie Frencli flerl tn tlie diflei.ciit. bridges over 
t l ie  Nivelle and tlie aignal redoulit $vas let't to its tute. 
Tliis EormidriliIe work barred the way of the light division, 
but it was of no vnlue to  tlle deience when the forts on i k ~  
flonlcs mers abandoned. Colbomo appzoached it in hont witli. 
tlie fiftyaecond regiment, Giron meniioed it on Colborneya 
right, Cole im priasing to  its rsar and Kempt's tiripde mm 
tiirriing it on tho left. Calborne whose militnry judgment 
WM scldom at fault, hdted nndcr thc brow of the conicd hill 
on wliich tlie work ivns situatcd j l>ut somi? spnninds mnking 
a vnunting thongli fcchlo dcrnonstratitian of nttncking it on his 
ridit wcrc hentcn bnck, nnd nt tlint moment a staff-officer, 
witliout warrant, for lllten on the apot aqaured tlie autliar o€ 
tIiis history he sent no sach oirlei; rode up und dirocted 
Colborne t o  arlvwce. I t  was no moment fm remon- 
strance nnd oovered bg the s t e e p ~ s  of the Iiill lie renchad 
tlie fllit top forty yarda from tlie worlr ; the ras11 was then 
made, but a widc ditcli, thirty feet deep, well frplised and 
pa l ided ,  stoppad liim short, aiid tlie fire of tlic enemy 
stretched al1 tlie foremost, men dmd. Colborne, escapiiig 
miraculoudy for he IES rtlways rrt tlie h e d  and on horseback, 
immediately Id tlie reg-iment under cover of the brow fa 
another point, aud thinlring to tsilre tFie Frencli unawares 
m d e  another  TUS^, yet wibli the same result: at three dif- 
ferent plnces did he rise to thc siirface in this mmner, and 
encli tiiiia the French f i i ~  snrept away the hearl of liis column. 
Resorting tl~eo to persunsion be held out a, wliite hnrlkercliief 
aiid ammoned tke coinmiiiidnnt, pointing out lo Irim liow 
liis wnrk waa sitrnilisided, Iiuw Iiopeleus lii defence; Le 
yielded, Jiaving liad onIy ene mnn killed, wliercns on tlre 
Bri~isli side tliere k l l  two liiindred soldien oE a regiment 
never surpliciied in nrms since arms were first borne by men. 
Duriiig tliis a h i r  CIausel hud crossed t31e Nivelle ili grent 
disorder; i\lsr~nsin'n aud Cunroudg truops nml- &u PGj tlie 
tliirty-first regisncut 2 ~ t  Hasastnguiu, Tuuliin bet~veen tliat 
plwe aiid tlie bridge or Serres. Pursued by tlic tliird and 
severitli divisions, tlie skirmishcrs uf tEie furmer crossod tig 
Amotz antl rt bridge olovt! San F6, and entered tlie Iutter place 
w1r.liile the Prerich lvere in tlie xct of l~dssing tlie river beIow. 
It was now past tmo dclock, Conroux's troops puslied on to 
IEelliacei~ de Borda, a fortiGell liosition on the road irom Sas 
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PB to Bayonne, wwhere they were joined by Tanpin and D'E:rIon 
with D'Armap~c" division; but Clausel rdEied Maran,nain3a 
men and took post on some beights lmmediately ubove San 
76. 8ou3t who had on the firtit alarm Lnriied from St. Jean 
de Luz to the camp of Serrefi with al1 his m q e  artillery and 
apre troops, now m e n a d  the alliex' ieft flank by Ascain. 
'CVcl!ington tlien lialtd Cole, Alten md Giron on the reverse 
~Eopes of Clitusel's original position, facing the camp of serres; 
waiting until Clinton, t h  folloming D'Armisgnac on the 
right of the Nivelle, iras well advanced. When assured of 
C7iuton's progresa Le crossed the RivelIe 4 t h  the third and 
swenth divisions, md drove h- l&n$iII  from lus new position; 
bnt with a b d  struggle, iu Tvliich Inglis Faas wounded and 
tlie fifty-first and sixty-eighth regiments hmdEd very mughly. 
This ended the battIe in tlie centrg for darkness colning 
crn, and tlie troops were exhausted, especially the sixkh divi- 
ion, wkicli had been marcriing. or figliting for twenty-four 
honrs. Ilowever three diTisions were then firmly establisbed 
in re, of Soult'a right wing, of wliose operations it i8 time 
ta treat. 
I n  front of Regle's entrenchentsweretwo advanced po~itions; 
the camp of the Sans Cnlottes on l i s  right, the Bons hieoours 
in his centre, covering Urogna TLe first was mrried early iri 
the morning by the íifth division, whicli advaiiccrl to tho inun- 
datIon covtlring the lieights o[ Bordtgain anrl Ciboure, The 
smnd was taken by Halket's Germantns and the guarda; and 
the eighty-fifth regiment, of lord hylmer's brigade, drove a 
French hattalion out of Urogne. T h e M  divlsion then menaced 
the camp of Belchsna, nnd the Qerman skimiahem p a w d  a 
~trearn covering part o f  the line; they were bowever aoon 
driven back by the enerny, whose musketry ancl Ci3iinonad~ 
were brisk dong the whole front. Freyre, adwncing from 
Jullimont and tlie Cdveire on the right of ths first division, 
placed cight guns in buttery agninat tho Nnssnu rcdoubt, con- 
stmcted on the ridge occuyiied by Villntte to mver the 
nppraathcs fo Ascuin. Tbere he wfbs opposed by his own 
countrymen under %&m Palacio, who commnnded the remains 
of Jmeyh's Spnnish gmrds; and during the fight Freyre'a 
skirmishrs on tlie rigbt uuited as we bave s m  with h n g a  
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This hls.lse battle was maintained aIong the whole line until 
nightfall, with eqml loss of men bnt p t  advantage to &e 
aIlies ; because it oocupied Ite'ie's two divisions and Villattds 
reseme, and prevented the troops in the camp of 8erres from 
passing tho bridge of Ascain t o  aid CIansd However when 
be was ovgowered and Wellingbn had entered San Pé, 
Daricau and the Italian brigade withdrew from Serres ancl 
Villatk occupied it; whereupon Freyre and Longa entered the 
town of Ascain, but Tillatte held the camp until h i l l e  had 
witbdramn into St. Sean de Luz and destroyed al1 the b r i d p  
on the lower Nivelle,-whm that wae effeded the wliole 
retired, and at daybreak reached tha heights of Bidart on the 
road to Bayonne. During the night tlie nlliea lsdted on tlie 
position hIiey had gained in tlie centre; but tlie accidenhl con- 
flagrtrtion of a wood complekly separded the piquet~ towarda 
kscain from the main body, antl spreading far and wide 
over the heiith lighkd up d the hilla, a blwinp sign of war tu 
France. 
, Tlie 11th the amy advanced in order of battle. Hepe 
forded the river ahve  ISt. Jean de Luz mith his idantry and 
macched on Bidart; Bcresford rnovd by tha rmda leading 
npon Arbonne; Hill, communicatktg by lllB right with Moriilo 
who was on the roch of Mondmin, brought his left forwrnd 
jnto communication witli Berwford, and with Es centre taok 
pmession of Suroide and Espdette facing Cambo. The timo 
requid to reatare tlic bridges for thc artilIery at Ciboure and 
the change of front on thc riglit rendered theac movemcnta 
slow; anrl gwe Souh time to rnlly kis ormy upon a third line 
d forfifid camps, the right resting on the coast ~t &i~rt, the 
centre at Helbacen 'Borda, the left Usbritr. an tlie Nive. 
Thia front mk &out eight miles, bnt the works were onEy 
síi~htly advnnced, and Sonlt, d r d m g  a mcond li.ittle on ao 
wirle 8 field, drlrew b ~ c k  h i ~  centre nnd 3& to Arbonne and 
Amuntz, broke down the Ziiidgaq on tha Nive a t  Ustaritn, and 
at ttwo o'clock a sliglit skirmish engaged by tIie allies in 
the centre clo~etl tho clny's proceedinp. Next morning the 
Prench rctired to tlie ridge of Beyriu, their rigl~t near Qnglct, 
thcir Icft in tlia cntrcnclied camp of Bnyonne. 
During tliis movemcnt a denso fog arrested the nllies, 
bnt mhw the day cleamd Hope took post fit Birlart on the 
le&, and Eeresforcl occiipied Ahetze, Arbonne, and tlie Iiill 
of San Enitrbe, in tlie centre. Hill endenvonred t e  pltss 
tlie fords and restore tlie broken briaga o€ Usbritz, and he 
also inade a cleinnnstration sgainst. tlie worlrs at Caiiibo; but 
the rain whicli fe11 heavily in t h ~  mouotains on the 1 l th  ren- 
dered tlie £oras impmsable, and both points were defended 
s~~ocesslully by Foy, TIiat officefs q~erations had been 
isulated. Fur tliough DXrEon mistruating tEic strcngtli o€ his 
omn position liar1 in the niglit of the 9th sent Lrn an oder to 
more on Espdette from Bidmay, ii arrived too late; Foy, 
frsllowhg Soult's previous instructions, diove Ninx from 
the Gorospil mountnin in thc rnorning of tlie IOth, and 
fianltlng MoriIlo forced him dso hack figliting to the hiato 
de M v .  Riit tfien tlie receding sonnil sntl m o k e  of  WKrlon'il 
lxttle eaused the Frencli general, who Iiod lmt a coIonel and 
one bundrecl and fifty meii, t o  retire; he however took mucli 
braggage and a, liundred prisoners and continuiiig I i i s  retreat 
al1 uiglit reached Cambo and E'staritz tlie Zlth, in time to 
relieve Ab&'s divkion at tliose posts, wliich on tlie 12th 110 
defended aginst Hill. 
lo. In this hhttle Soiilt m 3  driven in a few Iionts fmm o 
monntain posikion which he Iiad been fortifying for tlirec 
rnonths. Ec lost four thousand two hundred m d  sixty-five 
men and olficerg inclucling tweive or fourteen liuntlred pri- 
Boners. One general wzbs killed; al1 hia ficld-mligmines at 
6t. Jean de Luz and Espelette fe11 into the hnnds oE the 
victors; and fifty-one pieces of nrtillcry were taken, tlie greater 
ptut having been abandoned in tlie redoul~ts of tlre low country. 
Tbe allies had two gene&, ICempi and Byng, wounded, 
sana thcy lo& two thousand ~ix h d r e d  and ninety-four men 
mci officers. 
29 Soult fmed as most generds will, who seelr by exteiisive 
lines to supply the want of nuinbera or of haidiueuti iu the 
troope. Against mde cummanden und unJiwiplinec1 aolrliers 
lines mtiy avail, seldom agiiinst acwinplislied genemls, never 
when tlie assailants are the better soldiers. Casar at Alesi& 
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resistecl the Oauls, but his lines served him not at Dyrrachium 
against Pompey. Crwsns f d e d  in Calabria xg;linst Spartacus. 
Marlliorough brolie throiqh al1 thc Prench lines in Planden; 
and if Wellington succeedccl at Torres Vedrm it was l~d iaps  
becíiuse liis liiim wcre not attacked It may be Soiilt was 
seduced by ttliat eeuzui~~le, Cor bis works were altlnrost a9 g.igaillic 
and upon tho cama plan; that is to s y  a river on one iiank 
tlie ocean on tlie otlier, tlie firint on rnriuntaius covcred ivitli 
redoulits md partinlly protected by inundutions. But Iic hud 
onIy threo moiitlis t o  completa liiu apstcni, Iiis liiboum wcra 
irndcr tlic gnxe of Iiis cncmy, nnd hiq troop~i, tivicc dcfciitcrl 
during tlie cxccution,wmc infrrior in confidente niid numbcm 
tlie assail~nts. Weliingtoii's lincs liad bcen la'oouret? for $1 wliole 
yerir; bInssenn only Irriem of them mhen t l i v  skopped liis 
progress, and liis armp, inferior in nunitiers, liad been repulsed 
in tlic recent battle of Busaca. 
3". Tliis criticism does not apply t o  entrenched camps 
aithin conipass around which an active army moves as on a 
pivoti deliveiing or avoiding h t t l e  uccordin; to circumstanms; 
It applies anly to those extensive coveritig lincs by ~ivlicli 
soldiers are tnught to consider themselves inferior to  their 
enemies. A gcnerd is thus precluded from sliowing Iiimself 
at important liojiits and at critica1 periods; he ia unab1a ta 
encoiirnge !lis troops or correcl ert.ors; and suddeti coiritiina- 
tioils of gc~lius nre excluiled by the necessily of dliering to 
the ivorlrs, ivliile tlic tissni1ant.s n i q  meriuce every poirit ntid 
sclect wiiere tu  break througli. TIie ilefeiidem gecing tlie 
Iarge nttacking coliimns and liuvi~ig no proporhionnte niasws 
to  olq~ose~ hctiiiie feiirFuI, Icriuwiug tliere must be sonie w e k  
point wliieli wiI1 be tlie inensrire o f  strenqtll for !:*a wliole. 
But tlie rtssailants i i~ l l  ori ivith B heat arid vetietuence beluiig- 
iiig tu t,liose m110 act voliinturily arirt 311 the aff'etisivo: cnch 
mnss strives to oiitdo tliose cin i t s  rig1:llt aiid Icft, mnd failure i 8  
oiily a repulse; \vlirrcüs tlie assüiled, having no resource Liib 
victcis; lvuk to tlieir ilauks aurl are mum auxious about tIicir 
neigYitiuti~b ligliting tlirrii tlieir own 
4". A11 t1iese disu11vaiit:igey were illustrated on ti~e Nivelle, 
D'Erlon nttriliutcrl liis defcilt tu Cuiirumr'ti losiiig tlie bridge uf 
Ainotz, aud ta t11ut also hIarauau trnced ki discuiiifi~ure. 
Rwi, Taupin laid his defcat at Maransin's door, and 
of h n c h  Clmel ltsdbed it to wa.nt of fimnecs in the 
gcncrala 
M p,mrt, troops ; but he also gaid, if Darieau liad come 
MSB. fiom the mmp at fierras to bis aid he would 
have held bis p u n d .  Soult thought ClauseI had rashly 
Soult, M$$. atternptd to defcnd Sane after the San Barbe 
and G m d a  redoubts were taken, and thus let 
Conroux be overwhelmed in detail. ITe should, Soult said, 
have cancentrated his three divisions on the maiu position, 
and there mvered by the mdl Rhune sliould have been 
victorious; and it R a s  scarcely credible that wch entrenchments 
as CIauseI and DXrlon hacl to defend ahould have been carried; 
-for liis part he relied on their strength so confidently, EIS te 
t l i i  the allies must srrciifice twenq-five thousand men to 
force them and perhapa fail tlien. He had hen un the Dglit 
when tlie battle began, no rgorts carne to him, he could judge 
of eventa only by t l ~  fire; nnd when he rwclied the camp of 
S e m s  rrith ]lis reserve troop~l and artillev Clausel'a worka 
were lost I lIis rnn-ivd had however paralysed the rnarch of 
tliree divisions. Tliis was trae, yet there seems some foundor 
tion for Clwel's compluint, nainely, that he liad for five houm 
Tought on his inain pusition md during tkak time no Iielp hd 
come, altliough the cmnp of Seires was close at liand, the 
di~tance from St. Jean de Eux to  tliat place only four iniles 
and tlio nttack in tlie Iow ground evidently a feiut. Tliis tlien 
wvm Soult'ti errur, He auffered Hope lo Iiold iii play twenty- 
five tliausand rnen in tlia loiv ground, wl~ile fifteen thousand 
under Clausel lnst tlle battle on tlie kills. 
5 9  The Frcncli army wan inferior in numbem and many of 
tlie works were nnfrnislied ; get two streng divisious, Darkau's 
and Poy's, were quite thrown out of tlie figlit j fcir tlie sliglit 
offensive movenient made by the latter produccd no eii'ect 
whatever. Vigurous counhr-wttncli~ are no deubt esseiititll to 
a goocl defence~ antl it was in allusion t o  this tbat Napoleon, 
spenking of doseph'~ position beliind the Ebro in tiia begin- 
ning of the war, ~uid,  if a river weru as brod and mpid as 
tlie Danube it would be notlung without sccure points for 
passing to the offensive,' The samc maxirn affects lina, 
and Soult applied tliis principie grundly wlien hc proposed 
the desccnt npon Ar~gon h Suchet; ht he c~nceivved ib 
mennly, when he ordered Fay to attack by the Gorospil 
mountdn. That gweral'a nnmhcw mero too fem, the direction 
of his mnrch falce; one regimcnt in the battle nt the decisive 
moment, would hava been worth three on auch a socondñry 
point. Foy's retreat was inevitable if D'Erlon failed, and 
wanting Foy'i prid D'Erlon did fnil. What suceess could Foy 
obtain? He might have driven Mina over the Col de Maya 
end Broirgh the Bastan; he might have defeated hforilh and 
perhaps have taken Hill'~ 'sggage; j e t  this would bave beea 
Iittle against the allid succees at Amotz, and the deeper he 
penetrated the more difficult would have been his retreat. The 
incursion into the &tan by Yspegui, proposed by him on the 
6tl1, althougli properly rejected by Xonlt mould h a n  produced 
greater &eck than the one exem ikd  by Gorospil on tlie 10th; 
for ELill's troops were then in m m h  by brigadss tliraugh tha 
Blduidw, md n sudden attack rnight have cauwd a delay nf 
the great b&tle bgond the 10th; tlien the h ~ u v y  rdns, which 
aet in the 11th would have rendered it difficult to attack 
at a11 : SonIt would thus have had time ta completa his workk 
6". It has been advanced as a minor cauce of defent that t h  
Fmnch troops wcrs posted in front, whereas they 8houId havo 
been in rear of the redoubts , this, if so, was not by defiign, for 
Clausel's report of thc &ion exprcssFp s t ~ t c s  that Maransin 
was directed to form in m r  and charge when tIie mRilanh 
were between the redoubta and the abbntis. It is bowevcr 
neecfless to pry closely when the peat cause lies broad on the 
snrface-'Arellington dircctd superior numbers with superior 
skiIL The proof wiIl be found in the folIowhg analysis, but 
it must be noted that the conscripts are not included in tlie 
Prench Eorce-they were kept in mttsses behind and never 
engaged. 
Ai~hFs Aivision o!? five tbowand old ddim were pwIysed 
by the 01;crathtiona of Longa and Afina, who at tlie snme tIme 
entirrly occiipied Foy's division-tlilis s i l  thousand of WcI- 
lington's worst soldiers suficed to emplny twelvo thonsnnd of 
5ou1t7rr be& troops, and meanwl.liile HiI1 fe11 witb twenty 
theuaand iipon tlie five thonsand under D'Amapac. The 
bttle was in thia manner sccumd on the right bank af tba 
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Nivelle, mbile Berepford on the left bank thmst twenty-four 
thousand agtiimt the ten tliouwnd composing Conroux'a md 
1Iaranain's divisions. Hill and Beresford dso in ad~lzneing, 
furmed ra weqlga tow~rds tlie bridge of h a t ~ ,  wwliereby forty- 
fuur t h o u s d  men were jmpellcd ug:birist the fifteen thomand 
under D'Armognae, Conroux, nnd Xaransin; and thssa Iuet 
could nat cven figl~t together, Iiecrause part of Gonroux'e 
troops were previoiislp defetitcd ncar Snrre, nnd a brigde oF 
Mnrancin's wm iscntcn on $he smaller Rhune before tlic mnin 
attnclr comrncnccd. Finally, Altcn, liaving eighlit tliousmd 
combntnnta, first defcrcated Bnrhot's hrigndc on tlic Eliunc md 
then fe11 on'Paupin who h d  only tliree tliotimnd, nnd the rest 
oF the Frcnch army wnti hdd in cliecl; Iiy Freyre nnd Hopc. 
Thus more tlian fiftg tliousxnd good and confirlent troopa vcrc 
suddcnly throm upan eighteen thoiisrtnd, good men algo but 
diapirikd bp previous dcfelits. Aginst such a thunderbolt 
fhere WRR no defence in the F~encii worlr~. Was it then a 
simple matter for Wellington so to combine liis battle? The 
mount~ins on whose Iiuge f lank~ he gatliered his fierce ~oldiery 
thc roads he opened, the bomid crags he surmounted, thc 
headlong steeps he deaeenderl, tlie wild region5 through which 
he poured the destmctive fire of  more thnn ninety gmns, tliese 
aniI the reputation of the French commanrler fumish the evcr- 
lasting reply. 
hntl yet he did not compass a11 tlint he designed. TEe 
French right escaperl, because wlien he pnsfied the Nivelle 
at San P6 he liad only two divisions in Iiand; the sixth liad 
not come np; tliree were watcbing tlie cninp rit Scrres, and 
bcfore lie coiild de~cend in force t o  the lom ground tlio 
day closed. Tlie greíit object of tlie Iiattle mris tlierefore 
unattained; antl it mriy be m qucstion, fiecing sliort ligl~t nnnd 
had roads were not unexpected, wl~etl~er the principal attack 
should not Eiavc been directed entirely q n i n s t  Clctiscl. Cn i l~s  
d'Espniirs ~nrl  tlie remniuder of Mina's bnthIions could llave 
reinforceri IIorillo ~ 4 t h  five tlioiisantl meri to occuliy D'Erloiis 
attention. anind it .mis not eseential to deferit liirn; for tliough 
he attribiited his retrcnt to Clausel's xwersc, tliat general did 
not coniplaiu tliat D'Erlon's fiight enrlan%~retl. Iiis position. 
This nrrangernent would have enlililed Uill to rciiuforce 
l3ere~forrI, mid have givcn Wellinghn tlircc additiond clivi- 
~ iona witli whicli tn cross the NivclIe iicfnre two o'clock. 
fioult's riglit wing coufd not then Iirtve escaped. 
7'. From Borne ovemidit the despxtclies ilirl hnt scant and 
h ~ d y  justice to tlie liglit division. Ilctiig done, for Lmga 
went oiT towads Asctain and scarcely fired a shot, tlint divisicn 
anlg four tliousmd seven hundred strnng, first cttrried thc 
smaller Rht~ne defeiided by Bwbot, anrl then beat Tanpin from 
the m u n  position, tlim &inB snperioc numbers from the 
ptrongest T V O P ~ S ;  and being lesi tliart onc-sixt.h o€ Ghe wliole 
o n e - t h i  of liis corps. Jfany brave men they lost, and of 
two whn fe11 1 will sye& 
Tlie first, low in rxnk for he was but s lieutenant, rich in 
honour for he h r e  rriariy ~ c a r s ~  was young oE daya-he was 
only nineteen, and h d  seen more coiiilittts mrl sicges thau he 
coulrl couut yeurs. So sliglit i ~ i  pcrc;ou and uf oucli ~urpassing 
and delicatn beanty tliat tlie Spaniartls oftcn tlionglit hiin 
a girl disgised in rnun's clotliing, lic wna yet uo vigoroas, 
so active, so bravo, thnt tlie most ditririg and cxpcrienced 
veterans watchcd lii~ Ioolrs on t l ~ c  field of Iintt'Ie, tmd, impllifcitly 
foIIoming where he lcd, wnuld lilre cl~ildren obcy Iiis sliglitcst 
@TI in tha most difficul~ ~ituntions. Wia ctlucntian wra 
incompletc, yct wcre liis natural powcrs no happy that tho 
kecncst and licabfurnislied intcllects slimnlc from m encountcr 
o€ wlt; and mery tlioiiqlit nnil nspirstion warc prniirl and noble, 
intlieating ftitiire grcatncss if dcstiny liad so willed it. Siich 
was Ellsnríl Freer of tlie fortptliird. Tlie niglit bcfore tlie 
hnttle lie 1 1 ~ 1  itmt fitninge aiiticiptitiun o€ corning dmtli EO 
oftcn fclt hy militarj* meii ; he >vas xtrticl; wit!i tliree bdls 
nt tlic firiit ~torming of tlie Rhune roclrs, mid tlie atp:mLqt 
H O ~ ~ ~ P P R  wcpt CVCR in thc middle of t h c  figlit wlicn tlicy m~iiv 
him fdl. 
On thc snme da? and et  tlic snrnc Iioiir wnn killcrl colond 
Tiiomas Lloyrl. Uc l i lwisc Iind I iccn a Ion: time ir1 tlic 
furty-tliird. Undcr liiin Prccr hnd lcnrticd dic rudiincnts of 
h i ~  profes~ion; llut in tlic conrse of t,hc mar prornotioii plnccd 
Lloyd rtt t l ~ c  licnd of tlic ninety-fourth, antl it >vns leading 
tliat reginient lic fcU, In Iiim dso were wmlmed mental 
and bodily powm of no ordinary Kid. Gracehl aymmety, 
hemIean &ren@h, snd a countenanm fmnk and majatic, 
gave the true intlex of Iiia nature ; for his caprtcity mas p a t  
and commanding, and bis niilitary knowledge extenave both 
from experience and study. Of his mirth and wit, well knawn 
in tbe armp, it only need be artid, t h t  he used the latter without 
offeece, yet so as ta  inwease bis asoendancy over thoae i t h  
whom he held intercourse ; for though gentle he was ambi- 
tious, vaBant and conseious of fitntlss for geat exploihs. And 
he like Freer wm presclent of and predicted liia o m  fall, but 
with no abatement of cxiumge ; for when he received the m o h 1  
woand, a most painful one, he would not mfer Limself t o  be 
moved and remaieed ko wateh the battle, making olisemations 
upon its c h m p  until death carne. It m thns at the q of 
tliiety, t h a t  the p o d  the Iirave the generons Lloyd died. 
TFibuks to his me& have been published by WelIinghn and 
The Evant- by one of  bis own poor soldias; by the high& 
fii Lifc or and by the lowest I To tlieir testimony 1 add 
a Sergegnt. mine: let tIiose who ~ e w d  on equl temai 4 t h  
bim say whether in auglit it has entggerated bk desierh 
S Q ~ T  at first designed t o  leave part of Lis forcea in the 
sntrenclied camp of Bqonne, and dko  n flaiiklng position 
hl~iad thc Pu'ivc, hlf-way bctween hyonne and St, Jcan 
f icd do P r t ;  hia Icft sccnrd by the cntrcnchcd m o u n t h  of 
U~~auia ,  his riglit on the hciig1it.s nbove Cnmbo, the bridne- 
hctad of wliich would givc him tho powm of mnlting offcnsivc 
movcmcnt~. Ec tlins hoped t o  lrccp hia troopa togctlier rtnd 
restore tlicir confidcnce, n.ilile Iic confincd the dlies-t.0 a small 
~terile diskict of Frnnce lictmccn the river and the sea, and 
rendered their situation very rinenny dirring the winter if 
tliey did not retire. Ro~vever hc woon modified this plan. 
Tlie works of tlie l h o n n e  camp were not complete anil his 
presenoe m s  necessary to urge &ir progrcss; tlie mmp on 
the Ursouia mounhin liad lieen neglected, contrary to ordeis; 
tlie bridge-hcad at b m b n  liad bcen only commenced on thc 
right ba& and thoiigli cornpletc on t he  lefk h n k  had R 
lid trace : rnoreover tlie Kivc in dry weather prwcd ford~blc 
at Ustnritz below Carnbo, and nt mnny plwes a b o ~ c  tllnt 
point. Rernainirig tliercfore at Bayoane Iiimsdf with six 
divisions and Villatte's reserve, he sent D'Erlon with t,hhree 
divisions to reinforcc Foy at Camba. 
Tet neitl~er D'Erlon's Jirisionfi nor 8oult's wvholc army 
would Lave stopped 1J7elhgton, if other circo.mstances liad 
pcrmitted him t o  act; for tlie hnrdships and privntions OS tbc 
mountnina bnd iinproved thc qitality of I i is troops. Pine air 
and tlie absence of drinli had confirmetl tbeir licrilth, while 
skict discipline and tlleir own engcrness to enter tlie fair 
plilnina of Francc spred oitt beforc thcm liad excited their 
niilitary qu~lities in EL wonderful dgree. Dnnger wris tlieir 
sport; and tlieis cxperienced general, in the vigour of life, w a  
equnlly irnpaticnt for action. Neitlier tlie works of tiie 
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OUL'r t tint i ed t l u t i e s i 11le
e enched ayolln ta e a n i IJOsiti
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811011,; and their experienced general, in the vigonr of life, WIlS
e lly impatie t f r acti . either the or s f tile
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Bayonne mmp noi the bamier of the Nive conld have long 
withstood the progress of such a fiery Iiost; and if Web 
lington wuld have let their strength ihnd fury looe  in the 
first days gucceeding the battle, France would have felt hig 
conqueiing footsteps to her centre. But tlie country at the 
Eoot of h e  Pyrenees is a deep elay, impassable ~ f t e r  rain 
sxeept by tbe roya1 red near &e coast, or th& of Xt. deiin 
Red de Port, both of wliicli were in the power of the Frencli. 
On the bye-roa& the infalltry mnk to the mid lag, tlie 
cavalry ~ b o v e  the horaes' Bnees, and even t o  tIie saddle-giirtlis 
in Borne places: tlie artillery wuld not move &t all. Rain 
mmmcnmd on thc llth, and tbc mist in the carly part of 
thc 12th gwe XouIt time t o  regain hia mmp and secure tbe 
higli road to St. Jcan Fied de Port; hence Iiia troopa easiIy 
gained thcir proper posts on tlre h'ivc, while hipi  adversa^, 
fixed in the swtamps, ccould only make the ineffectual. demon- 
dmtion at Ustnritz and Cambo. 
Wellington, uneasy for his right: flank while the French 
commanded the Cambo passage, dixected HB ilI menace it 
agein on the 16th. Foy haii received ordera to preservo the 
bridge-head on the right bank in any circumstancas, but he 
was pmitted to a h ~ d o n  the work on the left hnk in the 
evenb of a general attack; liowever, at Rilg apprwh tlie 
officer in commnd destroyed al1 tIre enffenchment% aud the 
bridge itself; thus doing tlie allbs' work for fheir flank 
h i n g  thecetiy securd tthy went into cantonmenta to awid 
the rain. But bad weather m not the anIy ohstacIe to 
further operations. On the vwy d g  of tbe battle Freyre's 
and Longa's soldiers pillqed AB& and murdered smml 
persons; next day al1 the Spanish troops continued these 
cxcmaes in various places; and Mina's battaliom, mme of 
whom wem aLo in a atate of rnutiny, made a plundering and 
mudering incursion from the mounfains towads Hellette. 
Tlie Portupese and Biitish ~oldiers of the Icft wing had com- 
menced the Iike outrriges: two Frerench persons *re kiIled in 
one towu. Ccnernl P~lcenham, miving at tllc moment, put 
the perpetraton to deat,h, thus njpping this wickednesa in the 
bud at bis o m  rislr. LegaTIy he bad nat tl~at pomer, but 
bis generositjr, humanity and cbivariic spirit. then and d w a p  
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infnntry occnpied &U buhe villnges antI t o m s  behind ne f 
haclr as E~spalette, Surniile, dinhoa, Snn PI$ Swc, ar 
Asmiin. One regirnent of Tnndeleur'~ mmlry remriined i 
the left, the rernainder were sent to Anrlnya snd Urop 
Yidor Alten's horsemen were abont San P&; and the heal 
cavalry rernained in Spain. 
The cstaliiishing o the advanced porrts prodnced several 
nkirmishes. On the 18th the generals WiIson and Panddmr 
were woxnded. On the snme day IIercsford dmve tht? Frencli 
from the bridge of Urflains, and maintained his acqnisition 
next &y iigainst s rounter attnck A more seGous actiun 
had place the 23rd in front of Brcanges. This viUrige, held 
by tlie piquets oof the light dividon, w s  two or tliree miles in 
frunt of Arbonne where tlie nearest suliport was cantoned. 
It stood in tlie centre oT a crescent-shaped ridge, and the $en-. 
trics of both amies were ~o close tliat tlie relicfs md patrolcs 
aetually pqsed ea& ootlier iu their rounds: ii, suqirise wtis 
inevitable if it suited either sidc to attempt it, JVeliiigton 
~5sited t h  post, and the field-oEcer on duty mado known t o  
liim its diatlvantages, and the meem of remedying them by 
bkhg entirc possession of thc villV, pushmg piqucts along 
the horns of tbc crcscent, ancl titablishing n chnin of posts 
ncroas r,lic vnLlg betwocn them. Ec appcamd sntisficd witli 
thia pmjcct, and two d n y  nftcrmrds the forty-thid and Borne 
of  tho riflcmcn wcre cmploycd to  cffoct ih, tho g r e n h t  pnrt of 
the diasion being brought up in ~upport. The French nftcr a 
few sbots abmdoncd Arcnngucs, Bussiwmry, and both horaa 
oí? the crcscent, retiring te a lnrge foítified house ~iiitiinted at 
tle. moutli of tlie valley. The matter wns thiis cxccutcd with 
tlie loss of anly f i ~ e  men moiindetl, nnd the nction should have 
ceased; but the piquets of tlie fclrty-third suddenly remived 
ordcrrr to nttnclr tho fortified housc, and mlnmns of support 
werc fihown nt scvcral points of the ~emicirclc; tbe Psench 
conceiving thcy mere to  bo scriously rissailcd thcn reinforced 
their post; a sliarp figl~t cnmd, an(1 the piqnets, findy 
w i t h d r m  te tlie ground t h q  had originnlly gained nnd 
bcyond which they shonld never h a ~ e  been pushed, lo& eighty 
eight men rind officem, of wl~icli cighty were of the forty-third. 
Wellington finding that the contiactcd clnyey country ha 
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occupied pnmlpccl nll his ibrtillery nnd hia cavalry, 
Original tliat is ta nny, n hundred guns aiid nine thous~nd Jrorning 
horsemen, became anxious t o  pass the h'ive; but stntea, 
M Y Y .  tlie rain contiaued to baRe him, e i d  meanwliile 
Milla, descending again from tlie Alduides to plunder E a y p ~ r y ,  
a beaten by the nationltl y d c r  of that valley, Howevcr, 
mrly in December t.l>e weatlier amendetl, fosty or fifty piew 
of artillery were brought up, and otlier pr~prations made to 
sitrpkc or force the pmsrqe of the Nive at Cambo and Usta- 
- - 
rih; and as this operation Ied to  mnguina~  battles ih is fit- 
ting to describe tlie exact position of tlie French. 
Bayonne being iiituatd at tlie eonfluence of the Nive and 
ths Adour riverv coinmanded tlie passage of both. It ww 
ra wealc fortress but derivd importaneo from its position md 
entrenclied camp w h i d  coriId nit be ~asily attacked in front, 
wherefore Xoult kept only six divisions tbere. His rigl~t, 
mmposed of Itciile's tuvo divisions rand Villntk'g reserve, 
touched on the lower Adour, ~vliei-e thcre was a fleiiEle of gun- 
hmts; it WRS ravercd by a a m m p  and artificial inundation, 
tliroitgh ivliicl~ %he royt~l ronrE Fcti ta Bt Jean de Luz* and tha 
advnned posb, wcll entrcnclicd, wcrc pusl~ed dong thnt cause- 
way beyond Anql:~et Ris IcR, under Clnuscl, composcd or' 
tliree divisions, extended from Anglet to the PYivc; it wari 
m~.cretl pxrtly Ry the riwmp, pnrttly by the fortified house 
awailed by tlie light division tlit! 23d, parEly by au inundation 
sprmding below Uidaíns tow~rds tlie Nire. Tlins ent~nclted, 
t l i e  fürt.:fied outposts m y  be cxlled +he front of battle, the 
entrcnehed camp tlie secontl line, Bayanne the citadd. The 
country in front, a deep clay BOJ, uiñs covered 4 t h  mal1 
wootlei and farm-homes and vcy  dificult to move in. 
Reyond tlie Kive an entrenched eamp, stretching from that 
Svcr to thc iipper Adoiir, wm mllcd the front of 3íouseroles. 
This camp was licld by B'Erlon with four divisions; but bis 
troop~ weie ex tmdd  up the riglit o€ the Nive to Uatarit~ 
nndcr D'Arrnagnnc, and frnm tliencr! t o  C ~ m b o  undei Foy; 
while in person he ocmipied a rringe cif hcighka two d e s  in 
fmnt. of tlie cnmp, having liis righlit at Tillcfranque on the 
Hire, his left at old lfogiicrrc nenr the Adour. Gcnerol. Paris 
dso carne domn from St, Jcan P i d  do Port to  Laliouesoa, doae 
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undei the U ~ I J H  mountain, where he wm in connexion ~ 3 h  
Foy's left by t,he pcat  road. 
The h ' i~e ,  tlie Adour, and the Gave de Pau which fa& into 
tlie Adour many miles &ove Eayonne, mere all na+able ; 
tlw f 1 ~ 8 t  as fm BB Ustmitz, the secand to Da, thc third to 
Pepehorade, and tlie Tasge -azines were collectd at tlie 
tm !atler ~Iaces,  The French rnrmy was bowever fed witli 
difficulty, and to restrain it from tlie country beyond the Nive, 
to intercept communication witli. St. Jenn Pied de Port, to 
Iiring tlie cavalry into wtivity and to obtain secret intdli- 
gen# from the interior, were Wellington'a inducementa to 
Iorce a prissage over the Nive. Yet to place tlie traops on 
both sides uf ra navigxhle river, where the communication, bad 
nt al! times, wna suliject to entire jnterruption from rain-to 
do this in faw of an inmy posaessing sbort cornmunicationg 
good rmds, and entrenclied carnps for r e t r ~ t ,  was a delicate 
a~id dangeroue opertition. Oders were howevcr ixsued for 
forcing t h ~  pnssrge on the 9th. On tliat day Hope and 
Oti~nal Charlc~ Altcn, h n ~ i n g  tlic firct, fifth and Iight 
st~tea. divisionrr, tlie nnnttnched bigdcñ of infantry, 
JLSS. Vnndclcur's cavalry anrl tmelvc p n g ,  in nll tmenty- 
faur thousand cornbatants, wcm to drive b& o11 the Frcncli 
advmced p s t s  betiveen the Nive and tlie sen. T h i ~  wns 
partly to examine tlic ooursr! o€ tlie lo~vcr Adour with a víew 
to subsequent operations j principally t~ make Soult discover 
Iiia dicpositions on that side, and to kecp hia troops in check 
while Bercriforit and Hill crtissed tlie Nivc. To support this 
doulile operlition, the fmrth and seventh diGsions mre 
aecretTy Grouglrt up from Arrcnin xnd Espclette on thc 8th; the 
latter to tlie liill o€ Et. Barfie, from whence it detacherl one 
bri,de to relieve the pmts oE the tfiird division. Thcre 
remaincd tlie aecond, third and sixth clivisions, Hamilton's 
Portupece, and Morille's Spaniards for the passqe. Beres- 
ford: lending tlie third and sixth, six p n s  and a squadron of 
camlrq; was to eross at Ustaritz mith pontoons ; IliIl, ha6ng 
the second division, Hamilton's Portug~ece, Yivhii's and Yic- 
tor Alten's cavdry and fourteen gnns, was to ford tlie river st 
Cambo aud Larrestiore : both generala were then to repair tIie 
briaga at thvse points with rnaterialz prepared beforeliand 
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mhen Hill hod won the passrtge he placed a Lrigride of 
Infantry at Urcurray, te cuver tlie bridgc .of Cambo alid sup- 
port his mvaIry, wliicli he despatelied to scour tLe roads 
towards Lnhoussoa, St. Jwn Pied de Port., and Haparen, and 
t e  observe Fnris ancl Picrre Soult.. Witli the rest of his troopsi 
he rniarchcd to thc hcigl~lits of Lorrnciithoa fhcing iiIoguerre 
untl ViIlefrtinqug and wn.q there jaincd by thc ~ i x t h  diviMan, 
tlic thirrl rerriuining to mver tlic bridgc of Ustaritrr. It wna 
now one o'clock, nnd ~Soiilt, coming Iinutily from Rnyonne, 
approved o€ n'RrIan's dispodtions and offered battle. D'Ar- 
rnagnae wag in advanee nt Villefranq~~c and n cannonade and 
slrirmish enzued along the front, but no general attacIr was 
madc becsuse the deep roarIs tiad retarJed the rear of Rili's 
columns. Nevertlieless tlie Portiiguese of tlie sixth division 
drovc D'Armngnac with sliarp fighting antl after ona repulse 
out of Villefranque, nnd a brigade of tlie ~econd division wils 
tlien establislred in Rdvance to connect WIll mitt  the troops in 
Wllefranque. Thus tlirec divisions o£ infaiity, ~vanting tha 
Iirigade left at Urcuri-ay, Iremmd up fonr Prencli divisions; 
md the lutter, ilotivitli~tanJing tlieir superiority of num- 
hrs, made tio advantage of tlie broken moveinents of the 
dlies criuscd by t11c deep roads, the parsage of tlie Nive may 
be j udged a surprise. 
Wellinq$on l i d  80 far overremlied Iiis abIe adversq, yet 
he lind not trustcd t o  this unccrtnin chsnm dono. If tlie 
French mmscs Iind fnlten upon tlie Iieads of liis colurnns at 
Zomcntlioe wliile tlie rcnr mas stiil lnliouriug in thc dccp 
M Q ~ R ,  thcy mi$ hnvc causcd soine disordcr; liut tlicy aoiiltl 
not havi: drivcn citIicr Hill or Bcrcsford ovcr tlic r i~cr  i~pain; 
hecnusc tlie tliisd division n.ne cIosc n t  hand to rcinforce tlie 
sixth, nní1 thr; brigiidc of tlic a~vciitli, Pcft nt %n h r h e ,  could 
liavc fulloivcd by tiie bridge of Ustxritz, tlius giving tlie dliea 
the supcriurity of niimlicrs. The gi-eatcst dnnpr was, t h h  
Paris, reinforccd by Picrre Soultys cmlryx sfionld have 
returned and fallen npon Morilla or the bripde lefh at 
Urcumriy, while Soult, rcinforcing D'Erlon with frcsli divisions 
brought from the otlier sido of the Nive, attackcd Hill and 
Beresford in front. It was to prwcnt ttiia itliat Hope and 
Alten, whnse operations ai-e noiv to be relatcd, liressed the 
enemy oa tho left bbxk, 
Hope having twelve miles to rnarch fram St. Jean de Luz 
bcforc he could reach the French worlcs put liis troops in 
motion h r i n g  thc nigfit; and &out cight lito'cloclr passed 
betwecn the tanIts in front oE Barroiiilhet with Lis riglit, 
while hls lcft, demnding frorn tho pIntferm of Bidurt, erosscd 
the d l c y  nnd moved by tthc hci~ht3 of Bia i ts  Tlie French 
outpsts retired fighting, and Rope tlien sweepiiig on a half 
circlc to his right md Iieing prccctl~l by tttic fire of his q n s  
md many sllirmiahcrs, arrivcd in front of tlic entrenched 
mmp about ane ddock. His Ieft m e d  on t.lie Iower Adoiir, 
hir eentrc rnenmetl ri, strong advanced worIt on tlie sidge of 
Eeyria begond Snglet; Lis right was in communimtion mitli 
Alten, who d t l i  a sl~orter distmce to move had ha l td  
about Bussirs~ary ~ n d  A m g u e s  nntil Hope's fiery crescent 
closed on the French camp-then Iic aduanced bnt witI1 tlie 
exception of B clight sklrmish at ttli fortified Iiouae there mas 
no resistanm. Tliree divisions, some ca~alry, and the unnt- 
tached brigxdcs, equnl to a fourth divlsion, suffioed therefore 
to keep s i l  Frencli divisions in check on thia side. But when 
evening closed the allies fe11 back towards tlieir original posi- 
tions under heavy rain and with great fatigue t o  Hope's wing; 
for even tlie roynl road vas knee-(Ieep of mitd nnd liis troups 
were twenhy-fmr houm uuder ams. The whole doiy's fighting 
wst aboiit eigLt hundred men for each side, tbe loss of tlie 
allies being rathcr gren te r  on thc Ieft bank of the- river tliaii 
on the rjglit. 
WelIin$on's ~ l ' i i l p  vere nom separated by the Nive, and 
Soult resolved to fa11 upon one of them with bis wliole force 
united; h t  lie mas misled by the: priswers, m110 told liim 
tIie t h i d  and fourtt di.jisions were at hrmentlioa. This 
induced him to  mdce his co-unter-strolre on the otlier Iiank of 
tbe Nive;  tlic more redily becausa thcre he muid concen- 
trate liis force mitG less difficulty, and tlie alliea were most 
extended. TJle garrison of Rayonne, eight tliousand strong, 
partly tronps o€ tlie linc partly nationnl guards; ivere to occwpy 
tbe entreilclied camp of 3Tousserolles; ten pn-bonts an the 
upper Adour were to watcli that river ns hiqli as tlie conflu- 
ente af tlre GAVF: de Pau; D'Erlun rvns to fila Iiis four divisioas 
avcr thc Iiriclge of boatti lietwccn tlic fartresq nnd ~IoiisscrolIeg 
to guin tlie clrmp of Narac nnd taIre post behind ClauseE on 
Imperial the other side of the Xive. Thus nine divisiona 
~ u s t ~ r - r ~ i r ~ ,  of infmtry nnd Tillatte's reserve, a brigade of 
IISS. cnva!ry, wnd forty guns, in nll sixty tlioiimnd 
combatanta, incliiding ccnscripts, were to assnil a qunrter wharo 
&igina tlic ullics, altliough stronger by one division tlian 
B ~ ~ r l l l l ~ g  wns i m a ~ n u l ,  hnd yct onlg thirty thousmd infan- 
Gtatw. try witli twenty-four pieccs of cannon. 
Soult's fimt dedcrrip mas t o  burst with 1iLs whoIe a m J r  on the 
table-lnnd of Eusmsaary and Arcanpm, and then 
Fonlt, ?iIJS. fo  net w circurrstancee shmld dictate; and he 
auprcd so weEl of Iiis cliances tlmt he desird tlie minister o£ 
war to espcct good nem for tlie next dny. Indeed the situation 
of flie al!ies, nlthmgh betier than he knew of, gave him aome 
riglit to  anticipate sucms; for on no paint was thera any 
espectntinn of tliis formidable coutlter-rtttack Wellin, ..ton nas 
on ihe right of tlie Nive, preparing to assault the heights 
where he had Eeeli ttic Praich the evening before; fiope's 
truop~, with sxceplion of Wilson's Portuguese new com- 
m a n d d  by iygeried Carnphll and posted at Barrouilliet, hrl 
retired to tlieir wntonmcnts; tl ie fiist dii~isian mas at St, 
J a ~ n  da Luz and Cibuure, more tIim six miles J i s h t  from 
tlie outpusts; tiie Sfth division was lietween tliose plwea and 
Ridart, md nll exccdingly fatigued. The light division hd 
ordea to  retire from Bussussary tu drbonne, four miles, md 
pmt o€ th? seeond Iirig-adc I i d  aircdy marchad; but fortu- 
iintely Kernpt, someivliat suspicioas of tIie enemy's move- 
~iciits,  kspt tho first Iirigde ia frcnt until he codd aee what 
was going on: he thus sared tlie position. 
Tlrc ext~iortliiiarp dificidty even for single homemen o€ 
iiioving tliroug-li tbe country, tlle nnmcrous c?nclo~urcs md 
cnpws wiiicii dcnied any distincb viel!*, t.hc rcccnt succecs in 
crossing tlie h c ,  and B cmhin ll~ughty confidente, tlio sure 
nttcnrliint of n long mime of victciry, serm t o  Iinve rcndered 
the Eiiglinh gcncrni nt tliis timc somcwhnt nckigcnt o£ h!s o m  
sccurity. His nrmy was no1; disposed ms i f  s bnttle wm 
cxpected. TIie gcnernl pmition, composcd of two distinct 
parts, was iiidccd strong; thc ridgc of l3tlrreuilhet could onlg 
be ntt~ckeiI donp the roj.al mrid on a narrow front betwecn 
the. hnka  wliich he directed to be entrcnched; bnt oulg 
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oue liripde was there, and a rond, opened with difficulty by 
the cngineers, supplied a bad flank communic:ttion mikh the 
light divisian. Tliia Bt~rrouilhct ridgc was prolongcd to the 
plntform of Buasussmy, but in its mintling Bulgcd too aear the 
enemy's works in the centre to  be safcly0ct?upiwl in force, and 
Iieliind it was it d e q  vdley or b&n cxtencfing to Arlionne. 
Oa. the otlier side of this basin w a ~  the ridpe of Arcangues, the 
position of battle for the centre; from thence three tonguss 
of land shot out to the front, and tlie wlleys between them, 
as welE as tfieir slopes, were covered rvith copse-woods almost 
impenetrable. The cliurcli. of Arcanguea, a private mansion 
itnd parts of the viIlage, furnished mIlying poiuts of defence 
for the piquet~, whicli wcre necessarily numerous because of 
the ~xttent of front ; md at tliis time t l ~ e  lebhand t o n p  was 
occupied by the fifty-second regiment, wliich had &o posts in 
tlie great bavin selinrating the Arcanp~w position from tlirit 
of Barrouilliet. The centra[ tongue was held by tlie piquets 
of tlre forty-third, with supporting companies placed in suc- 
csaion torn~arrfc Rumuasnry, whcn? tlicn? ~vns nn opcn common 
which must be pwassed in rctrcat to  rmch thc chnrch of Aran- 
gues. The third tonpe  wm gundcd ptlrtly by the forty- 
tliid partty by thc riflemen; but tlic vnllcy betwcen wfis not 
oomipier?, nnd the piqillds on the extreme rigl~t extended to m 
innndation, acrosa rt nmow part of which, nmr tho lionse o€ 
t.11e aenator h r r a t ,  there was a hrirlp: the fitcility for attmlc 
w ~ s  tliere horrever sninll. One brigdc of the seventh &&ion 
mntinucrl ttiis lino of posts to tlie Nive, holding t,hc bridge of 
Urrlains, the rest of the rlivision m bchind &m Plnrbe and 
heloiigcd mther to Ustaritr, tlian to tliis front. The 
U foirrt1i divisioii wm ~evernl niiles behind the righf of the lighb 
rfivision. 
If Roult had, as he fimt ddesigned, biirst with hia  mhole 
11my upon Russussnry and Arcangics, it woulrl have bccn 
impossible for the light dlvision, wttered as it was over ~ u c k  
an cxtent of difficult ground, to llave stopped hiin for hnlf au 
Itour, and thcre was no support within severnl miles, no 
superior officer to direct the concentmtion o£ tho different 
divisions, Wellington liad indeed orrlerd aH ttlie line to be 
entrenchd; but the worlrs were commenced on a greiit s d e ,  
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and, as commcmly haripens when danger doea not spur, the 
soldiera Iaboured so crtreles6ly, that hy-ond a f m  ahbati~ the 
tmcing of some lines and rerioubts aud tlie opening of a mad 
of cornmuni~%tion, tlie ground remained in its naturel ski&. 
The Frsnch would tliareforo qiiickly have gairied the lirriad 
Qpcn h!lls bcyond Arcariguea, and scparuting tlie fuurtli an(I 
rieventl~ from tlie ligllt division, linye cut tlicm off from Hope. 
Roult howerer, Iii tlic course of thc night, for somc iiiilrnom 
m o n  cllatigd Iiis ~ i r o j e ~ ,  rtnd at dayhreak RcilIc m~rched 
6 t h  Boyer'a snd Maucune's divisioua, Sprrc's caviilry> and 
from twenty to  tliirty p n s  qainst  Rope by tho main rod. 
He was fo l l u~ r~d  by Foj* and Kllatte, Lnt Clausel rissernbled 
bis troops under caver of the ridges near the fortified liouss in 
fiont of bus su asa^, and one of D'Erlon's dinsions approaclied 
the bridge of Urrlaiiis. 
Cena.Ziai nf the 10M,-ILeavy rnin fe11 in the nigl* yet the 
morning broke f i r ,  and soon after dxivn $he Frencli inrantry 
mere ol-ir;crved Iiy the piqueta of tIre forty-tliid to push each 
otlier ubout m if at gnrnbuIs, yet Iining by degrcea tlie nearest 
rlitclies; n general oflicer wae Jsu seen beliirid a fm-howe 
close to the scntinels, and ak tlie same tizne the heads of columns 
could btr perceived in tlie rsar. Thus waned, aome compmies 
were thmwn on tlic rigllt inte the basin t o  prevent tlie enemy 
from pcnetrating that wap to t.hc srnnll plrsin betíveen 13ussua- 
eary and Arcangues. lCempt was mith the piqueta, nnd 
immctliatcly plr*cetl thc rcacrves of his brigade in the church 
and rnnndon-house of Arcangues; merinwliile the Frcncli 
hrwking fortli mitli Ioud crieq mtl a rnttling rnusketry, fe11 ilt 
a running pace upon tlie piquets of the forty-tliird both on 
the tonh-ue rsnd in tlie Li:isiti; anci a cloud of ekirrnisliers 
d e s c e n d i ~ ~  on tlieir leR penetrnted Iietween tliern nnd the 
fift~y-cccoii regiinent nnd aouglit to turn both: thc right 
tonpe  wns in lilrc mnnncr afisailed find 8-t the snme time 
thc piqucts nt tlie brirlgo ncar Earrnt's housa mcro drivcn 
h&tI<. 
This  asqriult TTS so ñtrong nnd rnpid, tlic cncmy so numb 
roiis, thc grountl 80 cxtcnñive, thnt it woiiErl hnve beca impos- 
sible tn haae rexclieii tlie smdl pWn beyond Riissu~aiiry in 
time ta  regaia tlie chnrcli of Arcsnpes if any serioue resid- 
mce had been attempted; wherefore delivering tl~eir Gre a t  
pi~tol-~Iiot dishnce tlle piquets fe11 back in succession, nnd 
ncver WCrE thc stendintss and intclligcuco of vctcrnn soldiem 
more cminently displaycd. For though it wari necesary to 
mn at fitll spee(1 to p i n  tlie ama11 plnin br?foro t.he enemy, 
wlio wris con~tantly outflanking tlie line oE posta by tlie Iimin 
-thoiigh the ways were so deep and nnrrriw thnt no forma- 
tion could Iie preserved, tlie fire of  the Fr~.nch being thick 
and clase and tlieir cries vehcment as thcy rushed on in pur- 
mit-tlie instant tlie open ground at Eussussnry was attained, 
the apprently disordaed cromd of fu&ives tnrned in good 
order, defying and deriding tEie fruitlcss effurts of tlieir adver- 
sanes. The fifty-qecoiid, Ealf a mile to tlie le& though only 
slightly nsmilerl, feli back also t o  tlie main ridge; for Jhougli 
the closeness of the country &d not pemit colonel Colborne 
t o  observe the strerigtb ol' tlie enemy, Iie couId me tlis rapiJ 
retrent of hhe forty-tliird, and tlieuce judging how serious the 
dair TVE., so well did tlie regimenta uE tlio liglit d i ~ s i o n  
n n d e r s h i  each other's qualities, withdre~v his oiitposts to 
aecure the main position. dnd in good time he did so. 
On tlie rigl~t hnnd tonguc the t roop  were not so fortunate; 
for \vhhetlier they dclayed ilicir retreat too lona or tllat tiie 
country wnB more intricztc, the enemy moving by ttlie bitsin, 
reachctl Bussu~ary before t l ie rear rarri~ed, and aLont a 
bundred of tho forty-third nnd riRcman werc thus intcrccpted. 
The French wcre in a hollaw rod and carelecs, never doubt- 
ing that the officcr of thc forty-third, cnsign Camphcll, a 
outh  scnrccly ciglitcen y e m  of agc, would surrcnder; hit 
with u sllout hc broke sword in hand tl~r-corigh tliein, lm~ ing  
twenty o€ tIie forty-tliird and thirty of the rifIcmcn with tlicir 
oficcrs prisoncm 
U'Armagnac pushcd cIose np to tha littlo bridgc 5f Urilninñ, 
and Clriusel msernblcd his threo divisions by degrces nt 
Buwusacy keeping up a constant fire of  muslce t~ ,  lint the 
position was safe. TIie mansion-lioirse on tlie riglit, covered 
by abbaki,tis and not ensily acertssitile, was defendc~l Iy a rifle 
battaliun and tl~e Portuguese; tlie c h c h  and church-yxrd 
were occupied by the forty-t,likd sny~iurtetl ji4.L two muuntsin 
p, tlie front being protected by a clecl'vity o£ thick copse- 
wood, filled with riffsmcn and only to  he tunied by namw 
Iiollow roads leading on e& aide t o  the charch. On the left 
the fifty-second, sapported by the remainder of tbe dividon, 
apread M far as the great basb ~eparating them fmm Bar- 
rouifhet, towards ~ h i c l ~  some maIl posts wcre pnshed : birt 
there m &il1 a great intervd between Alten'a and Hope's 
positions. - 
Clawel Iirought np tweIve guns to tbe ridge af Bussussuy 
and threw shot and shells into the church-y& of Arcangues; 
four or fivr, huntlred infantry then made rt rush forward, but a, 
lieavy fire from tli,e forty-third sent them back over tlm ridge 
wliere their grins were postal. The practioe of the latter 
would bave been murderous if tliis muskety liad not marle 
the French ganners withdrnw tlleir piecm a little bliind tlie 
ridge, which causcd tlicir shot to Ay wiId and Iiigh; Kompt, 
tliinking the didance too pent, wrig at fiiwt lnclined to ~top  
the fire; but the momcnt it lulled, tlie French gunners pushcd 
tlieir picces Eorwa~d ap in  and their shells knackd d o ~ n  
eight men in Bn instmt,-wlien the muslret ry rccommend 
the ahells a p h  flew liigh. Tlie riflemen in the village and 
mansion held the cnemy equally at by, and the action, Fiottest A 
where the fifhy-second fought, continued al1 day. It m 9  aot 
very severe; but French and Englisli writers, misled perhapa 
by an i n a m a t e  phrase in the piihlic desptltch, have repre- 
sented it a8 a desperatF attack by whIch tlie Iight dividon mas 
diiven into its en trenchmenta ; whereas the piquets only were 
forced back, there were no entrenchments saye those made at 
the m~rnent by the soldiers in tlie church-prtI, and the Frmch 
can hardly be said to liiive seriously attaclred. The real battle 
was at ~~rroiiilliet.  
Tbcrc Iteille, ntlvancing v i& tmo divisiom alront nine 
o'cloclr, drove baclr tlie outposts from Anglet and tben fdl on 
tlie main position; hut nioving by a iiamow ridge and confi~ed 
on eticli siide by tlie tnuks he could only tlirow two Lirigades 
iulu action on the main rwad, aud tlie min of the prsceding 
niglit l i d  rendered al! tbe hye-mude so deep it w a  m i d 4 ~  
Iiefore the b e  of lizttlo wae filled. This delay saved h e  
allies; for tlie nttaclr ~vns so unexpected, thnt tho firat division 
and lord Aylrner's brignde were in St, Jean de Luz, 13idart and 
Guetarg d e n  tlie figliting commenoeti; tlie latter did not reach 
the pmitioe before eIeven o'clock, rtnd the foot-guarda did not 
nrrive until Cliree in tlie afternoon when t%e figlit wns done: 
a11 the troops were exceedingly fatiguet., onlp ten guns courd 
be broaght into play, annd from soma ne~ligence part of the 
infant y were at first aithout ammunition. Hope directed 
the piquete jn person, and resisted the enerny until CnmpbetE'~ 
Portuguesa first and then hbinson's Rritish brigdes nnd 
Drdford'a Portupese carne up. Mcanwhilc thc French akir- 
miaher3 ~yread nnIong the whole d l e y  facing Bimih, their 
principal cfl'iirt being by tbe grcat mad and ~ p i n s t  lie pltit- 
form of Bnrrouilhet round the mayor'# housc, whem the grwnd 
was so thick of hedges ond coppice-wood fhat a most confuscd 
fight took plncc. The aasailanta cutting wrrys in the hedgea 
poured throiiglr in ~mdler or larger bodiw a# the openings 
aIIowed, and mexe immediately engaged with the defenden; 
at some pointii tliey were succeasfiiI rrt others beaten back, nnd 
few knem what warr going on to t he right or left of where 
they stood. By depees Reille enga'aged botk liis divisions, and 
some of VilIatte's reserve alse entercd the fight; bnt then 
AyImer's brigxde arrired on the allies' side, wlilch enabled 
areville's hrigade of the fiftli division, hitherto kept in reserve, 
ta relieve Robinson, who had Iost many men and m danger- 
oudy wouncted. 
nt this time a very notable acfian wvaa p e d m e d  by tlie 
dnth  regiment nnder colonel Cmeron, w110 wn9 on tlie 
extreme left of Greville; Robinson mas then shifted in 
second Iine townds tlie riglit, Bradforcl rat tlie mayor's houqe 
some distante te  tl~e left of the ninth, and the spnce betrreen 
whs oceupied by a Portupese btlttalion. In fmnt of Greville 
was a thick hedge; biit immediately apposite tlie nintli n coppice- 
wnod w a ~  posscsscd by thc cnemy, wlime slcirmishei~ were 
continunlly ptherjng in mwsm aní1 rusl i in~ out ns if +,o nssnil 
the h e ;  they wcrc as oftcn drivcn bnclr, yet tlic ~ o u n d  n.ns 
ao broken tlmt nothing coiild be sncn bcyoncl thc Aanlts. 
IVhen some time liad passed in thk niannor, Ctcmeron, ~vho 
hwl received no ordem, l i d  a sudden firiiig along the maiu 
rond close to Ziis left, and found tht a f iendl  regimcnt, 
which mmt have pnssed unseon in mal€ bodios through tho 
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Portupese, between ths niutli nnd the mayor's lionie, wa~i 
Note by rapidly fiiiig in to  13110 on his renr. Tlie fonrf;h 
carneron, rcgment wati thcn in closc column nt  a ahort 
3lYB. distaiicx ; it$ cornmnndes, colonel Aper, ww 
directed by Carneron to face abont, rnarch t o  tlie rexr rrnd 
bring iip hia lefh sboulder, by mliich he would infallibly fa11 
in mitii tlie E'rench regiment; Gut mhetfier Piper misunder- 
stiod ilie rirder, took a wrong direction, or niistook the 
encmy for Portupese, lie p m e d  them, no firing was heard, 
tlie d j u t a n t  of t t e  nintli Lurried to tIie rear, itndreturned 
witli Lritelligerice tltat thc? fourtli regiment r v ~  nnot to  be ~een 
nud tho enzmy's line was neur1y formed, Carneron, leaving 
fifty mr7n to answer thc slrirmishing fire wliicli nom incrmsed 
from the mpse, immcdiratcly f m d  nbout and mnrched in line 
ngninst the new enemy iinder u fire, dow at first hut increw 
ing vehemently ne t.lie distr~nce le~~eticrl; yct ivlicn tlie ninth, 
coming elosie npj sprung f017vnrrIs tO the chargc the adverse 
line hroke acd fled t o  the flmks in tlie iitmost disoder. 
rrtlose wbo marle for tlieir ewn Tlg11t bnrshed the lefb of 
&eville's brigdc, and evmi mrried off an oficer of the royals 
in their riisli; yet t.he peatest number wcrc rnn(?c prisoners, 
md Carneron liaving Iost eighty men and oficcrs resumed hie 
Eormer groiind. 
Tlic action now siibsidd for s time, biit n tllird and more 
Figorous nttaclr -+as soon made. The Frencli win passed 
tlic thnka, wlzd tlie out-buillings ~f the mayor's house, and 
broke irito the coppice-waod in front ol  it. They were 
quiclrly driveii from tlie out-buildings by tlie royals; get the 
tumult was grmt aand tlie coppioe wras filled witli men of al1 
~istions intemiixed and fighting jn a perilou~ manner. Rohiii- 
son's briptle was a p i n  very liardly h a n d l ~ l  a squadrvn of 
Frencli cavdry, wlieeling siiddenly ruund t:ie ~voud, cut dowu 
many of Cmphiucll's Portupese; and un thc riglit the colonsl 
of tlie cidity-fuurth hnving hislily entcrcd o holiow rontl 
where the Fr'rencli occupied tlie high hlianlrs on ench side iros 
lrilld with a grcnt numbcr of his mcii. Sir John Hop, 
conspicuorrs fmm liis gigantic staturc rtnd hcroic ooiirafte, mm 
fimn wlicrercr óacger ~ircscicd~ mllying and encotimging tho 
troops; nt one time bc wns in thc midst of the encmy, his 
dothes were pierced mith bullets, and be rmeived a severe 
mound in tlie a&le, yet he would not quit the field, and by 
bis intrepidity restored the battle. The hall r d t  WBS the 
repulse of Reille'~ division; yst Pillatte still menaced the 
riglit flatnir, and Foy, taking possecsion of the narrow riclge 
connecting Bussnasary with the platform of Barrouilhet, 
tbrem his slrirmishers into the great bnsin Ieading t~ Arbonne, ' 
connectcd Iiis r!ght with Ikille's left and mensced Hope's 
flmlanlr at Barrouilhet. Tliis wa~i &out threa o'doclr, nnd 
Xonlt d o s e  columns were now al1 up waei going to renew 
the hattle, when Claiisel reported that a large bodg of 
fresh troopq apparentJy coming from tha other side of the 
Eive, was menming D'Ar-ac from the heighta above 
Urdainrr. Unable to  acmunt for this, and seeing tbe gaards 
md Q e m n s  moving up fhct bom St, Jean de Luz and di 
the nnattached brigada alrady in line, t l ~  French marahd 
h&tated, suspended his attack, and odered D'Erlon, who 
had t a o  aivisions in reseme, to detach one to the 
anlt'aPSS. 
snpport of D'Arma,pac : before tliese dispositions 
could be completed tlie niglit fell. 
Tlie fresli troops rreen by Clausel were the tia8 fourth, 
skth and seventh divisions. WelIington digoovcring at day- 
brenk on the 10th that the Frencli had abandoned the 
heighh in front of Hill, directed that officer to o m p y  
thcm, to push pnrtieg cIose up to the entrenclied camp of 
Mousserola, and sprend his cavalry up th0 Adour. Tbe 
rnmonnde on the lcft bank of thc f i e  then dicw bim t o  
that sidc, md he made the t h i d  and sixth divi~ions w p s s  
thc river; directing Rcrcaford w 1ay another brjrlgc of com- 
rnunimtion near Villefmnque to ~horten the line o€ rnove- 
menk Whcn he mw how tlre battle ritoorl Iie clmw the 
~fivmth divitiion towmds the left from tlie liill of &n Rtlrlie, 
placed the Bid rlivision at Urrlaing and bronglit up the 
fourth diFiRion to an open hcatliy ridge &out a milc b~hind  
Arcuguc~. From thence Ross's brignde moved i n h  khe 
basin on the left of Colborne to eover h b o n n c ;  and Cole 
prepared to march with his whole divi&on if thc enemy 
penetrated in force Getween Hope and Alten Tliese dispo- 
aitiow were oompIeted ahut two o'cloclc, and tlius ClnwI 
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wm held in check at Bussamq and Sonlt'a renewed attack 
en Barrouilhet prevented. 
- In tbe battle the Angla-Portupese losE more t8an h e l w  
hundred killed and wounded, h o  generah were amongst the 
latter, and tliree hundred men were maile prisenm. Tbe 
h n c h  had one general, TilEatte, wounded, and lost t w ~  
tliousand men; but when the action terminated tm 
ments of Nasm and one of Frankfort, under mlond Kruse, 
ame  mover te the dies, These ineu were not deserters. 
TIreir prince had abandonerI NwpoEeon in Cferrnany and sent 
secret instructions to his troops to do so Iilcewise; and in 
good time, for orders t o  disarrn them reathocl Soult the ncxt 
morning. The mntending. pnernlri, one hoping ta profit, 
tho other to prevcnt mischief, immediately tmnamitted notice 
of the event to Cakalonia, mliere several regimerits of the 
same nations wem ceerving. Welliwon failed for m o n s  
ta be hereafter meutioned, but Suchet dismmed his Gemnti  
with reluctsnce, thinking tliey could be trusted; and the 
N~imau troopc at Bapnnc were perhaps Iwa influenwd by 
patriotism t h n  by an old quarrel ; for when attached ka the 
army of thc centre they hnd forcibly f w e d  Bouit's clistrict, 
md carrieú of the apoil in defiance of his authoritp, which 
gave rke to bitter disputes at tlie time. 
C d t  Of lJ1~ 1 Uh.-In the night of the 10th Reille mith- 
drew from beliind tlie hnks to Pucho; Foy anll Irillatte 
likewise drew back dong t11e connectiag ridge t o m h  Biw- 
suasary and nnitad Fnth C l a u ~ I  anll D'Erlon. Thus on the 
morning of the 11 tli tIie wliole French iarmy, wit1i the excep 
tion o£ D A m n p o c  wlio remained in front of Udnins, wm 
concontrnted, for SouIt at fimt expected R countcr-attwk. Wie 
FrcncIi dwerters mid indeed tbat ClauseI lid scleckd kwo 
tliousnnd grcndcrs to assnnlt Armngucs, hut the dny pnsscd 
tlicre with onIy B slight ~kirmish. Not 80 OTI tlic ~ i d e  o fhr -  
rouilliet. A thick fog impeded thc view, and Wcllington, 
cleairons to ascertain wbat tlie French were abont, dircctetE the 
ninth regiinent ut ten o'doclr to open a akiimish heyond tha 
tranlrs torvards Pucho, and to p h  the action if the French 
augmented their force. Garn~ron did so, and the fiph* waa 
bemrning wnrm when colonel Delancy, a staff-oficer, rasbIy 
diredad the ninth to enter the dlage, m error shaxply cor- 
iwkd; for the fog cleared up, and hdt, who had tmenty- 
four thousmd men at tliat point, directd a munter-attack 
ara ~trang and mdden tht Carneron was instantly forced to 
fly, and only s a d  bis regiment with tlie aid of some Portu- 
ba'ese troop~ hast;lybrought up by Hopo. The fighting tlien 
ceased md TVellington went to the right, leaving odem to re 
cstahlish the former outposta on the connecting riclge towards 
Russuaory. 
Hope hnd talrcn ground on Boult's right with four re.gimcnt.4 
when Camcm fiigt attaclred, rand the Freneh rn~rshal, Iiitherh 
nndecidetl, being aroused by these insulb, directed Dari-1~ to 
attack Bmui lhe t  by the connecting ridge md Briyer to fa11 
on by the main road between the tanks. The dlies, expecting 
no Iiattle, M diapersed to gother fuel, for the weatlier ww 
wet and mld; the front llne ww4 thus composed entire1y 
of Portuguesc, and ín a moment tlie Prencli psnetrated in a11 
directio~s. They outflanked the iiglit, passed the tanka and 
drove the allies back in heapa. Honever, tlie ninth regiment 
plietl Boyer's ilank with fim, Aylmer's brignde carne up, and 
Soult finally withdrew L ~ B  troops; yet he retained al1 hisi 
posts of hhe precedmg ev~ning, and continued a galling cm- 
nonade until t l e  fa11 of night. In tbiliis figlit aliout six Lundred 
men on each side were killed and wounded, and tlie fifLh 
rlivision was now so reduoed, ttliat it wm replwd by the first. 
Soi~lt hen eent Spiparre'~ cavnlry over the Kive to check 1-Iilill's 
honemea 
Cmbd of BIB 12th.-Heavily the min fe11 in the night, ant? 
tliougli the morning brolce fuLr neitl~er side ~eemed incIined to 
rewrnrnenceliostilities. Tlle ndmnced posts wers Iiowever wry 
aluse to eaclcli other and aLout ten o'dock tliey quarrelled. For 
Soult, observjng the f r d i  regiments of the first 
Eoult, MSS- divigiou cIoso to his posts, expeeted an atkack 
and reiniorccd his front ; this Avernent induiiced a l i  error 
in an Engl isli battery, whicfi oyiened upon tlie ndvancing Frcnch 
troopg and, in an inshnt tlie whole line of posts WM engaged. 
Soult brouglit np a number of pus ,  the C n g  continuetl 
without au olijcct for many hours, nnd three or four hundred 
mcn of a side were killed and wounrled ; but the main body of 
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the French remaincd quiet on the ridge between Bnmuiihet 
and Rusatissary. 
As mrIy aR the 10th, WcIlington liad expected Sovlt would 
finally fa11 upon Hill, and had given Beresford ordeibl te  carry 
the sixth division tci that general5 assistanoe by the new 
bridge; and the aeventh division by the liridge of Ustarihz, 
without waiting for further instnrctioas, if Ilill was assded. 
Now seeing 8oult's teniacity at btrmuilhet he drev the seventh 
clivision towada Arlioane; but Bereafod had made bis move- 
ment towards the Nive; and this, with the mareli of tlie gevmth 
dividon and some changes in the position of the fourtli 
division, cmsed Sodt t o  believe tIie allies were gathering to 
attack his centre on tlie mornjng of the 13th-d it is 
remarlrable tliat tho dcscrtcm at this period told h h  the 
Spnniards biad re-entered Fmce, Jthough oders to th t  
effect were not given unt.il ncxt dny, Convinced new tlint bis 
bolt ~ w a s  shot on the Icft d the Nive, he plnmd two divisions 
md Tillatte's reserve jn tlre entrenched camp, and marched 
with the other seven to Mouss~roles intending ih fa11 u p n  
BilI next day. m 
That genemi's aeouts were on the Umbouri, and 
whee Sparre's borgemen amived at Mousseroles on the 12th, 
Eerre Soult advanced from the Bidouze and, supported by 
Paris, &ve the allies from Ehpriren. ColoneI Vhian, com- 
manding the English avdry, orderd major Brotherton ta 
charge acrom the bridge mt Bini place with the fourteenth 
dragoona; but tlie & i r  ma so daperate, thst when that officer, 
so noted for d d g ,  gdioped f o r w d ,  only one bmve tmoper 
foliowed him ond mas killed. Bmtherton was wounded and 
taken, and lientenant Southwel, whose home had fallen on 
*he allies' side o£ the bridge, was a1so borne off s prieaner, 
thottgh Vi+n, feeiing bis order had been rada, made a skang 
effort t e  rescue: both. Morillo barl relieved the British bngde 
at Urmray the 11 th, but this cavalry movement indnced Hill to  
fiend it back on the 12th; pet he again recalled it at sunset, for 
he had descried BouIt',tts columns passing the Nive by the bo& 
bridge atiove Dayonne. Tt waa at this time that Wellingbn, 
feeling the want of numhrs, brouglit a QaIlicXan division 
to St. Jean de Luzp and Borne AndaIusians to Itzasm; the 
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furmer to  snppo the npper Nive 
fsrim Paris iind :nsily reinford 
with Mie nutional guarda: t o  pmvent plunder lie fed them 
h m  the British mapzine~,  bnt tliey conld not mive in tima 
to aid Hill, whose situation wms vcry critical. 
Bis position of battle wns only two miles w-ide, jet the 
ground defended by it bct~een tha b o  rivem was n e d y  
fonr miles. Bis left, composed of t,he twenty-eighth, tliuty. 
eighth, and tl~irty-nintli regiments, under general Pringle, 
upied a wooded broken ridge crowned by +he chateau of 
lefranpe and cwered t.he pontoon-bridge, lint WM separated 
n the centre by a gtream and cliain o£ ponda in a deep 
rnmI1p valley. Tbe centre was on botli sides of the l~igh 
road near tl~e ZiamIet of St. Pieme. It o q i e d  a mscent- 
sliaped lieight, mncli broken with rocks ami dose brueliwood 
on the le$ but on the rigit strealced mtli tliiclr hedgeg one 
of wliicli, a hndred  yards in fmnt of the i ing was impwhsatable; 
the tieventy-iirst regiment was oa tlie le. the 6ftiet.b next, 
tlie ninety-second on tbe right. AshwortZig Portupese were 
in ad~ance, jusf beyond St. Eerre, having slrirmiahcrs in a 
srnell wood to cover their right; twelve giinsi, under ROER and 
Tullock, massed in front, looked down tlie great rocd; m4 
'-'f a amile in mar Lecor'~ Portuguese rlivigcin and trvo guns 
-c in reserve. (Xcncrai E p g  had the riglit wing, cornposod 
the th id ,  fiftp~venth, t&y -h t  nnd sixty-aixth regi- 
7th tlie tliid lieiiig on a h~ight ninning nearly paralle1 
h the Adour, crrlled indifferently 8ie ridge of Partouhiriri, 
Old hloguerre from a 6 l l q e  of tlmt name on the mmmit 
s regiment was puslid in-advance to a point where it 
eouIri only be appmaclid by mssing fhe Iower part af a 
smnmpy valley ~eparating Moguerre from the heights of 
8t Pierre; but the remaintler of the brigade was bpt by 
B p g  bclom, whem it warr wetl covcred by a mill-pond wbicli 
inea~ly filled the valley. 
h a  mile in front of St. Pierre waa rt rnnge of aounter- 
bcight~ hlonging to th French, tlie ba~in between being 
bond, open, and comrnnndcd in crcry pnrt by thc fire of tlic 
rtilica ; nnd in dl parts thc eountry mas teo hcavy and enclosed 
for cavalry. Nor oouM *he enemy apprortch in force, except 
on r m w  front of Iiattle and by the high rod, until 
within cannon-shot, wliere two narrow lanea brancherl oE te 
tho right mrE left, md crossing the smmpy vclleyñ an each 
side led, the one to t3ie Iieight where the third regiment was 
poaitetl, the other t e  Pringlc's position. 
In tlie ni~1it of the 12th, rnin aweIled the Nive nnd mrried 
away tlie alIics' bridge of commimtion ; thus on tho rnorning 
of tlie 13th ñill WM cornpletely cnt o!T from the iegt of the 
B m Y .  &ven French divisions of infant y, furnisliing thirty- 
five tltousmd combatantu, were approaching Iiim in front ; and 
an eiglith uuder Pmis, reiuforced wiiith tlie ca~alrg of P i m  
SoiiIt, m e 1 1 4  hiia in m .  To meet those 
iri hia frant he had less t h n  foarteu tlionsaiid, 
and only fomteen p n s  in position; t o  oppose 
Piuis them were oaly four thovsnnd Spaniards witli V i v i d  
cadry at Urcuray, fou the Andalusians had not yet &ved. 
Bdtle of Xb. P k - D a y  broke witL a Iieavg mist, under 
cover of which Soult formed bis order of battle. D'Erlon, 
liaving I3i'Arma~nacas, Atibg's, and D a r i d a  infantq, Sparr$~l 
mdry, and t.wenty-two guns, marched in front; he m 
fdowed by P3y nnd Maransin; bnt the remainder of i.he 
Frencb were in reser- for tk,e ruads would not allow of any 
other order, Tlie mist h g  heavily, and the Frmch rna~ses, 
ab one rnoment shroacled in vapour, at mother dimly seen or 
loomiag siidden and large and dark at  different points, 
appeared Iike thunder-clouds gxthering b e f a  the stonn. At 
lid£-past eigbt hit pushed liiick the Dritish piqueta in the 
centre, the san burst out at. that mornene, the sparkling fire of 
tlie Iight troop spreiid wide in the mlleg; mcl crept up tbt! 
liiils un eitlier &nk; and the bellowing of forty pieces of 
milley shook tlie banlts of the Nive md the Adonr. Daricau 
was directd againet l'ringle; D ' h a p a c  taking Old Mo- 
guerre as the point of direction, was to force Byng's right; 
Abb6 atwailed St. Rerra, mliere W. Etewart commmded; for 
HilI had bken bis strttion on a commanding monnt in tbe 
rar,  from ahence he couEd se md direct all the movementa 
of battle. 
AbM, a, man notea for Pipur, made his atfuck 4 t h  p t  
piolence, and gained gronnd 60 mpidy with his light troop 
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on the left of Ashworth'a Porhignese tliat Stemrtrt sent tlie 
~eventy-first aud two p s  from St. Pierre to their aid; tiie 
Fwnch skirmishers likewise won the smdl wood en Asli- 
worth's riglit, and half af the fiftieth mas d&ched to tlint 
qnarter. The wmd mag thus retalcen and tlie flauks of 
Stewart's position secured; but iuri centre was very mticll 
weakened; the fire of thc Prench artillery was concentratcrl 
apinst iG; anJ Abb6 pnshed the attack tEiem with such 
a power, th t  in despite of tlie mnsketry on his flanks and 
s crashing cannona.de in bis front he gained the top of the 
positionf driving back dso the remaindar of AshmrSli's Portu- 
p e s e  and tlie isther half of tbe Htieth regiment which had 
remained in reserve. 
General Barnes who had the ninety-second regirnent in 
hand teliind Sta Pierre, immedirttely brouglit it on with a 
stmng coiinter-attack; whereupon tlie French sirirmisheiu fe11 
brick on mli side lwving two regimeata in column t o  meet 
the charge of ti10 ninety-second. It was rough and pupudied 
home, t'lia Frcnch mass wavered and gave way; but AbbE 
ieplnced it, nnd Soutt, redonbling thc hmvy play of hia guns 
from th0 height he occupied, ~ e n t  forward a battery of home 
artiüery, which gdloping iiito tlie valley opened its fire close 
to  tlie ollies with destructive divity. The cannonnde nnd 
muskatry nom rolled lilra a prolongd pea1 of thnnder ; and 
the secund French column, regardless of Ross'~ p n s  though 
they tore thc rnnks in a horrible manner, advanccd so steadily 
up &e 11igb mad thnt the ninety-aecond jielrllng to the 
tempwt slowIy rcpincd ita position beliind St. Picrrc. Thc 
Portuguese guns limbcrcd up to rctim, and the Frcncli 
slUmishcra rcached tlts impenctrablc hedgc in front of 
Ashmortli's right. &mes, eecing harrl fighting only cwld 
#ave the position, made the Portuguese guiis resume their 
fin, while the wing of the fiftieth nnd the qadores p1- 
lmtly held the small wood on the rigl~t; brrt be was ~oon . 
wounded, most of h i ~  and Stemrt'a sstaff were hurt, ana the 
matter s c m d  dmperato; for thc light tmops, overpowered by 
nnmbera, wero al1 driven in cxccpt tliosc in ttlie mood, thc 
arkillcrymen were f d h g  at tlieir giing Ashworth7s lime 
crumbled nmj  rnpidly Gefore the muskctry and cnnnonah, 
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the  p m d  m stmd with the dead in fmnt, axid manp 
wounded were crawling t o  the rear. 
Jl the French light troops mula then have penehted 
throngh the thick hedge in fmnt of the Portuguese, defent 
wonld have been inevitable on this, point; for the msin 
column of atta& atill steaddy iidvanced up the main mml; 
rind a second column launched on ita right was dready 
vietorious, because colonel Peacock of the seventy-first Ird 
shamefully withdrswn tliat &hut regiment out of action 
and ahandond tlie Portuguese. Pringlo WM indeed fightiug 
strongly agalnst DarimuS superior nurnbm on the hill of 
Tillefranque; but on the extreme right, done1 Bunbnry oE 
+,he tilid regiment h d  nl.lao abmdoned his strong pmt to 
PArmagnac, whom leading bripde was thus rapidly turning 
Byng's ooter regiments on that side. Bnd. now %y's and 
Namsin'a divisiora, hitherto retitrded by tha deep roarls, 
wero mming into Iine to support Ablió, and lat n mornent 
when the troops opgosed to him were deprived of their 
reservo. For when HIlI. bchcld the retrcat of thc third and 
seventy-first regiments, deaocnding in haste from his mount he 
met and turned the latter bmlr t o  renew the fight; and then 
in gerson l d i n g  one brigade of Lc Cor's reserve diviefon to 
the same qnttrter, sent €he other against D ' A r m n p  on the 
hill of Old Mogncrre: thua aG tbo dccisivc moment ths 
FrencZi reserve was au,pented and thnt of tlie d l i e ~  t h w n  
BS a 1BBt resource inta d o n .  Homevilr thc right wiag of 
the fiitieth and Aahworth'e cqadorea, hoth sprend a8 skii- 
mishem, never Iost the m~ll  vood in front ; upboIdiig the 
fight there wd  townrds the high rond with eiuch unflinching 
courage, that the riinety-fiecond regiment hd time t o  re-Tom 
behlnd the hamIet of St. Pierre. 7%en its gnllant colonel, 
Cismeron, once more led it down tLe r o d  with coloura flying 
and music playing, resolved to give the shock to whaterer 
s t d  jn the way. At tliis si@t t l io  Britiah ~lcirmislrcm on 
the flanka, suddenly changing from retreat to attack, d e d  
fomerrl anrl drrive those of tlie enemy hwk on each side; 
yet the battle wemed hopeless, for Bsliwarth m hílly 
womded, his line shattered to  ntorns; snd Bnrnes, who had 
not quittcrl the fiold for Iiis fomcr hurt m now shot tlmupb 
the Liody, 

Tn thifi crisis Hill, seeing ~ u c h a n  waa succw~fully en& 
m the Partouhiria r idp and Bpg's regbents masters o€ 
fheir gwund in the rniil-pond valley, drew the fifty-seventh 
fcom the latter plwe to reinforce his centre. At the same 
time, the bridge above Tillefranque bang now restored, the 
sixth division, wliich liad been marching since dapbrenk, 
appeared in ordsr of battie on the mount fm whence Di11 
lintl clescended td rdly tlie ~lmeutp-first. It was soon followed 
by tlie fourth divkion, and tliat by the third divkion: two 
l~riprfes of the seventh division were likewise in morcli, 
Titll the first of tliese troaps carne Wellinglon, who h d  
hurried írom Bamouilliet when tlie first sound of tlie cannon 
reached him; yet he arrired only to wiiness the close of tbe 
ht t le  : the crisis was past, Hiii's glory ww completa. Soult, 
accordin,o ik the French metliod, mnhindeed a demonstdon 
ragrainst tbe mntre t o  cover hia nem dispositionq but he wrw 
mily repulsed, snd Buclinn dmve L1'Brmnpao Iteadlong off 
the Pnrtouhiria ritlge, The sixtlr d i d o n  then appeared 
behind Sh, Pierre ; aud thou~h the Frencli still held tlie higlt 
road and s hillock ~ i f l i n f f  between it md thc mill-pond, t.h& 
were quiclcly divoaaessed; far Wellinflon nom h o k  tlie offei- 
sive with 13pg9s briDomdc and with the troops on thc high rot., 
wlicre the genemls and ~taff bad been so mt d o m  that the 
aid-de-crtmp Currie, who crtrried iihe arder to ndvanoe, could 
find no superior ofiiccr t o  deliver it to and led the attack 
h e e K  
J3pg found the enerny on the hi?l stronger thrtn he expected, 
b ~ t  tlic impetus of victory wns h full force and ha soon planted 
tlie colours of the tliirty-firct on the mmmit; the rtilies' front 
wag thus clwed, aud two guns of tlie horse bottery sent down 
mrly in khc fight by Soult FETO trsken. Tlia bnttle then 
ahted b a slcirmish, undcr covetm of wwhh the French enda- 
vourd to carry off thcir wonndcd nnd rally strikg-gtem; bnt c t  
two dclock Welling-ton ordered rt geneml adrance, md thcy 
retrcated fighting, bcing closcly pZicd with muskctry on the side 
of t he Nive until dnrlt They homever mintained their ground 
on tlio aide of tha Adonr, md Spwe's cawlry padng out 
t,hhnt way joined Pierre Soiilt. During the action he and 
Pnrie lrad skirmished with Morillo nnd Vivian at Urenray, but 
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only thirty men were hart, and mhen Soult's failuremnri knom 
the French genemts retired to  Banloc 
B d e d  by the unexpeeted result of the battle, Soult Ieft 
D'Erlon'u three dividona in front of the mmp of Moussb 
roIcs, sent two otliers over the Nive t o  Irarac, and passing 
the Adour himself during tlie niglit with Foy'~ diviaion, s p r d  
it along the right bank of tliat river as far as the confluente of 
the a v e  de Pan. He had designed to  i c t  d t h  p a t  masses, 
b ~ t t  ithe restricted nature of the grorind had forced him to 
fight In detail; his loss wns certainly three tliousnnd, rnaking 
a total h khs fim dqs' fighting of six thoumnd, two gene- 
d s ,  Vil1att.e and Ynucomble, being wounded; the Britisli 
estimate made the  los^ mucli greater, and one La hm. French writer raisea it to ten thourtand, including 
probahly the Nusau and Frankfort regiments. 3ut the same 
writer sayti, the alIies lost sixteen thousand; whereas Hill liad 
only tliree generals and fifteen bnndred men kiied and 
wounded, and the mhole loss in tEie five daps was five thon- 
mnd and nineteen, five h d r e d  being prisoners; but the 
generals Hope, Robinson, hrnes, Lecor, and Ashworth were 
wounded. 
OBSERVATIONS. 
1" French marshal's plan mm eonceived with gcniue 
but; the execution IVEW in eontrast with thc conccption. Wliat 
a difference betwcea the sndilcn oonccntrntion of liis wholo 
army on the pIatforms o€ Arcanpes and Buesnssnry, from 
whence he could have fallen with the rol1 of m avalanche upon 
any point of the ~ l l i ~ 9 '  he-whnt a diffcmnce bctmccn thnt 
and the pet.ty attack of Claueel, which a t h o u m d  men of tlie 
light division sufficed to ~ m s t  at tlie vjllage nnd chnrch of 
Arcangucs; yct thnt was ccrtainly thc w a k  part of tlic Endi& 
general's cuirm: the spear pushed borne there wouEd h e  
dmwn blood. The movements of the third, fourth añd 
m e n t h  divisions wem made more with referente to the mp- 
port. of EilI tliiwi ta sustain an attack from Soult's army; ard 
it iu evident that Wellington, trusting to  tlie d e c t  of Lis 
victorg on the 10th af Piovember, hnd trcaterl: the French 
MQrB centernptuously t h  he cuuld have justifid by arms 
withont the ltid rif fortune. What induced Soul t t o  aIter h 
first d h i p  has not been madr known; baf for three houi 
after Clar;seI first rattacked the piquets at, Arcanpes thei 
wero not troops euough t o  stop tbree French dirisiong, mucli 
less a whole amp. And tliis point being nearer to the 
bridge by w l k h  D'ErZon pwsed the Nive, tlie concentration of 
tlre troops codd llave been m d e  soozter thau at Bmuilhet ,  
where tLe nrnnt af mil  In the attack caused by tlle dificully 
of tl ie roada mined the French combinations. 
So unexpctaat were tlie allies of aa attack, that the httla 
at Bmouilliet, which might llave been fought by tbem with 
sewoteen tliousand men, IVH actiidlr fought by ten tlioumnd; 
uor were tliose lirought into tirtion at once; for Rol)jnson's 
lirigade and Carnpbell's Portuguese, favourerl by the narrov 
apeuings between the hnks, res is t~ l  Reille for tivo honra and 
@ve time for tlio rest. af the fifbh Sirieion and Brdforrla 
higade t o  amive. BUt if Foy and Vzltltte had been abEe t o  
nssail tTie flank at the samc time by the ridge ooming from 
Busaussarv, tlie bnttle would Iiave been won by tlie FrenBli, 
althongh thrce divisions nnder Clausel, und tmo undcr D'Erlon, 
remaincd besihting before Urdains and Arwngues, where 
their cannonadc and skimishing wcro the mnrka antl signs of 
indcci~ion. 
2'. On the 11th i8he inertness of thc French during the 
morning mny be amountcd for by t11c dcfcction of the Ger- 
mna regirnenf,~, the neccssity of di~nning nnd remoring 
thosc that rcmained, tha cnre o€ the moundcd, and the time 
requirecl to re-exriminc the ~llies' poriition and a~certnin whrit 
chnngea hnd tnkcn pTncc cluring tho night. , TIIC attack in 
tlie aftcrnoon m well jiirlged. The Increaso of troop in 
Soult'rr front, nnd tlic works construcforl at tthc ckurcli of 
L i m p e s ,  indicated thht no clccieivc succcs~ could be expected 
on t,he Icft o€ tiie Nive, nand that the line of attwk m s  to be 
chnnged t o  t12c flght h n k ;  it was however necea4ary to 
rlrnw TVellin$on's reserves from thr! bght of tlic Nive previo~is 
t o  ~ssniling that qunrtcr, md to be c&in thcp ha$ come; 
which coiild only be done liy repmting +he attncka F I ~  Rarroii- 
illid. The mme w a e  opcrnted on thc 12th; for It WM not 
until the fourth and scventh divisiona werc Eiecn by him on 
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the side of Arbonne that Soult knew Li4 wile had succeeded. 
Yet rtgain the execution mas beluw the conception. Por 
the bivouac h e z i  on tlie ridge of Bussussary were extinpkhed 
in the evening, and then atlms were lighted on the side of 
&lonsseroles, thus plainlp indicating the mareli; which waa 
aIso b e p n  too early, since the leadinp fivialon was aeen by 
Iiill to pass the bridge of botits before aunset. 
These were serious errom, yet the Prencli marshal's general- 
ship cannot be thug fairly testedj tliere are mmy cirmimshncm 
te pmve, that w h  he complhed to the emperof o€ contra- 
dictions and obwles, he alluded to militaiy w mell ae to 
political and financia1 di%cdties. It is h w n  nature to  disr 
lika disturbance of habits; and aoldiew are never plewed at 
firat mith a general, who Lntroduces and rignrouslg exacta a 
aystcm of discipline difming from what they htbv~ been 
accuatomed to: its ntility mmt bc proved ero it wiIl find 
favonr in thcir eycs. hTow Sonlt wddenly assumcd tlie mm- 
mnnd of troopa who hltd hm Iong scrving under various 
genemls, nnd were uaecl to much licence in Bpnin; and thcy 
were, mea and officem, uneiuiy undcr the austerr: command of 
one who from naturai chractcr as well m thc cxignncy of the 
timea demanded sb rendy and exact obcdienm, e,nd a rcplarity 
which bbits of a difcrcnt kind rcndcrcd onerons. t hc  
French wcitem and Soult'a own re.ports fumirrh proofs that 
hia designs wcrc freqncntly thwartd or disrcprded by Iiis 
subordinittes whm circumstances promieed impunity. His 
greatest and ablmt milihy combinations wcw certainly ren- 
dered tibortive by tlie errora of hia tieritemnts in t h  first 
opemtions to rclieve Pampcluna; nnd their manifest negl ipce  
enabled TcIlin#on tc force thc phssage af tlio R i c h o s .  
Complaint nnd recriminntion wcm rife n h r  tlie defeat on tlie 
10th of Novemhr; nnd on tho 19th tlic Griclga-head of 
Cembo wm destroyed contmry t o  the instructiona Thme 
tliings, joincd to t.he acknowldged jalousy znd diaputes pre- 
valeni srnongst t l i~ Frcnch gencrals employerl in Spain, would 
indicate tbat the discrepancy betwccn the conecption and 
execution of the opwntions Xn front of Bayonne wus not the 
error of tbe commander-in-chid : perliape Joscph*~ factiou, EO 
Smic&1 to Sodt, was still powerfd in the mny. 
3". Weliington has been blamed for putting h i ~  troopa in s 
false position; and no doubt h undenalned, it was not Be 
first time, the mili tay genius and resourca of his able adver- 
sarp when he exposed E l 1  to the action of tlie 13th. But 
the passage of the Nive itself, the rapidity with which he 
moved Lis divisions from bank to bank, and the oon6dence 
with 'cvhich Iie relied upon t i ie valour of his tmupsi, so LLF 
from justifying tlie censures which h v e  been paased upuu 
him by French writera, ernphahidly mark liis rnmtery iu the 
art. The ~tern justice of sending the Spaniarda Iack into 
Spain after the baitle of the Nivelle is apparent; but tlie mag- 
nanimity of that measure can anly bs understood by consider- 
ing his situntion at the time, The battle of the Nivelle m a  
delivered w politicd grounds. Yet of whnt avail wouId his 
g:sining it have been if he had rernnincd incloscd aa it were 
in a net betmeen the Rive, the aeo, Bayonne, md the Pyrc- 
nees; uuable t o  open commuilicntions with the disaffected in 
Fmoe; nnd haring thho beaten anny nbsolutcly forbidding him 
to fow oi wcn to  look beyond the river on his right, The 
in~nsion of hance  wrui not Es own operntion, it wua the pm- 
ject of t he  Eng1;Iish ccabinet and the dlied sovereigns; h t h  
were urging hiin to complete it, nnd to pnss tIie Nivc and frec 
his fl~nka ivas indi~cnsnlilc if hc would draw any profit from 
his victory of tlie 10tli of Novembcr. He could not pus  it 
n?th hia whole nmy nnleaa he resigned thc sca-oowt nnd h i ~  
communications with Spain; rtnd he had t o  opcrata mith a 
portion onlfi wliich if; was dcsirnble to  make as fitrong as pos- 
sible; yct at tbat crisis 110 clivcctd himsclf of traenty-five 
tliousand Spnnish soldierc! 
Pina t h iñ  done in igno~nncc of thc rnilihry glory nmiting 
him beyond tbc lipot ivhere he &ood! 
If 1 Aad h & y  i l t o u ~ d  Xpanbcls  paid m d  ME,' he 
mote tci lord Btztliun~ '1 fi?hvdd I m  Dnyonw. I j  I And 
forty t?lowand 1 do m$ h o w  wllere 1 sJmld 847. XOW 1 
Imvs loih t ? ~  ihmnd m d  tfac forfy t l i o w d ,  bpd I 
I&m8 not t l ~  mmm af pying rvnd mplyhg t7mq a& tJq/ 
plunakr t h q  wZZ r u i m  dZ.' 
Requisitions, whicli tlie French espected ns a part of mi, 
wr,nld liuve cnablod him to nin this carccr; but he looked 
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Mher;  he had promised the people protection and h¿ri pt- 
ness of mina waa disclosed in a  ingle aentence. ' I must te?? 
y m  l d h +  lhar w wms d evwytT~tmg üepmPad qm 
mr & a t h  rvna' jbtim' Rather tlian infringe on either, 
be sent the ~~an i i i nds  to the rerv and p s s d  the Mive with 
the British and Portupese only, thus violating the military 
d e  which forbids a general t o  disseminats his troops befare 
tnn enemy in mass. I3n t genius begins where mies end, and a 
pt general always seeks moral pwer  in preferente t o  phy- 
sical force. Wellington's choice was between a shameful i n w  
tivity or P d a n p ~ w s  enkrprise. Trusting to the influence of 
bis repntation, to hia previous victoties, to tlle ascendancy of 
Ya troops in the field, he &ose the htkr and the result jus- 
tified hi boldness, IIe mrpriced the pass- of  the Nive, 
Lid his bridges, and but for tlie rain of tlie niglit before, 
which ruined the roads and retarded HiIl'fi mardi, he would 
have won the heights oE St. Pierre tlie same day : Soult could 
not then bam withdrnwn his divisions from thc right badc 
without b e i n ~  observed. Still it waa an error to bave the 
troopa on the lcft h n k  ao mprcpmd for battlo; it wm per- 
haps another error not t o  have ocmrpid the wllley or bnsin 
between Eope and Nten; ibnd mnirely it wns ncglipnee not to 
cntrench Rill'fi pposition on the lotli, Ilth, and 12th. Pet rio 
hmve, 80 hardy, #o unconquemble wcrc his soldiers lia was 
~ucccssfiil at every point: and that proves hia gencralship: 
RannibaI crossd tho AIps nnd descended iipon Italy, not iii 
madncñs birt bemuee he knew liimself nnd his troop. 
4'. It is agrccd hy Frencli and English that tlie battle rif 
8. Kerre waq anc of tlie most deverate oE the whole war. 
Wellington said he h d  ncvcr seen e fieId so thickly atmwn 
with dead; nor can the v!gour of the cornbatanh be weIl 
thrcc houm upn  a Taco of one milc squarc. How thcn rliil 
it hoppcn, valour bring. so conspicuous on hoth sidw, tltlitit 
lees tlim fourtcen tliousrtnd AngIo-Portnguae wjth four- 
teen p n s ,  were ennliIed t o  witlistund tliirty-fivs 
Appendix 2, tlionsnnd Frencli with twenty-two p n s l  The r ,  voi+v,, 
andysis of  tliis fa& sliows upon mliat nice cal- 
culutions and accidents war depends. IF Hil Iiad ~ o t  
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ohserved the French papsing their bridga on fhe mening 
tlie lStli, and tlieir lnvouac Eres in tlie ni&, Barnes's b r i p  
witli which ha suved the hiy, would h v e  been at U m y  a 
the enemy could not hrave been stapped. Bat Sodt muld 
only bring bie tmops i d o  lino in suocession, so tht  in fuct 
sixteen thoitsand French with twenty -two pm actually fought 
thr! battle: Foy and Marmsin did not q h g e  nntil nfter the 
crisis hnd passcd. On thc other hand the prooecdings of PCB- 
cocke and Runbury, for which they were deservcdly compelled 
to quit the seniice, foroed Hill to mrry his reserve amy from 
the decisive point at thxt critica1 period whick alwilp oca 
in a well+dispt~ted field, and whic11 every great general mtcl 
for wlth tbe ntmost anxiety. This mns no error, it was 
neceasity, md the military quaIitics of the troops renilered it 
successful. 
5". The French officer who rode at the head of the second 
attacking column might be a brave masi, doubtlesa he yas; he 
might be an nbIe man, but he hnd nof the instinct of a general. 
On bis %right flank the vigorous counter-attack of tlie allies 
WM indced ~uccessfd, but the battle was ta be won in the 
centre; his column was heav,  undismayed, md only one w d  
liattdion, the nlneíy-second, #-as before it; a short exhorta- 
tbn, e detided gesture, s dmkg emmple, and it n~ould hnve 
o~erbome tbe srnall body in ita front; and then FOJ-, Maransin, 
and the half of D'Armw~c's division wouId h a ~ e  followed in 
tlte pilth tlius marked out: instead of this, he meighed chances 
and retreated, HOW drferent was the mnduct of the Bri- 
tish  general^, two of whom and nearly al1 their st& fe11 
at this point, resolute not to yield a &ep at  su& s c r i t i d  
period; how desperately did the fiftieth and Por- 
:!" R.e. tupese fight to @ve time for tbe ninety-seeond to 
rally and re-form behind St. Pierre; Low glorio& 
did thnt regiment come forth again to charge with tbelr colom 
fljing and their national music plnying ae if ping tu a revieiv. 
Tris was t o  nnderctand m. The m n  wLa in tht moment 
and imrnechtely after e repulse tllouglit of m& military pomp 
wm by nature a soldier. 
69 EEilh employment of hi reseme was a fine ~troke. 
He mw that the misconduct of the twa colonels wodd mup8 
the Ioss of his position mom surely tlian any direct atta& upon 
it, and with milihry decision he descended at onm 'to the 
epot, playing tlie soldier as ivell as tlie general, dIying tiic 
ewenty-first and leacling the resem liimself; trusting meon- 
wl~ile witl* a noble and well-plawd coddence to the coiimp 
of the nincty-second and the fift,ieth to sustnin the fi$t 
at St, Rerre, He knew indeed t h ~  aixtli division wris tlicn 
closc nt huad, m d  the brittle mi@ be fought ovcr agnin ; hiit 
lilce a thorougl~ lioldier he m s  resolved t o  min his arm fig11t 
with his own troops if he could : and he did so nftcr a rnanner 
t h n t  in less eventfd times would linve rendered Iiim tha hera 
of a nation. 

APPENDTX. 
9 As d& of PcFeltPe, eniniisb of war, to fik k i y  of &&ia 
Fa&, le 29 Jamuiw, 1813. 
S ~ n r e , d a i  eu l'honnenr d'dcrh b V. M. le 4 do ce mois p m  
lui faire connaitre les intention~ de l'empereur au sujet deu daircs  
d'Eapagne, et la necessilk de hansporter lu quarlier gBnCra1 de 
Madrid Q Valladolid. Cette dhpfiche a ét6 expédiCe par dn licñte 
rt triplicate, ~i j'ipore encoro a i  clle eot paruoniie ii 6. M. 
Dquia sn dCpCchc [le bIndrid du 4 Dceembre ir  miis p r i 6  de A r a  
lcttrca, ct  ec long silcncc mc proun quo lea communicationa do 
Madrid B Vittoria reatent c o n s t m e n t  imtemcpth. 11 eat mi 
que lea operations du gfiridral Cd:weU.~ qui s'esl  porte avec foutce 
acs troupe~ disponibles sur la, ctte de Diecayc pour db~ager 
Sanbna fortement mcnac6 ar I'ennerni et parcoirir 1a cotc, a 
dnnnE nox lmndra d r  ln casti\o ano fmilit<< in t ihc  d'intomcpter 
la route de Rurgos b Vittaria, Les dcrnibrcs nmvclica que j o  
rccois k I'instant do l'arm6e de Portugal aont du 5 Janvier. A, 
celle Gpoque tout y Elait irnnquille, m a i ~  je  vois hnjours la mame 
diííicult6 pour communiqucr. Crt; ébt de choses ivnd tuujours 
~ 1 i i a  nécessaire de a'occuper &S sérieiisement et k E s  inshmtint  
rle Iialnyer ICR pmvinces du nord, et  de lea dhliner enfin dc ces 
hanirides qui out aupontEs en foroes et: en ~on~is tnnco  h un point 
qrii exige indiapens~hlement ioule nolro atlenlion e l  toua no8 
ciloris. Cette pende a teuement attirii I'attention de l'emperear 
qi ie  S. M. 1. rn'ur6itCré quatre foia successivemcnt I'ordm cxprbs 
[ir ienouvrllw Pncore l'ex casion de ses inttntioon ~ e j ' a i  rlfj? 
. ~ E B S ~ C  L T. M. ,m m. K t m  du 4 ~mt+r pourI cngngcr :r 
rcvenir N Vdl~lo l i J ,  B gartler Madrid par une dirision aeiilcment. 
ct h cconcentrer 6PS fo~ccs de inmikre b ouvoir cn~oycr dea 
honpra dc i'nrrncc do 1)ortugni rers lo nor$ en s n ~ n m .  ct cii 
Biscyc, afin dn dclivrcr crc: rovincr~, et d'p ri.tablir Ir tmn- 
pllit& h gdnbrai Rcillo ~ ~ J c r n o n t  fifi&pp6 da I'ftnt des oha~cs 
ans le nord de l'Espagne a bien compris la n4ceasit6 do prendre 
un parti decisif & cet fgard. Ii m'a transmia & cette occasion la 
l e t t r ~  $1 a eu l'honnair d'dsrire i V, M. le 13 Octobre dernier, 
ct j'ni m u'il Iiii a prCsmit6 un tnhleaii frappnnt rt vrni de Iia 
siturtion l o s  dlaircs qui n~nt cntibrcmcnt l'nppni do m i  
d&p&che du 4 wuranL Quant 5. i'occupation de Madrid, l'em- 
percup m'ordonne de metke sous Ls 7eu.x de V. M, le danger 
E R ~  

c?tcs anx Anglaia, e t  opkrer la aoumission entihe dn pava It 
est donc d'lins iinportnnce extdrne paur panenir h ce bht, de 
rofiter de i'inaction des Ankais, qiii peimet en ce moment 
!ornploi de toos nos maVaoa contrc loa i i i s q f s  ct doit amcner 
promptarnent leur anii6re destruction, si les ophntions entre- 
mes pour cette rKet suut conduihs arec l'aebivíi;, I'energio et 
mite q~~~c i l c s  cxiqent. Votre mnjeste a. pu se convaioore par 
la longe  et constante jnterruption des communicalionri autiint 
que par Ics rappoita qni Irii sont pmenus de bntc 1'8t~nduo dn 
nial, et de la néeessit6 dp porbr rembde. On ne pcut donc 
rncttre cn doutc E Q n  cmpr~sscment ib remplir les intcntions dc 
I'empererir sur ces points iniportnns des changemens, gui ont eu 
lieu pour le commandcinent en chef des arniees dn rniclidi, du nord, 
et de Portnzal, me font espérer gqize votre majesté n'gpronverrt 
plaq de diiGcu1ii.s pour I'exécntion de ses ardres et que tout 
milrcliera ari meme bbt sms contradiction, et ~~nbna obstmtcle. Ces 
nouvclles diapositions me disprnscnt de rdpondrc ,i difS6rcnka 
obscrvati~ns contcnucs dnns lcs icttres do votre rnajeatg, et  m'en- 
~ n ~ e n t  d tcndro  qu'ellr rnc fmse connaitre les rkultats [lea 
cliangcmens orílonnée par I'einpcrcur. Jo no rlois pas oiililier de 
prevenir ~0h-c majest8 ci'un odre  y t e  aa mrijesté impéride rn'it 
cliargc' de transmettre directement n rnonsicur le ~énéral  XRille 
oiir Iiii fRiro cnvoycr une division de son am6e en Nn~arrc dont k ~ihiation o x i l o  irnp6ricunoment dcs secoura pmmyts et otSosoes. 
Ceth cli~poeition no peut eontraricr aiicune de celles quo >-otra 
mzjcetC acra dans la cas rl'ordonner i i'aimée de Portugal pour 
concoiirir au meme birt et ameUer Ja aoumission des ~rovinces du 
nord de 1'Espngne. 
dc suia. nvec rcariect. Sirc. do rotro mnicstf lo trEs humbl~ et 
trts oli6kstant semito&, ' 
Ik ministre do la perre, 
Dnc DB FEITFLE. 
No. In. 
Duh if FeIh to  tJe of SJ~ZI$ 
Puri8, .?e 12 Em&r, (No. 2) 1813, 
B I ~ E ~ - P ~ ~  mn lcttre de ce jour No. 1, j'ai eu l'honneur de fniro 
oonnntke rt V. M. les intentiozis de l'empereur sur les ophations 
?i suivre en Espa~ne. La pr6s~nle aurn uur litt  de rtrponllro 
p1u p~rtieulidrrrncnt L la Icttm dont ~ . d r n ' a  hanoró eu data 
dn U Janvier, et  qtie j'ai en eoin de metbe soiia Ics yein de Yem- 
pcrcnr. Lea plninka qu'ell: cnnticnf .sur In condiiitci rluinméclinl 
duc do Ddmatio et du g8ii6ral C:~ffmili dcvionnent anjourd'hi~i 
snns obji-t yar 1'Cloignciiieiit de ces deux g6néraux en chcS. JP 
doiu cepcndallt prévenir T'. M. qii'nyant fait comitre  aug6nérnl 
Gnffarelli qii'on se plnipait L Aludrfd de ne point recevoir de 
romptcs dc l"nrm6c clu nord, cc gEn6rnl me rhpond aous la dnto 
du 27 Jan~ier  qu'ii a vu l'lioriii~iu. de r d r u  b .AL. des comples 
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extrSmement frequens, qu'il lni s envoy8 la aitnaiion de l'armfc at 
des donliles des ra porh qui me sont anlresstle. La g&néral 
CaiTareili 4 oute wait d.mana& i V. 31. d'wdomer que deirr 
djt?sions dc Yarda de Portugal vinrsent appuyer lea op6rations 
de l'arm&a dii nord, et il en6e que ces lett~rs ne seront crois6~s 
aseo les dC Cchos de ~ a g r i d  iai-oeqoe lea courriers ont éprour.6 
bcnnroii~ & i-etnrd, mria il y n lieu <le prhumer rluc taut ee qni e 
6tE adrcss6 dc l'nrmke dn nord n ¿iu pmcnir i Madrid t~mt la 
fin de Jnnvier. 8. N. rEit&a dan8 sa 1otti.o du 8 Jmvicr stq 
clemrtndes relativament anx liesoius de l'ambs. Toukea out éb2 
nrises soua lcs yeux de i'ernpereur. S. Rf. 1. m'ordonns de 
r6ponrlre ñu mjet des fonds doiit la demancle se retrouve dam 
plueieum dCphclies pr4c6dentes que Yargent nCcessaire a m  armhe~ 
d'R~pngne ae sewiit trouvE dxnn ceB richea et fertiles provinces 
d6vnstdcs par les bnndcn et pnr lea jnnt,rs insurrcctinnellea, qu'en 
s'ocmipnnt avec l'nctivit6 c t  In vigumir convcnnhles poiir ritnlilir 
l'ordre &la, trnnquillit.6, on y gngncrrn toiitcslas rcssourccs qu'ollcs 
pe~ivent enmre offrir, et que le tema rambnera dalis toute leur 
etendue. C'est dona nn motif de pltis your V. M. d'employer 
toua les moyens dant elle dispose pciiir mettre fin B c e t k  guerre 
intcrns qui trouble le rcps  dcs habltans paisibles, mine le pays, 
fat,igue noti nrm6ea et les prive de tous le8 avmtages qn'elles 
trouveraient dans I'occupation haiiquille de cea helles contr8pa. 
L'Arrngon et lu Navnmc nujourd'hui gous les loix dr: &Iiv~infG di- 
mentent de lenrs productions e t  de Ieurs rcvenns ccttc lutto ddsa8- 
treuae, il. est temv de mettre un tome $ cet btat de dehoses et de 
faire mntrer d m  les maias du gou~ernement 16giLiriic lee res- 
aources $un pa s florjssant lorsqu'il est paisible, mais qai ne 
wwent nujow~Kui qdi ron 8.4 birneot. 
de silis, m e c  re~pect, Sire, de rotre rnnjcatE le t r b  hnrnble et 
t r ba  obc"siaant aorvitcnr, 
Le ministre de la gnerre, 
13uc r i ~  FZLTBE, 
Parb, h 12 FmrnI~, 1818. 
Sxss,-J'ai en rhonnm d'6crire- b i s  fok k Y. M. dnns Ie 
c m m t  de Janvier, pour lu i  trnnamettre les intentione de l'em- 
sur la  mnduiie des affaire3 en Eapwe, et j'ai eu s o l i  de 
aire expedier tolitrs mes dCpZcIiea au moiiis par triplicatn, telle- 
mcnt que jc  nis c t  dois ce Crcr nnjonrd'hui q~~'cllcs sont ptarve- . 
nuos L ieur %estimtion. !e rcqois on os rnoment lo duptn díms 
lettre de Y. 31, en date du 8 J aiiviex, doat lo yrirnata n'est point 
m i v 6  et j'y voia uuc nouvalle preuve de la dificultk toujours 
suLsiaCante de cornmunication; ks ineonveniens de cet etat de 
ehoaesi devi~nnent pliia semililee dms les cireonatanoe~ rictuell~, 
oii il ktoit d'unc hante importmco qirc lca o r h s  de E'crnpcrcur 
repssent une prompte ex6cution. S. M, 1. pén6trbe de c e t k  
idire, attttend avee nne v6ritalile impatienm de aavoir ce qui a'est 
opErE i Madrid, d'aprhs scs instniotions, et cetto att~nte, jour- 
nclloment dep- fait craindre qn'on n'ait perdu un temps prC- 
eicwí, les Auglais stant depuis plus de d e n  mois daos l'impuis- 
Rmce de rien fahe. L'cmpsniir c s p h  du rnoínpi que lorsque 
V. 42. aura eu mnnniasnnce dii 29"' hl le t in ,  elle xnra E t 4  frappée 
de la nkceasitd de 80 mettre promptemont cn eommuniention 
QQCC la Francc et de Yassnrcr pnr tous les rnoyens possibles. On 
ne peut pamcnir it ce bat qu'en faisanl; refluer successivem,eut 
lea i'orces clont V. N. pciil rlisposer siir la lipe da cornmunim- 
tion de Valladolid iL Dqonne, et en portant en antre des forcea 
suíñsantes en Nnvarre et en h q o n  pour combattre avee aTan- 
W P  ct rl6truirr: lea bnnclcrr qni dEvnctent ceR prorinme. 
L'armde dc Portugal comliinlc arcc eello du nor3 cst bitn 
fisante pour remplir cet objet tandis ue lea nrmEes du centre et 
dn midi, oocupnut Salamanque ot  doli lid, presentent ssrez de 
farces pour t e n i s  les h~ldnis en échec en attendant les évhne- 
m~nts. L'emperenr m'ordonne de r4itPrer k T. M. qiie l'occu- 
ntion d~ FVaTalldXid commc qiiartie~ gr'nkml et rrsidcnce ponr % personno, cst un pr(liminaire indiaponiul>lo, Y h u t c  O ~ D T B ~ ~ O ~ .  
C'est de 13, qu'il faut diriqer sur la rorits do Uwgoa et surceesive- 
m& sur tous les points convenablea, lea forces disponibles qui 
cloivent renforcer QU seconder l'arm& du nord. fi2adi-d ct  meme 
T'alence ne pciiveiit Stre mnrojdCTla  dan^ ee 6ystL.m~ que comma 
dw points B oconpcr par rextremit6 $ancho de I n  Iignc, ct nullc- 
ment conimo Iio~x b maintenir exclnsivement par une concentra- 
tion de forees. Valladditi e l  8alamzn ue deviennent aujourd'liui 
les pohb essentieh entre losquels joivent Btre répnrties dea 
f'orces phtes ?i ~rendre l'otiensive m t r e  les Aaglnis et k fnire 
Pchaue~ leiii~s projets. TJ'emprre~~r est instmit qil'ifs se res- 
foreent cn Yortl~q~l,  c t qu'ils pnraissont moir lc doublc projct au 
de pouswr en I3apahpo ou de arllr du port de Lisbonne pour 
faira unc cxp6<libioii de 25 ndye Uommis, pzrtie d o ~ l a i s  pnrtie 
Espvgnols, aur un point qudconque des dtes dePraiice cndant 
qiio 1 i  luttc acra engagEe dnna lo nord. Pam empirlier?'rxioii- 
tlnn dc cii plan il fniif. Btrc toujoum cn m6surc dc SI: portcr rn 
avnnt ct rn6nnmr do marehcr sur Lisbomc on de conqucrir 10 
I'oriugd. En nibmc tcins il raut wriaurver das cummuilicaiions 
a~iss i  stwer; qiie fncilee avec lu P m c e  p a r  Btre promptenient 
insnuits d~ tmit w qni s'y et Ie ~ e u l  moyen d'y pnrvenir 
est d'cm loycr le tems ou ea hnglnis ~ o n t  dana l'inaction pour 
poifim- Ya Biwa 0 e t  i~~Navarra w m m o  jnai au ~ o i o  d e  In fnire 
mnnaitre k P. %T. dms mes r6cédenles. La sollicitude de 
Yempeceur poor les dairea d.8spspe liii aynnt fait rCit6~er h 
p!usieiii.s reprisa et reprocluire soi i~ toutes les formes sea idea- 
t i m a  Zs eot +nrd j o  ne puia nclicvcr micax dc lcs rcmplir qii'en 
r6capitulaut ICR ~ d k a  prhcip~Ies q~ic j'ai eu i'ordre de faire con- 
naitre B V. M. Occuper JTalladolid et Ealamanque, cmpIover 
avec la pina pande ñctivité possible tons les mo;ppna de pac&er 
ln Navarre et l'bragon, maintenir des conununieations t r h  
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rapidee et trh ~i icce  avcc 1n Frmcc, rcstcr toiijoiim rn mesnre 
de prcndro l'offcnaire nu besoin, voiIh co quo I*empcrcnr ma 
preserit de fairo considhrer ia V. M. commo instructian g8n8ralo 
our tolito Iii mmpqnei et qui dui t i 'ab b Liase de ses uperations. 
f ' a i  h peiue besoi~i d'ajjouler que s i  les wmdis Fraiip~ires an 
Espragne restaient oisivrs et litirrszinnt Ica Anclais mdtrea de 
f&e des expeclitions sur nos &es, la tranquillitC de lu Franca 
serrtit eompi.omise et la dScadence de nos dhirss en Espqn8 en 
serait l'infail tible rbsultat. 
J e  siiis, nvee m~psct, Sire, de votm mnjcstd le trEs humble et 
trEs ob6issmt serviteur, 
Le miniiitrei de In gneme, 
Duc DE PILTRX. 
No. V. 
The b k s  qf Feltw ta ~ X O  fin9 qf Spitifi. 
A r i a ,  Zs 12 NuP~, 1813. 
SIBE,-La diRcult6 tonjoum subsiatante des mrnmunications 
ib apportó dans ma wmapondance a\+ec V. M. des retarda ponsi- 
d6tliles et dt. lon~wcs interruptions dont les rkultah nepeuvent 
dtre qnc t r h  lir6Eiiidir,iaI~1cs nu smice rlc l'enipereiir. Depiiis plus 
do ~ C U X  mois j'cxpPdic snns ccssc ct par touslcs moyens possihlrs 
ordro sur ordrr! pour fuiro cx4euter Ioh disposii,ions prcscritcs pw 
8. >!C. l., e t  j e  n'aiaucuue ccr~ilurle que ceB orrlres ~oielit  parreiiiis 
ñ leur destmation. L'eiiiperair eutrbmement m6content de cet 
Bta t  de choses renouveCe sana cesse l'injonction la p1iis pdWse 
do Ie fahe cesser, et j'ignore encorc en ee moment si les moure- 
mens prescrita se pr8parent ou s'exbciitent, mais je  vais toujourri 
d'arnntnge que si des o r d r c ~  rchtifb cctto mcsurc doircnt partir 
do Nadrid cela entrainemit une grande parte do kms. L'cmpe- 
renr eu s. 616 i"rapp8. II drvierit donc lout-ir-hit indispensnlils 
de a'dcttrter iin moiiient de ln vote ordinníre rt: de~i dispoaitions 
par lc~r~ucllctl out dcvroit emmcr da V. AV. rtu moine pour ce 
qui eoncerne le nord et I'nm8e de Portiignf. Jo prends pnur wt 
rLlee lo pnrti d'ndresscr dircctcment aux gdnbr~ux comrnnndmt 
dc ces iarmCea les orhes rl'el6cution ui dnna dautres circon- 
sLaaoes dcrmient Ieirr parreuir de i d t d ~ a ,  et j'ai Ylaniieur 
d'adresser ci-joint B T. M. copies des lettrea que j'ai Ecrites au 
genbrnl lieille et au génr'ral Cllnuael pour dékrminer e d ~ n  i'ar- 
r ivk  des reufiirts abscilument nCcessairea ponr eournettrei'Aragon, 
le Navrtrrr: ct la U i s a i ~ c ;  lea dctailfi rnnt,ciina dni i~ ma Iettrt: nu 
gbn6rnl C l a ~ e e l  me dfi cnscnt dc m'dtcndro davnntnce EUT cct 
o+t important. Y. 8. )- rcmr surtaut qu'cn pnacrivaot ha&- 
cn~ioii proinpte et enlibro dea ordrca de l'empcrcur j ' a i  h u j o m  
reserve I'excrcise de I'tiutoritk supErieura remiso entre les ni;lins 
de Ir. N. et  gii'elle conserve 4galernrnt 13 d~reccionnlt6iieure dca 
ophrations dl*s qu'elle poma lrs conduire pnrelle.rni.ine. 
Touirs mcs préddcntrs dbp5clies sont d'aillcurs nacz precises 
sur ce point paur ne de laisser pas dvute lb cct cgard. 
5% duke ofFe1h-e fu the Kng, 
Pavk, 18 Mws, 1813. 
SIRE,-Pnrmi le8 lcttttrc~ dnnt P.M. mea honor6 1 lus rdcente 
de ccllca qui mc sont parrontics jusqu'h. cc jour est ' nf u l Femicr, 
el j e  rois qii'S celtc &poquc Ir. +M. ii'avait puini. encore r e p  wlle 
uc j'ai eii i'lioiincu~ de lui ailrcssw par orrlre de l'empei,eur le 4 
Qrnaier pour lenpgcr i tranefcrrr son quaroer ~Cnóinl r valla- 
dolid. Cette di~liiitiitiun a 626 renolivellik dans tontes mes 
dfpPiches pnstlrieiircs ~ o t i ~  lca d i~ tcs  do 14, 19 dnnvicr, 3, 13, 
25 Fcmicr, 1, 11 c t  12 3Iara, sans ayoir cn juaqu'h pescnt de 
certitude quc mes letires í'ua~cnt nrsiv&ea U. leur dcbliliuiio~i. Enlin 
uiie lellre de M. le dur: d'Alburera en date 4 31aw nie trausmib 
copiedacellc que Ir. BI. lui andressbe le2:JIi'evrier pour le prevenir 
quema lettre du 4 Janvier est nrride h31drid: etqu'on s'y pr6: 
pyimit k exhcuter les diapositioiia preacrites parl'empereur. Ainsi 
c cst do Talcneo quo j'ni rccu la p~e,rnihe nouv~llo positiva h mt 
h r d ,  et c t i l l ~  circuns(awe qui devolle eniiC~rrierit nd t r e  silutition 
d k 8  le nord d'Enpqrie  es^ une nouvelle preuve de I'exidme 
q e n c e  des mcsures prescrites par l'empereur et de tout lemdguo 
d"inexpli~1iIesretarclv ont caus6. S. M. 1. vient k eette occasion de 
mi: réitCrer l'injonrtion de fxire wntir Y. $1. la fausse directioii 
qu'ont prise las aff'icircs XEspngna par lo pen dc ñoin qu'on a, 
spport6 L rrianlanir Ics oorarnunicstiousrti.eo les íiroiitiCi.eu. L'em- 
pereur est 8tonn6 qu'on zit si peu compris B Mndrid l'extrhme 
im ortanee de conserver des commnnicñtíons s h e s  et repides avec 
la gmnce. LP defauh con~tant  [le nouveHes Btnit nn ~~vertisse- 
ment assez climir et rwsez o~itif de l'impuiasnnce o; BE trourait 
I.armdo dn nard do pro&rs la routo dc Narlrid 5 Ilayonno. 
L'Etat des aflfires dnnl; Ie norrl de I*lu.rope tlevaíl yliis ue jamaici 3 : fkke sentir la u6ceaaitd de recevojr des nouvolles do aiis et de 
prendre enGii des mcsures d6cisives pwr  ne pas rcster si languc- 
ment dan3 iin Gtat d'isolement ct d'ignoraiico absoln sur lea viles 
e t  l'intcni ion dr: I'empereur. V. M. n ~ o i t  trok nimCcs it sa dispo- 
sition pour rhb l i r  1cs communication~ avec l'armho du n d ,  et 
l'on sie voit pas un mouvenicnt de l'nrméo ds I'ortugal ou de cdla 
du ccntre gui soit appropriC nux circonstanccs, tiiildis que t'innc- 
tion &S Aizglnis permcltait de proiiter de notrc stipwioritd pour 
clinsscr les Liltndcs, ncttoycr la mutc, nssurcr la tranqnillit6 dnns 
lc paye. L'enipcreur rn'a orrlonnh de Saire wiinvi1i.c BB fyon  de 
peiiser sur al objel au gd~iUrd Xeiile, auquel j':ii dressc '  di- 
rectement les orrires de S. M. 1. polw les forces qu'd a citi mmctl-re 
sms rchrd sonslea ordrps di1 g&n6ralCI:~iinrE ninsi qiic j'oi eul'hon- 
ncnr d'ca pi bvcnir V. 31. pnr rncs lcttrcs du 29 Jntivier, 3 Fe~r icr  
eL 12 MWB. Xu eretles uircun~tlinceü rendent cette niessure d'uue 
extrbme urgenee. Einsction oU i'on est mete cndant l'hiver a 
inoourng6 et ro agE i'insui~cdion. Blie s,rtenBmriutcnnnt dc la 
Bisrnpe, en &lni&ne, ot 1Arngon exige, oiir ninsi rlirc, le mime 
anploi des foroos pour 1a pariiicr, que 1s$iscnpc ct  Ir Knvirre. 
U eljt dovc de la plus liuulc! iniporlauw que V.U. etende rjes soiu~ 
sur i'dragon comme aur bpl a ~ h e  pro*cea dn nora de I'Eqmgne, 
et les 6vcnernens qui se pdparcnt rendront ca ~oin toujours plna 
nbocaanire. D'on c6t6 toiitcii ICR b~ndcs chaw6cs de IR 33iamye 
ct  do I n N n v m  so troiiveront biontdt Forcdcs h ~cflncr danv 1'-h- 
gon, et $&nutre art l'6acuatiw de Cuenca, pw rhulht  du mouve- 
mant gBn&d 8 s  m e e s  du cenlre et dumidi riverail le gh6rnl J Sucliet de tonta cornrnuaicution avec V. M, aun un moment oU 
~ P S  ennemis se renforcent, rlcvant lui $une manihre assez is  
e .  Ii txt done tres importsnt de se pronirer une suire !gne 
de communication avec Vnience et ce t t~  ligne ne peut s'étalilir 
que pnr l'hmpn. C'cfit: it vo(lfre mnjest6 qiiil appnrticnt de don- 
ncr k. cct  Egard los erclres dcessaires. U. aufira sane doute deIni 
avoir fait connaitre 1'4tat do chosep ~t 1ii position du mxrCchal 
Suehet poiir lui  luire prcndre loa JStorrninaiions que les circon- 
stances rendraient les plus coiivenablcs. 11 mo tarde Leancoup 
d'npprendre enfin de T. M. clle-meme J'erCcution des ordres de 
l'enipercnr e t  de ponvoir satisfaire sur copointla juste impatience 
ac s. M. z 
No. Vi. 
Malaya, the 6th DmLer, 1812. 
Dnba SIR,-ThclcttBr QU did mc thc honow to aclreaa tomrion 
the 6th of Soptembsr iiaigeen midaid all this long time on sooount 
oi mp lieing separaled jEom Ihe &e since ihe moineut 1 gave 
np tlie mkmand of it, and it waa o n l  hst night X had the pleasure 
of receiriiig it. I fecl a great comfort in seingh m offimr oT yonr 
repntation afected 80 kiady with the mmws which so d t i c k y  
aa underiertedly (1 belie~e) fell iipon me as a consquence oí! m? 
shamcfd dcfaito nt C~tnl.tnlln. Eut I bcq t o  be cxcused if 1 con- 
tiiiue Iliis lelter in Frrnch. 1 lmo you understand it very well, 
antl I c m  not explain my t o ~ h l a  so TI ell in Engli~h. Je orois, 
M. le g6n6ra.1, que tout militaire, instniit deu faits, et A, la. me du 
mal-lieureux chmp  do bntaille de Gastalla, an du plan ui le 
reprCientc, doit faire le mime rniionement que rooa arez kit, k 
rnoins qu'il nc aoit 6pris des pctitca pawions et des prejugh qni 
nc dominent qno trop souvent les hommes. J o  cmis l'avoir 
demoniré I'evidence dane mon mpport olFtie1 angouvornement 
(que vous devex avair vu imprimzni.) accompap6 de la carte des 
rnvimns et dea copies de tontea les ordres que je donnai la, veille 
du coabat. S'auroia certzinemenf &ti vainqner ~i l'oficier qui 
commmiloit I P S  FGO ehe-raux, aTec deux pieces de 8 iL mon atle 
puuclie eut obEi mcs ordres, on mt seulernent thhE [le se Ini~aer 
v o i ~  do loin par la cnvallrric cncmic, ni an nomhrc dr: 4íKl 
rheniur ~ t o i t  station~o dnns 10 n l l a ~ e  Qe Vinr; mnis point du 
tout, cot oflicier, au lieu clc ae trauver sur Viar au point du jour 
dc la liataille, pour tenis cn échec la ca~dleric enuemie, pour la 
battre ~ ' d  en trouvoit une occasion probable, ou pour k suivre en 
tont m, et IiempBcher de tomber einr Caatalla im udment, 
cornme il lui h i t  trEs eaprers6ment md-6 par cfes ordres 
i5critc~ u'il avoiie, cet offjcier alla se cacher derrsre Villena, e t 
qnoi 114 entendit. i p  canon de CaatniIa, et qii'il fiit inatniit da la 
mw&o des drrgons do Viar par IG mute donil. il rosta tranquilo- 
menl en position de l'autre cbtb de Yiilena jnsqu'8 passe liuit 
heures du malin. Noua btiom deje battns, et tmfs mallienreuñ 
batxiilons Irach6s en pihces (quoiyu'ayant repouss6 la pi~mihrc  
clir~r~e) qnand JM. la brigadier Sni i t is tem ae mit en mmchc do 
ITillcnn poiir vcnir iL mon aecniirs. .Jiigrz dono, monu. Ir, g6nEiu1, 
si j'ny pi2 cmpechcr co ddcaatrc. Ccpcndunt, lo public, qui no 
peut jnger quo par les ~ s u l t a t a ,  8s deehaina. d'nhrd contra moi, 
e l  j e  iie m'eri plains pao, car cela btoit fort nnlurel; c'esl; un inxl1ieur 
attacliQ L notre profeasion, e t  que les g6nératr~Espagno~a doivent 
resentir snr toutit~ IPR uiitras, piiisqu'ile frint Ixgiirrrc sanresoiirces, 
ct, mnnquant de tniit contrr! nn cnnrimi wierri qni ni: mnnpin do 
rien; rnnis je me plnins rlcs Cwte8 de Is, nration, j o  mo plnins do 
ces phres dc la yatiie, gui sacliii~t que j'avois rltin~zndii nioimdmo 
ttrc jugC par rm cotiseille de perre, ont wpeodnill domb le 
ton ?t l'opinion publi ue se rependant en imectivea contrc rnoi, 
et m h c  contre mon k k ~ e  le rlgmt, a ~ m t  de soiiuoir a i  jc anis en 
rffrt eoupnhlc. rlprbs un pnrrilc traitcmrnt, et d n ~ a  i ' d tk t  de 
mishe ct de d4trcsse o?t so trouvent nos amEes, ou trouvorat'on 
clc gbn4raux qui vouillent exposer leurhonneur, et en wcepter le 
commanclemeiit? Qumt IL rnoi je servirai ma patrie par devoir 
et par inclinñtion jusgn'au dernier soiiph, mais je n'accepterai 
jamnis ZLQCUIL mmmnndement, uupporinnt qu'il me fnt ogert. h s  
informntiona que l'on prend rclntivement i, i'affaire en question 
nc sont as encore finies, cnr toiit va doucement chos noiis. J'en 
nltonds E resuitnt ici nveei.meu iiu gouuernement, et ausaitat que 
l'on aura prononce en justiee j'irai me prbsentcr commc sirriple 
vo1ontaii.o d~119 11ne cle non armfas si  l'on nc vrnt pns m'ernployrr 
dnns rna calit6 da p5nbnil snbnltcrna. Jo vons ay trop cnniig6 
demes poiuss; e'eat quo j'ea ay le cwur nmvre, ot  qult votro 
bontó m'a exciG m'en zoulager en vona les racontant. Ii me 
resta m c m  un eapoir flatteur, c'est le jn~ernent de tonts mcs 
camarades qui ont ve de prZs mes,dispositions B i'affaire de CM- 
tdla, et les efforts ue j'avois fait yendant aept mois, luttant 
ioujoum mnlre Ii !t,ti~sse et le dt.soiilra, poiu pdparer :r la 
víctoire une m E a  qni Etoil; tout-h-Eait nulle qwnd j e  rus obliq6 
a en prcndrc, m d p C  moi, le eornmandement. Ja m'estimcrui 
Iieiireux, rnonsienr le ~BnCral, dn mhriter auiusai le uufrai~,~ dll~n 
oEcicr nnssi distingii6 que voua l'Ctcs, et j c  vous pric d'qr6cr le 
t e m u i p a ~ e  du sincbre uttackement de volre trhs hurnlile et  trL 
obPissant ~erviteur, 
JOSEF O'DOIBLL. 
M0m.m~ la gh&&l I)wtki., 
&c, &C. 
No. VIL 
E m e d a ,  F e h a y  25& 11813. 
Sray-I have reca~ed yonr Ietter of tlic 1'2th instant, regiird- 
ing tlic coadu& of tha ~ccond Italian rcairncnt, and I cntircly 
conczrr in al1 tlie measures you have aduptcd, anrl apphud tlic 
dccision and firlnncss of your conduct. 1 am preparerl likcwise 
t o  zppreve o€ mhate~er  you &lid1 determine tipon dclilierntion 
rgarding the future stak o€ the men o€ tlio rccimcnt, wlietlier 
to be formed inta a regirn~nb q a i n ,  or not; or if so formetl, 
mhrther t o  bs ltept as pmt of tlie army or scnt back to 
Skily. 
Wio foreign troops tire so mucheddict~d ta dcserilion Iliat they 
are very unht for our armies, o€ irhicli they neccasarily form tuo 
large ri proportion to the nativc troope. l'lie cril js aggrzvattea 
by tho prsctice which prevails a f  cnlistinn prisoiiers as wcll as 
deaertcra, nnd fienchrnen m srl l  ns otlier í'nreipers, nolsitli- 
stnndina tlio rcpcntcd odcrs of govcrnmcnt upon tlic ~ubjcct. 
Shc ccinaequcnce i s  thcrotbxc tlint a fomign rogimcnt cannob 
bc lacecl in n aitustion i i i  nliicli tlie soldicm can d~scst  from 
it, &nt tliey do not go off in hundreds; and in ilie .Peninadn 
tliey convcy to the enemy the only iutelligence vliich ke can 
ac irire. 
b i t h  this h o d c d ~ o  I scidm if cmr uso tho foreiw British 
froops OS tlii? tlrrny u: tho duty o€ outliosls; tind wl i i iver  yon 
niny deliirrnirie regarrling tlie second X h l i r t r i  regimenl, 1 reeorn. 
mcnd the same practice to yow consideration. 
Thcrc is notliing new on tliia ~ i t i e  oF tlic Teninsuln. The 
arrnies are nearly in tlie atations wliich tliey took itp in thc wd 
of Pr'oucmbcr. 
I have the 1.ionoar l o  be, Sir, 
T ~ u r  most obedient smant ,  
\ l r x ~ m r n o ~ *  
Mqjor-. tinernl Cnmpúell, 
$c. &c. $c. 
No. TIIL 
Erfrnrt af a I&<rrfrnm tAe m a ~ p u t  o$ Tebbin.qfm fo limfenrrat- 
ycncral sir John Xm-ruy, k t e d  Frencdfi, rlp+il MIL, 1813. 
'In regard to  feedin: the Spanish troops in Bpain, 1 hwe 
invnritilily aet my f ~ c e  against it nnd Iiace newr  caasented to it 
or tlonc it;, cvcn foor ~b dny in nny inshnec. Mg rensana are, íimt 
t,h:tt it entailr; upon h a t  Jlrihin an expcnse which the counl~~y 
i n  unable to bpar; sectinrlly, ~ l i a L  it cnLaiI~ upon I l ie  department 
o€ tlic arnig wliioh uiidertnkes it R, dptail of btisiness, and a 
burtlicn in respecf to  trnnsport, and ot,her m e w  to wliich the 
deppnrtmcnto if f m r d  npon nny modemto ~rnln nind bti qnitc 
unequal; tkirdl, 1 lmow from eqcrience that if we don't inter- 
fere, iLs ~ ~ i n i a ~ t r o o ~ s ,  pssllouludy if paid lis yolira are, and in 
limiled nu~libers, will riot wanl food in niy parl: o f  Spain, whereas 
ihe best anrl most expcricnced of our departinenta trould n o t  be 
able to ddraw rrom tlic c.oi int~ rcsoumea tor iliem. I have alredy 
eonecntcd to  thc foimztion cif a mngnxinr, for tlic uae oF genexnl 
ll%ittinghm and gcncrd Roclie's corps for n certain nqmber of 
daya, if 11 shodd be Sound necessary t.0 givs them assistance of 
this description. 1 c m  go no farther, and 1 earnestly recommerid 
fo yon if ~ o i i  gire asnislmce at dl, t o  givc orer a magazine to 
Iast R givcn time, but; not to take upon onrseIF to sirpply thc 
Spmirlitmo r c n a ~ o d  in operntions. I{ howerer, you slionld 
notuitl.hn!ing iiiis rcoommondation tuko npm youmclf to gira 
such suppli~s, I miut ol!jpct, as comrnander-m-chief of tlie 
S ~ i s l i  m~np ,  to your piving more than bread to tlie tirsopa nLo 
receive pnp, as tliat is pasitively eontrary to the replations md 
cnstoms of the Fpnni~I i  arrny. 1 remmmend to you aEso .'o 
attcnd witli cnution ~ thcrlcmands of  bot11 pynmwl N%ittingliam 
aiid gcncral lloche, nnci to obscrve that in yroporhion na youwill 
cnmplp with tlieir demands, dcmands wi11 br: msde upon ~ o i i  by 
gcncral Ello and others, and you will ini~olve yeuraelf in a scitlu 
of expense and diffjculty, whch wiiI cyamp d our operat.ioos, 
and rliirli i s  qnite ineonairtent aith he r iens  ~ ? ~ o ~ e r n r n e n t  u  
tlie enskrn cout of tlie Peninsuk.' 
No. IX. 
GENERAL STATE OF THE FRJCNCH ARMT, APRIL 15, 1812. 
Artn&du Mldl.. .. 55,797 11,014 2,498 700 6,0135 64,W 11,714 
C e i i t i r  .. .. 19.148 3,993 114 61 tj24 19,91G 4 ~ 4 4  
P o i t y d  .. .. 66,!i87 b,lUj 4,8!i4 2 a T H  7,106 6!1.i151 lO;%%G 
Ebre .. .. .. IG,3;0 1,1473 21 6 &m24 2li,276 1,4í4> 
A s i a p  .. .. 1d.ihG 3,269 2,CICi F5R 1 ,  IR,+iiR 3.!127 
cntalugio .. zB,!iat l A  , 40 6,340 3a,027 1;jiin 
Xurd .. .. .. 48,262 7,úi.I l,di% 72 7 SA,276 7,91J. 
Grnnd Total .. .. P 4 4 , G N  X,747 12,260 884'3 M,3G9 481,3¡9 40,6773 
Civic guardsattached 
to tlio arms of tho 6,497 1,FS5 - 1 e68 6,7M 1,497 WUlh . . .. Troulies ~apeono~4 .. 33,952 69.5 e , aqa54 5-25 
~ o t d ~ s p a g n o h  .. 40,449 2.180 258 c ~ 2 W  apea 
G m E m  STATE, HAY 15, 1812. 
drm6eiluMldi .. 6ii,ihPI 12,101 2,717 FA0 6,G52 63,470 7.311 4,540 
Gmtrc .. 17.31i5 4.208 158 37 1GS 1'3.803 3.332 420 
Portnd ., .6??618 2 9,150 153s 8,339 lo.7i10 r.ru1 3,.S48 
A p r a ~ u n  .. 47,218 4,i68 4,438 E05 &ilii 35,3iT 2,976 1,940 
Cnt%logne .. 33,677 1,577 1h44 '2CT ri.009 41,.730 1,376 2 i 9  
Nnrd .. .. 33,751 fi,OAt 2,1ifi0 '271 7,767 4D,O!lX 4,445 1,113 
- - -- 
Total .. 225-7111 35,889 81,55551 3818 31,297 W9,%78 8&919 11,Wf 
Old Resenme ut 
Bayonne .. 8,894 221 1,642 ,, 864 6,MP 2üi ,, 
WPW llevrre st 
IIsyomc .. 4688 116 8.176 , b 6,7ti~ 1W ., 
h e &  sder a m .  DetacM. nwihb, ML 
Men. Borne, Iiben. H a i ~ a .  Hen. Cavnl~. %!D. 
AnnQe da M d i  . . B6,rM 401i0 1617 7,144 45.809 8,FrSO 2S01 
Centre . 1 ,  ti40 16 2,401 IB.íIi8 2,790 d%l 
P d i i d  .. 34.8Z.i 3.64 157 . 7.711 48.719 ri.726 2149 
-- -- 
~ ~ t a l  .. IW,W 15216 a443 I W ~  3n,ms 2ai,rs6 mrzs are8 
The operations and misbrtunes of the French prevented aay p n e d  
dates being sent home hetween thc 15th of March anrl the 15th of 
AuysE, 1813, wlim a neiv org~t~iization of tlie sn~iies took place; liut 
tlie numbers given Jn the n%rrative nf t h i ~  hiEltory are the  rm1t of ml- 
cnlationa forindd on the compariaon of a variety uf dricu~rients, anrl 
hrlieved t o  be avery clom xrproximation t o  the real atrmgth of  the 
armiea 
No. X. 
ESPECIAL 8TATE OF TUE ARMY OF M)ETGG.AL, 
JCNE 15, 1512. 
1st Dirlsion.. .. 
2nd do. .. .. 
:3rd do. .. .. 
41'11 do. . . . . 
5th do. .. .. 
Sth do. .. .. 
7th iln. .. .. 
ni h do. . . . . 
EmAD-Ql lanrnB,  m m n m .  
P r c r n t ~ l k r  mi. I M n r h d .  R* 
Men. I l u m  Mcn. i lone4.  
Fny .. .. 5.138 , 319 ,, S N  
1 . 7 4  , f i i X  ,, 613 
Fcrep .. 5+'i11 ,, 1.1 , 9% 
fi;ii.rut .. 5,ní6 ,, el4 n t ~ 2  
>Ifiuciine .. 5.9i89 , 6E4 .. 1513 
mar. 
Mrn. Cav.Tlaia 
h.973 " ,* 
n ', ,, 
G.4SB ,, ,, 
6,132 ,, 
. ." 6.JiO ,, " 
í H C 5  
;i:257 F:1 :: 
7,432 139 ,, 
I.ight Carn1rg, 
13 secadme ) Cnrto .. 1,336 13'38 1072 S24 846 1,705 1722 ,, 
Drn~~~liiia .. .. Boyer .. 1,BB 7378 479 358 86 1,1154 l iSG ,, 
Artiltery .. .. .. a,hie 2x49 513 toa 2zc 4,443 a47 m 8  
Geiijc .. .. .. 414 9 67 7 P I  5G5 ,. 12 
1:quipage .. .. 9 %  1 $1 44 243 1,2'hl lOR4 
Gen-#amies et~nft;npris .. 325 76 , .. 15 340 ;P ,, 
Total .. 64,560 6606 41M 991 8633 67,370 4053 a41 
_ .- . - _. _ 
F m  tbew 54,650 men, preaent under arms, m& be dedacted the 
artillmy, engium, e q u i p a p ,  and pmiwnrr, tha officers and s e p m t s ,  
and tha lolises m&.ined btween tho 8iqe of thn fo& and the battlo of 
S a b a n a ;  the resaIt wiU be about 42,000 sabm and bayonets in the 
battle. 
Itenforcements en mrche de l'armk da nord ... 1,870 
Do. de h p n n e  . . . . . . . . . . . .  l z , ~ r 6  
no&.-These troops did not join before the battle cif salamana 
ARITLLERY OF THE ARMY OF POETKUAL, JüYE 15, 1812. 
Poid e t  calibre. Nombre. 
U M e a  6 fw 
3 do. 
Total . . . .  . . U  
m i d e  l'armke d r d . .  
82 
- 
TOTAL LOS8 OF TKE ARMT @P PORTCJQAL F n Q M  JULY 10 
TO AUGUST 10, 1812, mCLUDIMG THE BhTTLI? OF SALA- 
MANCCL 
rnTEACTED FBOH THB amERIbIi ñIu$PIEB*BOm. 
Tu&. B l d h  
. . . .  í Duke 8e R~grise  .. +. II 1 General Cl~iasel  m 1 Cenernl lluiinet . . , , +, I ORlclersmipwiesrs . . . .  ~ o m c ~ ~ n l  lcerrey . . . .  I n Gciiernl ' l ' l iomie~s . . . .  1 .. General 1)eca;iwier Bertliolet 1 
-- 
Grande Total .. 4.029 1.761 645 
MRdersaaoldats .. lMX5 
Clhwh~~x . . . .  lpI90 
Cawns 12 
Deux aglm d e ' ~ 0 l h ~ ~ e ~ t .  d  lime. 
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No. XI. 
BTRENCtTII O?? THE ANCrTiO-PORTGUUESE ARMY üNDER 
LORD I'ISCOUNT WELLTRGTON, ON THE MORNINCf OF 
J aa 22, I81Z. 
flote.-The numbm are exclusive of offioera, ~ergesnh,  bwmpetm, 
artillerymen, and sw showing mereIy the sabrea and bilyonets iii 
tfie íield. 
Rriti~li mmlry, m e  dlvlqimi, pmqent iinder anns, 3,314 men, 8,795 horsee. 
Jlritiah infantcy, scvon divisiona do. a2,m7 ,, ,, 
. . . . . . . .  Total Btitltlsh 9 5 9 1  
n1nphk Pmhrnlm caralrp. three 
- .  ". 
re~imcnt3, ahiit. . . 1,600 Tbeae m p s  uot in the siato* 
Poitiisese infantig, &kn d%siona, 
ami turno indeueiulent bri~adc9 . . 16,lM 
Total Angl+Portugoesc . . 47,89 
C ~ r l n s  d'Krrpañirl~ ffpniniah di*, a h t  QOOb 
~ ~ i i  sanci eg . . . . . .  600 
3,5m 
-
&i~res aud bagoneh . . . .  46 ,W 
-
Wdght olrtllbm. Ko. dmm, 
BrULahihmewtIlte~ . . . . . . . . . .  6lba. IR 
Foot do. . . . . . . . . . . .  9 1 1 ~ .  12 
no. do. . . . . . . . . . .  12 111s. 11 
C m e n  [tn. . . . .  9 Iba. G 
Portupess ~d ~ntinh*bk~& &ihm ., .. 24 lb. h d t z o i s  6 
- 
64 
h a  8 p d h  Lattcry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5 
Generaltatsl .. GO pise=. 
No. X I T .  
OPFXCIAL REPORT OF THE LOS OF TKE ALI;IES ON THE 
TRdlBi\hTCOS AND GKARENA RITFXS, JU5T 18, 1812. 
MISS OF THE ALLES JN TEíE B A m E  OF SALiMANCh. 
Total .. 394 Pa7 4713 291 
THE BRimSU LOM BY iN3'hhTRY DTVISIONS 
CAVALRY BkiGiWJ%. 
rm MareM'u  brigde 
do. do. do. 
l'ictur Aiten'a du. rla do. 
let 1Xtisiou General Onmpben do. 
3rd do. (+eneral Pnlionham do, do. 
4th do. General C o k  c1a 
do. do. 
7th do. Gaiierd S. H o p  Ilo. do. 
L i ~ l i t  (lo. Gciieral C. Allen du. do. 
Artüiery Eeneril Pramlngbam do. da. 
9027 
No. 1111. 
Total ca~alrg . . . . . . . .  9,243 lG76 
Rritinh jdnntry .. 3 . G t i U  l f  71 
Portupese do. . . . .  23,905 1038 
Bnbres and haponels . . €6,806 8985 
Dedilct the 6th dirkion left at Xedtir de Pomar 6,3m 
- 
Sabres and hywnets . . 1,4%8 
Spanixli Aurlliiuiex. 
f IIariIb's divieion about 5.000 
Clron'S do. 40. l?;iloo 
( nrlox d ' E s p i w ' ~  do. do. 3,llOn 
LonsaWs do. do. a.anu 
Pennc Vilicmur Cmdq.. .. {J . do. ] l ino 
ulmi Sanchca do. 1,000 
w.nw 
h'UMBER OF ANGLO-PORTITGUESE OUN9 BT TEE B A m  
OF VrrORXh 
. . . . . .  . . . . . .  Britih homa srürlcry 9 lbs. 45 
Do. h . . . . . . .  E lbs. . . . .  30 
Do. do. . . . . . .  + i n c  h&tneiri . 15 
+ 
Tomi . . . .  80 
No Spauiyh p s  rcBt down in the retuni, Number unknowa 
f ~ d  WzlXm Bentiwk to  &v 3. Pel?,?, 
Ad sea, bme 18fh, 1813. 
8r~,-Y. R, has Eieen the information 1 linve reeeived of a 
rojcctcd attack iipon Sicjly by Murnt, in conjunction with tho 
!&don tlcct. I t  sssrns nocoasurg t h t  athe Frenoh lieet should 
lenve Toulon, should reach the comt of Nnples, eml-iark the men 
and lavd tliern in Sicily, or cover iheir passage f m  C h b r i a  or 
tlie &y o f  Nnples, if the intcntion be, M in tdie IRR~ iiistance, ta 
tranuport tlicrn to Sicily in tlie tonnvc md smnll crdt of tho 
cuiintry.-ll'he most important quostion is ,  wbotlier thia m be 
effectcd by (he enemy.-1 have no dii6cul in s a p g  on rny 
iart,  tlrat in tlie present di~position of tlie % eapolitan army in 
gieilg. iind in thr non-existrncc of any nntiond fo~co. nnci tho 
inipcrfcct eompositiori of tho British forco, if hnlf tho number 
inlended for thia expedition shoulci land in Sidy, Ilie i s h d  
mould be conquered. 
(Siped) W. BENT~NCX. 
fi? B. ~ ~ e ~ h  63 h d  E &%&Ch. 
11. X i9. C a l e h i a ,  dum lgth,  1813. 
MY LORD,-I frd it my duty to ~ t a t c  to your lordship tIiat in 
my judgrnent t.he Toulon fleet may evado mina williuul diííiculty 
under ri ntrong N. TV. wind to carry them thmugli tlie pussnge 
of tlie Xiere~ ialmcls, aitliout thc possibility of mg interruptilig 
tliern, nnrl tlirit tlicy muy Iia~e fm t ~ e l r e  t o  tvent -fo~ir Iiuui.tiV 
start of me in ihrsiog thcm. ílThen bioan off t t c  oonst, my 
look-out shi s ñoidd cerlainlp h r m ~  me such ini'umation as 
nould e n n d  m e  to foiiow uiem unmodiatelj t o  tlie Ilag af 
PiTaples. Your lodship js most competent to jndge vhetlier in 
tha intervd of tlicir iirrivnl nnd my p~~rirrsuit, lie P&ncli admird  
would ha ublc to embark Milrnt's nrnip ortillcry nnd etorcs, nnd 
iiind them on Zke ceast o f  oicily betóru 1 came up with h m . -  
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The fxcility o€ commi~nication by klegraph along the wkole 
coast cf Toulon ~ o u l d  certvinly aplirke Mur& of Ilieir sailing 3 
a very aliort notice, but for rny o m  pmt, 1 shoidd entertain 
vmg san~ruine Lopes of orertdcing them either in tlie Bny of 
Naples or nn the coast o€ S i e l  before they codd make good 
thcir landing. 
M WllZam Bmfikk to  M Wellingfo*. 
At =a, &LW 20f ia, 1823. 
MT LORD,-By the perusd of the mwmpnnying despalcli to 
lord CaxLlereagh, vour Iordsliip mil1 perceire tliat Mumt has 
opened a ne otiñtion mith IL~, the object of whicli is fiiendship 
aiih us auf Iiostilitp to Utionupnrfe. You mil obserre in one 
of tlrc converatitions with Mi~rnt'u qcnt,  thnt he informcd me 
tliat Buonapnrb liad wdcrrd Mnrat t o  hold twent+y tlionsund 
men iu rearlinms for tlie invasion of Sicily in con,jiinction witli 
tlie Toidon Ilret. I oiielwe Ilie copy o£ z letter 1 Iiave in consr- 
qitence addre~sed to R ~ Y  3. Pelleir, haether m-it.h liis answcr, 
npdthe practicability of th To~ilon flert s d i n g  aitliont tlie 
KnowIpdge of the hloekfidin~ flrct. Ynnr lorrlship mll Iiave 
r~ccircd my Icttcr nf tfic Slat of  May cnclosing ra copy of  mp 
dcgpakli to lord Batliiirst, rclativc to tho di~content of tlic 
N~apolitan troopa in Sicily ttnd tlie oon~equent sbte of wcaknees 
ir irot of dmger resul~ing fmm if to that island. 1 stated dso 
that t h i s  circumstance liad induced me to detain in SicjJy the 
two battñlions whiclt bad been witiizlrawn fmm Spain. 
Hwtrte, J u ~  1 6,1813. 
IKP  LORD,-^ Rnswer to yonr lordship's despntch, 1 havo to 
obuerve, iliat 1 conceive t h t  h e  i~lland of Sicily M at preaent in 
no dauger alistever. 
No. XT. 
Zetterfmm gen& Xyqeat to  brd WYIiane Bmgck. 
Yicnaa, Janzcay 2&A, 1812. 
MY nWAP r,ORT) ~ T , T , ~ A M , - I  Iinpc gna hnvi: mcrivcd tho 
Irttcr 1 ñrote to yon fihortly after iiiy nrrirml here by a pcmciri 
scrit for Lliat purpose. Suoti aller Iiih drs arluia Iho i t l h r  o!' La 
Tour lirpl>~ot=d. as Kiiig rncutions io 11s lotter. I t  roquired 
some timc bcfore 1 could j d g e  of thc result it woiild hnt-e mrl 
tlie manner it wonlcl be roiisidrred by tlie empcror and tlie 
govcrnincnt here, nnrl tlicn to setUc n s i n  thc mannor of sending 
ojlicers dorvn t o  tlie Mediterrlincm, for some oí' tliose h e 1 1  des- 
tiiied ta be sent wcre iliiplic:iietl. ,411 thcsa circuiiislnncea 
caus~d tlic delnv of tlie prcsciit wliidi oilir~irisc pou rr-oiilrl llave. 
had uitich aooncr. i i h o  tliri. ro,i sisr nf IIr: dcluy rra t h t  1 ii mted 
~ 1 2  
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to inform you of the an.neaer wbich wodd be Aven by this huase 
to the ~peculatstions that 1 wap commisaioned by the prinee-re~enb 
tc propose relatlve to the archduke. Tliera waa no deeiaive 
anamrr +en, and tbe only mrtnner of forming m oopiiiion upon 
that siil!jcct *FM b oburPVin~ and getting informahon of tlirir 
true intantions. ?m now f i r m l ~  eonnnood thot tbose aro such 
LR me could wiah, and that it i s  only .bar oof lieing coymitted tLwt 
prevenh t l m  to spcak iri u more osilivo manuer. Iheir wlide 
oondoet proves thir. more artio&rlrly in in T o d a  aKair, whiioh 
Liao prodoced no ohanee wintsower nor ied t o  n q  direoveq of 
vipws nr connexions. TIi~re ia even now less rliffimlty than crcr 
for oaeers going to the Meditei~anean. They gct paqsports 
fmm goverriueut here aiLhoul its inquirin or seeniing lo k n u r ~  
the red  objcct. As  it can do nothing elsegbut cannire, to ahicli 
tliia conduct answm, 1 thinlc a more es7licit dedarntion ia not 
cven rcquishe, and 1 am convinrcd t h ~ t ,  T T ~ C ~  t!io thing i~ oneo 
done thcy wilI gldly a p c .  Thia ia likcwiac King's and Hnr- 
donberg's and Jolin~on's opinion upon tlio sulijcol, md as such 
tliey desire me Lo elrpreris it  to you, and to o t s e l ~ a  tliot tb 
situation ofthings here m a k e ~  the forwarding of tlie measnwa 
pou may think ~ q e d i e n t  in t b  Mediterranean and tl ie ddriatia 
thn more dcsirnhlo. 
They are hore cxtremely satisficd Nith the mduct of govern- 
ment iu 33tiglan d, and by tfie iiccounts we b e ,  LIie latfi!r i a  much 
plewed mit3i Llie mnduct of tliis countrp, particularly relntivc to 
{he aK3irs oF Trnssiñ, Sbese are home~rr not drcided ~ e t .  But 
wlldrvcr tlip. consoqupnw mny he and whntev~r tliis conn ty  
rna7 do tbr tlic prcscnt, 1 nm convinccd thut Tour mcasures will 
uilimxtely runtriliutc mucIi to the result. L rm happy iy per- 
ccive by the inst infomation f ~ v m  ISngland that cvcryt.lliiti;j 
seerns to havc Iieen ñctkled tlicre by you. Tlie recruiting bnzi- 
ness of major Riirke is p i n ?  on rnpidly. As it wnu not I iepn 
iit the timc of mp dcparturc I mn oiilg attribute it to yovr 
presericc. ' n o  lvlters c o u l i n  likeivise tliit gguerurnent i~ come 
to tlic most Ejvourahlc rcsoliilions rc1ntii.o to  tho archrluke, snd 
T Iio e tlie formntion of tlie troops will soon be effectuaterl, 
Tlic iispositions oE illc Adrintic consto nnd iJia Tyml arc ns god  
t is  enn be, liut a11 deperids iipon eet;iblixling a basi~ nnd rrilliout 
iLrat al1 pnrzial ~xrriioris ~gwiild be uaclesa or dcst.ruclire. l i t  
tlie samc time that aomc rcgirncnfa a o d d  be formed, 1 think it 
rvauld be v e 1  exliedient. to fbrm at the same phce a Dalmati~u 
or n. Croat rrEimcnl, piirticdnrly as in {he prcacrit sthk of tliings 
it a i l l  be murli easier rven than bhe othcr. She mmen could bu 
ea~ilp recriiilod i i i  I<osnia, aild aent from Dnrazm to ihe placa 
gou diould appoint. Tlie Iicarer will give you every informa- 
tion upon the subject, and nt al1 rvents, 1 should propoae to yon 
to se:id Iiim úiimcclintelj* liiick to Durmeo, md, shouId yon n d q t  
tlie &tiore, tu gire him flie riecessnry ordem and tlie eomrnissiun 
lvr rccmiling niid sending tlie men l o  (he place oT Curmrttion. 
T o  pcrson can be bettcr qiinIíficd than Iie is. ITe kno~vs tlio 
Icngnag~, tIie coiintry, and tbe character of  the pcople, and 
nndcrcrtaDds everydiing thrat relates to comercial aiTRirs. AP 
te the place of forrnation, I tlunk I d r e d y  proposed Ceplralonin 
to yon. Lisga or one of the neares islands mould give too mucb 
j~aiouriy in the be inning in thone parts, until ouc capital in- 
crcaaon so ns to nn!crinkn on irnportnnt coterpriso, at al1 ovmts 
it is importani b f " o  a noyau oof tfie ihreo nations; it is heii  
l .hd  we majr lio e to be joined by tlw whole ol Udmatia and 
Croath after a &o* time. 3lnjor nnd 0 t h  officers will rliortlu 
p r w ~ d  to tiie Sfcdikmanelin. They i l l  Lo dirccted to Messini 
trhere 1 rcqnest you will ~ ~ n d  ordcrri for thcm. l t  moiild be vprp 
iisefnl nnd smving to providc mpnns for trans ortinq thom to  t h n t  
plaoe &om Uuraezo, and if poosible to esiub\sli n h o r a  froqucnt 
a~trid regular hkrcour~c bulivecn you and Lhe latkr. Johsou 
mho soon sets oE from here will in tlie meantime entabli$l.li ri 
commnnication aermg h n i a  to Durazzo lIis presence in those 
parts will be prohetive of m n y  good eftects. You will find 
that Iic is m able active anrl zeiilous mRn, mtl will certriinly bt! 
a c y  nsefuI in forwmdinp yow virlrs. I cm nnmcr for Iiis bcing 
worthy of yow Su11 coddence. Slionld you dopt  tlie pro ositiou 
relative +o tlie recrnitinr it won1d be necessarv to aut rrt Es dis. 
A posd tlie requisite f u d .  
Yori wili i nd r s  bv t he  mmnt the bearer of t h i ~  wiU eivo 
you wlietlier"'~10i h, &c.. can be l id at a chenper rnte fmm this 
wuntry or ~vhcrs ou are, and ho will bring hack our directions 
for L1.s objcct. ~ i y o w  me w obawve ~Lat il waullbfin higliiy iiru- 
f~il o linve cloll~e.es for a considemble numbcr oC men pre ured S beforclinnd. Many importnnt reasans havc prcwntcd mc lii L ierto 
from roceediiig tfi tlte hTrditrmiienn as upecdily~.au 1 mishecI. 1 
hopo Iowercr not to br dotoinod miirli Ion~r r ,  ond aoon t o  1ioi.o 
rcmovcd evcr obstnclc. 1 tliink to sct off from licro in tha 3 Iicgiuning of ,fnrcli, mtnd requcsS you wiIl bi, so kind ns to  pm- 
virlc witli tlie return 01" tEie bcarcr to Dui.azx@ thc nirans of rnp 
passage Aom tlirneo, whcm 1 sliall come with B fciancd narne. 
1 Iiopc Iic will tic back thcro by tlie time of rny awird. 1 shall 
cnrlcu~oiu to l i a~ t rn  m7 jnumep, ns  1 hnvc importaiit informn- 
tion in e r q  rcspcrt. Bu that timo me sh& k~iuw tho dWi8ioii 
~c lat iue  to the nortli. jíinC: Iia~ informed you oi' tb i~asuns 
n hich made mi alteration iieccss jn r e p ~ d  to Frazzi'bi journey. 
Fiirt of pour objeet is in fnot?~iilled dready, md fiere are 
ngents in Ihly &c. As to tlio other anrt p h c i p d  pnrt relative 
to nonncxions in t h o  nmy, and tho gainbg m cxn~4 h o w l e d ~ e  
OS il nnd o f  tlie government in Ilaly, w j l l ~  other circiunatmci.~, 
I e ~ p e c t  80an t u  have a peraon of guajcienl wnsequence and 
alsility to execute your instruetions, and lie wiIl go to Milan h. 
as soon as it can be done wit,h &e*. His permaneut reeirlence 
in tliat country sccms ta Iic ncwssu tlint hc moy be d l c  to 
acmmplisl~ Fuily lha rbl;ie~+, md nd zi surn rou bive ussigned 
foi. tliiz PUITOSG i~ stúii~:icnt for a consi(~cratie time, you can 
dekrmine ñ-lictlicr be ie to remnin tlicm pcrrnancntly or not. 
h z z i  nil l  Iiring you an exaet aacount of irliilt iiñs Iieen manged 
rchti i~ to this Iiusinc~a, ancl will hunscif be i~very proper person 

Xei!terfrc-m Mr. H i ~ g  t o  h d  IEZliam BmCmk. 
Eemna, daway NtR, 1812. 
M 3  LORD,-I have the lionour to acknowledge ttli eceipt af 
yonr lordship's letter of thc 2.jtIi of Augst, whicli aas delil-ered 
to  me townrtls tlie 1atte-r end of  Octolier by mptain Prozzi, whom 
1 should immediately Iiarc fnrnislicd ñ.ith the menns of pmceed- 
ina to Ltnly for tlie purposi! of cmyving Tour Iorddiip'u in~true- 
t ion~ inio r>ffiact, hnd it not nppcorcd to mc tlint tho mcnsiircs 
which 1 had ttnlcn on my ar r i~a l  Iiere had alrcadp in a, meat 
dt=~ree anticiydecl your lordship'fi intentions. As a m n h n t r o n  
of tliis, 1 beg leave te transniit for yonr lordahip's perusal the 
rcporttr (rnmtrlc~d A) of three messengers wJiom 1 sent to tLe norkh 
of Itnly for the purpose of aseertaining tlie etate oF the publio 
mind, rtrt;icnlarly in the ci-davant Vcnetion temitones nnd *a- 
ccnt L r i u k .  'J3e.e ra orti ooníirm in a verg aatislctory 
m m e r  uia ussurrnecs. ntisii 1 iuue reocired tlmougii variuw 
other chnnnela, tlin;t tlio inliabitantñ of those countries are renQ 
and dehrrmincd to a\-ail themselelrea of thc first opportunit~ to 
fihtike off a yoko sliich iti hcrome Fnñiipporiaiblo, X t i n ~ o  nlso tlia 
hononr to trr~nsrnit to ponr lordsliip tLc eopT of a lcttcr from 
count Montgclas, tlie miniater of fo~eign afi~irs m Bavnrin, to tha 
comrnissary-general at Kunlitcn, frorn wliicli id appcara that tlio 
Bar& goveriiment js not altogether ignorad o€ t he intentions of 
kl~e  Swiss and T,~mlew, but 1 ain Imppy to have it in my powerto 
jnform vnur lordsliip thnt t.he peraoiia who scem to h a ~ c  excited 
tlic ~nspicions of tlio Uavarian gorcrnmcint do notenjoy the con- 
fidence of our Friends in Swilzcrlmd, and Iizve not Leen made 
acquaintcd wi t l  t h ~ í r  intentions; it i s  nevertlielesa iiidispensably 
nccesrary tliat me should act aith tbe y t e s t  posribie caution 
in the emplopent of ~rnissaries, lest t e Frencli and Bavarian 
g o ~ c r n i n ~ n k  shoiild tnki: tlie nlam and adopt rneasures s h i a h  
mould defc~t our prgjects or at least occasion a rematare esplo- 
.ion. 0. tiicse grounds (ha+ preuiously aonr?ited wiih goncral 
N. to shom m tain Frozzi was particnlxrly dr lres sd  and ii-ho 
entirely so ino ik  io my opiniou) I ihiok it eligible to send t h  
omcer bnck to Sicily, and 1 h a t  that. jn so doing 1 ~h.linl1 meet 
with your lordship's npprohation. 1 beg learc t o  obncrvc tliat 
.tho only semiee eu tain Prozzi conld render in 1t.Q at tlie pro- 
aent moment woulg bo to asceshin Ihe ilurnber and dislribution 
of the Frcnch forcrces in this coiintry, hit as t h e ~ e  undeqo  con- 
tinual echmges 1 thinlr it wjIl IM suficicnt to despstch a confi- 
dcntinl rigcnt to vour lordship witli the latest intrlligcnce from 
I tdp,  0% m eriod wiion the northorn war nnd conseguant wcu- 
y r t i k  unf fEe Freniii lmops will e n d e  your lordsliip to derive 
adritntage froni such intell~gence. 
The genera? opinion is tliat; liostilities ariU commenee between 
Frtince and Ikioain in £110 montli of April at, wFiir:li arind tho 
prepomtions af th Prcneh govarnrnent aiil ba oompl)aied, nnd 
tliera i s  litllo ronsun tu hopo that tLu ltuaaians mil1 nvail tliem- 
selveri oE tLe  inkrval, eilhcr to amddate  Wie m y  of tlie duchy 
of War~rnw OF to d ~ a n c e  to the aasiritnnce of thc king of h a s i n ,  
vrho s i l1  in al1 pmbabirity d y  lumtielc with F m c e  n o t ~ t h -  
s~anding La former declnratiom to tlie contmry. T Z c  lakst 
intelllgence from Eerlin a h k s  that count St. Mllrsnn liad pre- 
arnted tho ultimatnm of Iiis govrrnmcnt, wiiich drrnn.ntnda nn 
anconditionnl ~iimcndcr of nall t l i ~  Pmasinn foortrrasea, nnd inaists 
on the militury foro0 and reaourms of Pmsia b~ing placcd at 
the disposal of French generals. It ia posilively asserbd t h t  
the king iu inclind to siihmil to these humiliating proposda, Iiut 
nothing lias lieen aa yet dcfinitiwly condutled. 1 &m s o t q  to 
infonn your lordship tlint tlie nspeot of affairs in this country is 
higlilg diricotimging; tha injudicious financia1 mrnrnres whicli 
rount mraliiis luia tl~ought ropcr to adopt Iia-rc rcndcrcd it impoa- P ~ i h k  for goi7ernrnenk t o  P acc tho m y  on ra respectalila footing, 
and have conoiderablbly incrrased the: dkconlent ol' tlie people, 
vlio however stfl rctain tlieir climacteristic a~ersion to tIie 
Freneh. T h e  go~ernment is determined to maintain a ~ t r i c t  
neutrali* rluring tlie R proachin: c r i ~ i ~  if O R R ~ ~ I C .  
In m7 formrr lettcr rrnwtioned t o  yonrfordsllip my intontion 
uf eehlilishing a person at Dwam in orrler fbrnarri messcn- y &c. &c. and io tranamit to me occasionnlly inlilligir~ee of 
t ie etnte of t l i i n p  jn t h  Adriatic. 'But I if tvin~ recrived of Jate 
repeated ~qsriranees af the inmeasing discontent of the jnlialii- 
tnnts of thosc parta of thc eonat who havo tlie misfortuno to '00 
under tlio domlnion of tlie Prcncli, and of thoir willingneas to 
make evelp efi)rt to sliako off t h  yoke, and Leing awam how 
jmportant it is nt tlis rcscnt moment not to n~kec t  an ol!jeot o€ 
t l i i a  nahirs I hnre gs ired \fr. Jolmson to prwced fliit,lier in 
ordcr to f o m  conncxions in dibania, Dnlmntia nnd to nvnil him- 
possiblo manner of the spirit of discontcnt ahieli c:bgxdiy mrniferled ilseif Mr. Johiisoii xho hns beeu 
employed on thc contincnt for some yeiirs past as an l~gent of 
gorernnient, rind who hna L ~ G W  proofs of bilis eeal and nlilities, 
'~ill rcpnir to Durszzo, or wcording to circumstancea .to soma 
olller 1,uwn in the neighbourliood of tlie Adriatic, md wil? 
thcro reside aa ngent o[ tlis Br~tish po~ernmoi~l.  He vil1 
communicate his itl~ival to your lordship ~ i t h  as little clelajr as 
pos~iMe. 
By tho fdlowing piece of infomation, which 1 hnve derived 
frorri  an autlieniic aource, your lordship will purceive IIiat ihti 
Frcnch md Sredish goveniments are fnr f m  lieing oa ftiendly 
tema. niE alliance h s  been proposed by the Sormer tte t l ~ e  
lntter and instniitaneo~~sly rqjected. The t ~ r m s  nf the dliance 
R C r C  f0110w8, Viz. lst, t, Qodp of 30,000 Sncdcs to bc laccd 
al Iha di~puaal uf  Fmnoe; 2nd.-3030 seurnen (o be fumis!ed to 
ilie Freiicli mwine ; and 3rtl, a rcgimenl oT Swerles Lo be iuiaed 
for tlie serrice of Frnnce as was tlle case befwc tbc Frencli rcvo- 
lution. 1 tronmnit t I l i ~  letter tO yolir lordsliip hy raptnin Strin- 
hcrg nnd ensign Fcrnndi, two officers who hnwc scrvcd crrrditi~tily 
in ihc Austrian army T h  former h~ connesions nnd lucal 
h-nowkdge in Lis mhve country nliicli may Ltecoruc pürlicul~rly 
nsefnl. 1 fear it will not be in my power to aend 50 mbdtera 
ofieer~ ta Sicily, as yonr lordship desired. I slidl Lorever 
ocwimd1-y deepdch some intelligent officers wtio wiU I t f i k  
be extrerncly uscful in tlic formntion of ncw aorpa. 
No. m 
Mr. Bmtgkm lo sir Charles Staad. 
Cadiz, A u p t  3&, 1813. 
'The Spmiah troope iu Catalonia and dsevlierc me ~ t a r v i n g ~  
and the gevernmcnt m feeding them aitli pi.&ations to 
intendnnts. Since 1 hwe known Epain 1 hwe never k n o m  the 
scnt of governmcnt in la rrorai: ~ h t e .  TThei.e js a ñtrong fecling 
wd ns t zhc Hnglish and a miscmblc jmbin party whicli 1s violenent 
li&nd measure.' 
Da'tb lo ixtB. 
cawh TM]. %a, 1813. 
'Pu'evm wm nn hing ao diaipceful in the annalrr of the world 
as t l io conduct o f nll tho Sptmish nnthonties on tho ocrmion of 
the siclcness breaking out. I t  is beliemd that no persone h a ~ e  
tIls sichess t w i c e ,  R I I ~  as almost eyery family in Cii& has 
patised tlie epideinio of die fever the inkrested rnerchanta wouId 
not allow i t  to  be said fhat the e idernic aisted, t h q  have can- 
tiriuod to irruo denn bills of hcnlfli to vesak len.ing the port in 
thc height o€ tbe mortality. and did dl they could to iiitirnic2ate 
tlio govcmment and Cortes i n io  romaining mongst £he=' 
Sir Xmry WeZlegh~ fo M Wetlimgfoa. 
'S&. 13tk 11813. 
'A cnriorip acene h a  been paasing here Iately. The perma- 
nwt dcputntion* having hcen nppointcd, the Cortc~ closed thcir 
sesiiion tlie 14th. TIierv h d  bcen for some d q s  reports of h e  
preralence of llle yeIluw fever rvliicli l i d  exciterl dxin.  Oe Llie 
18th in tlie evcning, 1: received an oíñc id  note h m  tlieministrrs 
of utattte apprising me of the intention of  tho ~ov~rnrnent to 
procced to Mnrlrid on the folladne but wit,lioiit rtssigning 
any rcnsoa for 80 ~ilddcn a resdution. At night I wcnt to tliu 
rqpncy, thnlíing iliia waa an oceasion when it i~ould be right 10 
off'er tliem some pe~wniai.7 assistance. I found Apar aud Ci~car  
togcther, tlie carrlind Iicing i i i  of the goiit. Th& told me thab 
tlic prevfilrneo or tlic dimrdrr wníi tXio arilt: c,niiaa o£ thir  deter- 
nninution to 3ca~c Cdií*; nnd Ciscar pnrticularly dwdt upon tho 
hl led the Extrñmdimrg C l o r h  
neccssity of  rrmoving, s n y n ~  lio Birrl seen the fntal effccts of 
drlny at C~arthngcna. T h q  thcn told mc thnt tlicrc wm dia- 
turbance in tha t o ~ n ,  in oonsequence o€ which thep determincd 
on nummoning tlio extmonlinq Cortes. 1 wenl from tlie 
regency tu the Cortes. A motion wns made for suinmoning tlie 
miuisters to account for t h  proceedings af tbe regcncy. Ncvei 
m-as 1 witness to so ciisqncPTi~1 a scene of lyinz and previisi- 
cntion. Tlie m i n i s h  insiuhd that it m not tlie jntsntion of 
tlic rcgencg to lcave C d z  until the Cortea had been eonsulhd, 
altlioiigh 1 had in my r k e l  «lo oficial nole amiouncing l h i r  
inteniion t o  do 8 4  m liacl been toEd by Ciscar thnt tlie edra- 
ordinrtrg Cortea mas ns~emhled for no other reaeon $kan bccawe 
thme aere diatnrbmccs in the town.' 
Sir H a y  Wcllesfq fo loTd V-%lli&m. 
Cadiz, set .  lOfh, 1813. 
' The for nlncin~ the tinncess at tlie heed of the Sii~nish 
urilcss u, lir.riüe and Ehe rol&& of Ferbünd ahoukd put m end te 
all such projecta.' 
Hr. Sbia& i% M WdIIRngton. 
' Jtcw I l t h ,  1513. 
'Thc repuyancy of the Admiralby h a d q t  tlie mewurcs s u p  
geattxíl by your lordship at the cmmencement of the bmerican 
s a r  for tIic protection of the msst, lins been followed kv evcnts 
d i i c i i  liavc f d y  justificd yonr opinion. F$cm m c h m n t m m  
Franr: Iicm faiFeia o$ O p d o  zm a fovqtnight, and ra vahablo Porfu- 
gsme Amewnrd-bmnd merchunt &$ wm captured ihme rlat~s 
ayo closs h the bar of Lisbcna.' 
No. XT: 
"e thirky-ninth regiment, cornmanded by the hon. col. @Cal- 
lagl.linn, tlirn immerlintdy ~ n g n p d  aitli tho Prench, mcl sfter a 
sct-cre conhat dso rctivrtl, tFir lifcictli rraa ncxt in sumra~ion and 
t h c ~  1 6 0  after n gnllont stand rctircd, maltina way for tlic nino- 
~ccoiid, ivliicli mel ilie atlrancing F~enc l~  cohunn Iirst willi iis 
riglit ming t l rn~n up in line, and afles a most .rleshctive 6re and 
lleavy los9 on botli  irles the remntint o€ ~,IIB ili~$it ving retired, 
Irming n line of killed antl ~o i indcd  tliat mppcrired to have no 
int,crvnl; tho h n c h  oolumn d ~ ~ i c o d  i ~ p  to tliis lino and than 
1i:~lted. tho killed and ir-oiilidod oT I l io  niucIy.sccoud Fortriing a 
sort of mmp~rt, the left wing then olieneíl itR h+e on tlie coltiinn, 
and as I ira3 bu$ a little to  tlre right of tlie ninct,y -aecoud 1 sould 
not h e l ~  reflecing pddn11y Lew man of the wmnded oi tkeir 
nght mnp rnust Laae uns~oidsbly au&red from the Firs of their 
oomrades. The left + n ~  aftcr doing good aervice and austainin~ 
a loss quaI to h e  h s t  h e  retired.' 
COMBAT OF IEONCEYALLXS. 
B ~ b f r m  g m a l  Cok's nnd Mw&I &uZfa Oficial Rqovh, MSS: 
GmmaS Colo to b d  Wo11i~gtm 
' HagJdk fafront of Pampelmu, Jdq 27lA, 1813. 
- 'The enemy having in tlie course of the nighk turned 
f h s e  o s t ~ ,  aere now perceived moving in Te considerable 
iorce hg the Rdec lending to tho Piielio dc ~xndichnrri.  I 
therefore proceedcd in t h t  diredon and found that thcir ndvance 
hnd ncar1y r e d e d  the mad 1 e d . q  from ltonceavdlos pms to 
Los Aiduides, Fmm mliicli it jn se m t c d  by a, smeli ivvoded 
ualiq. Owinp to the difirnlw of t& cornmunications the herd 
of major-genera1 ILo~a's  bngacle coiild not amive tliere sooner; 
tlic ma'or cnwd liowovcr, with grcat dccision, nti;nclced thcm 
with ika-%kuoawick eornpnny snd thrca com mies of tho 
twentisllq ull Le Lad u m i  lo fmm; thesc aetiiu$ iosodr i l l i  
the enemy md bayonetted seperal in tlie ranks. Thcy were 
horerir Torced to eicid to suprior numbers, md to retire 
scroas the valley; t e enemy uttem )ted to follow them, bnt 
vcre repdsed with loss, the rcmninber of thc brigrtde bnving 
come up. 
Mw~Wak 6oult t o  fh Xiister of War. 
' T i ~ o k ,  26 Jüilkt, IRIR. 
'hura portea ont EgaTcmcnt BtE consid4rablea, swit A l'ltttaquo 
dn Lindow par ;le ~Enfir-ral Beiiie ou le 20"'" reglmcnt a Et6 presque 
EI6truit la aii i te d ' w e  charge k la b a p e t t e  executEe par un 
butadloil dn Gm leger, &&ion Poy, aoit B. l'nttaqlie d"8ltobi~car 
par Ie géndd ClauzeL' 
Eset~rnct fm thti c~7egondenre of tRe d a b  ofDalm*atiis &LA 
f 7 ~  Mimi8tm $ War. 
Ascain, 12 A&, 1R13. 
'Dka h présent V E. voit Ia situation de l'armée, elIe connait 
se8 foroe~, celles de l'ennemi, c t  elle fie hit BMS cloute ime iclL:e 
de #ea prnj~ts, e t  d'nvnncr rllr peiit nppr6rF~r e qu'il rst en notre 
pou~oir  dc fnirc; je ne r l i n ry~  poiiit lc ~iiliI{:~in, jc dia iiin liciic8t: 
mns dl!toiir, et j'livouo I riiricmi eniploic t o u ~  scs mo~cirs,  
.mi que pmixililenieul St*Y:rr, ocur <pie iiuus pourroiis sii re 
moment opposcr Etnut Ir: beaucoup infcricurs, noiis nc ourrons y cmpecher $ilils ne firsr beaucoiip de mal. Aran dfvoir rst 
e le cIiw k . R. guoiqiie ji: ticnne une ntitre Inngqe aiix 
tmupcs et augivs, ct que d';illcurs j c  ne n&$igo aucun moyen 
your r e r n p h  e mon micux 1 i ~  tache qui m'etit ruips6e.' 
No. XPIIL 
wls Appontiix 1s referred to ab page 184 ir No. XiXJ 
Rq& of the m w d g  of t h  a- ofAra.qm d&g tiie- 
J;Jm d q , t  nf Srplembw, 1813. 
' Le 12cme toate Tnrmh d ' h p n  se dnnit B Jhlino di1 %y J 
une ywtia ds celle de Critdo~me t la garniaon de Barceloune se 
plncent h droite i~ Olleeisa et Martarel, pourpartii. bus ensembles, 
a 8 heures du ~ o i r  et se portcr la dmite par S u  Sndurni, le reste 
par la pande: ronte d'Ordn1 mr Pilla Frnncn, oii l'nmlc: Anghise 
6tnit mmssembl6. Gdn6rnl Hnrivc rencontre ia onzc heum duaoir 
ime forte avznt-gariie xu Cul d'0rdal d a m  les a w ' s t ~  retramI6e- 
m m .  Un comliat des pliia a s  s'enjpgea aouR les ordrm dn 
g6nBral de l'avsnt-garde Alesclop. Le 7"m' et ri.4Pn'" re "' mon- 
frcrcnt une hnute mleor, ninai qii'une pa~tie  d'llBme- %s posi- 
tiona sont priscs ct  reprises, et  nous rwtent enfin, murerts de 
mort~ et de blees8s Andnis. Dana ln parsuite 1: 4PmC ~ D I I R R R T ~ S  
ae anissirent des 4 pii?ces de cannon Aughis, &c. nmc troia ou 
naire cents pririsonniera, msquo tous de la 27"'"" re#" Anglais .  % d d t e  qant rcncontr6 zes olistadea et que1 ues tmupeo m e -  
mi9 t i  comhttra dnne ictl pRRsncc:Cq, ~ 8 t ;  xetnriio [ an8 l a  marche, et 
l 
S 
nhrriva pns aveo Ic jour tau rcndcnons entre Z'Ongat et &hada, 
Uri bataillon de Ik7""'" vmant S gancho, par Bojns sur Avionct, 
rejoint Iiarm6e en osition, avec des prisoriniers. 
' J;p  rnarcchnl {nchet rlirects un movement de cawrlerie et  
d$rtillerie iii tenxient la Gte ponr donner le t o m s  h l'infanteris 
d n i  Los Anglais 6tnient en hatnillo m r  t r h d i p c s  
en amnt do ViUa Frnnca, ils comrncncerent amsitbt Icar retrnito 
en Iion ordre. On les poiiiziuivireiit e t  QII Isa liarcelerent, la 
ca~derie fit pIosieurs chilrges atiaez vives. IZs opposerent de la 
rcsistance, essuycrcnt des pertca, enrtout en crrvalerie, precipi- 
tcrcnt Icirr rnnrrlie, hruiercnt un pont ct s'éloigiiercnt vers Arbos 
et Vcndrils, Iaissant plu3 que 150 h m m e s  pris o t  beauwi~p de 
morh et de lilessGs, siirlniit des lioussards- deUrunswick. BVtra 
avant m.nrrle Ta cc soir B Vendrils et plusieurs centaines de de- 
serteurs sonb rmasse's.' 
mn OF VOL. V. 




